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Abstract
This thesis examines the impact of the 1970s oil booms on Venezuelan private 
manufacturing within the framework of the Dutch disease and ‘resource curse’ 
theses. However, as some of the assumptions implicit in the Dutch disease model 
do not hold for Venezuela, other factors and theories were brought into the 
picture. Attention was drawn to the implications of the existence of 
unemployment before the boom. Our major hypothesis is that, assuming the 
existence of unemployment, the role of government policies, especially industrial, 
export promotion and technology policies, are bound to play an important role in 
shaping the final outcome of a boom.
In researching these issues, a Dutch disease index and an econometric model were 
estimated. A cointegration and error-correction methodology was chosen to test 
for the predictions of the standard Dutch disease model. We not only identified 
the existence of Dutch disease symptoms in Venezuela during 1973-82, but also 
established whether the transmission mechanisms predicted by the theoretical 
model operated during these years in Venezuela. The thesis has also involved the 
compilation of a 30-to-40 year data set of national accounts and trade figures, as 
well as detailed variables for 18 manufacturing lines.
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Introduction
This dissertation assesses the effects and policy implications of the 1970’s 
oil booms on Venezuelan industrialisation. The Dutch disease theory and 
the so-called ‘resource curse thesis’, provide the theoretical framework of 
the dissertation.
The term Dutch Disease, which appears in the economic literature in the 
1960’s, refers to the corrosive impact on the Dutch economy brought about 
by the natural gas discoveries of that time, basically after the real exchange 
rate appreciation.1 Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the origin 
of this phenomenon is not exclusively related to the emergence of extractive 
sectors or higher commodity prices.2 On the contrary, it is rather linked to 
sectoral booms of a different nature, which are bound to exert undesirable
3 • •general equilibrium consequences on other sectors. Dutch disease is 
defined as the structural (composition of output and employment) 
adjustment experienced by economies because of the wealth increase 
following a boom. Within the core model presented by Corden and Neary 
(1982) and Corden (1984), the expected effect of an oil boom on the 
economic structure is a reallocation of resources in favour of the booming 
and non-tradable sectors.
The first reference to this term is found in the article "the Dutch disease" in The Economist, 26 November 1977, p. 82-83, 
(Corden, 1984).
It has been argued that the adverse impact o f the boom on Dutch manufacturing was due to the increase in government 
expenditure e.g. social contributions financed by the high revenues from natural gas, (see Frijns, 1986). Other scholars have 
claimed that Dutch de-industrialisation is better explained by the collapse o f the post-war industrial pattern o f  developed 
economies, (Fajnzylber, 1981).
Corden and Neary (1982) recognise the existence o f  different sources o f  a boom, namely (a) neutral or non-neutral 
technological improvement, which involves the displacement o f  traditional sectors for more dynamic and productive 
sectors, (b) an external transfer o f  foreign capital in the energy sector, (c) an increase in the world prices and (d) a windfall 
discovery o f  new resources or an increase in the world prices o f  a resource.
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More recently Auty (1990) presented the so-called resource curse thesis 
according to which those economies with a primary export sector are 
expected to under-performed those which lack a resource-based sector due 
to the lack of macroeconomic discipline and the delay in the adoption of 
outward and more liberal policies.
It must be stressed that the Dutch disease model is used as a tool to examine 
the topic, albeit, as the model showed limitations to explain the reality due 
to its unrealistic assumptions, other theories and factors were brought into 
picture. Attention is drawn to the essential role played by government 
policies in the outcome of a boom as there is unemployment and as 
revenues accrue to the State. Under these conditions, there is room for the 
State to encourage the traded sector and set the foundations for a long-term 
path of growth. Hence, the exchange rate, fiscal, investment, and industrial 
policies are examined in detail. The factor intensity character of the 
different manufacturing lines is also examined.
This thesis is the first research of this kind that comprehensively assesses 
the topic within the Venezuelan context. It provides empirical estimates of 
the sources and transmission mechanisms of Dutch disease in Venezuela 
during 1973-82. The pre-boom (1960-72) and the post-boom (1983-94) 
phases are also considered as a fruitful counterfactual exercise. The thesis 
also examines in detail the policy response to the boom namely, fiscal, 
financing, investment, credit and exchange rate policies with special 
reference to private manufacturing as a whole and at a dissaggregated way 
during 1973-82. In this way, insights are also derived on the impact of 
these policies in the context of the adjustment policies launched in the 
1990s.
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Manufacturing development during 1973-82 the pre-boom and the post­
boom phases are examined and the sources of growth on the demand and 
supply side for the sector is also made for manufacturing as a whole and at 
a dissaggregated level (18 subsectors). The development o f manufacturing 
is linked to the industrial and economic policies.
This thesis is an attempt to give insights on some structural features o f the 
Venezuelan economy and especially on industrialisation and its links to the 
existence of an important oil sector. It is our purpose also to contribute to a 
better conceptual and empirical understanding of the Dutch disease and 
‘resource curse thesis’, and their limitations to explain the reality of 
developing countries. Indeed, we consider that this thesis would have 
achieved its objective if it could shed some light on the factors behind the 
development o f private manufacturing and on the adequate policies for 
reversing Dutch disease in particular in the sense of promoting 
industrialisation and a non-oil export-competitive sector.
In assessing the above issues, the thesis compiles a long economic data set, 
which covers the 1968-94 years and includes the main macroeconomic 
variables, national accounts, exports and imports. A long-term series of 
different real exchange rate indices was constructed. A detail set of 
variables for Venezuelan private manufacturing was also compiled, which 
implied additional elaboration by combining data at current prices from the 
industrial survey and deflators from the Central Bank of Venezuela and 
doing some projections to complete the series. This implied a careful effort 
by interviewing personnel from both institutions in order to guarantee 
consistency. This also implied a double check work of data with those 
provided by UNIDO. It must be noted that to our knowledge this set o f data 
on manufacturing is not available elsewhere.
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The major hypothesis is that the performance of the Venezuelan economy 
and especially Venezuelan industrialisation did not follow a typical Dutch 
disease process during the 1970’s oil prices increases. By contrast it is 
argued that the major reasons behind the performance o f Venezuelan 
manufacturing during 1973-82 relate to the economic policies launched and 
especially to the lack of a coherent industrial policy which could have 
promoted the development of an export-competitive manufacturing sector 
and deepened import-substitution industrialisation, laying the foundations 
for a more sustainable development.
Cointegration and error-correction techniques were used to test for the 
existence of the equilibrium relationships implied by the Dutch disease 
theory. A contribution of this dissertation is the testing of the Dutch disease 
model in Venezuela by applying this new econometric approach. Previous 
econometric work on Dutch disease in both developed and developing 
countries are scanty and the non-consideration o f  the time series properties 
o f  data is likely to have conducted to misleading results. To our 
knowledge, there is not other similar work for Venezuela.
It must be noted that Venezuela represents a fertile ground to study these 
issues. It has been an oil-exporting country since the 1920s and it embarked 
on an import substitution industrialisation strategy in the 1950s. In special, 
the links between oil activities and windfalls and industrialisation can be 
clearly observed. Over the 1973-82, a huge stream of oil revenues accrued 
to the Venezuelan State with oil revenues representing at times near to 40 
per cent of GDP. Part o f this extra income was used in a resource-based 
industrialisation and import substitution. Nevertheless, the economy went 
into a deep crisis by 1978 and even the second oil price increase did not
18
revive investment. Thus the extra oil income represented a lost opportunity 
to encourage sustainable growth and since 1983, the economy is in a severe 
crisis.
In organising the theoretical framework we proceeded as follows: In stage 
one, a survey of the different approaches to the problem of the impact o f a 
mineral development on the rest of the economy is made with special 
reference to the Dutch disease theory and resource curse thesis. The Dutch 
disease model assumes that there is no government intervention, so an 
economy following a sectoral boom is bound to experience a structural 
adjustment in favour of the non-traded sectors of the economy prompted by 
the movement of the relative prices. The ‘resource curse’ thesis formulated 
by Auty (1990, 1993) is concerned with the impact o f a primary export 
sector on the rest of the economy and this does not necessarily refer to a 
sudden boom. This thesis argues that those economies with an important 
primary export sector are expected to perform those economies, which lack 
this kind of sector. Furthermore, the problems of industrialisation in the 
first type of economies are associated with the disruptive impact o f a 
primary sector, which is supposed to cause real appreciation of the domestic 
currency, the lack of macro discipline and the adoption of import 
substitution policies, which according to Auty is a wrong strategy.
In stage two some criticisms to the Dutch disease model and the resource 
curse thesis are highlighted. Concerning the Dutch disease model the 
following aspects are emphasised: (a) the existence of unemployment at the 
beginning of the boom may spare the traded sector from the corrosive 
impact o f the boom; (b) the factor intensity of the manufacturing lines may 
also be relevant in examining the impact of a sectoral boom on the different 
lines; (c) in explaining manufacturing development during a boom more
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important than exchange rate policies may be the lack of a coherent 
industrial policy that considers the need to combine import substitution and 
export promotion. O f course, the setting of a competitive exchange rate 
seems to be a requirement, but this must be only one aspect o f sound 
economic policies.
Chapter 2 provides a background to the Venezuelan economy and examines 
the impact o f the 1970s oil booms on the real exchange rate by presenting 
the mechanisms of transmission of the boom to the non-oil economy -fiscal 
and monetary policies and estimating a set of different indices of the real 
exchange rate for Venezuela. The aim of the chapter is to establish whether 
the Dutch disease hypothesis according to which a boom is bound to cause 
real appreciation of the exchange rate holds for the Venezuelan case during 
1973-82.
Chapter 3 assesses the effects of the 1970s oil booms on growth and 
structural change in the Venezuelan non-oil economy. The purpose o f this 
chapter is to provide stylised facts on the macroeconomic and sectoral 
developments during the oil boom period of 1973-82, the pre-boom phase 
(1968-72), and the post-boom phase (1983-91). Formal estimations to 
identify the existence of Dutch disease in Venezuela are presented by 
computing the Dutch disease index provided by Gelb and Associates 
(1988), and a Dutch disease index based on the Syrquin (1989) norms. The 
Dutch disease mechanisms predicted by the standard model are also tested 
by examining the development that occurred in the sectoral relative prices 
and sectoral private investment and, by estimating a Dutch disease 
econometric model for the major sectors of the non-oil economy which 
implied the use of cointegration and error-correction techniques. To my 
knowledge, there is not previous work of this kind for Venezuela.
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Chapter 4 presents a detailed analysis o f the policy response to the 1970s oil 
prices increases with special reference to Venezuelan private 
manufacturing. Fiscal, investment, financing and exchange rate policies 
were considered by reference to Venezuelan private manufacturing. In 
addition to the stylised facts, econometric estimates were applied to 
quantify the impact of some of these policies on dissaggregated private 
manufacturing. This econometric work represents a major contribution of 
this dissertation because this can shed light not only on the impact of 
macroeconomic policies on manufacturing lines during a boom, but on the 
effectiveness adjustment programmes which have been encouraged by the 
‘Washington concensus’ for Venezuela even today. It must be noted that 
cointegration techniques were applied to find out the determinants of 
private manufacturing investment.
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of the previous policies on Venezuelan 
industrialisation during 1973-82. The first section gives a background on 
Venezuelan manufacturing and the industrial policies applied during 1950- 
72 since the previous chapters suggest that the outcome of the 1970s oil 
boom was largely related to the reinforcement of the policies launched in 
the previous decades. Next, a detailed assessment o f the development of 
Venezuelan private manufacturing during 1973-82 is provided against the 
background of the previous policies.
Chapter 6 presents the estimates of the sources o f growth on the demand 
and supply side for Venezuelan private manufacturing as a whole during 
1968-94. It must be noted that the estimates o f TFPG for private 
manufacturing during 1968-88, represents another contribution o f this 
dissertation because to our knowledge there is no previous attempt to
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provide these estimates. The major purpose of this chapter was to elucidate 
the factors behind the trends examined in the previous chapters.
Chapter 7 deals with the impact of the boom on disaggregated 
manufacturing. A factor intensity framework was used to establish whether 
the differences across the manufacturing branches were accounted by the 
factor intensities. The sources of growth on the demand side were also 
estimated for 18 manufacturing lines. Moreover, the development in labour 
productivity by lines was also examined.
Finally, the major findings of this dissertation are summarised in chapter 8 
along with some policy recommendations on the choices open to a primary- 
based developing economy, not only during a sectoral boom but also in the 
long run.
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1. Industrialisation in Resource Rich Economies
Introduction
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis, which is 
concerned with the effects of the 1970s oil price increases on the 
Venezuelan industrialisation process. The Dutch disease and the ‘resource 
curse’ thesis are discussed exhaustively. Section 1 describes some early 
developments on the issue represented by the relationship between a 
primary sector and development. Section 2 presents the Dutch disease 
model. Section 3 examines the ‘resource curse thesis’. Next, some 
criticisms of these two theories with reference to their applicability to 
developing countries are raised in section 4. Finally, some further insights 
are summarised in section 5.
1.1 On the Existence of an intrinsic negative relationship between a 
primary export sector and development
1.1.1 Early discussion
Attempts to formulate a general theory explaining the relationship between 
primary export and development have been extensive.1 Notwithstanding, 
controversy remains. One important issue of this discussion is concerned 
with the disruptive impact of a primary export sector on the rest of the 
economy and especially mining. These activities have been perceived as
1The staple theory in the 1950s represented an early approach to this issue. It was advanced by Harold Innes. For a survey 
o f  the literature dealing with the interaction between external trade and development, see Thobum (1977, Chapter 3). This 
author analyses the impact o f  the tin mining, rubber and palm oil industries on the Malaysian economy within the 
theoretical context o f  linkage theory. For a complete survey on the literature dealing with the links between growth and 
primary sectors, see Davis (1995). Section (1.1.1) o f this thesis partly relies on Davis.
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disruptive to development in developing economies (Lewis, 1984, 1989). 
In this sense these ideas set the background for the emergence o f the Dutch 
disease and the so-called resource curse thesis.
The arguments that mineral sectors represent an obstacle to development 
find their origin in the work of Raul Prebisch, the founder o f the old 
structuralism in Latin America represented by ECLA. From the 1930s 
Prebish studied the trends in the terms of trade o f primary exports 
concluding that there seems to be a long-term deterioration in the terms of 
trade of primary exports. Thus, he criticised the neo-classical theory of 
trade based on comparative advantage, arguing against primary export 
development and that it was imperative to adopt a state-led strategy to 
encourage industrialisation as the main route to development. This is the 
major argument o f the so-called structuralist school in Latin America. 
Mineral activities became a disruptive and undesirable activity. This line of 
thought was reinforced by the recommendations of the UNCTAD in the 
1960s which advised countries to adopt import substitution industrialisation 
(ISI) and evaluated mineral activities as negative.
The instability and vulnerability of economies to swings in mineral prices 
was another argument against these activities as recorded by the 1974 
United Nations call for a New International Economic Order.
Mineral development was also heavily criticised by the dependency school 
and Marxist economists. Within this stance, mineral activities were 
perceived as disruptive as a result of being dominated by foreign capital. 
This worked against the developing economies, as the interests o f foreign
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investors would involve the extraction and overseas transfer of maximum 
profits, perpetuating the conditions of dependency and the exploitation and 
impoverishment of the periphery. These activities were singled out as 
enclaves with no contribution to development (Baran, 1957; Frank, 1966).
Likewise, the linkage theory firstly formulated by Hirschman (1958), shows 
that the lack of forward and backward linkages in the mineral activities can 
imply a weak contribution to development. Hirschman (1981) pointed out 
the existence of fiscal and consumption linkages between resource-based 
activities and the rest of the economy. It should be noted that authors such 
as Furtado (1971) and Sunkel (1967, 1972), adherents to the old 
structuralism in Latin America, emphasised the negative role of oil on 
development due to the lack of linkages between the oil industry and the 
rest of the economy as well as the unproductive use o f oil revenues. A 
similar analysis is found in Harris (1971) for the Venezuelan case.
1.1.2 Criticism of the bias against mining
Some of the criticisms of mining activities were questioned and proved to 
be mistaken in the light o f further studies. For instance, Prebisch’s 
prediction on the decline of the terms of trade of primary exports has been 
questioned. There was an upward trend in these prices following the 
publication of Prebisch’s work (Gillis et al., 1992, p. 426-428). Davis 
(1995, p. 1767) states that:
Prebisch witnessed an ‘unlucky country’ effect in Latin America. This was to lead to a rather 
disastrous 30-year foray into forced industrialisation by many Latin mineral exporters.
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It seems that Davis’ vision is at the other extreme, and mineral development 
appears as the only possible and feasible export activity for Latin America.
1 argue that his evaluation of the industrialisation process in Latin America 
as disastrous is unfair and indicates a bias against manufacturing. As an 
ample set o f studies have shown2, there have been respectable cases of 
industrial effort in Latin America, notably Brazil, Mexico and Colombia. 
In addition, the existence of a mineral sector has often exerted a positive 
effect on manufacturing through the linkages, by encouraging the 
development o f mineral-related industries. The establishment o f export 
resource-based industrialisation has been perceived as an extension of the 
‘curse’ related to the existence of a mineral sector by Auty (1991). 
Nevertheless, when we think about a country like Venezuela it is difficult to 
see why the immediate effort to develop export industries should not 
consider the resource-based branches, some of which are linked to the oil 
sector, e.g. chemicals.
However, Davis’ criticism of those scholars who advocate a bias against 
mining seems to be fair. They ignore the early contribution to economic 
development made by mining activities in some developing countries.
The positive role o f mineral activities in the Chilean economy is highlighted 
by O ’Brien (1994), who argues that mining exerted a positive impact on 
development by establishing the first railways and the modernisation of 
agriculture via direct investment linkages. Likewise, the investment of 
local mining groups led to urban development and the encouragement of 
other activities like banking and the production of guano. There is also
2 See Helleiner (1994,1995).
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evidence that the negative impact of mineral activities associated with price 
instability has been overemphasised. In the case of Chile, mining revenues 
seem to have contributed to the stabilisation of the economy during the debt 
crisis following the 1982 crash. Concerning the lack o f linkages between 
mining and the rest o f the economy, Davis points out that over the post-war 
period, and for a sample of countries, mining became integrated with the 
domestic economy, with output, income and employment multipliers 
ranging between 1.5 and 2.5 (enclaves should have a multiplier of 1).
The contribution of mining activities to development through fiscal linkages 
has been recognised since the 1960s. By 1972 it seemed that the bias 
against mineral activities was giving way to a recognition of the positive 
role o f these activities in development, which took place against the 
background of rising mineral prices. Nevertheless, a new literature, which 
emphasised the negative impact of mineral sectors, appeared.
1.1.3 Rising mineral prices during the 1970s and the renewed criticism 
of mineral activities
The oil price increase of the 1970s, led to the appearance of a voluminous 
literature concerned with the use of the oil windfall and the concomitant 
structural effect. The effect of oil exports was singled out as a curse by 
Amuzegar (1982) since this entailed the dependence of the population on 
the state.
In a cross-country study of this period, Nankany (1979) also concluded that 
the impact of a primary sector on economic development was negative.
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Gelb (1986, 1988), working within a neo-classical framework, has argued 
that the impact o f oil exports on the non-oil economy was negative for a 
sample of countries during the 1970s.
1.2 The Dutch disease theory
As observed earlier, Dutch disease is the most recent effort to deal with the 
impact of a resource boom on the rest of the economy. However, this 
approach shares with the previous literature the emphasis on the existence 
of an intrinsic and inevitable negative relationship between the primary 
exports sector (booming sector) and the rest o f the economy (Gregory, 
1976; Corden, 1984; Snape, 1976). Corden (1983, p. 442) states that
‘the Dutch disease is not primarily to do with the manner in which such gains are spent but rather 
with the general equilibrium consequences -the effects on sectoral outputs and factoral incomes.’
The great attention given to the Dutch disease issue by scholars of many 
countries might be linked to the perception that it is a generalised 
phenomenon throughout many economies: developed and developing. 
Outstanding examples of energy exporting countries in the first group are 
the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the 
harmful general equilibrium effects on the tradable sector induced by export 
booms seem to comprise many other cases. For instance, the process of 
technological change in Japanese manufacturing during the 1960s gave rise 
to adverse effects on some tradable sectors. It should be noted that an 
interesting discussion of the impact of export booms on the economy took 
place among Australian academics. In fact, Caimes (1859)3 studied the 
impact on Australian industry of the discovery of gold in 1851. Later, 
Meade and Russell (1953) appraised the effects of an increase in the 
external demand for Australia's food exports upon the domestic balance of
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payments and factor distribution. The two sector (food exports and 
manufacturing) model introduced by these authors suggests the adverse 
effect o f an increase in food exports on manufacturing. This episode has 
also been approached from an historical perspective by Maddock and 
McLean (1982).4 This topic has received great attention from many 
Australian economists owing to the mining development that occurred in 
the mid-1960s. An influential paper on this issue was provided by Gregory 
(1976). The main argument advanced is that the negative impact on import- 
competing manufacturing of the increase in mineral exports is similar to 
that arising from a significant reduction in tariffs. Another major 
contribution relates to Snape (1977), who first presented a model based on 
the traded/non-traded goods dichotomy with a Ricardo-Viner factor 
specification; also Porter (1978) studied the effects of the mineral sector on 
the Australian economy.
McKinnon (1976) analysed the adjustment problems faced by oil 
economies (Venezuela and Kuwait) which benefit from a considerable real 
international transfer.5 The discussion of the Dutch disease topic in the 
Norwegian case has also been extensive (Eide, 1971; Bjerkholt et al 1981; 
Enders-Herberg, 1983; Oystein, 1983; and Hodne, 1983). Likewise, a 
discussion with reference to Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and the 
United Kingdom is found in Barker and Brailovsky (1981). Forsyth and 
Kay (1981) studied the effects of oil on the British economy.
Corden and Neary (1982) focus on the real impact of a boom on 
industrialisation. The core model o f Dutch disease based on the standard
3
A summary is in Bordo (1975).
4
The case o f  Spain during the 16th century owing to the discoveries o f gold in America is refered to as another example o f  
Dutch disease symptoms (Forsyth & Nicholar, 1983).
It should be noted that the spending effect o f  the Dutch disease model is equivalent to the receipt o f  an international 
transfer. This issue was approached by Keynes, Ohlin and others in the 1920s, regarding payments in favour o f  other
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three-sector model o f Jones (1971), with full labour mobility and capital 
specificity among all the sectors, is presented. Furthermore, some exercises 
of comparative statics are made under different assumptions concerning 
factor mobility and factor intensities of the sectors. Neary (1982) and Van 
Wijnbergen (1986) assess the real and monetary implications of Dutch 
disease. The main contributions in the field of monetary aspects o f Dutch 
disease are due to Neary (1982), Neary and Purvis (1983), Winjbergen 
(1984a, 1984b, 1985) and Harberger (1983). A survey of the Dutch disease 
literature is found in Corden (1984).
Concerning Dutch disease in developing countries, relevant cases are 
represented by OPEC member countries and some Latin American 
countries, e.g. Colombia. Typical Dutch disease symptoms seem to appear 
in resource-poor countries as a result of the receipt of considerable capital 
inflows (e.g. an increase in their external borrowing, or foreign aid). In 
fact, Egypt6 and Bangladesh may be said to have experienced Dutch disease 
owing to foreign aid; and the effects of foreign borrowing and external debt 
on the Chilean economy during the late 1970s are perceived as constituting 
a case of Dutch disease by Hojman (1987).
It should be underlined that the implications of primary exports on the Latin 
American economies have been assessed by many scholars from the 1930s 
onwards. A major discussion took place in Venezuela on the impact o f oil 
exploitation from the beginning of this century (Mayobre, 1946; Peltzer, 
1955; Harris, 1971; Aranda, 1977, Flichman, Hagerdoom and Stroom, 
1981; Hein, 1981; Mommer and Baptista, 1985, 1991). This discussion 
focused mainly on the distributional issue between the state and foreign 
capital as well as on the problems of ‘rentier states’. Almost all o f these
countries that were imposed on Germany in the aftermath o f  WWI. For a study o f  the so-called transfer problem according 
to the Swan-Salter model, see Dombusch (1980) and Krauss (1979).
6
The case o f  Egypt is appraised by De Macedo (1982).
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scholars emphasised the negative relationship between the oil sector and 
economic growth. After the primary export booms of the 1970s, studies 
from the Dutch disease perspective with special reference to developing 
countries have been increasing (Nankani, 1979; Roemer, 1985; Hojman, 
1987, Gelb, 1988; Urrutia and Yukawa, 1988; Benjamin, et al 1989; Auty, 
1993). The Nigerian and the Indonesian cases are assessed by Pinto (1987). 
Sothersten (1991) analyses the monetary effects of the oil boom in Nigeria. 
The impact o f the coffee boom in Colombia is examined by Edwards 
(1984) and Kamas (1989). An interesting analysis of the effects on 
agriculture o f the oil boom is found in Sherr (1989) who focuses on the 
cases of Indonesia, Mexico and Nigeria, showing how the policies adopted 
during the boom induced different responses. An analysis of the interaction 
between primary exports and development in Latin America from the Dutch 
disease perspective was made by Hojman (1987). This author emphasises 
the adverse long-term general equilibrium effects o f higher commodity 
prices on manufacturing. This negative impact of primary export booms 
would prevail under different sets of economic strategies. In fact, from his 
point o f view the de-industrialisation faced by the Chilean economy in the 
late 1970s is attributed to the large external borrowing. However others 
have argued that de-industrialisation in Chile seems to have been the result 
of the radical trade liberalisation policies imposed by the authoritarian
n
government during the 1970s
1.2.1 Core model by Corden and Neary, and Van Wijnbergen
Within the Dutch disease model the impact of a resource boom on the 
economy can be portrayed as follows: the greater income leads to a higher 
demand for both traded and non-traded goods. However, equilibrium in the 
traded goods market is achieved by an increase in imports, while in the non­
7
For an extensive study o f  neo-liberal policies in Chile during the 1970, s see Foxley (1983).
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traded goods market the demand expansion requires a rise in prices. It 
might be brought about by either nominal appreciation or inflation giving 
rise to an appreciation of the real exchange rate (defined as the ratio of the 
price of non-traded goods to the price of traded goods). This, in turn, will 
be reflected in a lack of international competitiveness, profitability and 
output of the non-booming tradable sector. This is the so-called spending 
effect. Further, the non-booming sector receives the adverse impact of the 
draw of productive factors from the rest of the economy into the booming 
sector, or resource movement. Thus, if manufacturing is the lagging sector, 
de-industrialisation appears as a major outcome of the boom and a squeeze 
of absolute profitability in manufacturing is bound to happen as well. 
Although the final effect of the boom might vary according to the different 
assumptions with regard to factor intensities and factor mobility o f the 
sectors, de-industrialisation is a certain effect when the spending effect 
prevails.
What follows here will refer to the basic general equilibrium models used to
o
analyse the effects of a resource boom. As the main studies of the effects 
o f mineral development on the economy, these models hinge on the Swan 
(1955) and Salter (1959) models,9 as well as on those presented by Jones 
(1971) and Snapes (1977).
1.2.1.1 General assumptions
a) The framework adopted is one of a small open economy in which three 
sectors can be distinguished: the booming export sector (B); the other 
tradable goods or lagging sectors (L) which includes the manufacturing
g
The model introduced in this section is a summary o f  those presented by Corden and Neary (1982), Neary (1982) and
Neary and Van Wijnbergen (1986).
9
These models analyse the problems o f  internal and external balance, distinguishing between a traded (unsheltered) and a 
non-traded (sheltered) sector.
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sector and agriculture export; and, the non-tradable sector (Nt) which 
includes services and activities which are not subject to international trade. 
Hence, exportables and importables are aggregated into a sector following 
Hicks' theorem, which states that different commodities can be regarded as 
a single good provided that their relative price is constant.10
b) The prices o f both traded goods are exogenously given by world prices. 
Consequently, the law of one price holds.11
c) Perfect demand substitution between home-produced importable goods 
and imports is postulated.
d) The Ricardo-Viner specification is assumed. Hence, there are two 
productive factors used by each sector, whose supply is fixed in the 
economy: labour and capital. The latter is regarded as specific to each 
sector in the short run while full labour mobility between sectors is 
assumed. In addition, there is no international factor mobility.
e) Perfect competitiveness and flexibility in the factor and commodity 
markets are assumed. Thus real wage flexibility guarantees the existence of 
full employment at all times. The Nt prices move flexibly to equalise 
domestic supply and demand.
f) The real exchange rate is defined as the price of Nt relative to T, given
PNt
by: RP = . The price o f traded goods in domestic currency is defined
10 Hicks (1946).
This requires that the domestic price o f  tradable goods should be equal to the effective exchange rate at the international 
prices. The realism o f  this assumption for manufacturing in developing countries is doubtful, given the existence o f  market 
imperfections. Furthermore, empirical studies suggest that the law o f  one price does not hold even for developed 
economies. Isard (1977) showed that it does not apply in the cases o f  the US, Germany and Japan.
These assumptions rely on Jones (1971) and Snape (1977).
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as its international price in foreign currency multiplied by the price o f a unit 
o f foreign currency (nominal exchange rate). Thus, a variation of the real 
exchange rate can be caused either by a change in the nominal exchange 
rate, if  the nominal prices of Nt are not allow to change, or by an 
adjustment of these prices when the nominal exchange rate is fixed.
g) Manufacturing output is regarded as numeraire: wages and profits are 
measured in terms of manufacturing output.
h) Since equality between national income and national expenditure is 
assumed, the attainment of internal balance involves external balance as 
well.
1.2.1.2 The Two effects of the boom on the real side of the economy 
Pre-boom conditions
The pre-boom equilibrium in the labour market is illustrated by Fig. 1.1 
The economy's total labour endowment is represented by the horizontal 
axis,(e.g. the volume of labour employed by Nt is measured by distances 
from Ont). The vertical axis shows the wage-rate in terms of manufactures. 
Under the assumptions stated above, an inverse relationship between the 
demand for labour and the relative price o f production in each sector 
prevails. Consequently, at the initial prices, Lm, Lt and Lnt correspond to 
demand for labour in manufacturing, traded and non-traded sectors, 
respectively. The pre-boom equilibrium is attained at A, where the full 
employment condition holds. The initial price of non-traded goods depends 
on sectoral profitability, which is endogenous to the model. So, the way in
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which the initial price of a service is determined can be appreciated in Fig. 
1.2. -the Salter diagram of the productive pattern, as well as the price 
adjustment in the Nt sector.
wag*
labour
Nt
Fig 1.1 Impact of the boom on the labour market
The vertical axis shows tradable production (T), this includes both booming 
(B) and lagging (L) output, reflecting the fact that the terms of trade are 
fixed, while the horizontal axis represents non-tradable production (Nt). 
Assuming the absence of commodity or factor-market distortions, the pre­
boom equilibrium situation is reached at point a, where the curve TNt 
which represents the production possibilities curve is tangential to the 
indifference curve Io. At this point, the initial price of Nt goods or the real 
exchange rate is determined by the slope of the common tangent to both 
curves.
The Resource movement effect
This effect is concerned with the transfer of labour away from the rest o f 
the economy into the booming sector. In order to consider this effect on its
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own, an increase in demand owing to the boom is ruled out. So, the 
mechanism is as follows: assuming that the source of the boom is a 
technological improvement in B, this implies an increase in the marginal 
product of labour in this sector. Therefore, if  the assumption of constant 
wages in terms of T is maintained, a higher labour demand arises and, 
consequently, a reallocation of resources in favour o f B is bound to happen. 
This effect is composed of two parts: during a first stage, the assumption of 
a fixed relative price of Nt (real exchange rate) is embodied while later it is 
ruled out. This is reflected in the fact that the curve for the demand for 
labour corresponding to Nt in Fig 1.1 and the price relation in Fig 1.2 
remain constant.
Concerning labour market adjustment, the increasing trend in wages faced 
by B leads to an upward movement of Lt and so equilibrium moves from A 
to B (Fig 1.1). The higher wages in B at constant RER result in an outflow 
o f labour from other sectors into B. The disruptive effect on manufacturing 
represents direct de-industrialisation, since it is caused solely by the 
resource movement effect without any real appreciation.
As regards the effects on output (Fig 1.2), it can be seen that there is an 
expansion of T caused by the boom, while production of Nt remains 
unchanged. It is illustrated by the outward movement of the production 
possibilities curve from OT to O T . At a constant real exchange rate, the 
new production point is achieved at b, meaning a fall of output in Nt. The 
exclusion of the spending effect requires a zero income-elasticity of 
demand for Nt and, hence, a vertical income-consumption curve. It 
intersects T 'S at j, so it can be concluded that at a fixed RER the resource 
movement effect gives rise to an excess demand for services, which 
involves the need for real appreciation to restore equilibrium: in this way,
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the higher prices of Nt goods entailed a fall in their demand and an 
expansion of output. Fig 1.1 indicates a situation in which real appreciation 
leads to an increase in Nt output. Nonetheless, it is not enough to 
counterbalance the dampening of output entailed by the squeeze of labour 
into B. Thus, the negative effect of the resource movement effect on Nt 
output prevails. It can be seen that the draw of labour out o f the non­
tradable sector at fixed real exchange rate reinforces the phenomenon of 
excess demand caused by the spending effect. This, in turns, leads to 
further appreciation and transfer of labour from the lagging to the non­
tradable sector. This effect combined with the spending effect gives rise to 
indirect de-industrialisation by means of the movement of labour from the 
lagging sector to the non-traded ones.
The Spending or demand-side effect13
In order to analyse this effect the booming sector is regarded as an enclave 
producing for export, with few or no productive linkages with the domestic 
economy, so there is no drawing of factors from other sectors. In this way, 
the spending effect o f a mineral boom is similar to the impact derived from 
the receipt o f a real international transfer.14 The problem is as follows: the 
income derived from transfers induces a higher demand for both traded and 
non-traded goods. Hence, an increase in imports so as to match excess 
demand for T is a possible alternative. Nevertheless, the augmented 
demand for Nt cannot be met in a similar way and, hence, a real 
appreciation (increase in relative prices of Nt with regard to T prices)
Some Dutch disease models which solely analyse the spending effect are: Gregory (1976), McKinnon (1976), Forsyth 
and Kay (1980), Buiter and Purvis (1982), Corden (1981), Van Wijnbergen (1982, 1984) and Enders and Herberg (1983). 
In addition, some empirical research dealing with the impact on the Australian economy o f  mineral development has 
focused on this effect (see Dixon, Parmenter and Sutton, 1978).
14
As stated above, the effects on the economy o f international transfers has been largely discussed in the sub-field o f  
international economics.
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appears to be necessary. This is expected to entail a supply-side 
substitution effect in favour of Nt as well as a demand-side substitution
goods
O N t
Fig 1.2 Impact of the boom on the commodity market
effect in favour o f traded goods. Thus, at a given real exchange rate, the 
labour market is not affected by the boom (Fig 1.1). Looking at Fig 1.2 it 
can be seen that after the boom a vertical upward movement o f the 
production possibility curve occurs. It is represented by the displacement 
of the point o f production from a to b. Therefore, as income rises, and 
assuming that services are normal goods, at the initial real exchange rate 
there is excess demand for services. It is shown in Fig 1.2 by the movement 
of demand along an income-consumption curve (on), which intersects the 
frontier production curve at point c. Consumption at that constant exchange 
rate must lie on the price line tangential to b or point c. Consequently,
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excess demand for non-tradeable goods is the outcome again. In turn, it 
leads to real appreciation caused by higher prices of Nt relative to T. Two 
cases are possible: in the face o f a fixed nominal exchange rate, equilibrium 
must be achieved with a rise in the nominal price of Nt, while if  the price of 
Nt remains constant, a nominal appreciation is required to restore 
equilibrium.
In Fig 1.2 the new equilibrium is achieved at some point between j and c, 
implying that there is an expansion of Nt production. The real appreciation 
will be reflected in a shift of resources out of both B and L sectors into Nt, 
together with a switch in demand away from Nt into T and B.
Finally, a key point is that the impact of a boom on the output o f Nt is 
ambiguous: while the spending effect implies a positive increase in the 
output of Nt, the resource movement effect tends to diminish it. In Fig. 1.2 
the spending effects prevail, so that the new equilibrium point at g implies a 
higher output o f Nt.
By contrast, in manufacturing the results are unambiguous. In this case the 
two effects work in the same direction, lowering its output. In sum, the 
reallocation of labour from manufacturing into B due to the resource 
movement effect, dampens manufacturing output. This is the direct de­
industrialisation effect, which is due exclusively to the resource movement 
effect. This is illustrated by the reduction of employment in manufacturing 
from OtM to OtM' in Fig 1.1. In addition, manufacturing is adversely 
affected by the real appreciation derived from both effects. Firstly, the 
negative impact on the output of Nt owing to the resource movement effect 
entails an excess demand for services, and consequently, a real 
appreciation. This result together with the real appreciation prompted by 
the spending effect determines a reallocation of labour away from M to Nt;
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giving way to de-industrialisation. Once again, it is shown by the 
contraction of employment from OtM' to OM" in Fig 1.1.
1.2.1.3 The Income distribution effect15
We will consider in turn, the implications of a boom for factor prices. First 
o f all the resource movement effect leads to an unambiguous increase in 
real wages. It emerges from the required fall in Nt output resulting from the 
reallocation of resources, which means higher real wages in terms of Nt. In 
addition, the real wage should rise in relation to T (Fig 1.1). Therefore, real 
wages increase in terms of both goods. By contrast, the impact o f the 
spending effect on real wages is ambiguous. It might be that real wages rise 
in terms of traded goods but fall in terms of NT, since the price o f these 
goods are supposed to increase (real appreciation). The achievement is 
linked to both the share of Nt goods in labour consumption and the 
difference between the increase in the price of Nt and the rise of wages. It 
hinges on the employment elasticity and, hence, on the labour intensity in 
the Nt sector.16 So, a stronger spending effect relative to the supply effect 
coupled with a high share o f Nt goods in labour consumption and high 
employment elasticity are expected to lower real wages.
Instead, the two effects induce a fall in the absolute profit of the lagging 
sector and a contraction of output. However, it should be highlighted that 
when capital intensity is regarded, other results are possible. For instance, 
as L is more capital intensive than Nt, the relative profit of the former is 
less affected by the boom. Thus, if  the resource movement prevails, an 
increase in L profits relative to profits in Nt would be possible. Likewise, a 
similar result with regard to B might appear when the spending effect
15
Cassing and Warr (1983) focus on the distributional impact o f  a resource boom in the Australian case.
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dominates and L is more capital intensive than B. This would induce a 
reallocation of resources in favour of L in the medium-run, prompted by the 
relative profitability.
1.2.1.4 O ther factor specifications.
As already noted, the core Dutch disease model presented in the previous 
section can be modified, allowing for different factor specifications. Thus,
1 7a range of models have dealt with this issue. The main conclusion on 
these grounds is represented by the unexpected rise of the lagging sector. 
Nevertheless, all share a common feature: although the contraction of the 
lagging sector is not inevitable it is a possible outcome of the resource 
boom.
To illustrate the implications of different factor specifications, the model by 
Corden and Neary (1982) is presented. In this context, full labour mobility 
among the three sectors and capital mobility solely between the lagging and
1 Rthe non-tradable sectors are assumed.
The main result from this model is given by the possible expansion o f the 
lagging sector because of the resource movement effect at constant 
commodity prices.19 In fact, this is the case when the lagging sector is 
characterised by an intermediate capital intensity between the booming and
^  Mussa (1974) highlights the relevance o f  factor specificity, substitutability and intensities for the study o f  the income
distributional impact o f  tariffs.
17
Cassing and Warr (1982) present a model with full factor mobility o f both factors, namely capital and labour, among the 
three sectors. Long (1981) considers the case in which capital mobility is only possible between the two traded sectors, 
while labour is mobile among all three sectors. An attempt at applying the Dutch disease model to developing countries is 
made by Sarmientos (1988). Labour mobility only holds between the lagging and the non-traded sectors, since labour in 
the B sector has very particular features. Additionally, a low substitution o f  capital for labour in all the sectors is a realistic 
assumption. An interesting point o f  this model is the consideration o f an additional traded sector: agricultural primary 
commodities, with an intermediate capital intensity between manufacturing and services.
18
In this way, the analysis o f  the impact o f the boom on the rest o f the economy is conducted in the context o f  a
Heckscher-Ohlin Model.
19
Corden (1984) refers to this model as paradoxical because an unexpected outcome might be achieved, namely, pro­
industrialisation and devaluation o f  the real exchange rate.
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the non-tradable sectors. So, the resource movement effect involves a fall 
in the return to capital in the non-tradable sector. This leads to an outflow 
of capital from Nt into the lagging sector and hence, to an expansion of its 
output.20 An alternative outcome arises when manufacturing is regarded as 
labour intensive relative to the non-tradable sector. Under this assumption 
the resource movement effect entails an increase in the output o f non­
tradables, together with a fall in their prices and a contraction of the lagging 
sector. Thus, curiously, real devaluation is the result. Concerning the 
spending effect, it should be stressed that the fall of the lagging sector 
remains.21
1.2.4 The Monetary impact of a resource boom under flexible wages 
and prices
This section is devoted to considering the monetary aspects of a resource 
boom. Here a monetary model based on Neary (1984) and Neary and Van 
Wijnberger (1986) is summarised. As already noted, the real model o f the 
previous section implies the small country assumption regarding traded 
goods. So in what follows here it is assumed that the same assumption 
holds in the case of asset markets. This, together with the fact that market 
imperfections are ruled out, allows for perfect substitution between foreign 
and domestic bonds. Finally, domestic money represents a third asset. For 
the sake of reasoning, the discussion will begin by considering the market 
for non-traded goods illustrated by Fig 1.3. The nominal price o f non- 
traded goods (pr) is measured by the vertical axis, while the nominal 
exchange rate (e) is represented by the horizontal axis. It should be kept in 
mind that given the fact that transport costs are ruled out and world prices
20
This result emerges from the application o f  the Rybszinski theorem.
21
According to this analysis, the negative impact o f  the oil sector on the lagging sector is bound to prevail in those 
countries in which only the spending effect occurs (e.g. Venezuela).
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are fixed, the price of traded goods can be normalised to unity, e.g. PT  = e . 
Hence e is defined as the domestic currency price of a unit of foreign 
exchange. Likewise, a real balance effect on spending is introduced by the 
higher consumption resulting from lower prices and increased wealth. 
Thus, equilibrium in the Nt goods market can be expressed as follows:
pr M(1.1) X nt-——  = Cnt(pr9e,y ,— )
(e,b) P
Where:
Xnt= output o f  non-tradables
Pr= relative prices o f  not tradables to tradables
e= nominal exchange rate defined as the domestic currency price o f  one unit o f  exchange rate 
b= parameter which accounts for the resource movement effect.
M = the nominal stock o f  money
P= the domestic price level
M/P = the real money balance effect on spending
y= level o f  income
Additionally, P is assumed to depend upon on pr and e:
(1.2) P = P(pr,e)
dP/dpr and dP/de > 1
Under the assumptions that money supply is the only asset whose velocity 
is constant, the money demand function that guarantees the equilibrium 
condition for the money market is as follows:
Where Y= real income
In sum, the desired level of real money balances is a function o f real 
income, which implies that money demand is disrupted by the resource 
boom through its impact on Y.
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Fig 1.3 shows equilibrium in the money market and the non-traded goods 
market. The first one (equation 1.1) is illustrated by the curve NtNt. It is 
upward sloping, but its slope is less than that corresponding to a ray from 
the origin. The reason is that a proportional increase in pr and e, 
accompanied by a fixed money supply, might induce a fall in real money 
balances. It, in turn, would give rise to a contraction of spending and 
consequently, to an excess supply of Nt goods. It can be seen that a rise in 
the nominal price of Nt goods implies excess supply of these goods, while 
higher prices o fT  goods entail excess demand.
The clearing market equation for the money market (1.3) is shown by the 
curve MM, which is downward sloping. Hence, a rise in pr and e brings 
about a higher domestic price P, entailing an excess demand for money 
resulting in a fall in the real value of the money stock. The equilibrium 
point must be always on this curve when there is a flexible exchange rate 
regime and the clearing money market conditions hold. In this case, 
assuming a given level of money supply and full employment income, an 
increase in pr is accompanied by a fall in e.
Alternatively, a fixed exchange rate regime implies that equilibrium might 
be achieved at points above MM in the short run. In this situation, an 
excess demand for real money balances is a possibility. Consequently, 
equilibrium requires a rise in foreign exchange reserves, which leads to an 
increase in the money supply.
We will consider, in turn, the effects o f a boom. The pre-boom equilibrium 
is at point A. However, as both the resource movement and the spending 
effect induce excess demand for Nt goods, the NN schedule shows an 
upward movement towards NN'. As the augmented real income also leads 
to an increase in demand, equilibrium in the money market would require a 
fall in the price level, provided the domestic money supply is held constant.
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This third effect of a resource boom is called the liquidity effect.1 It brings 
about an inward displacement of the schedule MM to MM”. If  a floating 
exchange rate regime exists, the equilibrium is achieved at point C, where 
MM' and NN' intersect. Consequently, the adjustment is attained through a 
nominal appreciation or fall in e, which implies lower prices of T goods. 
Under a fixed nominal exchange rate regime, (eo), similar movements o f 
the MM and NN curves take place. Notwithstanding, the equilibrium point 
is attained at J, provided the nominal money supply is constant and an 
increase in the price of Nt goods occurs. Concerning the long run 
equilibrium, it can be seen that the change in relative prices of Nt goods 
does not guarantee a stable equilibrium. It is because the spending effect is 
partly neutralised by the balance of trade surplus. The point J is also 
characterised by a disequilibrium in the money market, since there is excess 
demand. Therefore, the trade surplus is expected to boost international 
reserves, and if  the inflow of reserves is not sterilised, the domestic money 
supply will increase. This will be reflected in an upward movement of the 
NN' and MM' curves, above the point J. Thus the new equilibrium will be 
attained at the point at which the two schedules intersect. This point is 
bound to occur at point C’, where the real exchange rate matches the slope 
of the ray OC.
Finally, in the case of a floating exchange rate the adjustment of the relative 
prices of Nt goods was achieved through a fall in the relative prices o f T 
goods. Instead, under a fixed exchange rate regime the necessary rise in 
relative prices o f Nt goods implies a rise of their nominal prices. This will 
cause inflationary pressures.
1 Neary (1982).
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Fig 1.3 Monetary effects of the boom
1.4 A Critical appraisal of the Dutch disease theory
Another group of authors maintain that the interaction between primary 
exports and development is not necessarily negative, depending upon 
government policy. Findlay (1983) and Davis (1995) argue that there is no 
reason to depict a primary resource boom as a disease. In Findlay’s view, 
any change in relative prices is bound to exert negative and positive effects 
on the different economic sectors. For instance, Malaysia and Thailand are 
quoted as cases that suggest a substantial contribution of primary exports to 
economic growth. Karshenas (1989) highlights the positive contribution of
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the oil sector to industrial growth in Iran via the creation of a national 
market and capital accumulation and Kauvosi (1986) also shows the 
contribution of oil export revenues to Iranian industrialisation, emphasising 
the availability of low imported inputs and capital as well as demand 
linkages. Likewise, Scherr (1989) and Southern (1991) conclude that the 
de-agriculturalisation faced by the Nigerian economy during the oil boom 
reflected the policy response (e.g. scanty public investment). Finally, 
research on Dutch disease in Cameroon by Benjamin et al. (1989) 
concludes that the policy response proved to be crucial.
Some criticism of Dutch disease theory has focused on the applicability of 
the theoretical model to developing countries. As is well-known, the Dutch 
disease model was formulated to explain the disruptive general equilibrium 
effects o f a resource boom with particular reference to a developed 
economy. Under the assumption of full-employment, de-industrialisation is 
the certain outcome of a resource boom. However, the applicability o f such 
a model to developing countries remains a controversial issue. The major 
difficulties can be summarised as follows:
(a) The full employment condition does not hold in developing economies. 
Hence, the two effects might not appear, or may be offset. Likewise, under 
the existence of unemployment the effect of the boom is bound to rely upon 
the policy response to the boom. It has been argued that even with 
unemployment, a contraction of the non-booming tradable sector may arise 
from the direct competition for some productive factors such as skilled 
labour (Sarmiento, 1988, p. 94). On these grounds, Wai (1988, p. 122) 
draws attention to the fact that the resource movement effect in developing 
countries might be driven by the transfer of capital from manufacturing to 
the non-tradable sector. Similarly, Southern (1991) alludes to the 
expansion of the informal sector in Nigeria as the result o f the oil boom of 
the 1970s.
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(b) The Dutch disease theory does not considerate technological change in 
the lagging sector. It might affect the sector’s response to changes in 
relative prices.2 Even more, it is an interesting issue given the diversity of 
technology patterns used by the different sub-sectors, which compose both 
the lagging and the non-tradable sectors in developing economies. This 
fact makes it difficult to distinguish which sector is more capital-intensive. 
For instance, the non-tradable sector might include capital intensive 
activities such as electricity and transportation as well as labour-intensive 
activities such as personal services and the informal sector. This raises 
questions about the applicability o f models based on different factor 
specifications of the traded and non-tradable sectors in developing 
countries. Likewise, it can be concluded that an accurate analysis o f the 
impact of oil on the productive structure calls for sectoral studies. This 
aspect seems to be relevant for Venezuela because of the diversity of 
production possibilities presented by agriculture and manufacturing in their 
sub-sectors.
(c) The distinction between traded and non-traded goods in developing 
countries is a controversial aspect too. It has been argued that in many 
cases the tradable sectors may behave as non-tradables owing to 
commercial policies, e.g. tariffs, import restrictions (Roemer, 1985). 
Similarly, a policy of price-controls and low producer prices might lead to 
tradable natural goods becoming non-tradable (Struthers, 1991; Cook and 
Sieper, 1984). By contrast, others scholars claim that these kinds of 
policies do not make a good non-tradable. It might only be the outcome if  
a policy of prohibition of imports was applied, leading to a process of 
market segmentation. Instead, the adoption of highly protective policies 
based upon tariffs and other instruments would cause a traded good to
2
This aspect is highlighted by Scherr (1989) in a comparative study about the impact on agriculture o f  the 1970s oil boom 
with reference to Nigeria, Indonesia and Mexico. It reveals that available technological options for agriculture played a
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behave as a pseudo-non-tradable (McKinnon, 1976; Bhagwati, 1978; 
Rofman, 1987).
(d) The assumption o f perfect substitution between domestic manufacturing 
and imports embodied in the Dutch disease model does not hold in 
developing countries. This makes it difficult to aggregate import- 
competing and exporting sectors into a tradable sector. This is a very 
relevant issue, given the assumption o f perfect substitution between 
domestic and foreign goods common to neo-classical trade theory. On 
these grounds it has been pointed out that the lagging sector might be 
composed o f exportable and importable as well as agriculture tradable 
activities. Thus, de-agriculturalisation rather than de-industrialisation may 
be the result.3 Finally, the issue of low substitution between domestic 
production and imported goods, together with the impact of protectionist 
policies, raises doubts about the applicability o f the law o f one price to 
developing countries.
(e) There is a need to differentiate between import-competing and export- 
competing sectors within manufacturing. Some of the import-competitive 
manufacturing lines may benefit from the greater home demand during a 
boom and from the real appreciation through cheaper imported capital and 
raw material goods. The negative contribution of import-substitution to 
growth may be offset by the contribution o f domestic demand.
(f) The factor intensity character of the different manufacturing lines may 
affect the outcome o f a boom too.
key role in the adjustment o f  this sector. O f course, it proved to be associated with the policy choices pursued by the 
|ovem m en ts.
This issue is brought up by Corden (1984, 1985) and Roemer (1985). This seem s to be the case o f  developing countries 
such as Nigeria and M exico during the oil boom s o f  the 1970s and Venezuela when oil activities were initiated at the 
beginning o f  this century.
(g) The ahistorical character o f this model and the non-consideration of 
political economy factors are also important. The present reality of 
developing countries is rooted in their histories. Hence, political and 
historical aspects should be taken into account in the analysis o f the impact 
of primary exports on the economy. Indeed, the impact on the real side of 
the economy of a resource boom might not be explained by market 
mechanisms. Rather, it seems to be concerned with government policies.
1.3 The ’Resource curse’ thesis
Auty (1986, 1990, 1993, 1994) among others, has been a major observer of 
the impact of the primary export sector and resource booms on the 
economy and especially on industrialisation of developing countries. This 
scholar presents the so-called ‘resource-curse’ thesis, which states that 
resource-rich countries are bound to experience poor economic 
performance in comparison to non-resource based economies. This 
disruptive impact of a primary sector on the economy is explained by the 
following factors: (a) some features of the primary export sector, such as 
the high capital intensity of the oil sector, leads to weak productive 
linkages, low income gains and the predominance of fiscal linkages; (b) the 
receipt o f substantial export revenues by the government o f a mining 
economy may produce Dutch disease symptoms; (c) the availability o f 
foreign currency makes possible the adoption of protectionism for a long 
time; (d) the lack of fiscal discipline based on over-optimistic expectations 
of the trend in the prices of minerals, and, (e) the existence of rent-seeking 
groups. Auty’s, thesis need to be discussed
1.3.1 The Debate on industrial strategies in Latin America and the 
’resource curse’ thesis during 1950-90
A full discussion of the industrial policies and import substitution 
industrialisation with special reference to Latin America and Venezuela is
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above the scope of this dissertation, which deals which the impact o f  the 
1970s oil booms on Venezuelan private manufacturing. Nevertheless, a brief 
discussion of those theories appears as necessary because the ‘resource curse 
thesis’ suggests that the failures o f industrialisation in Latin America were 
linked to the existence of an important primary sector which led to the 
overvaluation of the domestic currency and allowed for the adoption of 
interventionist import-substitution policies. The reason behind the lack of a 
non-oil export-competitive sector in Venezuela is explained by Auty (1990, 
p.78) by these factors. We agree on the fact that the structural overvaluation 
of the domestic currency seems to have been an important factor in 
explaining the process followed by the Venezuelan economy and by 
industrialisation during 1935-82. Nevertheless, in our view, the impact of the 
accrual and domestic distribution of oil revenues by the Venezuelan state did 
not only take place through the structural overvaluation of the domestic 
currency. Major mechanisms of the domestic distribution of oil revenues in 
Venezuela were as well as the real appreciation of the bolivar, the creation of 
public employment, government spending on infrastructure and the creation 
of the home and labour markets, which set the basis for ISI by the 1950s. The 
domestic distribution of oil revenues through these channels from the 1920s 
exerted an enormous impact on the social, political and economic structures, 
which gives remarkable specificity to the Venezuelan economy and 
industrialisation with regard to other Latin American countries. These are 
important political economy aspects, which falls outside the reference 
framework of the Dutch disease and resource curse theses. This is true that 
Venezuelan industrialisation shows some similarities with the region in the 
sense that both applied an import-substitution policy, but the roots of the 
problems in Venezuela and the reasons why import-substitution led to the 
absence of a non-oil export-competitive sector are specific to the Venezuelan 
society. Furthermore, it is misleading to affirm that any of the Latin 
American countries applied export-promotion policies or showed some 
export development.
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Import substitution vs outward-oriented policies 
Early discussion
Within economic development, the discussion on the more accurate strategy 
to achieve economic development and industrialisation was dominated by the 
theory of modernisation and the dependency theory until the early 1970’s. As 
far as Latin American is concerned, over the 1950’s and 1960’s two 
approaches to economic development became popular namely the so-called 
structuralism school represented by ECLAC and those advocates of the 
dependency theory in its Marxist version. While both views relied upon the 
notion of centre-peripheiy and the idea of dependency, the latest stance 
explained underdevelopment as a necessary condition for the development of 
the centre and the only possible way to overcome dependency and achieve 
development in the Third World was through a break with the capitalist 
system, which appears as impossible in the view of some scholars. So, a 
successful industrialisation was not possible within the capitalist system; with 
manufacturing remaining in the primary import substitution phase, which is 
characterised like a new modality of the dependent link between the centre 
and the periphery, favourable to the new condition in the international 
economic system. These gave way to a new international division of labour 
in the 1950’s, which favoured the production of final ensemble consumer 
goods in the periphery. This excessive focus on external factors in explaining 
the reality in the Third World led to the lack of concern with economic 
policies and to reductionism, so the internal specificity of a society were not 
considered.
Import substitution industrialisation (ECLAC’s approach)
In contrast to the dependency approach, the ECLAC approach claimed that it 
was possible to achieve capitalist development through the adoption of
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appropriate industrial and economic strategies and changes in the internal 
structure. This vision and its policy prescription imposed in Latin America 
during the 1950’s. Import substitution industrialisation (ISI) was thought like 
an appropriate industrial strategy in many Latin American economies to 
overcome the dependence on industrialised economies and the vulnerability 
to external shocks. This strategy was embodied by the thought of Prebisch, 
which subsequently became known as the ECLAC approach. Among the 
main aspects of the ISI strategy was the criticism to the traditional theory of 
foreign trade based on static comparatives, which encouraged an international 
division of labour in which the peripherical economies were prompted to 
specialise in primary products to be bought by the developed economies, 
while importing manufactured goods. Prebisch (1950) stated that this 
situation led to a deterioration in the terms of trade and extemal-sector 
disequilibrium. Factors behind this situation included the no diffusion of the 
benefits of technological progress in the developed economies, the low- 
income elasticity of primary products, the growing substitution of synthetic 
for commodities (Prebisch, 1950 and 1951). It was argued that some degree 
of protectionism had been used in the successful cases of industrialisation 
Within this line of thought, industrialisation appeared as the only adequate 
strategy for achieving development in Latin America. This pattern of 
development would contribute to ameliorate the impact o f external 
fluctuations. The industrial strategy was supposed to rely upon the local 
production of previously imported goods to satisfy the home market with the 
major instrument being a policy of protection. The state was also supposed to 
play a key role in providing infrastructure, investment, financial and 
technological policies. It must be noted that in the thought o f Prebisch (1954) 
protection should have a selective nature. For the author:
‘There two types of protection. Firstly a type of protection exists which encourages the structural 
changes required by economic development without provoking a reduction in inports below the 
volume corresponding to the capacity for external payment and without either reducing world trade or 
weakening its rate of growth. Secondly, there is the type of protection which exceeds these limit and 
adversely affects the world trade’
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ISI contributed to a rapid industrial growth during the 1950s in many Latin 
American countries including Venezuela. Nevertheless, over the 1960’s it 
was obvious that industrial process presented important flaws related to the 
excessive and indiscriminate protection given to manufacturing; the lack of 
technological dynamism, the discrimination against exports and the lack of 
attention to external markets and economies of scale. Additional problems 
were the scanty development of a capital good sector, which led to excessive 
dependence on imported capital and intermediate goods, and gave way to 
balance of payment’s disequilibriums, and the low employment generating 
capacity and the existence of few intra-linkages and the linkages with other 
activities as agriculture. Consequently, by the late 1960’s and 1970’s the 
wide spread perception of these flaws, the limitation of the domestic market 
and the need to increase foreign currency among other factors led ECLAC to 
recommend an export promotion policy.4 In this vision ISI and EP were 
seemed as compatible.
The Neo-classic critics of import substitution
The neo-classical approach which became popular during the 1980’s 
encouraged by the IMF and WB (the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ has 
blamed the inward and state interventionist nature of the industrial strategy 
launched in the region for the failure of Latin American industrialisation 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s, which is the common counterfactual in the 
studies on East Asian industrialisation within the neo-liberal and other 
stances. Under the neo-liberal view5, outward oriented policies and the 
reliance upon the free market were thought as an alternative to ISI policies 
promoted by ECLAC, which is seen as a misleading strategy. The critic to 
ISI focused on excessive protectionism, rent seeking behaviour, and the 
existence of an anti-export bias. This criticism to the ECLAC’s strand or
4
More recently it has also been pointed out by the neo structuralism that the so-called ECLAC approach or old structuralism did 
not consider appropriate short-term policies.
Among the most influential representative o f  the neo-liberal thought and critics to Structuralism and ISI are Balassa
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structuralism is though, mistaken since the later view showed concerned 
with the need to adopt selective protection and to promote exports as early 
as 1964. An attempt to shift from ISI to export promotion strategy 
occurred in some Latin American countries, notably Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico and Colombia. There is evidence that these economies were able 
to expand their exports as rapidly as any one could reasonably expect 
during the 1970s. Brazil expanded its exports of manufactured goods faster 
than any other country with the exception of South Korea over these years.6 
This evidence seems to contradict the neo-liberal argument according to 
which while Latin America followed an ISI policy with no export 
promotion, East Asian followed an outward-oriented policy, which appears 
as the major factor behind its success. The problem is not that Latin 
America could not expand not-traditional exports, but the lack of 
consistency; that is to say, the Latin American export effort was 
undermined at some point and by 1981 the conditions were not strong 
enough to absorb the impact of the reduction of capital flows from outside. 
These countries were partly disrupted by real appreciation of the domestic 
currency and inflation during the 1970s.
Indeed, it seems that if there is a country in Latin America, which did not 
adopt an export-promotion policy for the private sector at all, this was 
Venezuela. In this country there was not any significant attempt to promote 
non-oil exports in the private sector during the late 1960s or 1970s. This 
represents a striking difference between the industrial process in the region 
and Venezuela. A resource export industrial strategy based on state 
enterprises in aluminium and iron lines was promoted in Venezuela, but there 
was not any serious or co-ordinated important attempt to encourage exports in 
the private manufacturing sector in the later country. One hypothesis o f this 
dissertation is that the virtual lack of a non-oil export-competitive sector in 
Venezuela is partly related to the structural overvaluation of the domestic
(1971, 1978, 1982); Bauer (1981,1984); Krueger (1974,1978,1980; Lai (1983); Little (1982).
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currency due to the domestic distribution of oil revenues by the state during 
1935-82. Nevertheless, this is not to say that this was the only or more 
important factor behind this feature of Venezuelan industrialisation. This is 
an oversimplification common to the Dutch disease and resource curse theses. 
Institutional-historical factors as socio-political structures are bound to have 
played a key role. For instance, in Venezuela there was not a strong agrarian 
economic group linked to the export sector because the export-agriculture 
sector was dismantled at the beginning of this century. Thus the existing of 
conflicting interests between a land-lord class linked to the primary export 
sector and industrialists, which is stated as one of the factors undermining ISI 
in Latin America does not hold for Venezuela.7 The no implementation of an 
agrarian reform due to the existence of a powerful landlord group common to 
Latin America as a whole is not common to the Venezuelan case. This is 
another striking feature of Venezuelan industrialisation and the rest of Latin 
America. Likewise, it seems that unlike other Latin American countries, 
Venezuela did not experience inflation problems until the late 1980s and 
1990s, which is explained by the fact that the availability of oil revenues 
allowed for the import of goods.8
It has been pointed out that under the neo-liberal thought, there is not room 
for industrial policies since the free market is bound to guarantee the most 
efficient allocation of resources. According to this early view the role of 
industrial policies in East Asia has been marginal (Balassa, 1988). However, 
in the light o f the substantial and convincing evidence that showed the 
remarkable importance of industrial policies in the economic development of 
East Asia (Amsden, 1989; Wade 1990, and Chang 1993), the orthodox view 
modified its argument. This was forced to recognise the existence of 
extensive state intervention in East Asian larger NICs and that there was not 
an unique model. Nevertheless, they still claim that industrial policy,
6 See Helleiner (1994,1995)
7 Hirshman (1968) and Anglade and Fortin (1987).
g
For a model in which the determination o f  domestic prices in Venezuela is explained by considering the role o f  imports
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although widespread, exerted only a limited impact on productivity and 
structural change. An example of this view is the East Asian Miracle report 
by the World Bank (World Bank, 1993). This study concludes that the 
contribution of the government policies to industrial change and international 
competitiveness in East Asia was insignificant and it appears that state 
intervention was not negative because these was ‘market friendly’, that is to 
say the outcome had been the same without interventionism.
This view favours the adoption of free market-oriented policies in order to 
achieve international competitiveness and the stage of export-substitution, so 
there is no role for industrial policies. The success of East Asian 
industrialisation is explained by the adoption of free market policies in a static 
framework and of an outward oriented strategy which would explain the 
sustained growth of these economies (dynamics framework).
In response to the World Bank reading of the East Asian model, a substantial 
range of theoretical and empirical studies, has appeared whose distinctive and 
common feature is the emphasis on the central role played by the state in the 
successful East Asian models. The successful industrialisation in these 
countries appears as the result of the launching of long-term coherent and 
effective import and export promotion policies by the so-called 
‘ developmental state ’.
Likewise, it is worth noting that Weeks (1997) shows that the differences in 
economic performance between Latin America and the ‘High Performing 
Asian Economies’ (HPAEs) has not been as great as is generally believed?. 
The author concludes that (p. 2,3):
'...for virtually all the important variables, we find not statistically significance differences between the 
Latin American countries (this includes all of the Spanish-speaking continental countries of the 
Western Hemisphere and Brazil, plus Dominican Republic, eighteen in all) and the countries of East 
and Southeast Asia (HPAEs). Few of the oft-quoted 'stylised facts' prove valid: on average, 
investment rates were not higher in HPAEs for most periods; growth of exports was not significantly 
higher; and public sector expenditure did not claim a higher portion of national income than in the 
Latin American countries. These and other non-significant differences lead to inspection of what was 
statistically significant during cmcial periods: the relative burden of the external debt for die two 
regions.
financed by oil revenues see Baptista (1997).
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In light of the non-significant results, a growth model was estimated...which demonstrates that a 
measure of debt service burdens is highly significant in explaining differences in the rate of change of 
national incomes; it is shown to be of equal importance to investment rates and exports...’
In our view, Weeks (1997) provides evidence that the statement repeated by 
the World Bank (1993), the orthodoxy and non-orthodoxy, according to 
which the difference in growth rates in Latin America and the HPAEs was so 
great that an hypothesis is necessary to account for the difference is not 
correct.
The Resource curse thesis and industrial policies
The so-called ‘resource curse thesis’ clearly suggests that the problems of 
industrialisation in economies with an important primary sector relates to the 
abundance of natural resources which implies real overvaluation of the 
domestic currency and the adoption of import-substitution and misleading 
macroeconomic policies. According to this theory the devaluationist and 
more outward liberal policies appear as the answer to the problems faced by 
industrialisation in Latin America and in Venezuela.
Auty’s thesis shows various weaknesses. First, in our view, it is likely that 
the availability o f foreign currency arising from the primary export sector 
may have contributed to the delay in the adoption of export-promotion 
policies in Latin America and especially in Venezuela. However, we insist, 
the so-called Latin American NICs (Brazil, Argentina y Mexico) and 
Colombia applied export-promotion policies with relative success from the 
late 1960s. This is a misreading of reality to state that these countries did 
not follow export-promotion policies or were not able to export at all. This 
is an oversimplification of reality implicit to the resource-curse thesis and 
to the critic made by the orthodox to the ISI. The critic to the lack o f a 
non-primary export-competing sector is valid in the Venezuelan case. The 
latter country does not have a sizeable export-competing manufacturing 
sector which should be partly explained by the lack o f compulsion to
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encourage non-oil exports, and the structural overvaluation o f the domestic 
currency due to the accrual o f oil revenues. However, this is only one 
factor and to point this out as the main factor is an oversimplification o f the 
failures of Latin American and Venezuelan industrialisation. This also 
overlooks the multiplicity and complexity o f the factors involved in the 
industrialisation process. It can be argued that in the case of Venezuela, 
which has been an oil-exporting country from the 1920s, the socio-political 
and economic structures were greatly shaped by the existence of an 
important oil sector and the domestic distribution of oil revenues. For 
Baptista (1980, 1986, 1997) and Mommer (1987), the accrual and domestic 
distribution of oil revenues o f a substantial oil income by the state, which is 
not the result of the national productive effort, had notable implications for 
the development o f the economy and industrialisation. Oil revenues were a 
kind of international transfer whose domestic distribution by the state 
implied the collapse of the export-agriculture sector (coffee and cocoa) 
during the 1920s and 1930s, and the emergence o f an important state 
apparatus and of the tertiary or non-traded activities as construction and 
trade. The ‘rentier capitalism’ in Venezuela implied the non-traded sectors 
developed firstly than the productive activities as manufacturing. Indeed, 
the industrial capital was closely related to the financing, trade and 
construction capital. The disappearance of the agricultural activities by 
1930 implied that the commercial and financial groups were favoured, and 
these are the same groups that later invested in import-substitution 
activities. The commercial capital for instance continued importing input 
and capital goods under import substitution of consumer goods. This is 
true that the industrial process in Venezuela show many of the features of 
Latin American industrialisation as heavy dependency upon imported 
inputs and intermediate goods, but in the Venezuelan case these features 
were much more prominent which leads us to say that Venezuela is a 
special case in the region. Likewise, it must be stressed that it is mistaken 
to affirm that Latin American as a whole did not develop a reasonable
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degree of a capital and intermediate ISI and an export-competitive sector. 
This is the case of Venezuela, in which the availability of substantial oil 
revenues and the specific socio-political structures determined the lack of a 
non-oil export-competitive manufacturing sector and the absence of 
industrial diversification.9
The above aspects are of importance to understand the development o f 
manufacturing in Venezuela, but they fall outside the reference framework 
o f the Dutch disease and resource curse theses.
Second, Auty seems also to dismiss the early contribution of oil revenues to 
economic growth and industrialisation in Venezuela through the creation of 
the home market and the availability of cheap capital and intermediate 
goods. The author sees as negative the impact o f real appreciation on 
import substitution industrialisation, when indeed manufacturing seems to 
have benefited from this under import substitution to some extent. We 
agree with Auty on the need to launch export promotion policies, which 
requires the setting of a competitive exchange rate. However, it seems that 
the author overemphasises the role of devaluationist policies to promote 
exports, when indeed the experience of developing countries shows that the 
overcoming of the problems of industrialisation in these economies cannot 
rely on liberal and devaluationist policies on their own. Furthermore, the 
author seems to ignore the high social costs of pointing out to the reduction 
in wages as the solution to the economic problems in already impoverished 
Third World economies.
Third, the resource curse thesis fails to explain why resource-rich 
economies like Malaysia and even Indonesia have performed better than 
Venezuela and other Latin American countries in terms of industrialisation
9
A detail assessment o f  the differences between the Venezuelan and Latin American industrialisation falls outside o f  the 
scope o f  this dissertation. For a comparative study between industrialisation in Latin America and Venezuela see Purroy 
(1982) and Bitar (1983).
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and manufacturing exports. Despite the fact that Malaysia faced a primary 
export boom related to the increase in rubber prices and the beginning of 
petroleum production in the mid-1970s, this economy was able to launch 
export-promotion policies together with ISI from the 1970s. Most 
importantly, and despite the flaws of the industrial strategy, it seems that 
both resource-based industries and non-resource based export industries 
have developed from the 1970s. The Scandinavian economies are another 
example of countries endowed with natural resources, which managed to 
increase manufacturing exports. Finland and Sweden were able to use their 
comparative advantage in mining, forestry and ocean resources to foster 
technology-intensive industries like paper machinery, paper, hardrock 
drilling, etc. The oil resources in Norway were used to foster its industrial 
exports. These facts suggest that other factors, different from resource 
endowment such as social and political structures, are determining in 
explaining the industrial policies adopted.
Fourth, the empirical evidence presented by Gelb (1988) and Auty (1990) 
to claim that mineral economies have under-performed those non-mineral 
economies has been challenged in a recent study by Davis (1995), who 
concludes that mineral-rich developing economies outperformed non­
mineral economies both in growth and in development during 1971-91. 
Davis suggests that mineral export-development is a feasible strategy for 
many developing countries and that industrialisation based on an export- 
promotion strategy does not have to be the only or most feasible alternative 
open to a mineral economy. We agree with Davis on this point. A 
coherent economic strategy for an oil-based economy like Venezuela in the 
foreseeable future is the encouragement of oil exports together with those 
industries linked to the oil sector such as chemicals. Nonetheless, in our 
view, this must be accompanied by an effort to implement coherent 
industrial and agricultural policies that lead to the creation of a non-oil 
export competitive sector. Oil exports, including oil revenues, must
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guarantee the foreign currency required to stimulate non-traditional exports 
in the short and medium term. This seems to be a feasible option because 
the low level of oil prices may exclude the possible negative effect of a real 
appreciation on non-traditional exports.
Fifth, Auty’s vision shares with most of the comparative studies between East 
Asian and Latin American industrialisation the assumption that both regions 
had quite similar conditions in the 1950’s, which is mistaken. As Kholy 
(1995) states, even though in terms of per-capita income South Korea and 
Brazil for instance were comparable, the first country showed considerably 
greater dynamism in the decades previous to 1950 and by the 1950’s, the 
pattern of state-society modalities prevailing were relatively unique.
Auty, as many of the scholars who assess the problem, tends to 
overemphasise the important of the shift from ISI to EP strategies under Park- 
Chung-Hee government. Kholi (1994) argues that the common question 
posed in comparative studies of East Asian and other countries’s 
industrialisation of why was East Asia able to shift from ISI to EP in the early 
1960s is incorrect. Indeed, according to Kholy to speak of a shift from ISI to 
EPS in South Korea during the 1960’s is a mistake since in the light of 
historical studies it has begun to be acknowledged the fact that the Japanese 
imperialism contributed greatly to the creation of a kind of a developmentalist 
state which encouraged export-oriented manufacturing to some extent during 
the colonial phase. Even though, after the independence and the split of the 
country, the industrial base inherited was greatly destroyed, or diminished 
because most of manufacturing was in the north, according to Kholy some 
labour intensive industries were in South Korea and the entrepreneurship and 
the export-oriented industrial tradition remained in the region. Kholy states
(p. 1286):
‘South Korea indeed made some important policy changes under Park Chung-Hee, but 
their significance can be easily exaggerated; moreover, the state-society configuration that 
enabled these policies to success had deeper historical roots. In this sense, South Korea 
under Park Chung-Hee did not so much ‘switch’, as it fell back into the grooves o f  colonial
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origin, or more precisely chose one o f the two or three main alternatives that were available 
to it from its complex historical legacy. Revolutionary communism, a corrupt and wasteful 
autocracy o f  the Rhee type and a more US style open democracy were all possible paths 
along which South Korea could have travelled. The key elements, however, o f  the eventual 
path it adopted -a Japanese-style state-driven export economy- were deeply etched into the 
social fabric. More specifically, Korean economy, especially Southern Korean economy 
was already export-oriented, its entrepreneurs had considerable experience in selling abroad, 
and the state within the economy had learned from its own history that strong support from 
business and exports, and tight control over labour, was a route to high economic growth.’
Kholy’s argues for a bringing up the colonial past of developing countries to 
understand their different path of industrialisation. According to him the 
denial o f the dependency theory implied that the colonial past o f the 
developing economies was ignored.
The lack of industrial entrepreneurship in Latin America has been pointed out 
as partly inherited from the colonial past and the features of the colonialism.
Sixth, Auty does not seem to recognise that the differences in the 
performance of industrialisation in Latin American and East Asian 
countries may relate to the different features o f the import substitution 
policies in these regions. The problem involves not only the delay in the 
shift from one strategy to other. Auty’s assumption that the two regions 
undertook a similar ISI pattern of industrialisation during 1950-60 is not 
correct. As Anglade and Fortin (1987) and ECLAC (1987) show, there were 
striking differences in the way that import substitution policies took place in 
the two regions, which emphasises notably, those factors related to the role of 
the state, technological and human resources, institutional and income 
distribution and land reform (these aspects can not be linked to the natural 
resource endowment. The differences in the ISI strategies in the two regions 
may contribute to explain why the primary export industrial phase was 
delayed in some countries. It has been pointed out that the adoption of 
agrarian reform led to a more equal income distribution in East Asia, which in 
turn prompted a demand for labour intensive manufacturing goods during the
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1950’s.10 The shift from the primary import substitution to primary export 
substitution in the 1960’s took place once the narrowness of the local market 
set obstacle to further growth. However, a key point is that the narrowness of 
the domestic market was due to the relative saturation of the mass demand for 
non-durable and the policy response was to encourage export of those labour 
intensive manufacturing. Thus the phase of primary ISI gave way to the 
primary export substitution phase; both domestic demand and exports worked 
like source of industrial growth and allowed for the penetration of the 
European and North American markets by the low value added East Asian 
exports. The rapid shift from ISI to EPI in this region was also encouraged 
by the USA’s pressures for greater exports due to the balance of payment 
deficit which was financed by the first country. The possibility of a reduction 
in the USA aid contribute to stimulate the rapid industrial growth and to 
target external markets in South Korea and Taiwan. All of these factors 
together with the adoption of a long-term strategy and the support of the USA 
and the local capital
By contrast, the lack of agrarian reforms led to concentrated income 
distribution in Latin America during the 1950’s and 1960’s. The unequal 
income distribution caused a skewed patter of industrial growth which set 
limits to the expansion of the demand for basic consumer goods, and resulted 
in a supply pattern oriented to the satisfaction of the demand of the high 
income social strata (Anglade and Fortin, 1987; Pinto). This reinforced the 
adoption of capital intensive techniques, high import dependence upon 
imported capital and raw materials and may have set obstacles to the rip the 
benefits of scale economies, and to a more efficient growth. These were key 
factors in Latin American industrialisation during 1950-60 and 1950-70, 
respectively. In the Venezuelan case despite the fact that the distribution of 
oil revenues benefited to some extent the labour groups, the redistribution 
was unfavourable to rural workers and although at a high level it is
10 ECLA, Anglade and Fortin, Rosales Fezyngber
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recognised that a skewed income distribution was a feature of Venezuelan 
society during the 1950’s and 1960’s. The accrual of substantial oil revenues 
to the Venezuelan state at the choice of no devaluation in the 1930’s implied 
the decline of the export-oriented agriculture, so unlike other Latin American 
countries, there was not a powerful landowner class related to primary export 
activities.
It must be noted that, concerning the comparative studies on East Asia and 
Latin America, the following issue must be highlighted: common to the 
comparative studies of both the orthodoxy and the non-orthodox approach is 
the idea of sequencing in an industrialisation process. The shift from one 
strategy to another in the large Latin American countries as Mexico and 
Brazil should have taken place at the beginning of this century because these 
economies have achieved the first stage of industrialisation based in the 
market growth by this time. In this light a comparison between East Asia and 
other Latin American countries different from Brazil, Mexico and Argentina 
industrialisation would make more sense.
Finally, Auty's blanket criticism of import substitution industrialisation 
seems to validate implicitly the neo-classical idea that the adoption of 
outward-oriented policies was crucial to explaining the success o f East 
Asian model and that import substitution industrialisation policies were a 
waste of time in this region. This is far from being true since the evidence 
indicates that import substitution policies in the 1950s were a pre-requisite 
to the later export success. Likewise, as discussed above, manufacturing 
exports grew faster in Latin America during the 1970s than during the 
1980s and 1990s under outward and liberal policies. Although Auty states 
that CIP implies the granting of temporary protection, there is no 
acknowledgement o f the fact that central to the success of outward-oriented 
industrialisation was the existence of a precedent phase of extensive import 
substitution and technological improvement during which international
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competitiveness was developed. It must be stressed that in an earlier paper 
Auty (1991, p. 18) recognises that South Korean industrial strategy can be 
defined as dual, in which ISI proceeds alongside export promotion. 
However, in the paper discussed here he seems to share with the orthodox 
approach the heavy criticisms of ISI.
Within the Latin American context, more important than the rapid shift 
from ISI to EP strategies, seems to be the adoption of an adequate and 
coherent industrial strategy, which together with other economic policies 
leads to an improvement in technological change, exports and income 
distribution.11 ECLAC has often insisted on the compatibility between 
export and inward oriented strategies. This institution argues that although 
export promotion of manufacturing goods is necessary, the domestic 
market also offers possibilities to achieve industrial growth. 
ECLAC/UNIDO (1988) stresses the differences between growth based on 
the domestic market and import-substitution and the need to combine these 
strategies with export-promotion. A concern o f ECLAC is that an 
improvement in income distribution in Latin America would mean a greater 
potential for inward policies based upon the greater domestic demand. In 
addition, the scanty diversification and heavy dependence upon imports o f 
the industrial sector suggest that there is potential for further import- 
substitution. This must imply, though, a different set of policies that link 
import substitution to export-outward industrialisation.
Seven, concerning the argument of the entrenchment o f rent-seeking groups 
promoted by the adoption of protectionist policies (autarkic policies), this 
has been criticised by Fannely et al. (1988 p. 47), Fine and Stoneman 
(1994) and Cheng (1995) who argue that according to this theory, rent- 
seeking or profit-seeking is acceptable behaviour when it takes place
11 It must be noted that the shift from ISI to outward-oriented policies in the Chilean economy from the early 1970s did not 
lead to successful industrialisation. It has been recognised that following the adoption o f  neo-liberal policies, de­
industrialisation was the outcome, with manufacturing exports representing a small share o f  non-traditional exports at
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through the market but not through the state. Indeed, the case o f the 
economic groups linked to trade in developing countries under import 
substitution policies shows that there may be rent-seeking e.g. profit- 
seeking behaviour with both policies. These groups may also benefit the 
most from import substitution policies if  they manage the importation of 
capital and raw material goods, while they also may benefit the most under 
import liberalisation policies. For this reason these economic groups have 
supported the launching of neo-liberal policies which consider import 
liberalisation and devaluation as the main tools to increase exports. This 
contradicts the argument posed by different authors, both orthodox and no 
orthodox, which identifies industrialists linked to import substitution as the 
main rent-seekers.
In our view, it is mistaken to assign full responsibility to the state 
interventionism or to the import substitution strategy in the failure of the 
industrialisation process. The delay in the shift from import substitution to 
export substitution was not only or exclusively due to the state policies or 
‘rent seeking behaviour’. From the neo-classical perspective, which is 
ahistorical and ignores political economy consideration, the influence of 
different economic and political interests of the social groups on economic 
policies applied are not taken into account. This is a key point to understand 
the process o f industrialisation in developing countries.
The Role of the state and the ISI strategy in Venezuela
Against the previous background here we briefly consider the role of the state 
in Venezuelan industrialisation. In doing that it must be stressed that, being 
Venezuela a country with an important state-owned oil sector since the 
1930’s, gives specificity to the economic and industrial process.
present.
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The increase in oil exports by the beginning of this centuiy and the accrual of 
important oil revenues to the state gave it a decisive role in the Venezuelan 
economy. Thus the role of the state in the economy has been extensively 
analysed within the Venezuelan political economy. This discussion has 
changed through the history. Nevertheless, a key issue logically has been the 
use by the state of the oil revenues and what should have been the best use of 
these revenues to promote economic and social development. During the 
1920-40 years, an ideological debate took place concerning the ownership of 
oil fields. Then, two main visions could be distinguished namely, that 
represented by the interest of land-ownership, which claimed that the oil 
revenues should accrue to the owners of the lands in which the oil fields were 
located. Opposed to this vision was that which argues that state ownership 
should be favoured. This stance which eventually imposed, reflected the 
interest of the national commerce, and financing capital which perceived that 
the distribution of oil revenues by the state would favour the capitalist 
development. This line of thought is fairly represented by the work of Uslar 
Pietri (1939), who claimed that the legitimate use of oil revenues should be 
investment. This represented the vision of capital. Another vision which 
favoured the state ownership of oil was the populist one embodied in the 
thought of Betancourt (1949), and the AD party, which claimed that oil 
revenues should benefit both labour and capital.
Within the academic level, the major contribution of the Venezuelan political 
economy to explain the role of the state in the economy and industrialisation 
were mainly ascribed to the Marxist dependency school o f thought during 
1950-70. Most of these studies tended to focus on the relationship state-oil 
transnationals, with the topic of the launching of effective economic policies 
and long-term growth being less important. The impact of oil revenues on the 
economy is perceived like negative because this reinforced the economic 
dependency. The state was supposed to represent the interests o f the 
international and national capital with little capacity of choice against the
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foreign capital. The failures of the ISI policies appeared as the result o f a 
constellation of external factors which involved the existence of an 
international division of labour which made convenient for the developed 
economies (centre) to keep the periphery producing final consumer goods, 
and buying capital and technologies from them (Maza Zavala et al 1974; 
Malave, 1974; Cordova, 1976; Mieres, 1975). The criticism to this view is 
the reductionism.
Other scholars have tended to see the Venezuelan state as an independent 
entity or agent, which is able to assume choices and represent interest 
different from any other social class (Sontag 1974).
In the 1980’s, another approach within the Venezuelan political economy has 
argued that in this economy (Baptista, 1987,1997 and Mommer, 1987, 1991), 
the state ownership of the oil sector and the accrual of considerable oil 
revenues gave way to the emergence of the so-called ‘rentier capitalist’ 
promoted by the state. In this Marxist approach to the oil question in 
Venezuela, the oil revenues appear as a kind of international rent imposed to 
the international capital by the state. The term rent has the meaning of the 
Marxist term, the part of the social product appropriated by the landlord. 
However, it must be highlighted that while the state behaves like a landlord in 
the international front, this behaves like capitalist in the domestic economy by 
distributing oil revenues. Thus Venezuelan capitalist development appeared 
as driven by the domestic distribution of an international rent by the state 
which assumes the role of the industrialist bourgeois in the national economy 
to some extent and promoted the emergence of this group as well as o f the 
capital linked to finance, commerce and construction.
The main mechanism of distribution of oil revenues by the Venezuelan state 
between 1930 and 1950 were the public current and capital spending, and the 
real appreciation of the domestic currency, this latter through cheaper
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consumer goods. These policies prompted a considerable stimulus to 
capitalist development with the creation of the home market and the labour 
force required for the beginning of industrialisation in the 1950’s. This 
distribution of oil revenues was beneficial to the commercial and financial 
capital which were involved in construction and trade activities, and the 
emergent industrialist group, but this also benefited the labour group to some 
extent.
Through the 1950-70 phase, Venezuelan industrialisation was encouraged by 
the adoption of an ISI strategy, which focused basically upon the granting of 
protection to the consumer goods and a policy of subsided credits. 
Furthermore, manufacturing continued benefiting from expansionary fiscal 
policies and from other mechanism of distribution of oil revenues, like the 
low income tax and the cheap imported capital and intermediate imported 
goods due to the real appreciation of the bolivar and low tariff and quotas. In 
sum, the industrial and other economic policies during 1940-70 seem to have 
encourage manufacturing in the following ways: the availability o f foreign 
currency which allowed for cheap imports of capital goods, inputs and 
technology necessary for the domestic production o f non-durable goods; 
and the creation of domestic demand as a result o f public capital and 
current spending.
In our view, the Venezuelan state encouraged the emergence of the bourgeois 
through the distribution of oil revenues into the private sector. It seems that 
this process, which it may appeared as a kind of original accumulation in the 
Marxist language was accelerated during the 1970’s oil booms and 1979-82, 
when the state distributed actual and future oil revenues through external 
indebtedness. In this light, the weakness of the state from the 1980’s appears 
as the result of the transfer of oil revenues into the private sector, which was 
also caused by he fall in oil prices.
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It must be kept in mind that the Venezuelan state had the role to distribute an 
important oil revenue from the beginning of this century. It has been pointed 
out that the process of distribution of oil revenues led to the emergence social 
groups whose interests were related to the appropriation of a share of those 
revenues, which are not the results of the national productive effort (Baptista 
ob cit. Mommer, ob.cit). In Venezuela, the social groups linked to ISI and the 
commercial capital which evolved from the groups related to import activities 
at the beginning of this century (in Marxist language commercial bourgeoisie) 
found profitable to be involved in ISI of primary goods during the 1950’s, 
while at the same time some of them remained related to the commercial 
activities through the import of capital and raw materials necessary to the first 
phases of industrialisation.
Hypothesis
Under the assumptions embodied in the Dutch disease model a resource 
boom is bound to cause de-industrialisation or de-agriculturalisation as a 
result of the price mechanism. However, the relaxation of the assumptions 
allows for different outcomes. For instance, assuming the existence of 
unemployment, which is common to developing countries, there is room 
for government policy to play a key role in the final effect o f a resource 
boom. Furthermore, there are important aspects which fa ll outside the 
reference framework o f  the Dutch disease theory. First, in the case of an 
economy which may have been benefiting from significant oil revenues, 
the impact o f a sudden boom may depend largely on the initial conditions 
o f the economy, and the specific economic dynamic brought about by the 
government policies during the pre-boom phase. Our major hypothesis is 
that assuming the existence of unemployment even if  some real 
appreciation takes place, de-industrialisation may not be the outcome, 
especially if  there is only an import-competing manufacturing sector. This 
may be explained by the short-term positive effect o f real appreciation on 
this sector via cheap imported capital and raw material goods, the greater
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home demand and the beneficial impact of financial, investment and credit 
policies. In this case a possible outcome of a boom might be that despite 
the negative contribution of import substitution and export to 
manufacturing growth, the sector may still expand out of the greater home 
demand. Thus the presence of Dutch disease symptoms in that economy 
during a sudden boom must be understood in the sense that the accrual o f 
oil revenues may contribute to delaying the need to adopt a coherent 
industrial strategy, which combines both import substitution and export 
promotion.
The second hypothesis of this thesis is that although manufacturing may be 
able to grow, fostered by the home demand in the short to medium term, if  
there is no coherent industrial policy that encourages non-oil exports and 
efficiency, this growth may be inefficient, highly dependent on oil revenues 
and unsustainable. This will make the economy prone to a balance of 
payment crisis once oil revenues fall. The accrual of the extra income may 
lead to a booming phase of rapid manufacturing and non-tradable growth in 
the short-term followed by a severe depression prompted by the need to 
adopt deflationary economic policies in the face of fiscal and balance of 
payments problems resulting from falling oil revenues and the lack of a 
competitive non-oil sector. Thus an oil boom may give way to recession, 
which may become entrenched despite another oil price increase. If this is 
the case, the recession should not be ascribed to the Dutch disease 
mechanisms, but to the deflationary policies and more specifically to the 
lack of export-competitive manufacturing. This may be largely related to 
the negative impact o f real overvaluation and the lack of coherent industrial 
policy in the pre-boom and booming phases.
A third hypothesis is that the oil boom may induce a sharp decline in 
productivity if  the policy response is inefficient. This would be the result
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of the absence of a coherent industrial policy which could have been 
concerned with efficiency issues, technological change and export 
promotion. In addition, congestion problems brought about by the lack of 
skilled labour and management capacities may add to the mentioned 
factors. We argue that within this context, manufacturing may experience 
an increase in the wages share in value added driven no so much by 
increasing product wages as the Dutch disease model predicts, but by a 
sharp fall in labour productivity caused by the above-mentioned factors.
It must be noted that the Dutch disease model is a comparative static 
exercise, which focuses on structural change. This is a limitation because 
the impact o f an oil boom on long-term growth and efficiency in the use of 
the oil revenues seems to be even more important in the case o f oil- 
exporting developing countries. In the case of an oil-based economy, such 
as Venezuela’s, a full understanding of the impact o f a price boom on the 
non-oil economy calls for the analysis o f  the implications o f  the domestic 
distribution o f  the oil revenues fo r  growth and labour productivity even 
before the boom.
A fourth hypothesis is that given the accrual of oil revenues to the state, the 
role o f government policies must be brought into the picture and an 
accurate understanding of the impact of oil revenues on development calls 
for a more detailed consideration of monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, and 
sectoral policies undertaken by the government. Contrary to the 
perspective of many scholars who point to the existence a negative 
interaction between oil revenues and economic growth as well as 
industrialisation from the beginning of the oil activities, here it is argued 
that the Dutch disease symptoms that may be distinguished in Venezuela 
are not the result of the automatic adjustment depicted by the theoretical 
model. Instead, these symptoms seem to be primarily concerned with the 
economic policies followed under different historical phases. We argue
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that oil revenues induced some positive effects on economic growth and its 
disruptive impact does not seem to have been exerted on manufacturing 
during the 1951-65 period or the 1973-77 phase. This contradicts the view 
of most scholars (Harris, 1971; Flichman, 1981; Hein, 1981; Clemente, 
1990; and Haussman, 1991) and the dependency school who have 
emphasised the negative impact of oil on Venezuelan manufacturing. A 
few Venezuelan authors (Peltzer, 1955; Mommer, 1988, 1989, 1990a; 
1990b, 1991; and Baptista, 1987, 1991, 1997) claim that the oil sector 
entailed some positive effects on economic growth and on manufacturing 
during the import substitution phase. Nonetheless, there has been no 
attempt to demonstrate it empirically in detail. An exception is Mommer 
(1991) who estimated the multiplier effect o f the oil sector on the non-oil 
economy in an input-output framework for 1987, showing the existence of 
important linkages between the oil sector and the non-oil economy 
including manufacturing. Baptista (1997) presents a Venezuelan political 
economy analysis, which focuses on the effects of the distribution o f the oil 
revenues, defined as a kind of international transfer or income which is not 
the result of domestic productive effort, by the state on economic growth 
and structural change. However, reference is only made to the impact of 
oil revenues on manufacturing at an aggregate level and it is shown that 
industrialisation benefited greatly from the domestic distribution o f the oil 
revenues during 1930-77.
We claim that oil revenues may have exerted some positive impact on 
Venezuelan industrialisation between 1945 and the mid-1960s, through 
expansionary public spending, the creation of public employment, the 
creation of markets and real overvaluation through cheap imported and 
capital goods. However, once the limitations of the domestic market 
became binding for further industrial development, real overvaluation may 
have exerted a disruptive impact on manufacturing by contributing to the 
lack of international competitiveness.
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2. Impact of the 1970s Oil Booms on the Real Exchange Rate in 
Venezuela
Introduction
The impact o f a boom can be traced initially from its effect on relative 
prices. The Dutch disease model establishes that the spending of the extra 
income leads to an increase in the output prices of non-tradables relative to 
tradables. Therefore, this is the first stage of transmission of the boom to 
the non-oil economy, which is bound to disrupt the tradable sectors through 
a fall in relative profitability.
For this reason, although the major topic o f this dissertation is the study of 
the impact of a sectoral boom on the real side of the economy, this chapter 
examines the first stage of transmission of the positive oil price shocks of 
1973-74 and 1979. The main purpose is to establish whether the movement 
in the real exchange rate and in relative prices took place according to the 
mechanisms embodied in the Dutch disease theory. In other words, we 
consider if  there was real appreciation of the domestic currency during 
1973-82 as a result o f the so-called spending effect linked to greater income 
and domestic demand.
As with the oil revenues which accrue to the Venezuelan government, we 
discuss in section 1 the mechanisms of transmission from the oil boom to 
the non-oil economy by examining the relationship between oil price, fiscal 
deficit, money supply, inflation and real appreciation implied by the Dutch 
disease model. Next, empirical evidence on the relationship between the 
oil revenues and the fiscal deficit and between oil revenues and the money 
supply is presented in section 2. The path taken by the real exchange rate 
during 1973-82 is presented in section 3, and the major conclusions are 
summarised in section 4.
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2.1 Transmission mechanisms of the oil booms: oil prices, fiscal deficit, 
money supply and real exchange rate
When the extra oil income accrues to the government, there are two 
possible options, namely, full adjustment and non-adjustment. The first 
option would imply the distribution of oil revenues into the domestic 
economy while the second one would involve the sterilisation of the 
monetary and fiscal impact of the extra revenues by the purchase o f foreign 
assets. In this way, capital outflows would offset the receipts in the current 
account.
Assuming that a fixed exchange regime with no complete sterilisation of 
the monetary and fiscal effects of oil revenues is adopted, the Dutch disease 
theory predicts that a sectoral boom is bound to cause a real appreciation of 
the domestic currency. This would be the result of the so-called spending 
effect derived from the greater income. When the extra revenues accrue to 
the government though, the impact of the boom depends on the 
government’s policy response, and the structure and timing o f public 
spending become relevant too.1
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the real appreciation of the exchange 
rate may be prompted by increasing public expenditure, which leads to 
higher demand for both traded and non-traded goods and a rise in the 
relative price of the latter due to their inelastic supply. At the same time, a 
direct effect o f greater government spending on the non-tradable market 
can be identified: non-tradables such as construction, services and wages 
are supposed to be an important component o f public spending. So, an 
expansionary fiscal policy may add to the real appreciation of the domestic 
currency through this channel.
The policy choice faced by an economy going through a sectoral boom has been discussed by David (1983), Scherr 
(1989) and Van Wijnbergen (1984) within the neo-classical framework o f analysis. According to these scholars, i f  the 
boom is supposed to be temporary it is advisable to avoid the structural adjustment implied by the changes in relative 
prices. In contrast, i f  the boom is expected to be long-lasting it may be justified to allow the structural adjustment to take 
place.
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The monetary effects of a boom and the links between government 
spending and money supply can be assessed by considering the following 
identity which traces the process of money creation for the central and 
commercial banking system:2
A M 2 = (G -  T+ANFA*) + A D C b + A NFAb
Where M2 = broad money or liabilities of the banking system;
G-T = government spending less taxes (taxes includes oil and non-oil revenues);
NFAg = net foreign assets of the government;
DCnb = domestic credit to the non-bank private sector; and
NFAb = net foreign assets of the banking system
This equation indicates that changes in the money supply depend basically 
upon the domestic budget deficit and the supply of bank credit to the 
private sector. If  the extra oil revenues are deposited in the Central Bank,
L
while government spending is held constant; T and NFA rise by the same 
amount o f the increase in oil revenues with no change in the money supply 
taking place. In contrast, if  there is an increase in government spending 
and oil revenues are monetised, an expansion in the money supply will take 
place which, combined with the higher real income, is likely to cause 
inflation as a result of greater domestic demand. This, together with the 
inelastic supply of non-traded goods, would cause a real appreciation.
Theoretically, the greater international reserves do not necessarily lead to 
an expansion of the monetary base o f the economy if  the increase in the 
first variable is offset by a reduction in net domestic credit to the 
government or to the private sector and if  oil revenues are saved abroad. In
Dombush (1980), chap. 2 eq. 11, quoted by Pinto, op.cit.
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this case, the accumulated reserves are sterilised.3 Nevertheless, if  this 
policy is not applied, a rise in the oil price will cause a real appreciation of 
the domestic currency.
2.2 The Mechanisms of transmission of the oil boom: empirical 
evidence
In this section the mechanisms involved in the first stage of transmission of 
the 1970s oil booms namely, the fiscal deficit, money supply and prices, 
are analysed for Venezuela. The purpose is to establish if  these 
mechanisms suggest the existence of a typical Dutch disease process. In 
doing this we first provide a background sketch of the Venezuelan 
economy. Secondly, we present some estimates of the oil revenues that 
accrued to the State during the 1970s; and in the two following subsections 
empirical evidence on the links between oil revenues, the fiscal deficit, 
money supply and prices is presented.
2.2.1 Background on the Venezuelan non-oil economy and the impact 
of oil revenues
Venezuela is a small opened economy, which experienced a rapid oil 
development from the beginning of this century. Large-scale oil activities 
began in Venezuela during the 1920s, following the important discoveries 
made during 1917 and the major investments carried out by Royal Dutch 
Shell and Standard Oil of New Jersey in the 1920s. As a result, by the 
middle 1920s oil became the country’s major export and by 1929 
Venezuela was the first oil exporter in the world. Previous to this mineral 
development, agriculture was the main sector, accounting for more than 80 
per cent o f GDP, with export-oriented coffee and cocoa being the major 
subsectors until the early 1920s. Following these years, the Dutch disease
It has been pointed out that even if  government spending is held constant after a boom, real appreciation might occur as a 
result o f  the net transfers to the private sector (Pinto, p. 421). See also Neary and Van Wijnbergen (1984).
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effect during the 1920s and the Great Depression in the 1930s combined to 
squeeze these activities.
Owing to the accrual of oil revenues to the state, and given the pre­
capitalist conditions of the economy in the 1930s,4 the first use o f the oil 
revenues by the Venezuelan state was necessarily on current spending and 
infrastructure construction due to the low capital absorptive capacity of the 
economy. This led to massive rural-urban migrations which damaged 
agriculture. It is worth noting that the agricultural sector was further 
disrupted by the collapse in crop prices in 1927 on the one hand, and the 
government policy of maintaining a fixed exchange rate with gold from 
1934, despite the fact that the gold content of the American dollar had been 
modified in February 1934, which implied 40 per cent devaluation of the 
dollar. Unlike other Latin American countries the Venezuelan government 
took the choice of no devaluation, so the gold parity of the domestic 
currency to the American dollar declined from Bs5.18 to Bs3.06.5 This 
reinforced the Dutch disease effect.
Since oil became a state-owned resource, the domestic distribution of oil 
revenues gave way to a particular economic model defined as ‘rentier 
capitalism’ by analysts (Baptista, 1986, 1997 and Mommer, 1984, 1989).6 
The major feature of this economic model was the existence of a strong 
state which was the recipient of a substantial external ‘rent’ that was 
distributed within the domestic economy through various mechanisms 
notably, public spending, public employment, real overvaluation o f the 
domestic currency and low income taxes and subsidies. It has been
4 Rangel (1971).
 ^Mommer (1987, p. 171).
6
The concept o f  rentier capitalism in Venezuela was firstly put forward by Mommer (1987). This scholar observes that
the accrual o f  important oil revenues led to the emergence o f  a kind o f  ‘rentier capitalism’ in Venezuela between 1920 and
1985. Over these years voluminous oil revenue encouraged the development o f  capitalism. The end o f  this economic
model based on the distribution o f  oil revenues occurred in the middle 1980s with the important decline which occurred in
oil revenues and their use to cover the external debt.
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estimated that oil revenues accounted for 15 per cent o f non-oil GDP by 
1940.
Two phases have been distinguished in Venezuelan economic history 
between 1920 and 1985: the first one comprises the years o f 1920-45 and is 
referred to as the oil outward growth strategy (Maza Zavala, 1974; Malave, 
1974). Through these years, the Venezuelan economy relied almost 
entirely upon oil activities since agriculture was severely squeezed and 
there was no manufacturing activity. These years witnessed the 
distribution of oil revenues for the development o f the state apparatus and 
the creation of the home market, with the main mechanism of distribution 
of oil income being the creation of public employment through current 
public spending. The second phase, which spanned the years from 1945 
until 1970, was defined by the use of the inward-oriented model, which 
refers to the adoption of an import substitution strategy from the late 1940s. 
This phase was characterised by the distribution of oil revenues into 
capitalist development and industrialisation through import-substitution 
industrialisation. The main mechanisms of distribution of oil revenues 
were the increase in public employment through government investment 
and consumption, real overvaluation of the domestic currency which 
allowed for cheap imported goods, low income tax, cheap credit to the
n
private sector and protection from foreign competition. These policies led 
to the development of the home market and were the basis for import- 
substitution industrialisation. It must be noted that three sub-phases can be 
distinguished during 1945-70. The years between 1945 and 1956 were 
characterised by an increase in the fiscal use of oil revenues and the rapid 
growth o f both the oil and non-oil economy with the latter growing by 9 per 
cent per year during 1943-57. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the non­
development of an export-competitive manufacturing or agricultural sector
7
Mommer (1990).
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implied an excessive dependence on oil income as a source o f foreign 
currency and this made the economy prone to balance of payments crises.
The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 caused an upward trend in oil prices, 
which together with the selling of leases on oil fields by the military 
government which controlled the Venezuelan economy at that time, led to 
the accrual of substantial oil revenues to the state and to a booming phase. 
This did not last, however. The oil policy underwent major changes when 
the military dictator was deposed in January 1958. The social democratic 
Accion Democratica won the elections in December 1958 and the 
nationalist attitude against oil multinationals resulted in a radical change in 
oil industry legislation. As a result, no more leases were granted, tax rates 
were increased and a state-owned enterprise was established. This, 
combined with the opening of the Suez Canal and falling international 
prices, produced a substantial fall in exports, oil revenues and capital 
inflows. The late government response to this situation led to a balance of 
payments crisis by 1959-60 and an adjustment policy was launched. This 
implied the adoption of a multiple exchange rate regime from 1960 to 
1964, and, after the completion of a 35 per cent cumulative devaluation, a 
return to a single fixed convertible currency.
Finally, it must be noted that the Venezuelan government adopted a fixed 
exchange rate regime from the 1930s to 1960, which fixed the American 
dollar to 3.35 bolivares. From November 1960 to January 1964 a gradual 
devaluation occurred and a multiple exchange regime was adopted due to a 
balance of payments crisis caused by the drop in international reserves 
prompted by a decline in oil revenues. This regime was abolished in 1964 
and a fixed exchange rate system with free convertibility was implemented 
in January 1964 and maintained until February 1983. The parity was 1 
US$ 1 = 4.30 bolivares.8
g
For a detailed study o f  the treatment o f  imports in the exchange regime in Venezuela from 1983, see Torrealba de
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2.2.2 The two 1970s oil booms
The previous background makes clear that Venezuela has been an oil-based 
economy since the 1920s. As shown by Figure 2.1, after the stagnant trend 
occurred in the oil revenues during the 1960s, the two oil prices increases 
of 1973 and 1979 brought about a massive flow of oil revenues into 
Venezuela. The quadrupling of world oil prices, from about $3.45 per 
barrel to $14 per barrel in 1973, involved a rise in the price o f Venezuelan 
crude oil from $2.50 in 1972 to $10.50 a barrel in 1974. Consequently, oil 
revenues accounted for 40 per cent of non-oil GDP in 1974, up from only 
13 per cent in 1972.
Figure 2.1 Trends in oil revenues, Venezuela, 1936-88
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Notes: oil revenues at constant 1984 prices. Sources: Baptista (1991) and BCV, economic 
reports, various issues
Although oil revenues then declined until 1978, the second oil price 
increase, which resulted from the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and Iran’s 
subsequent war with Iraq, resulted in oil revenues accounting for nearly 25 
per cent of non-oil GDP in 1980. Subsequently, from 1982 to 1986 (with
Suzzarini (1991).
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the exception of 1984), oil revenues followed a downward trend. This is 
the post-boom phase.
2.2.3 Links between oil revenues, the fiscal deficit and prices during 
1973-82
As noted earlier, if the revenues derived from a sectoral boom are managed 
by the government under a fixed exchange regime, the impact o f a boom 
takes place through direct public spending or an increase in the domestic 
credit to the private sector.
In Venezuela, the traditional of strong interventionism was enhanced with 
the outset o f the 1970s oil boom. Within the context o f a democratic 
government, the higher oil revenues were rapidly transferred to the private 
sector via current and investment expenditure. There was an attempt to 
save part o f the oil income abroad during 1973-74 through the Venezuelan 
Investment Fund (FIV)9 -which was reflected in the fiscal surplus during 
1973-75- but the government lacked fiscal discipline due to the political 
pressures to spend the extra oil income from 1975 to 1977. This, together 
with an important rise in domestic credit to the private sector, led to an 
increase in the money supply (Mi) and an acceleration of the rate of 
inflation during 1974-77 (see Table 2 .1).10
Data on Venezuelan government deficits and their sources o f financing for 
1968-88 are presented in Table 2.2 below. The domestic government 
budget, excluding oil receipts, is shown in column 2. In this way, the 
difference between government spending and non-oil revenues is used as a 
proxy for those expenditures financed by oil receipts and external 
borrowing.
9
The Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) was assigned a budget o f  13.000 million bolivares, an amount which was equal 
to 50 per cent o f  special fiscal revenues from the oil sector. Resources were supposed to be invested in the domestic 
economy according to absorptive productive capacity (BCV, economic report, 1974, p. 314).
This relationship proved to be true in the Colombian case during the coffee boom o f  the 1970s according to a Dutch
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The main purpose of this table is to show the marked increase in the 
domestic deficit, defined as government expenditures minus domestic tax 
revenues (or exclusive of oil receipts) as a percentage of GDP during 1974- 
77. This caused an enormous expansion of money liquidity, which paved
Table 2.1 Some macroeconomic indicators, Venezuela, 1966-88
Realisation Growth Rate o f Growth Govemme CPI
rate o f growth rate o f nt
Year prices OilX/ OGDP/TG International o fM l o f  public surplus/de inflation
o f X DP ficit
oil reserves as rate
spending percentage
% % % % % % o f GDP %
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1966 1.88 92.4 -6.5 2.4 5 2.3 1.7
1967 1.85 92.1 54 13.9 10.6 8.2 -0.3 0
1968 1.86 92.7 51.9 6.4 9.6 6 -7 1.3
1969 1.81 91.1 50.7 1.2 8.9 6.2 -24.1 2.4
1970 1.84 90.2 47.7 9.3 4.1 -2.5 -13.3 2.5
1971 2.35 92.4 43.4 46.2 18.2 12.9 4.1 3.2
1972 2.52 92.2 43 19.2 12.6 6.6 -2.7 2.8
1973 3.71 93.1 37.5 38.1 20.4 8.2 15.8 4
1974 10.53 95.6 29.2 181.3 34.6 44.7 44.4 7.9
1975 10.99 94.6 27.1 42.1 43.3 4.1 16.2 9.7
1976 11.15 94.2 24.8 4.1 11.8 2.2 -29.5 7.4
1977 12.54 95.5 23.7 1.2 23.1 26.6 -43.3 7.5
1978 12.04 94.9 24.5 -15.7 19.1 -2.3 -40.8 6.9
1979 17.69 95.2 23.1 12.8 6.5 -13.7 19.1 11.6
1980 26.44 95 22.1 8.6 12.9 8.5 0.4 19.5
1981 29.71 94.6 20.3 33.8 6.9 10.4 -13.7 14.9
1982 27.47 94.8 20.2 -5.2 -8.7 -13 -43.5 9.2
1983 25.31 92.6 20.2 -2.1 26.7 -9.6 -15.1 6.1
1984 26.7 92.1 19 17 7.2 9.9 33.1 11.5
1985 25.89 89.3 19.2 17.6 12.2 -1.7 50.8 10.8
1986 12.82 82.6 18.7 -19.2 20 -5.3 -20.2 11
1987 16.32 79.5 19.1 -4.4 29.5 14.8 -51.7 24.8
1988 13.51 79.6 20.8 -50.3 20.5 -14 -71.2 25.8
Notes: (2) Oil share o f  total exports value, percent, (3) Oil share o f  total GDP, percent, (4) M ill o f  U.S. $, (8) 
Variations in the consumer price (index 1972 =100). Sources: own estimations based on data 
provided by the Central Bank o f Venezuela, economic reports (various issues) and PODE, reports, 
(various issues).
the way for an acceleration of the inflation rate by 1975 (Table 2.1). As a 
result, a price control and subsidies policy was launched and a surge in 
imports occurred to offset the inflationary pressures. Despite these 
measures, domestic inflation rose substantially during 1974-77 compared to 
1968-71, leading to a real appreciation of the domestic currency (see next 
section). These data thus capture the links between public spending and
disease econometric model presented by Edwards (1986).
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Table 2.2 Government indicators, Venezuela, 1970-86
Oil Government Government Net domestic Net Public
revenues domestic2 external
Year as % domestic
deficit1
deficit credit to foreign debt as %
o f  GDP as % o f  GDP government Borrowing o f  GDP
1970 11.4 -6753 -12.9 371 443 30.9
1971 12.2 -8401 -14.7 193 -177 27.1
1972 12.7 -9346 -15.2 212 15 24.8
1973 16 -11680 -15.9 452 42 20.3
1974 32.1 -39566 -35.3 -889 -313 12.5
1975 22.3 -28466 -24.1 -1335 -2 21.3
1976 19.3 -35784 -26.5 -680 8651 80.2
1977 15.5 -36918 -23.7 599 6233 124.7
1978 13.3 -35897 -21.2 -1512 10151 168.8
1979 17.3 -41772 -20.1 -1605 -1081 135.5
1980 20.5 -65790 -25.9 -1897 5469 123.4
1981 19.6 -60971 -21.4 8207 -1373 143.1
1982 15.5 -54518 -18.7 -1645 -7899 159.0
1983 14.4 -79238 -27.3 -1715- -1617- 136.7
1984 14.5 -103546 -29.8 -5116 -4529 151.3
1985 10.7 -113319 -30.5 -20965 -3962 128.5.1
1986 7.8 -124172 -30.7 -19435 -4393- 387.7
Notes: 1 Government domestic deficit is equal to government expenditure minus domestic tax 
revenues; 2 This refers to domestic government deficit or exclusive o f  oil revenues as percentage o f  
GDP. Sources: oil revenues: BCV, economic reports, various issues and IMF; government deficits: 
IMF, International Financial Statistics; public debt: IMF and World Bank, World Tables. GDP: 
World Bank, Tables.
inflation in an economy following a sectoral boom, as predicted by the 
Dutch disease theory.
It must be noted that the government deficit, excluding oil receipts, 
increased regardless of the falling trend in oil revenues during 1976-78. 
The greater government spending brought about a surge in domestic 
demand and in imports over 1974-78 which, against falling oil revenues 
and the lack of a non-oil export-competitive sector, led to an imbalance in 
the income and outlays of foreign currency by 1977 and the adoption o f an 
external debt programme in 1978 (see Fig. 2.2).
Declining oil revenues and substantial external and domestic deficits led 
the government to implement restrictive credit and budgetary policies in 
1978-79. The stabilisation programme applied by the new Christian 
Democratic administration, which took office in 1979, had the following 
elements: (a) rationalisation and a decrease in public expenditure, which 
would be cut by 10 per cent in real terms in 1979; (b) the elimination of the
85
Fig
 
2.2
 
So
m
e 
m
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
 i
nd
ic
at
or
s, 
V
en
ez
ue
la
, 
19
68
-9
0
.00
(001- = *86 0  xepui
I t
f e
o  |
<4-1 3  
O N . <U
£  c  
o  «  
G  >  3 ^
o  oI %CAW CQ
-o  £  
o  S
°  o«  w
-3-
"oo
o
o oo
o
oo
o
(/>PL
O
Q .
E
jo
0
1 
sCO
■ >T3
*S
> »_co
Z3o
$ IMUU
log (Cp, Ip, Ipr)
SS 8 > a 
.5 3
U;= •o
II ua S3 
~  .o
i i
i f
3 .£ (/) -3 C W5 O «
a £
>c  00■ 3 ON
> a> 
'C -O
VO
OO
"00
CNCO CM CM CMCO
B O
! t
s &I i 4I I
EX'C M o.e u O  c  'c £
N3  O v) o
O  IO _ |
£ o
•n £ o-o
1 p
u  8
•O s
P  %
O  <4-1s  2
(Jdo ‘aa) Boi
external debt; (c) an increase in competitiveness, this would be achieved 
through a price and import liberalisation policy with import duties to be 
reduced from up to 300 per cent to a maximum of 100 per cent; (d) 
reductions in subsidies; and a decrease in the money supply growth and a 
rise in interest rates. These policies prompted a decline in domestic 
government spending exclusive of oil receipts between 1978-79 and 1981- 
82.11 Although government spending increased in 1980 as a result of 
higher financial investment, the fall in domestic private investment from 
1978 produced a drop in domestic demand (Fig 2.2).
The adjustment programmes brought about a recession in the non-oil 
economy and, contrary to other oil-exporting countries, the second oil price 
increase did not lead to a boom in Venezuela. Over the 1978-82 period oil 
revenues were used to finance the outlays of private capital, so that these 
revenues distributed by the state to the private sector were saved in the 
external markets.
As the stabilisation programme launched in 1979 also included a price and 
import liberalisation policy and the elimination of subsidies, the 
deflationary effect of the contraction in domestic demand was more than 
offset by the impact of the elimination of price controls and subsidies with 
the result being high inflation from 1979. At the same time, some cost 
factors, such as rising wages and salaries and higher financial costs, also 
contributed to an acceleration of the domestic inflation rate.
Concerning labour costs, Fig. 2.3 suggests a substantial increase in nominal 
wages and salaries during 1978-82. A general law on the readjustment of 
wages and salaries to compensate for the price rises resulting from the new 
policy was passed in early 1980 and some wage increases were obtained 
by collective bargaining. It has been estimated that total wages and salaries
Physical investment spending was reduced from 6100 million bolivares in 1977-78 to less than 4000 million in 1979-80 
(BCV, p. 778).
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paid by the central government rose by 29 per cent in 1980. Likewise, 
average family income was 20 per cent higher during the first half of 1980 
than during 1979.12
Average annual wages per man in the non-oil economy increased 
substantially between 1978 and 1982 compared to in 1973-77. The 
minimum urban wages established by the government increases from 
Bs450 per month in 1979 (USS 104.6) to Bs 900 per month (US$209) 
during 1980-82. Minimum rural wages were increased from Bs450 in 1979 
to Bs750 per month during 1980-82.13
Fig. 2.3 Trends in wages and the interest rate, Venezuela, 1968-90
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The effect of increasing labour costs on inflation was reinforced by rising 
credit costs resulting from the higher interest rates in international financial 
markets and from the adjustment in domestic interest rates in order to 
contain the outflow of capital during 1979-80 (Fig 2.3). This policy was 
reversed from March 1981 when domestic interest rates were reduced, 
despite the upward trend in this variable in international markets, which
12 ECLAC (1981).
13 Valecillos (1990), p. 88.
reinforced the outflow of private capital during 1981-82. Thus, the 
lowering of the domestic interest rate did not encourage a recovery of 
domestic private investment during 1981-82.
It should be noted that rising wages and the price and import liberalisation 
policy implied that the price of non-tradables kept growing despite falling 
domestic demand, while the tradable sectors were prevented from 
increasing prices because of foreign competition.
2.2.4 The Links between oil revenues, money supply and prices during 
1973-82
This section traces the first stages o f transmission of the 1970s oil booms 
through monetary policy. From the Dutch disease perspective higher oil 
prices are bound to cause an expansion of the money supply as a result of 
growing international reserves. Thus the boom can also contribute to real 
appreciation of the domestic currency via monetary channels. This 
outcome can be offset by policies which aim to sterilise the impact o f the 
boom on the money supply through a decline in domestic credit to the 
private sector or to government.
Table 2.3 shows that in Venezuela the first oil boom exerted an 
expansionary influence on the money supply (M l and M2) which was not 
offset by a rise in government deposits in the banking system or a decline 
in domestic credit to the private sector during 1973-77. Despite a sharp 
increase in government deposits in the Central Bank over these years, 
which led to a decrease in net domestic credit to government, the 
significant growth of credit to the private sector and a decline in the 
deposits in investment funds of the government implied that the greater 
international reserves gave way to a monetary expansion during 1973-75. 
Over 1976-77 the effect of declining international reserves on the money 
supply was partly offset by the expansion of domestic credit to the private
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sector together with a decline in deposits in the government investment 
funds.14
The growth of the money supply and the expansionary fiscal policy during 
the 1973-77 oil boom in Venezuela led to a sharp increase in domestic 
inflation compared to 1968-71 and to the real appreciation of the bolivar 
(see next section). Although as noted above, a price control and subsidies 
policy was launched in 1974 to avoid inflationary pressures, the domestic 
consumer price index accelerated considerably. Table 2.3 indicates that 
substantial growth in high-powered money (M l) occurred during 1973-77 , 
which caused a marked acceleration of the domestic inflation rate 
compared to the pre-boom years.
The mentioned policy response proved to be inefficient. A more cautious 
fiscal and monetary policy may have been advisable given the low capital 
absorptive capacity of the economy compared to the amount o f extra oil 
revenues. The government's choice implied the rapid spending o f oil 
revenues during 1974-77 and, at the same time, the aim to control 
inflationary pressures led to the adoption of price controls and subsidies as 
well as to a surge in imports.
In this light, it can be concluded that the impact of higher oil prices on the 
monetary side did take place according to the predictions of the Dutch 
disease model over 1973-77.
When it comes to the second oil boom, however, the picture changes. As 
noted above, the restraint in fiscal and monetary policy over 1978-79, 
combined with a price and import liberalisation policy and a drop in private 
investment, gave way to stagflation. Table 2.3 indicates that the rise in
There was a drop o f  19 per cent in the Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) deposits with the Central Bank and the 
commercial banks in 1976. This development is explained by the fall in fiscal inputs to the FIV in 1976 and the increase in 
investment (ECLAC, 1976, p. 424).
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international reserves resulting from the 1979 oil price increases did not 
prompt a substantial monetary expansion. Lower domestic credit to the 
private sector and a rise in the government investment funds combined to 
offset the expansionary effect of international reserves on the money supply 
in 1979 and 1981. There was a large increase in M l in 1980 due to the 
expansion of government spending and domestic credit to the private sector 
at the outset of the second oil price increase. Paradoxically, this 
development did not result in a significant expansion of internal demand
Table 2.3 Decomposition of changes in the monetary position (annual growth rates)
Years M l M2 NIR DCG* DCPI DCP QM IF OI
1970 15.6 15.7 41.1 -330 127.4 9.7 15.8 0 51.5
1971 18.5 20.5 16.7 -848 -54.9 15.5 23.4 0 -11.3
1972 17.9 18.3 36 -508 57.3 23.7 19 0 64.5
1973 34.7 27.4 98.8 -1787 4.2 29.3 16.8 0 10.8
1974 37.6 39.9 31.7 -17300 5 41.1 43.5 32.8 13.7
1975 15.1 22.9 -9.9 -23755 9.1 31.4 33.6 -33.8 -24.2
1976 22.7 23.4 1.5 -22139 28.2 17.4 24.2 -44.1 -1.9
1977 13.6 14.1 -18.7 -18175 -7.2 21 14.7 -126.3 1.8
1978 8.5 5.9 19.3 -15166 19.2 4.8 2.6 -43.6 67.9
1979 16.8 16.5 -9.6 -16401 41.6 15.4 16.2 -151.5 -5.8
1980 9 15.2 18.4 -12832 6.3 8.7 22.7 11.6 52.1
1981 5.4 11.7 9 -8721 -15.7 12 18.4 50.3 50.4
1982 18.8 18.8 20.4 -2212 16.6 5.3 18.8 -117.9 -54.9
Notes: NIR is net international reserves, DCG is domestic credit to government, DCPI is domestic credit to public 
institutions, DCPS is domestic credit to the private sector, QM is quasi money defined as savings and time deposits, 
IF is investment funds and 01 is other items; * values. Sources: IMF (various years).
due to the sharp fall in domestic private investment. This suggests that the 
lack of investment opportunities in the domestic economy meant that a 
substantial share of the oil revenues transferred to the private sector by the 
government was saved in external markets.
The increase in the domestic interest rate played a major role in the 
expansion of domestic demand in 1980. This policy was aimed at 
controlling the massive outflow of capital resulting from the lack of 
investment opportunities in the home market and the high interest rates 
prevailing on the international financial markets (see chapter 3). A 
structure of domestic interest rates that were competitive with those
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prevailing in the international market was established. This, together with 
other measures, succeeded in ensuring a source of financing for domestic 
production and to a lesser extent in stopping the foreign exchange drain 
through 1980. Loans and investments by commercial banks, which had 
stagnated during 1979, grew by 17 per cent in 1980. Likewise, loans by the 
mortgage bank increased by 18 per cent. These institutions were granted 2 
billion bolivares by the Central Bank at the beginning of the year to 
compensate for the fall in deposits by the public in these institutions.15 
However, domestic interest rates were reduced in March 1981 with no 
adjustment being introduced despite the rising trend observed in this 
variable in international markets. This policy encouraged the outflow of 
short-term capital, which contributed to sterilising monetary liquidity and 
to controlling the domestic inflation rate in 1981. This occurred despite the 
fact that there was no liberalisation of the capital account during this 
period. As the differential between the domestic and external interest rates 
increased, the discretionary management of interest rates was replaced by a 
system of floating rates freely determined in the financial market.16 Since 
interest rates in the foreign market were increasing, domestic interest rates 
rose considerably in 1981-82.
It is worth noting that Van Winbergen (1984) presented a Dutch disease 
model which attempted to explain the recession in some developing oil- 
exporting countries following the 1979 oil price increase. Within this 
model, product wages in manufacturing need to increase, while product 
wages in the non-tradables need to decline. Thus, if the decline in the latter 
variable is not enough to absorb the workers shed by the tradable sector, the 
outcome of a boom may be unemployment. Assuming the existence of real 
wage indexation on the CPI and a high share of tradable goods in consumer 
goods, a rise in product wages of the tradable sectors would cause a large
15 ECLA (1980 p. 539).
The differential between domestic interest rates and the USA primate rate was -4.37 per cent in 1981 compared to -1.82 
per cent in 1980, while the differential between domestic interest rates and LIBOR was -2.20 per cent in 1981 compared to
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decline in the product wages of non-tradable goods. This sector will be 
able to employ the workers laidoff from the tradable sectors.
Van Wijnbergen argues that the experience of the Gulf countries, Indonesia 
and some Latin American countries seems to fit this model. Since in the 
Gulf countries most goods are imported (tradables), the boom is expected 
to create employment. By contrast, the existence of high tariffs on 
imported good in Latin America, Indonesia and Egypt makes most 
consumer goods non-traded. According to the model, these economies are 
expected to end up with classical unemployment following a sectoral 
boom. In our view, these conclusions are misleading. Firstly, the existence 
of high protection does not make a tradable sector become a non-traded one 
and secondly, the author apparently explains why the 1979 oil shock led to 
unemployment in some economies but he does not explain why the 1973s 
oil shock did lead to employment. As it applies to Venezuela, 
unemployment was the outcome of the second oil shock, but not for the 
reasons implied by this model. As shown above, the increase in domestic 
demand was lower in 1978-82 than in 1973-77. As regards the conditions 
and assumptions embodied in this model, manufacturing must not be 
considered a non-tradable sector and there is no real wage indexation on the 
CPI in Venezuela. Even if  manufacturing is assumed to be a non-tradable 
sector, the model fails to explain why employment rose after the 1973 oil 
price increase.
2.3 The Impact of the 1970s oil booms on the real exchange rate
The real exchange rate can be viewed as the ratio o f the price of tradables 
to non-tradables. A fall in this index means a decline in the relative prices 
o f import-competing tradable goods and exports. Different measures o f the 
exchange rate are presented in Fig 2.4.17 By all measures the trends in the
-0. 020 in 1980. (ECLAC op. cit).
17
The indices o f  the real exchange rates were estimated following the methodology used by ECLAC, Economic Survey o f
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exchange rate conform with the theoretical predictions of the Dutch disease 
model: a downward trend in this index occurred during the 1970s oil 
booms. After a real devaluation of the domestic currency in 1974, there 
was an appreciation through 1975-77, which was followed by a slight 
recovery in 1978-79. Finally, the real exchange rate declined sharply 
(appreciation) from 1980 to 1983.
It must be noted that the trade-weighted indices can be estimated according 
to different weighting procedures depending on the objective o f the study.18 
Given our purpose to analyse the impact of higher oil prices on the non-oil 
economy, the import-weighted real exchange rate is the most relevant 
because this is computed by excluding oil and is focused on the non-oil 
sector. According to these measures of the import-weighted real exchange 
rate (MWREr), a real devaluation occurred in 1974, which was related to 
higher world inflation compared to that in Venezuelan. Nevertheless, there 
was a decline in these indices (meaning an appreciation) between 1975 and 
1977, which was followed by a slight recovery in 1978-1979. Finally, a 
downward trend occurred from 1980 until 1983, as devaluation and a 
multiple exchange rate regime were implemented. This policy caused a 
real devaluation of the domestic currency during 1983-85, but an 
appreciating trend appeared again between 1986 and 1988. It seems that 
the devaluation brought about a substantial increase in the inflation rate 
through the higher cost o f imported inputs.19 Thus the adjustment o f the 
Venezuelan economy during the post-boom phase and within the context of 
falling oil revenues proved to be unsuccessful.
As suggested by the preceding evidence it appears that, as predicted by the 
Dutch disease theory, some real appreciation of the domestic currency
Latin America, 1981, 1986. The tradable-weighted Er was calculated according to the indices given by Rhomberg (1976). 
For details, see methodological appendix to this chapter.
Struders (op. cit.) and Rhomberg (1976).
19
According to Shafaeddin (1993), 54 per cent o f inflation was caused by the real devaluation o f  the domestic currency 
during 1980-87.
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occurred during 1973-77 and 1978-82. The analysis of the mechanisms of 
transmission of the oil boom into the non-oil economy, made in the 
previous section, showed that the real appreciation during the first oil boom 
occurred according to the channels predicted by the Dutch disease theory. 
Clear links between budgetary and credit expansion and the real exchange 
rate can be identified. By contrast, during the second oil price boom the 
links between the real exchange rate and monetary and fiscal policies 
predicted by the Dutch disease theory broke down. The real appreciation 
that occurred during 1979-82 was due to other factors. The deflationary 
policies, combined with import and price liberalisation and wage rises 
during 1978-80, led to a real appreciation and a squeeze on profitability in 
the traded goods sector. Likewise, the modest expansion of public 
spending in 1981-82 was counterbalanced by the fall in private investment, 
which did not lead to a significant recovery in domestic demand.
In sum, as a whole, the stagnation of the economy and real appreciation 
during 1978-82 is not explained by the mechanisms considered by the 
Dutch disease model.
2.4 Final rem arks
The above analysis suggests that the impact of the 1973 price increase on 
the exchange rate in the Venezuelan case took place according to the 
predictions o f the Dutch disease core model, to some extent. The real 
appreciation during 1974-77 was driven by greater domestic public 
spending and expansionary monetary policy. The hypothesis on the links 
between a rising oil price, money supply, public spending, higher domestic 
inflation and the real appreciation of the domestic currency established by 
the model applies to the Venezuelan case during 1973-77. Nevertheless, 
when the second oil shock is considered, it was shown that real 
appreciation was not the result o f  the so-called spending effect because the 
expansion o f  domestic demand was lower than in 1973-77 due to the
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deflationary fiscal and monetary policy applied during 1978-80 and the fa ll 
in private investment. This suggests that by 1978, given the lack of a 
manufacturing export-competitive sector, the fall in oil revenues led to 
internal and external problems, prompting the adoption of deflationary 
policies. The drop in private domestic investment greatly offset the 
positive impact of higher public spending on domestic demand during 
1981-82. Contrary to Auty (1987) and Gelb and Bourguignon (1988) we 
conclude that the real appreciation of the domestic currency during 1978-82 
does not seem to be adequately accounted for by the mechanisms 
considered within the Dutch disease theory, that is, the spending effect. 
Apart from 1981-82, when there was an attempt to reactivate the economy 
by raising public spending, deflationary policies were launched. Real 
appreciation may have been partly encouraged by the spending effect over 
these two years. Nevertheless, other more relevant factors seem to have 
been at work, namely, the acceleration of the inflation rate in the 
Venezuelan economy as a result of the elimination of price controls and 
subsidies together with some high wage offers in the public sector. Thus 
the reasons behind the real appreciation over these years were not 
principally related to the spending effect predicted by the Dutch disease 
model.
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3. Impact of the 1970’s Oil Booms on Economic Growth and Structural 
Change in the Venezuelan Non-Oil Economy 
Introduction
This chapter examines the impact of the 1970s oil boom on economic growth 
and structural change in the Venezuelan non-oil economy within the Dutch 
disease framework. The major purpose is to quantify Dutch disease in 
Venezuela during 1973-82 and to establish which role, if  any, were played by 
the mechanisms of transmission embodied in the standard Dutch disease 
model in explaining the phenomenon.
In considering the topic, we first present an overview and brief assessment o f 
the Venezuelan non-oil economy during the 1960s, which are o f relevance to 
the understanding of the impact of the 1970s oil booms on growth and 
structural change in Venezuela. Section 2 sets the macroeconomic context 
during the 1970s oil booms. Section 3 paves the way for the measuring o f a 
Dutch disease index by presenting stylised facts on growth and structural 
change in the Venezuelan economy during 1968-94. Indicators of growth and 
structural change for Venezuela and some selected developing countries are 
presented. In section 4 two kinds of Dutch disease indices for 1968-94 are 
estimated according to the methodology developed by Gelb and Associates
(1988). The first index uses the Chenery-Syrquin (1975) norms, while the 
second index relies upon the Syrquin (1989) standardised pattern o f structural 
change as counterfactuals.
Section 5 discusses whether the Dutch disease mechanisms embodied in the 
standard Dutch disease model were of any relevance in explaining the 
performance of Venezuelan manufacturing during 1973-82. This is done by 
looking at the trends in sectoral relative prices and by estimating an 
econometric model which sheds light on the impact of real appreciation and 
the absorption effect on four sectors of the non-oil economy. Because of the
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non-stationary nature of the data, a cointegration approach was adopted. The 
theory of cointegration and the error correction model (VECM) (Granger, 
1983; Granger and Engle, 1985; Johansen, 1988, 1991) and Stock and Watson
(1989) dynamic OLS are used to test the existence of the equilibrium 
relationships implied by the Dutch disease theory. It is noteworthy that 
previous econometric works on Dutch disease economics in both developed 
and developing countries are scanty and do not test for stationarity, thus their 
results are likely to be misleading.
3.1 Major features of the Venezuelan economy during the pre-boom 
phase (1960-72)
By 1973 Venezuela was a middle income small economy which had achieved 
some manufacturing import-substitution development. Manufacturing was the 
fastest growing sector during the 1950-70 years with its share in GDP 
increasing from 12 to 17 per cent over these years. By contrast, agriculture 
never recovered from the initial disruptive impact o f oil revenues in the 1920s, 
and despite substantial subsidies and investment programmes this sector only 
accounted for 6 per cent of GDP in 1972. However, it must be stressed that 
the major share of non-oil GDP was accounted for by services. This was 
partly the expected outcome of the accrual of significant oil revenues, which 
supported greater import capacity.
The 1950s and 1960s were characterised by high investment, which was made 
possible by the accrual of oil revenues to the state. By 1972 public saving 
accounted for more than 40 per cent o f total national savings. State-owned 
enterprises were established in transport, electricity, iron, aluminium, steel 
and later oil. It has been estimated that over 1968-72, 30 per cent o f gross 
investment was public.1
BCV, economic reports, various issues.
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Other aspects of the Venezuelan economy during the 1960s, which are worth 
mentioning within the context of this thesis, are the low inflation rate and 
public external debt. During 1958-72 the consumer price index increased at 
an average yearly rate o f only 1.8 per cent, and in 1972 public foreign debt 
was $1 billion.2
Despite rapid growth, however, the Venezuelan economy suffered from high 
unemployment and a severely squeezed income distribution. Open 
unemployment was estimated to be 8 per cent in 1971 (without including 
underemployment). According to Gelb and Bourguignon (1988, p. 323), the 
Gini coefficient for incomes before transfers exceeded 0.50.
As discussed in later chapters, striking features of Venezuelan 
industrialisation during the 1960s were the lack of a non-oil export- 
competitive sector, low employment generation, failure to equalise income 
distribution, heavy dependence on imported capital and intermediate goods, 
high capital intensity and high protection. The reduced market due to the non­
existence of exports and the unequal income distribution may explain the 
slowdown of manufacturing that occurred in the late 1960s. The policy 
response of the Christian Democratic government (1968-73) to this 
development was the launching of a resource-based industrialisation in steel 
and aluminium. It must be noted that this administration also implemented a 
nationalistic oil policy which would end with the nationalisation of the oil 
industry in 1975. The higher oil revenues allowed the COPEI government to 
compensate for slower economic growth of the non-oil economy, with greater 
public spending.
The new social democratic government of AD (1974-78) emphasised the need 
to fight poverty and unemployment and continued with the resource-based 
industrialisation.
2 BCV (1990), tomo I.
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The above background allows us to summarize some features of the 
Venezuelan economy by 1970, which are relevant for the analysis in terms of 
the Dutch disease framework, as follows:
(a) The booming or oil sector works as a kind of enclave, which only directly 
affects the public sector through tax payments. Thus there is no resource 
movement from the rest of the economy to the oil sector. It can be assumed 
that the oil sector contains only its sector-specific factors, while full mobility 
of capital and labour are common to the tradable and non-tradable sectors.
(b) The spending effect of the boom, which relates to the increase in national 
expenditure, depends solely on the government's policy response to the boom.
(c) The Venezuelan economy was characterised by the existence of 
unemployment at the beginning o f the 1970s. Thus the assumption of full 
employment common to most of the Dutch disease models needs to be 
qualified. Nevertheless, there were some rigidities in the skilled labour 
market.
(d) The Venezuelan government adopted a fixed exchange rate regime with 
free convertibility between January 1964 and February 1983. The parity was 
USS1 =Bs4.30.
(d) There was no non-oil export-competitive manufacturing or agricultural 
sector.
3.2 The 1970s Oil booms and the macroeconomic context: stylised facts
3.2.1 The 1973-77 phase
Following the three-fold increase in oil prices by the end of 1973, policy 
discussion in Venezuela was concerned with the issue o f what to do with the 
extra oil income. The newly elected government of Carlos Andres Perez
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made an initial attempt to sterilise the windfall income by transferring funds 
abroad. Nevertheless, this was not possible, and during 1973-77 there was a 
substantial expansion of private sector consumption and especially 
investment. The revenues accruing to the government were mainly used to: 
expand imports, public investment in manufacturing and investment in 
infrastructure; to subsidise domestic private industry and agriculture; and, to a 
lesser extent, to increase wages.3 Likewise, the resource-based industrial 
strategy initiated in the late 1960s was also reinforced during the oil boom 
period of 1973-82.
The domestic distribution of oil revenues brought about a huge expansion of 
home demand driven by the rapid growth of both consumption and investment 
during 1975-78 (see Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.1). Investment grew by 19 per cent 
per year during 1973-1977 and this variable increased its share o f value added 
from 18.7 per cent in 1974 to 33.8 per cent in 1977 (see Table 3.2). The trend 
in public investment growth during 1973-77 is explained by the launching of 
important investment programmes, which were embodied in the Fifth Plan of 
the Nation (1976-1980).4
The surge in domestic demand boosted imports, which grew at an average 
yearly rate o f 21 per cent during 1973-78 compared with 4 per cent over 1968- 
72 (Fig. 3.1). It is estimated that imports of capital goods grew by 61 per cent 
per year during this phase while at the same time intermediate and consumer 
goods achieved average yearly growth rates of 29.9 and 49 per cent, 
respectively.
It should be noted that the marked import expansion through 1974-77 was 
accompanied by a falling trend in oil export revenues. This brought about a 
deteriorating situation of the trade balance which, according to the Central
For a detailed discussion o f  the use o f  oil revenues in Venezuela, see Gelb (1989) and Mommer (1991).
A major exponent o f  this policy was Gumersindo Rodriguez (1979), minister o f  planning.
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Bank of Venezuela (BCV),5 declined from US$7414 m in 1974 to US$1500 m 
in 1978 (see chapter 2 and Fig 3.3 below).
Table 3.1 Trends in the final demand components of Venezuelan real GDP
Sectors 1968-72 1973-77 1978-82 1973-82 1983-88
Domestic demand* 7.30 13.00 1.10 7.30 -0.40
0.99 0.99 0.55 0.84 0.02
Non-oil domestic demand 7.61 13.00 0.08 6.83 0.19
0.99 0.99 0.01 0.79 0.00
Consumption 6.40 10.40 4.80 7.60 0.10
0.99 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.01
Private consumption 6.40 10.50 4.80 7.70 -0.20
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.01
Public consumption 6.40 9.40 4.72 6.60 2.87
0.94 0.89 0.84 0.89 0.71
Gross domestic investment 10.05 19.10 -8.02 6.40 -2.76
0.95 0.96 0.86 0.44 0.14
Non-oil gross domestic investment 11.50 19.60 -13.00 4.41 2.10
0.94 0.95 0.96 0.20 0.00
Private investment 13.40 20.40 -15.40 4.60 -4.10
0.99 0.96 0.99 0.19 0.49
Public investment 7.10 17.00 -6.30 3.60 8.96
0.22 0.87 0.27 0.17 0.47
Non-oil exports 12.40 14.10 7.70 11.20 8.30
0.89 0.93 0.77 0.95 0.89
Imports 3.70 21.20 0.30 9.30 -4.75
0.86 0.98 0.00 0.67 0.12
Non-oil GDP 7*** 9.80 1.70 5.80 2.17
0.98 0.98 0.93 0.87 0.61
Total GDP 3.20 4.00 0.50 2.70 2.51
0.98 0.92 0.39 0.87 0.69
Notes: *Growth rates are the least squares estimates o f  trend growth; **domestic demand is defined as the sum o f  
consumption and gross domestic investment; ***It refers to the 1960-73 period. Figures in bold are the R2 o f  the trend 
growth rates. Source: own estimations based on data at 1984 price provided by the Central Bank o f  Venezuela, economic 
reports, various issues.
The greater home demand brought about some acceleration of the inflation 
rate during 1973-77 compared to 1960-72. However, it must be noted that, as 
shown in Fig. 3.2 below, the trend was modest compared to the huge increase 
in domestic demand and inflation was relatively controlled from 1975 to 1978. 
This development is accounted for by the surge in imports and the price 
control and subsidies policy launched during 1973-77. The same figure 
suggests that the first oil boom prompted a drop in the unemployment rate 
during 1973-77 compared to the pre-boom phase. There was a rise in
5
BCV, economic report, 1979.
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employment during 1973-77, followed by a continuous decline until 1984 
with the exception of a slight recovery in 1980.6
Fig. 3.1 Trends in the final demand components of GDP, 1968-90, (log scale)
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Over this phase, especially after 1976, a change in debt policy took place, with 
a sudden increase in external loans received by the central government and 
public sector agencies. Likewise, private sector debt in international markets 
also increased.
Although data for total employment and unemployment may give an accurate picture o f  the trends in both variables; Fig.. 3.2 
also shows a rise in the unemployment rate in 1975, which is unlikely because construction, manufacturing and services value
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Fig. 3.2 Total Employment, unemployment and inflation in Venezuela, 1965-90
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Notes: L= total employment; CPI consumer price index, base year: 1984. Sources: Central Statistics and Information 
Office, Household Survey.
Table 3.2 Final demand components of value added (%)
1968 1973 1977 1978 1982 1986 1988
Consumption 41.2 47.8 64.6 67.0 79.4 69.1 71.5
Private consumption 35.6 41.4 55.7 58.6 69.7 59.0 60.3
Public consumption 5.6 6.4 8.9 8.4 9.7 10.0 11.2
G. D. Investment 13.6 18.7 33.8 36.0 25.0 17.4 14.0
Private investment 7.9 13.1 25.4 26.7 14.0 9.4 6.6
Public investment 4.2 4.5 7.2 7.3 5.1 5.9 5.1
Exports 55.1 45.3 25.7 26.5 22.5 27.8 30.1
Private (goods) 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.9
Oil 53.9 43.1 22.2 22.5 17.4 19.6 21.0
Public 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0
Services 0.4 0.8 2.2 2.8 3.8 7.4 8.2
Imports 16.1 15.6 34.5 34.6 33.1 14.8 12.9
Total GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: As in Table 3.1.
3.2.2 The 1978-82 phase
The Venezuelan non-oil economy stagnated during 1978-82. Non-oil value 
added grew by only 2 per cent per year in this period and private domestic 
investment growth began to slow down from 1978 (see Table 3.2).
As shown in chapter 2, the reasons for the stagnation of the Venezuelan 
economy from 1978, despite the second oil price increase, are mainly related
added were growing.
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to the launching of a stabilisation programme in 1979. This was a response to 
the growing internal and external deficits caused by falling oil revenues from 
19797 and a huge foreign debt, aspects which are related to the lack of an 
export-competitive manufacturing sector and the excessive dependence on 
imports. The adjustment programme was supposed to last until 1980 but, in 
fact, recession persisted until 1982 despite the second oil price increase.
Within the context of the Venezuelan economy, the immediate effect o f this 
adjustment programme was the acceleration of the inflation rate prompted by 
the price liberalisation policy that also activated a wage-price spiral. The
Fig 3.3 Some macroeconomics indicators
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output is based on data at 1984 prices. Sources: as Table 3.1, oil revenues: Baptista, 1991.
It must be bom in mind that the concept o f  oil revenues refers to an income which is different from the fiscal tax paid by the 
oil companies to the state. Instead, oil revenues are defined as a rent in the Ricardian and Marxist sense o f  the term. Mommer 
(1997) and Baptista (1991) define oil revenues as a rent paid by the oil companies to the state. They define a normal benefit as 
15 per cent over the invested capital. Thus all benefit in excess o f  15 per cent is considered as rent or the remuneration to the 
natural resourceds. In other words, oil revenues are understood as a kind o f  international transfer.
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trade unions managed to get an increase in wages and salaries from January 
1980. It must be noted that the general living cost index in Caracas rose from
7.2 per cent in 1978 to 12.3 per cent in 1979 and 21.6 per cent in 1980.8
The inflationary process, together with fiscal spending cuts and lower 
monetary liquidity, led to a decline in home demand and non-oil value added 
which grew by only 1.1 and 2.0 per cent per year, respectively, during 1978- 
82 (see Table 3.1). Both public and private consumption increased at lower 
growth rates than in the preceding phase (1973-77). The reduction in 
domestic demand was largely accounted for by a decline in investment growth 
from 1979, with the public component recording negative growth during 
1978-82 (-15.4 per cent per year). Similarly, private investment undertook a 
substantial decline of -6.3 per cent per year over 1978-82 as compared to 17 
per cent in the preceding phase (see Tables 3.1, 3.2 and Fig. 3.1).
During 1978-80 the decline in import growth owing to falling investment and 
together with the stable performance of oil exports and the rise in oil prices, 
allowed for an improvement in the external balance. Thus, the balance of 
payments experienced some improvement in 1979 (Fig 3.3). By 1981-82 the 
substantial slackening of value added, the improvement in the external and 
fiscal sectors and the assumption that the second oil boom would be longer, 
led to the adoption of an expansionary policy. Nevertheless, no significant 
recovery took place, and total investment and domestic demand experienced 
only a mild recovery in 1981, because the expansion of public consumption 
and investment was offset by the drop in private domestic investment and the 
outflow of capital.9 It is estimated that capital outflow amounted to 
US$38,815 m. between 1973 and 1987, and that the foreign assets o f the 
private sector represented 131.5% of total external debt by 1985.10 Private 
financial balances in Venezuela had been negative from the late 1960s and
8
BCV economic reports, various issues.
9
It must be noted that there were no changes affecting the regulations o f  the capital market over these years.
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this situation worsened during 1973-82 (see Table 3.3). The outflow of 
capital was encouraged by the policy of keeping interest rates fixed in 1980, 
despite domestic inflation and the rise of interest rates in the US. Moreover, 
the conditions in the oil market deteriorated which, together with the lack of a 
non-oil export-competitive sector, led to the balance of payments crisis of 
1983 (Fig. 3.3).
Finally, some evidence suggests that the low capital absorption may have 
contributed to the stagnation of the Venezuelan economy by 1978. For 
instance, the growth rate o f the non-oil economy was falling from 1977 
despite the fact that investment growth had achieved its maximum level in that 
year, and there were large capital outflows (Baptista, 1986, 1997, Mommer, 
1991), (see also Fig. 3.3). This may indicate that the expanded productive 
capacity due to the over-investment of oil revenues during 1975-78, could not 
be matched by domestic demand which was depressed during 1978-82. It 
must be noted that the inability to export implied that production could not 
find demand in the international markets.
Table 3.3 External financial balance and oil revenues, Venezuela
Year Public financial Private financial oil revenues Financial balance
Balance balance (R) Public/R Private/R
1970 786 -279 5474 14.4 -5.1
1971 715 133 6396 11.2 2.1
1972 2227 -654 6847 32.5 -9.6
1973 634 -1030 10259 6.2 -10.0
1974 162 -1759 27476 0.6 -6.4
1975 2144 424 18224 11.8 2.3
1976 8674 -2166 17063 50.8 -12.7
1977 7921 -582 14609 54.2 -4.0
1978 7842 -846 12710 61.7 -6.7
1979 6333 -409 18077 35.0 -2.3
1980 2325 -3077 22177 10.5 -13.9
1981 4588 -4494 21213 21.6 -21.2
1982 9873 -6428 14728 67.0 -43.6
1983 -4282 -700 11341 -37.8 -6.2
1984 -3681 -405 16181 -22.7 -2.5
1985 -4341 -537 12321 -35.2 -4.4
1986 -4473 -1321 6764 -66.1 -19.5
1987 -2725 -185 11603 -23.5 -1.6
Notes: R = oil revenues; mill o f Bs at 1968 constant prices. Sources: Mommer (1995, p. 
39, Table 3).
10
Pastor (1990), quoted by Mommer (1991).
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3.2.3 The Adjustment of the Venezuelan economy during the post-boom 
phase (1983-88)
The balance of payments crisis in 1983 forced the government to launch a 
stabilisation programme, which implied the adoption of devaluation and a 
multiple exchange rate regime (in February 1983), cuts in public spending, 
foreign exchange controls, an extension of protectionism and price controls. 
This program which continued in 1984, when a 40 per cent devaluation was 
implemented and proved to be successful in achieving external and fiscal 
balance. This, together with a combination of high unemployment and low 
inflation, led the government to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy in 1986. 
However, the falling trend in oil revenues following a sharp decline in oil 
prices brought about further complications. Thus, another 93 per cent 
devaluation was implemented in December 1986. During 1986-88, the 
government undertook expansionary policies which implied a sharp fall in its 
international reserves and the accumulation o f imbalances which ended with 
the worst economic crisis o f the Venezuelan economy in 1989 following the 
launching of the IMF adjustment programme.
3.3 Growth and structural change in the Venezuelan non-oil economy 
during 1973-82 and Dutch disease
According to the standard Dutch disease model, a resource boom is bound to 
prompt a structural adjustment in favour of the non-traded sectors o f the 
economy. The mechanisms or intermediate causes of Dutch disease are as 
follows: (a) real appreciation of the domestic currency and the consequent fall 
in the profitability of tradables, (b) increases in real and product wages, and
(c) a rise in the interest rate.
At the same time, within the ‘resource curse’ thesis the existence of a negative 
impact of the oil sector on agriculture and manufacturing is expected to work 
through the real overvaluation of the domestic currency, the adoption of
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inward-oriented industrial policies and the lack of macro discipline together 
with the instability o f oil prices.
If  these two theories apply to Venezuela, the following effects should hold: (a) 
a resource boom may lead to a deceleration of the growth rate of the non-oil 
tradable sectors (agriculture and manufacturing) or to lower growth rates o f 
these sectors compared to non-tradables; and (b) an structural specialisation in 
favour of non-tradables must be the outcome of a boom (de-industrialisation 
and/or de-agriculturalisation). Even more importantly, these outcomes must 
be associated with the above mentioned transmission mechanisms.
Pattern of Growth
Table 3.4 presents a comparison of the growth performance o f the Venezuelan 
non-oil economy with that of other developing countries for 1967-88. The 
picture that emerges from these figures is that Venezuelan manufacturing
Table 3.4 Sectoral growth of GDP in some selected developing countries, 1966-1988 (average annual growth 
rates, %)
Average annual growth rates
Countries 1967-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-88 1989-96
A M s A M s A M S A M S A M S
Bolivia 1.7 2.6 -2.6 4.0 7.2 8.1 2.5 -3.6 1.9 1.4 0.4 0.5 - - -
Colombia 4.7 7.3 6.2 3.9 4.6 5.2 3.2 j 2.5 5.2 3.1 3.9 2.9 2.0 1.5 5.8
Costa Rica 6.7 - 5.8 1.9 8.2 5.4 1.3 -0.3 0.8 3.5 4.7 3.9 3.0 3.4 4.2
Ecuador 4.3 10.7 5.4 4.0 11.9 10.1 2.5 6.1 4.7 4.0 -0.2 -0.2 3.4 2.8 3.0
Venezuela 3.8 oo bo 5.2 3.0 11.8 10.2 0.6 4.4 -0.5 5.3 5.8 3.5 1.1 3.4 2.1
Sources: A = agriculture; M  =  manufacturing; S = services. G rowth rates are expressed at 1987 constant dollar prices. Sources: W orld B ank  data 
base. Estim ations o f  sectoral growth rates for Venezuela are based on data at constant 1984. Sources: as Table 3.1.
achieved satisfactory rates of growth until 1973-77 and following a severe 
stagnation during 1978-82, recovered during 1983-88. In the case of 
agriculture, the sector seems to have been disrupted by the 1973-77 oil boom 
and the deflationary policies of 1978-82, but it experienced some recovery 
during 1983-88.
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A more detailed picture of the pattern of growth of the Venezuelan economy 
is provided by Table 3.5 and Fig 3.4. These indicate that construction and 
manufacturing achieved the highest levels of value added and employment 
growth during 1973-77, followed by services. The marked employment 
increase in construction during 1975-77 (13 per cent), compared to the pre-
Table 3.5 Sectoral growth rates of real value added, employment and exports, Venezuela, 1960-95
Value Added 1960-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-88 1989-95
Agriculture 5.84 2.97 0.61 5.34 1.14
0.97 0.75 0.36 0.97 0.78
Mining 2.91 -2 0.67 15.75 4.62
0.38 0.12 0.042 0.95 0.54
Manufacturing 8.22 11.82 4.43 5.81 3.41
0.99 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.74
Construction 8.39 20.46 -4.14 -2.23 4.92
0.76 0.95 0.75 0.36 0.2
Services 6.85 10.23 -0.50 3.45 2.08
0.97 0.99 0.18 0.96 0.55
Non-oil value added 6.92 10.92 1.72 3.64 2.15
0.97 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.47
Employment 1968-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-88
Agriculture 0.5 -3.14 0.65 1.61
0.05 0.77 0.40 0.56
Mining 2.067 -2.58 6.1 -3.33
0.28 0.14 0.63 0.49
Manufacturing 4.35 9.68 -0.58 4.57
0.99 0.99 0.09 0.86
Construction 5.95 10.92* 4.5 8.34
0.09 0.98 0.88 0.76
Services 5.6 5.12 4.99 4.79
0.09 0.98 0.99 0.97
Total 4.18 4.49 3.25 4.46
0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96
Exports 1960-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-88 89-95
Agriculture 13.29 -17.74 9.92 -15.00 16.55
0.74 0.74 0.28 0.34 0.79
Oil 1.60 -12.51 -6.46 1.87 7.25
0.60 0.86 0.77 0.31 0.92
Manufacturing** 9.69 -19.95 23.63 7.16 21.33
0.51 0.29 0.72 0.33 0.73
Non-oil exports 10.33 -19.78 22.66 6.66 21.17
0.68 0.37 0.74 0.29 0.74
Notes: growth rates are the least squares estimates o f  trend growth. *It refers to 1974-1977. **It refers to private manufacturing. 
Figures in bold are the R 2 o f  the trend growth rates. Sources: real value added at 1984 prices: as Table 3.1; em ployment: own 
estim ations based on data provided by the OCEI, H ousehold Survey, various issues, and the Industrial Survey, exports in tones: 
BCV, Finexpo, economic surveys, various issues.
boom phase, is consistent with the Dutch disease theory, but manufacturing 
employment also expanded greatly during 1973-76. Although it was not
i l l
possible to estimate factor intensities for the economic sectors due to the lack 
of data, it is expected that manufacturing would have been more capital- 
intensive than construction, services and agriculture. Nevertheless, the boom 
of some of the labour-intensive manufacturing branches and the public sector 
may explain the growth in manufacturing employment during 1973-77. 
Furthermore, increasing ratios of raw materials to wages during these years 
compared to 1968-71 may have encouraged the use of labour.11 Although 
agricultural growth declined during 1973-77 compared to the pre-boom phase, 
it must be noted that this sector was also affected by droughts during 1975-76.
Fig. 3.4 Sectoral growth in value added, employment and exports, Venezuela, 1960-94, (log scale)
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Notes: Ya = agricultural value added; Ym = mining value added; Yma = manufacturing value added; Yc = construction value 
added; Ys = services value added; Lag = agricultural employment; Ln, = mining employment; Ln,a= manufacturing employment, 
Lc= construction employment; Ls= services employment,; Xjg = agricultural exports; Xma = manufacturing exports. Sources: as 
Table 3.5.
As regards the impact of the 1970s oil boom on exports, Table 3.5 shows that 
the performance of non-oil exports has been really poor and that a clear 
negative link between manufacturing and agricultural exports and the growth 
of oil revenues can be established. The 1973-77 phase saw a sharp fall in
See chapter 6 o f  the present dissertation.
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export growth, which was the result of real appreciation as well as the 
expansion of the domestic market (see chapter 6).
This information suggests that some Dutch disease symptoms can be observed 
in Venezuela and/or before during 1973-77, which were related to the 
disruptive impact o f the 1973 oil price shock on agriculture and on the 
performance of the already insignificant non-oil exports. By contrast, 
manufacturing output and employment accelerated their pace o f growth over 
1973-77.
S tructural change
As regards the argument derived from the Dutch disease theory, which states 
that the outcome of a boom will be a structural specialisation in favour of non­
tradables, evidence suggest that the Venezuelan economy was severely 
squeezed by the late 1960s. Data showing the specialisation in favour o f non­
tradables (construction and services) is presented in Table 3.6. This provides 
a picture of structural change for selected developing countries and the lower 
middle income economies, which is the group to which Venezuela belongs. It 
becomes evident that, as applied to Venezuela, there is a severe squeeze of 
agriculture and to a lesser extent in manufacturing and this pattern was already 
set by the mid-1960s.
An interesting aspect, however, is that the share of manufacturing in GDP did 
not decline during 1972-82 (see also Fig 3.5). By contrast, after undertaking a 
decline from the mid-1960s, the sectoral share undertook some increase 
during 1969-72 and this continued increasing during 1973-76 but at a slower 
pace. It must be noted that as applied to Venezuela the increase in the 
manufacturing share in value added during 1983-88 was due to the positive 
effect o f devaluation on import substitution, while the de-industrialisation 
effect in the rest of the countries appears to be related to the launching of 
adjustment programmes during these years.
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Table 3.6 Structural change in Venezuela and some developing countries
ftr capita 
OP($)
Population 
mil, 1988
ftoduoricn stnrtue as %cf(XP Sectoral dwes in 
total experts CM)1966 1972 i__ L 1982 1988 1996
1966 1988 A M S A M S I A M S A M S A M S 1972 1982 1988 1996
Algeria 1818 2576 23.8 9 14 49 10 14 46 i 10 10 38 14 14 45 13 8 38 5 1 4 4
Bolivia m 701 Q0 19 13 53 20 13 46 • 21 9 41 33 16 35 - - - 1 3 3 16
CUcntia 682 1120 Q0 25 19 49 24 22 47! 19 21 30 17 21 47 16 16 64 20 24 24 34
CbstaRca 1149 1541 0.0 23 - 54 19 19 54! 24 20 30 16 21 60 16 18 60 24 25 25 24
Ecuador 604 1108 9.8 26 19 51 22 19 30 i 12 18 48 14 21 30 12 21 51 2 3 2 9
Vgti* 352 849 301 28 - 45 31 18 42! 20 13 48 19 24 52 17 24 51 31 8 35 32
ftru 312 295 206 18 16 52 17 20 51 i 10 20 48 8 25 56 7 23 56 2 14 16 16
Venezuela 2897 2662 188 6 15 68 5 15 66 ! 5 19 57 7 22 60 6 20 64 2 2 8 12
Notes: A= agriculture, M = manufacturing, S = services; per capita GNP at 1987 constant American dollars. Sources: World Bank 
data based; except for Venezuela all the structures are based on data valued at 1987 constant dollar prices. The last heading 
refers to manufacturing exports. Sources: Central Bank o f  Venezuela economic reports, various issues and World Bank, data 
base for all other countries.
Fig 3.5 Structural change in the Venezuelan non-oil economy, 1960-94
Value added s truc tu re  E m ploym ent s truc tu re
68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
■■■ Manufacturing ■■■ Agriculture Manufacturing i h  Agriculture
Sources: as Table 3.7.
A more detailed look at the process of structural change exhibited by the 
Venezuelan non-oil economy is presented in Table 3.7. This makes clear that 
in terms of value added and employment, construction and manufacturing 
increased their size during 1973-77. Manufacturing's contribution to value 
added rose from 15 per cent in 1973 to 16 per cent in 1977. Analogously, the 
sector's relative share of total employment increased from 17 per cent in 1973 
to 19 per cent in 1977. Data on manufacturing employment given by the 
Household Survey differ greatly from that published by the Industrial Survey.
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Table 3.7 Sectoral shares o f Venezuelan non-oil value added and employment (%)
Value Added Employment
Sectors 1968 1973 1977 1982 1988 1994 1968 1973 1977 1982 1988
Agriculture 11.1 8.7 6.5 6.2 6.9 6.6 25.0 22.1 16.9 13.8 13.3
Mining 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1
Manufacturing 14.6 15.4 15.9 18.6 21.9 21.4 15.9 16.5 19.1 17.8 17.6
Construction 5.8 9.1 13.0 11.6 7.6 7.2 6.3 7.1 8.1 9.2 8.4
Services 67.6 65.8 64.0 63.1 62.7 63.6 51.0 52.7 54.4 57.9 59.6
Non-Oil GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: the structure o f  value added is based on constant 1984 prices. Sources: value added: own estimations based on
Central Bank o f  Venezuela (various issues); employment: OCEI, Household Survey, (various issues).
According to the latter source there was a sharper increase in manufacturing 
employment during 1973-77, which is in accordance with the substantial 
expansion of sectoral value added over the period.12 Construction's relative 
share o f value added rose from 9 per cent to 13 per cent in 1982. This sector 
had also increased its share from 6 per cent to 9 per cent through 1968-72, 
while a fall from 12 per cent in 1982 to 8 per cent in 1988 took place. The 
contribution of services to value added declined from 66 per cent in 1973 to 
64 per cent in 1977. A drop in this share also occurred during 1968-72 and 
1983-88. Services observed a rise in its relative contribution to total 
employment between 1973-77 and in the post-boom phase.
Correspondingly, agriculture and mining underwent a drop in their relative 
shares of value added and employment during 1973-77. The contribution to 
non-oil value added of these sectors also fell in the pre-boom phase and in the 
post-boom period (1963-88).
Structural change during 1978-1982 was influenced by the deflationary 
economic policies launched during 1978-80. The public spending cuts
It must be noted that data on employment for Venezuela provided by the Household Survey carried out by the Central 
Statistics and Information Office are very poor. Figures for total employment and unemployment may reflect the trends in both 
variables, but they are not easily reconciled with the sectoral development o f  value added. According to this source, 
manufacturing employment expanded at a very low rate during 1973-77 and a substantial drop in employment growth for all 
sectors took place in 1975. This is unlikely, because all the economic sectors showed high value added growth in this year. 
Since the Industrial Survey provides data on manufacturing employment, we applied the growth rates o f  employment derived 
from this source to the 1966 value o f  manufacturing employment given by the Household Survey. It was not possible to use an 
alternative source o f  information for employment because data given by the Labour Ministry are even less reliable and are
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implied a decline in the relative size of non-tradables in non-oil value added, 
with both services and construction diminishing their contribution to non-oil 
value added during 1978-82. However, these two sectors increased their 
relative contribution to total employment for the period. Thus a significant 
rise in the manufacturing contribution to value added from 16 per cent in 1978 
to 19 per cent occurred in 1982 while the share o f agriculture and mining in 
value added remained the same during the phase.
The development of the sectoral export structure is presented in Table 3.8. 
This makes clear the insignificant share of both agricultural and 
manufacturing exports in total exports until the present. This, together with 
the evidence presented in Table 3.7 above, makes clear that the Dutch disease 
symptoms in Venezuela are related to the squeeze of agriculture and to the 
virtual lack of a manufacturing export-competitive sector.
Table 3.8 Export structure, Venezuela, 1960-95
1960-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-88 1989-95
Oil 99.72 99.35 98.84 95.66 86.94
Agriculture 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.23
Manufacturing 0.22 0.58 1.1 4.22 12.82
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: BCV, Finexpo, reports (various issues).
3.4 Estimation of a Dutch disease index for Venezuela
In order to provide further evidence of Dutch disease in Venezuela, two 
versions of the indices of Dutch disease were computed for the whole 1968-94 
period. Both relied on the methodology presented by Gelb and Associates 
(1988). According to this methodology the Dutch disease index is computed 
by comparing the trends in the sectoral shares for agriculture, manufacturing, 
services and construction in non-oil GDP to the norms or standardised pattern
sporadic.
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of structural change derived from the Chenery-Syrquin norms (1975).13 
Following Gelb (1988), we used non-oil value added per capita in place of 
real income per capita.14 The formula provided by Gelb (1988) to estimate the 
Dutch disease index is as follows:
DD = (SNag + SNma) -  (Sag + Sma)
where SNi are the norms for the sectoral shares and Si are the actual constant 
prices shares.
Thus the index is derived from the deviation of the actual shares from their 
stylised norms according to Chenery-Syrquin (1975), providing a measure of 
the squeezed of agriculture and manufacturing share in the non-oil economy 
relative to their normal levels.
The first index computed in this dissertation used the Chenery-Syrquin (1975) 
norm as a counterfactual, but while Gelb only estimated the index for the 
years 1973-82 we estimated a year-to-year index for the whole 1968-94 
period. In addition, another version of this index was attempted by using the 
actual sectoral shares of manufacturing in private GDP.
Following Sakr (1997), a second index of Dutch disease was computed by 
using the results provided by Syrquin (1989) to derive the counterfactual 
norms. In doing so, we first estimated the standardised norms for the relative 
shares in non-oil GDP corresponding to agriculture and manufacturing. These 
were obtained by multiplying the stylised growth rates o f these sectors which 
were associated with a 1 per cent increase in per capita income as reported by
Despite the fact that structural change can be influenced by many factors, a general stylised pattern has been identified, 
which relates structural change to the growth o f  per capita income. The empirical evidence suggests that this pattern is 
observed with an important degree o f  uniformity and it is known as Chenery’s stylised pattern o f  structural change.14
This is justified by the high share o f  oil on GDP and exports, which would make the share o f  other sectors appear very low. 
Given the fact that Chenery and Syrquin present aggregate results for manufacturing and construction, an additional 
computation was made. Thus the Chenery-Syrquin equations were used to project industrial shares and then on industry was 
split into construction and manufacturing.
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Syrquin (1989, p. 37) to the observed non-oil per capita income in the 
Venezuelan economy. Therefore the index is derived as the deviation o f the 
actual changes in the share from the norm. A positive index indicates a 
reinforcement of Dutch disease and a negative index would indicate a reverse 
Dutch disease effect. Reasons to estimate this index are the relatively newer 
character o f the estimations made by Syrquin compared to those of Chenery, 
and the availability of estimates for manufacturing on their own as opposed to 
the industrial sector as a whole. The incremental index was also estimated as 
the change in the value of each index from the previous year. A negative 
number indicates an improvement while a positive number represents a 
deterioration of the index. The incremental index was more meaningful for 
catching marginal changes and for comparing the trends with the changes in 
economic policies.
The trends in those indices are analysed against the development in the oil 
sector and its windfalls, and some key variables such as the real exchange 
rate, domestic demand and shifts in economic policies.
The Manufacturing indices
Table 3.9 presents the sectoral shares in non-oil GDP and modified 
Chenery/Syrquin norms (1975) for 1972 and the Dutch disease index. These 
results suggest that the Venezuelan economy exhibited severe Dutch disease 
symptoms by 1972, in the sense that both the agriculture and manufacturing 
shares o f value added fell far below the estimated norms. Concerning the 
trends in the Dutch disease index, Figures 3.6 and 3.7 indicate that there was 
an increase in the index for manufacturing during 1966-68, which was 
followed by a decline during 1969-73. As shown later, these trends seem to 
be associated with the unfavourable effect of the structural overvaluation on 
manufacturing, and the launching of a resource-based state-led 
industrialisation by the late 1960s; a policy which was reinforced during
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1973-82. This and other incentive policies for manufacturing during 1973-77 
may explain why the index did not rise, but it declined slightly during 1975-76 
and more sharply prior to 1978. This suggests that in the case of Venezuelan
Table 3.9 Staxtural dun^andllitdidseasein Venczuda, 1972
Sedas Adual Nxns
^ icd tae 8.50 17.56
Moikiuring 15.69 27.45
Cbnstnictiai 923 1139
Services 66.58 43.60
Sources o^estirmtian
manufacturing Dutch disease was not reinforced during the 1970s oil booms.15 
It must be noted that an improvement in the index for private manufacturing 
occurred during 1974-77, 1977-79 and in 1981. The development in the later 
phase was the result o f the large decline in the share o f non-tradables due to 
the deflationary economic policies.
It must be highlighted that, as regards to manufacturing, the Dutch disease 
index worsened in Venezuela during 1983-88 in spite o f a real devaluation. 
This may indicate the irrelevance of devaluation policies for reversing Dutch 
disease, especially in the case of de-industrialisation in Venezuela. Finally, it 
is worth noting that the second Dutch disease index (Fig 3.7) suggests that 
there was an improvement in the index during 1989-91, although the trend in 
this index was highly unstable for the 1989-94 phase as a whole. Likewise, 
the index based on the Chenery-Syrquin (1975) norm indicates a similar trend 
during 1989-90.
It must be noted that according to Gelb (1988) this index also declined between 1972 and 1981.
119
Fig
 
3.6
 
Du
tch
 
di
se
as
e 
ind
ex
 
ba
se
d 
on 
the
 
C
he
ne
ry
-S
yr
qu
in
's 
(1
97
5)
 n
or
m
]U90jad
Fig
 
3.7
 
Du
tch
 
di
se
as
e 
in
de
x 
for
 V
en
ez
ue
la
n 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 
ba
se
d 
on
 
the
 
Sy
rq
ui
n'
s 
(1
98
9)
 n
or
m
}u aojad
The Agricultural index
Concerning the agricultural sector, the Dutch disease index increased during
1974-78 while it experienced some decline from 1979, which may be 
explained by the drop shown by non-tradables during 1978-82 and the 
positive impact of real devaluation during the post-boom phase. Nevertheless, 
this index increased again during 1986-88.
3.5 Did the transmission mechanisms of the Dutch disease model work in 
Venezuela during 1973-82?
3.5.1 Trends in sectoral relative prices
As shown in the previous chapter some real appreciation of the domestic 
currency was brought about by the first oil boom. Here we look at the trends 
in relative prices to establish their role in the performance of the tradable 
sectors during 1970s.
Table 3.10 illustrates the cumulative changes in the implicit deflator. This 
makes clear that there was a significant acceleration of the inflation rate 
measured as the non-oil GDP implicit deflator during 1973-77 compared to 
1968-72. The prices of both tradable and non-tradable sectors increased 
markedly during the boom years (see Fig. 3.8). This development reflected 
the large monetary expansion and the increase in public expenditure as a result 
of the surplus in the balance of payments and the expansion of domestic 
demand following the first oil price boom. Although the basic cause of 
domestic inflation during 1973-77 was demand pressure, an additional factor 
was represented by the increase in the price of imported goods which grew by
17.4 per cent in 1974 and 12 percent during 1975, compared to 5.4 per cent in
1973. Likewise, some induced wage increases also took place because the 
government passed a law for the general increase of wages and salaries in
1974, which is estimated to have represented an increase of 17 or 18 per cent
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of wage costs.16
Fig. 3.8 Growth rates of prices in the private non-oil economy, Venezuela, 1968-90, (per cent)
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Sources: As Table 3.10.
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A look at Table 3.10 indicates that construction recorded the highest rise in 
prices, but that the increase in prices for services price lagged behind those of 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing over 1973-77.
Thus, although the Dutch disease index increased for agriculture during 1973- 
77, one of the major mechanisms of transmission of the disease predicted by 
the standard model namely a decline in the relative prices o f tradables which 
is supposed to dampen profitability and investment, is not corroborated for 
agriculture. This was due to the policy of higher agricultural prices like the 
granting of incentives to increase production. It must be noted that the 
stagnation of agricultural value added from 1976 is also explained by adverse 
weather conditions.17
The performance of Venezuelan agriculture does not seem to be explained by 
the trends in relative prices. Indeed, de-agriculturalisation occurred during
Pazos (1988, pp. 124-125).
17
BCV, economic reports, 1977,1978.
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1973-77 despite a policy of allowing for higher producer price, subsidies, easy 
credit and cheaper inputs, and the higher domestic demand for intermediate 
and final agricultural goods.18
Table 3.10 Cumulative percentage price evolution in the private non-oil economy, 
Venezuela, 1969-88________________________________________________
1969-72 1973-77 1978-82 1973-82 1983-88
Agriculture 10.1 72.2 55.2 131.6 119.5
Mines -0.6 55.6 19.2 75.7 150.3
Manufacturing 8.2 51.5 49.9 109.9 96.2
Construction 12.3 82.0 54.5 145.3 97.7
Services 13.2 43.7 66.4 117.8 96.5
Non-oil GDP 12.0 50.9 60.8 119.4 97.2
Notes: * It refers to the cumulative annual changes in the sectoral price index. Source: 
own estimations based on data provided by the Central Bank o f Venezuela.
Fig. 3.9 Relative price of non-tradables to tradables, (index 1972=100), Venezuela, 1968-90
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Source: As Fig. 3.8.
Concerning the second oil price boom, a sharp increase in domestic inflation 
took place with agriculture and services prices experiencing the greatest rise. 
As already discussed, inflation during these years was not linked to demand
The increase in agricultural producer prices was the result o f  the greater domestic demand and the fixing o f  new minimum 
prices for the producer with respect to 15 crops, eggs, chicken, pigs and fish. The credits granted to agriculture by the 
government amounted to Bs 3000 m. compared to Bs 510,8 m. in 1974. The ‘Instituto de Credito Agricola y Pecuario’ was 
established to give credits to the small producers. Likewise a law was passed in 1974 according to which the debt o f  
agricultural producers was forgiven. An agricultural financial programme with a value o f Bs400 m., as part o f  the government
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pressures, but to other factors such as the freed prices policy adopted in 1979. 
In August 1979, control prices of almost all goods were abrogated with the 
exception of a few basic goods. This policy implied that only 37 of the 158 
categories that had been controlled remained so. Likewise this policy led to 
the establishment o f differential prices for public services, for redistribution 
purposes. The more moderate price increases in construction occurred in 
parallel with the strong contraction of this sector over the period. By contrast, 
the drop in services value added was accompanied by an acceleration of price 
growth.
As for the post-boom phase, mining and agriculture recorded the main 
increase in prices. Apart from 1987, there was a persistent drop in the relative 
prices o f non-tradables to manufacturing and agricultural goods during 1984- 
89. The lower growth of manufacturing prices compared to agriculture may 
be related to the existence of price controls in some manufacturing branches, 
which may have avoided a full mark-up price adjustment during 1983-88. 
Some agricultural subsectors may have benefited from the import substitution 
effect encouraged by the large devaluation of the domestic currency, but 
exports did not show a significant increase.
As regards the performance of manufacturing during 1973-77, contrary to the 
predictions of the core Dutch disease model,19 the incremental Dutch disease 
index for manufacturing fell slightly during 1973-77 and 1978-82 indicating 
an ‘improvement’.
Concerning the second mechanism embodied in the Dutch disease model, 
namely increasing real and product wages and salaries in tradables (although
assistance measures for the flood victims in 1976, was set (BCV, 1975, p. 158-59).
19
Apart from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, all the developing oil-exporting countries experienced an expansion o f  their 
manufacturing sectors during the 1970s oil boom (World Bank, 1984). This fact was highlighted by Benjamin et al. (op. cit.) 
and Fardmanesh (op. cit). The Dutch disease theory has shown some limitations in explaining the impact o f  a booming sector 
on the agricultural sector also. Richard’s (1994) points out that the impact o f  the booming activity o f  the 1970’s and 1980’s in 
Paraguay did not conform with the Dutch disease predictions since some o f  the traditional export-crops expanded. This 
outcome may be related to the complementary nature o f  the expansion o f  the new cash crops with some o f  the traditional 
export-activities.
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we do not have disaggregated data for agriculture), Table 3.11 indicates that 
the increase in manufacturing product wages was mild during 1973-77. 
Finally, as for interest rates, the setting of very low interest rates for 
agriculture and manufacturing until the 1980s is a very well-documented fact 
in Venezuela (see also chapter 4 of this dissertation).
Table 3.11 Sectoral trends in wages
1969-72 1974-77 1978-82 1983=88 "
Rxxbct’ttagps
Qmstructiai 3.47 -6.69 -1.56 -0.76
Mimfk*uring -1.17 0.60 260 -7.80
Ncrnirial\\agps
Construction 7.32 6.86 10.40 7.58
Mffidkturing 1.10 9.60 21.10 10.60
Sources: for construction wages Baptista (1997) and for manufacturing: OCEI, industrial survey 
and BCV, economic reports.
Relative prices and the trends in investment
De-agriculturalisation in Venezuela during 1973-77 does not seem to have 
been the outcome of real appreciation leading to lower profitability. Private 
and public investment in agriculture expanded substantially during 1973-77 
compared to the pre-boom phase. The considerable expansion of investment 
reflected the substantial credits granted to the sector by the government and 
the policy of cheap interest rates.20,21
Table 3.12 and Fig 3.10 indicate that private investment growth in agriculture 
was faster than in manufacturing during 1973-77, which may suggest that the
According to regulation No 3 o f  the General Law on Banks and Other Credit Institutions, commercial banks were required 
to allocate a minimum o f  20 per cent o f their loans to financing agricultural activities. Likewise, a Decree published in 1975 
established tax exoneration for income derived from capital granted to the agricultural sector (BCV, op. cit. p. 161).
It has been pointed out that the public sector allocation o f resources into agriculture was inefficient; for instance, grain 
production was favoured despite the lack o f  comparative advantages in this product compared to temperate products. Likewise, 
government assistance to increase farm size went to larger farmers who reloaned low-interest agricultural loans at higher 
interest for other purposes. (Auty, 1987).
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problems o f the agricultural sector are accounted for by the inefficient 
allocation of investment rather that by the relative price mechanism, which
T able 3 .1 2  Trend grow th in investm ent, V enezuela , 1968-84
Private Investment 68-72 74-77 78-82 83-84
Agriculture -4.43 8.84 -3.99 -17.05
0.33 0.43 0.27
Manufacturing* 9.15 14.52** - -
0.66 0.93
Services 6.28 24.21. -26.11 -6.01
0.7 0.91 0.99
Total 5.53 21.17 -24.58 -7.2
0.65 0.9 0.99
Public Investment
Agriculture 5.69 11.69 -16 -38.42
0.40 0.54 0.73 0.65
Manufacturing 69.49 0.54 -25.3 -36.59
0.99 0.97 0.82 0.76
Services - 1.6 18.69 2.05 14.44
0.00 0.90 0.03 0.78
Total 7.31 22.6 -2.46 -30.77
0.16 0.88 0.06 0.50
Notes: data at constant 1968 prices. There is no available data on private sectoral 
investment from 1984. *The Central Bank o f Venezuela stopped publishing data 
on private manufacturing investment from 1976. ** It refers to 1975-77.
Source: Own estimations based on data provided by the BCV, economic reports, 
various issues.
implied that the investment effort was not sustainable. The slump in 
agricultural value added and investment from 1977 to 1982 was associated 
with a decline in the level of financial resources granted to the sector by the 
government and private institutions and with the drop in domestic demand.
In our view the existence of Dutch disease symptoms in Venezuela during the 
1970s must be understood in the sense that further real appreciation (although 
mild) and a buoyant exchange currency set further obstacles to the 
development o f an export-competitive non-oil sector, which may have laid the 
foundations for a more independent and sustainable pattern of growth in the 
long-term. It is also worth mentioning that although private manufacturing 
growth accelerated during 1973-77 compared to 1968-72, the trend was lower 
relative to the growth in agriculture and services. Furthermore, Fig 3.11 
makes clear that the share of manufacturing in non-mining investment
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declined during 1973-77 compared to 1969-72.
Fig. 3.10 Trends in private investment, Venezuela, 1968-84, (log scale)
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9
8
7
6
5
6 8 7 0 7 2 7 4 7 6 7 8 8 0 8 2 8 4
----------- l a g  — &—  I s e  — ■ Y m a
Notes: lag = agricultural investment; Ima = manufacturing investment and Ise = investment in services. Ail 
data is at constant prices o f 1968. Sources: as Table 3.12.
Fig 3.11 Sectoral shares in non-oil investment (%), 1968-1984
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Sources: as Fig 3.10.
It may be said that the policy response to the 1973 oil boom encouraged the 
increase in public investment in manufacturing, but although private 
investment accelerated its pace of growth compared to the pre-boom phase,
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this was relatively modest, leading to a decline in its share in total private 
investment during 1973-77. This suggests that the policy response to the 
boom did not bring about a significant response in private manufacturing and 
that the first reaction in the sector was to use the high spare capacity to meet 
the greater home demand. This, as shown later on, was due to the lack o f a 
coherent industrial policy.
3.5.2 Econometric evidence on the transmission mechanisms of Dutch 
disease in the Venezuelan economy
3.5.2.1 Model
In order to give further support to the previous ideas, econometric estimations 
were attempted by using time series data for 1955-94. In this way, additional 
insights are provided on whether the Venezuelan tradable sectors were 
negatively influenced by the 1970s oil booms through real appreciation of the 
domestic currency and the spending effect, as predicted by the Dutch disease 
and ‘resource curse’ theories.
A reduced form model is formulated for the purpose of identifying the impact 
o f the 1970s oil boom on the Venezuelan non-oil economy. The basic 
hypothesis being investigated is that higher oil prices will cause -through the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate- a decline in the tradable output growth 
rate. Since there is a spending effect, we establish the relationship between 
real appreciation, real public spending and the output of the different 
economic activities. A second model considers real money supply as a proxy 
for the spending effect. Accordingly, the vector o f variables considered here 
includes the sectoral real value added as the explained variable, and the real 
money supply (M) and the real exchange rate (Er), as explanatory variables. 
A cointegration and vector error correction model approach was adopted. The 
reasons for using this methodology were twofold: firstly, most o f the 
macroeconomic variables are non-stationary or have a time series structure
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with a unit root. A second reason to choose the cointegration and error- 
correction approach was that this technique allows for consideration o f the 
dynamics of both short-run changes and long-run (level) adjustment 
processes; so it was possible to appraise the impact of the resource boom on 
the real side of the economy in the short term and long term.
The problem posed by the non-stationary character o f most o f the 
macroeconomic data has been highlighted by recent studies (Nelson and 
Plosser, 1982 and Schwert, 1988) which show that the trend components of 
most time series contain both deterministic and stochastic elements. Since 
regression analysis using time series data relies upon the assumption that this 
data is stationary, the results may be misleading. Stock and Watson (1989) 
have argued that the regression of non-stationary time series on another non- 
stationary time series implies that the standard t and F tests are not valid, the 
regression being spurious.22 That means that the results from applying the 
classical estimation methods, such as OLS, are not valid. Differencing o f the 
data has been pointed out as a solution to this problem. Nevertheless, in this 
case valuable information about the long-term relationship between the 
variables may be lost.23 The cointegration concept allows for the search for a 
stationary linear combination of time series, each of which are individually 
non-stationary. Methods to test for cointegration are the Engle-Granger 
(1985,1987), CRDW or Durbin-Watson statistic for the cointegrating 
regression24 and the Johansen method (1988, 1991). We used the three tests to 
establish a cointegrating equation.
3.5.2.2 Methods to estimate the long-run elasticities
Following the evidence that our variables were non-stationary,25 we conducted 
tests for cointegration, that is to say, for the long-run equations. The Engle-
22
The idea o f  a spurious regression was first presented by Granger and Newbold (1974) and later developed, within the
cointegration framework, by Phillips (1986).
23
Gujarati (1995).
24
The use o f  this statistic to test for cointegration relies on the work o f  Sargan and Bhargave (1983).
25
The unit root tests are presented in the methodological appendix to this chapter.
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Granger and Johansen methodologies (1988, 1991) were adopted to test for 
cointegration as a first step. Secondly, given the existence of the inference 
problems posed by OLS estimations even if there is cointegration, we apply 
the dynamic OLS methodology presented by Stock and Watson (1989, 1991). 
This has allowed us to get reliable estimators free from nuisance parameters of 
the long-term impact of the movement in the real exchange rate and money 
supply on the output o f the different economic subsectors.
The Engle-Granger test
The so-called Granger (1985, 1990) representation theorem states that, if  a 
vector o f variables are cointegrated there is always an error correction 
representation (ECM) of the dynamic model and vice versa.26 The basic idea 
is that if  a vector o f variables is cointegrated, there is a long-term equilibrium 
relationship between them. Nevertheless, since in the short-run there may be 
disequilibrium, the error term in the cointegrating equation can be interpreted 
as the ‘equilibrium error’ and this can be used to tie the short-run behaviour of 
the variables to their long-run behaviour.27 The error correction mechanism 
corrects for disequilibrium. According to the two step procedure o f Engle and 
Granger, an ECM can be estimated as follows: the first step is to formulate the 
cointegration model. A static OLS regression is run on the levels or log of 
each variable in order to search for a linear combination of individually non- 
stationary time series that is itself stationary. The second step of the Engle- 
Granger procedure requires that the lagged estimated residuals o f the 
cointegration regressions are entered into the Error-Correction-Model or 
dynamic model in place of the level terms. This model represents an 
equation, which ties the long-run behaviour of manufacturing output to its 
short-term value. The basic form of an ECM is as follows:
AYt= (3 A Zt+ 0Rt_i + j-it
26
The error-correction mechanism was first presented by Sargan (1964) and later popularised by Engle and Granger (1985).
27
Gujarati (1995).
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where Z is the vector of all explanatory variables, Rt_i represents for the 
residuals o f the cointegrating vector, and 0 is the error correction coefficient.
The Johansen Test for Cointegration
The Johansen (1991) test for cointegration was also applied. This method 
allows us to establish the number of cointegrating equations. This 
methodology is described as maximum likelihood (ML) and relies upon an 
assumption of multivariate normality, despite the fact that the asymptotic 
arguments do not depend on this assumption. The Johansen procedure works 
with the EC representation directly, and the framework adopted implies the 
assumption that introducing sufficient lags will lead to a well-behaved 
disturbance term. AXt is assumed to be an 1(0) vector and the initial 
specification of the process can be written as follows:
AXt= F iAXt_i + rt.,A Xt_p+j + 7tXt.p + (J, + e
The above equation is a typical first difference VAR model which includes the 
long-run equilibrium term 7iXt_p. The Johansen method examines whether the 
coefficient matrix n provides information about long-run relationships in the 
data vector. The number of cointegrating relationships which can be 
identified in Xt is given by the rank (r) of n. The above model can be 
interpreted as a vector error correction model (VECM) similar to the 
representation presented by Engle and Granger (1987).
Within the Johansen framework, there are two test statistics for identifying the 
number o f cointegrating vectors: the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics. 
The second test computes the null hypothesis that there are r or less 
cointegrating vectors (r = 0, r< l, ... r< n). This is tested against the general 
alternative (r = l , r  = 2 ...,r  = n). We used the eigenvalue test to establish the
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number of cointegrating vectors.
The Dynamic Stock and Watson Representation
Once cointegration was obtained we proceeded to apply the Stock-Watson 
representation to estimate the long-term elasticities. In order to get more 
reliable estimators of the long-term elasticity of sectoral output with respect to 
the changes in real money supply and the real exchange rate, we applied the
Stock and Watson dynamic OLS specification (1989, 1992). This method
represents an answer to the biases introduced in the cointegrating regressions 
by simultaneity and serial correlation. The non-linear representation 
reproduced below was applied
k k
Yt = cco + Px Mi + P2 Ert + E Su A Mi + E 8u A Ert + et/=i /=i
where k represents leads and lags.
3.5.2.3 Unit Root Tests for Stationarity
Table 3.13 reports the results of the unit root tests for the variables analysed, 
namely, sectoral value added (Ya, Ym, Yma, Yc, Ys); real money supply (M); 
bilateral real exchange rate (Er); and relative prices (Pr).
Where
Ya, Ym, Yma, Yc, Ys: logarithms of real value added at 1984 prices of 
agriculture, mining manufacturing, construction and services, respectively. 
Source: Own estimations based on data provided by the BCV, economic 
reports, various issues.
Mt: logarithm of the real money, that is the sum of notes, coins and checkable 
deposits (M l), deflated by the consumer price index.. Source: BCV.
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G: log of real government spending at 1984 prices. Sources: BCV, economic 
reports, various issues.
Ert: logarithm of the $ or bilateral real exchange rate index. Source: Table 2.a, 
column 10, chapter II.
The lag length depends on the existence of autocorrelation in the variables. 
All the variables in levels needed one lag to be included for serial correlation 
to disappear. On the basis of the computed DF and ADF tests, the unit root
Table 3.13 Unit root tests for variables in logs and differences
DF Perron test
Variables/Critical Values -3.525 -4.220
Agriculture Y -1.080 -1.300
Manufacturing Y 0.113 -4.140
Construction Y -0.876 -2.770
Services Y 0.112 -1.560
M -0.594 -3.320
G -0.697 -2.720
Er -3.078 -1.810
DF Perron test
Variables/Critical Values -3.528
A Agriculture Y -6.202 -4.750
A Manufacturing Y -5.793 -4.390
A Construction Y -3.760 -3.430
A Services Y -4.931 -2.070
AM -5.022 -5.050
A G -6.024 -4.4006
AEr -8.191 -6.050
Notes: No augmented DF test was performed when the disturbance. The DF critical 
value for goverment spending are -3.5514 Terms in the DF regression did not seem to 
be autocorrelated and -3.5562 because the sample spans from 1960 to 1994.
hypothesis is rejected for all the variables in (log) first difference form (AX) 
(except for mining value added). Thus the variables appear integrated of order 
1. The Perron test confirms these findings for agriculture and manufacturing 
value added. Nevertheless, according to this test the first difference of 
construction and services value added is non-stationary. Since the DF test 
rejects the unit root hypothesis for these variables, we assume that they are 
stationary.
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3.5.2.4 Estim ating long-run elasticities
The econometric model presented here is based on the model formulated by 
Kamas (1986) to estimate the impact of the 1970s coffee boom on the real 
side of the Colombian economy. However, it must be noted that this scholar 
overlooked the problem of stationarity. The estimations presented here rely 
upon this model, but a cointegration and VECM methodology is applied.28 
The cointegrating equation is o f the form:
Yt — ct + /?! Mt + Ert + et
where Yt is real value added, Mt is real money supply, Ert is the real exchange 
rate and et is the error term.
This equation was estimated for the different economic sectors, namely 
agriculture, manufacturing, construction and services. In the case of 
construction and services, real government expenditure was used as a proxy 
for the spending effect.
The results o f the tests for cointegration are reported in Table 3.14. In the 
case o f the first test, the results of the DF test for determining the existence of 
a unit root in the residuals o f these cointegrating regressions are also reported. 
This suggests the existence of cointegration in all the cases. Hence, long-run 
movements in the level of the sectoral value added are related to the long-run 
movement on the real money supply (M) or real government spending (G) and 
the bilateral real exchange rate (Er) (this is the cointegrating equation). The 
real exchange rate appears to be correctly signed from the Dutch disease 
perspective in the long-run for agriculture, manufacturing and construction but
28
The econometric model presented by Kamas served as typical model used in other studies on Dutch disease; see for instance
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Table 3.14 Testing for cointegration, 1960-1995
Engle-Granger Test
Cointegrating Vector
Constant M Er G Rz DF
Agriculture 2.240
(0 .000)
0.320
(0 .000)
0.848
(0 .000)
0.94 -5.121
Manufacturing
Construction
-3.646
(0 .000)
-5.647
0.736
(0 .000)
1.271
(0 .000)
-0.019
0.96
1.422 0.94
-2.616
-3.188
Services
(0 .000)
0.130
(0.745)
(0.921)
0.596
(0 .000)
(0 .000)
0.822 0.92 
(0 .000)
-4.394
Johansen Test
Null hypothesis r<=l, alternative hypothesis r=2 
No of lags:4
Estimated cointegrating vectors (Normalised) Yag M Er Max
Agriculture 
Vector 1 -1 0.373 1.186
19.025
Vector 2 -1 0.253 0.694
Critical values:
95 percent 14.069
Null hypothesis r<=l, alternative hypothesis r=2 
No of lags: 7
Yma M Er
Manufacturing 
Vector 1 -1 0.952 0.191
14.568
Vector 2 -1 0.666 0.474
Critical values:
95 percent 14.069
Null hypothesis r=0, alternative hypothesis r=l 
No of lags: 5
Yc G Er
Construction 25.06
Vector 1 -1 1.476 -1.469
Critical values:
95 percent 20.967
null hypothesis r=0, alternative hypothesis r=l 
No of lags: 5
Ys G Er
Services 38.68
Vector 1 -1 0.833 0.648
Notes: Critical values:
Critical values:
95 percent 20.967
Notes: number on parenthesis in the Engle-Granger test are the standard deviations.
not for services.29 The Johansen cointegration test also confirms the existence 
of cointegration for the vectors of variables.30 The cointegrating vectors in
Richards (1994) and Hutchison (1994).
29
Another equation, in which the sectoral value added is determined by the real money supply (M) and the relative prices o f  
non-tradable to tradable (Pr), was attempted. However, the tests showed that there was non-cointegration.
Serial correlation tests were applied using p = 4 in the equation o f  the levels vector autoregression. In this way the choice 
o f  p = 4 is confirmed in terms o f  residual whiteness. The Johansen test was applied using different p, with similar results.
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normalised form are also shown. In the case of agriculture and manufacturing 
a positive coefficient on the real exchange rate would suggest a long-run 
disruptive impact o f real appreciation on value added. A positive parameter 
on the money supply would indicate a favourable impact of expansionary 
monetary/fiscal policies on the sector.31 For construction and services a 
negative parameter on the real exchange rate would indicate that real 
appreciation has a positive effect on the sectoral value added. As can be seen 
from Table 3.14, the real exchange rate is correctly signed in the case of 
construction but not in the case of services.
In order to get more reliable estimators of the long-term elasticity o f sectoral 
value added with respect to the changes in money supply and the real 
exchange rate, the Stock and Watson dynamic OLS was applied. The results, 
presented in Table 3.15, do not differ substantially from those obtained by
Table 3.15 Stock and Watson estimates, 1960-1995
Constant M Er G Rz
Agriculture 2.332 0.291 0.900 0.98
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Manufacturing -3.234 0.719 1.235 0.99
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Construction -6.475 0.394 1.327 0.97
(0 .000) (0.175) (0 .000)
Services -0.137 0.689 0.809 0.99
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Notes: standard deviations in parenthesis, number o f  lags is 2.
applying the Engle-Granger and Johansen tests with regards to the signs of the 
coefficients. Apart from the Er in the case of construction, the coefficients 
keep the same sign. However, under the Stock and Watson methodology, in 
the case o f manufacturing the coefficient for the real exchange rate is greater 
compared to the results obtained by using the Johansen methodology. In the
These results were obtained using E-views (1994) and the estimation option for variables with a linear deterministic trend. 
The maximum eigenvalue statistics indicate the existence o f  three cointegrating vectors in the cases o f  manufacturing, 
construction and services (r=3).
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long-term, the real appreciation of the domestic currency has a negative effect 
on agriculture and manufacturing. Nevertheless, this effect is partly 
counterbalanced by the positive impact of the fiscal expansion.
3.5.2.5 Estim ating short-run elasticities
The Engle-Granger two step procedure was used to formulate an error 
correction model and test the predictions of the Dutch disease theory on the 
real side of the economy for Venezuela. Thus, an error-correction model was 
tested under which the residuals from the cointegration regression presented in 
Table 3.14 were used as an error-correcting variable in a dynamic equation 
which states that sectoral real value added is influenced by the bilateral real 
exchange rate (Er), and the level of domestic absorption measured as real 
money supply (M).32 The standard equations o f the ECM for the log of 
sectoral value added can be written as:
A Yt = a  + Px (T) A Mt + P2 (■£) A Ert + rt-\ + et
AYt = a  + Pl(L)A Mt + P2(L)AErt + r t - 1  + et
where A denotes the first difference operator; L is the lag operator, rt_! is the 
one-period lagged value of the residual from regressions (3), and et is the error 
term. Equation (10) was applied to the different economic sectors. Thus the 
changes in sectoral value added (Yag, Yma, Yc, Ys) are linked to changes in the 
money supply (M) or real government spending (G) and the bilateral real 
exchange rate (Ert) and the equilibrating error in the preceding period. In this 
equation AMt and AErt represent the short-run disturbances in the sectoral 
value added and the error correction term (rt_i) captures the adjustment 
towards the long-run equilibrium.
This model is based on Kamas (1986), who estimated a similar model to measure the impact o f  the 1970s coffee boom on 
the Colombian economy, by using OLS method without testing for stationarity.
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The ‘general-to-specific’ modelling methodology o f Hendry (1986) was 
followed. We formulated an initially complex model with different lags on 
the dependent and independent variables and a dummy variable for the 1978- 
81 years, which was simplified and reparametarised until we obtained the 
most adequate equations. According to the Dutch disease theory there is a 
positive association between the behaviour of manufacturing real value added 
and the movement of the real exchange rate; while a negative relationship 
between the trends in the latter variable and construction and services value 
added is expected. The impact of real government expansion on both tradable 
and non-tradable sectors is bound to be positive. Thus, in the estimation of 
the equations for agriculture and manufacturing it is expected that pi and p2 
>0; while in the estimation of the equations for construction and services it is 
expected that pi >0 and p2<0.
The results for estimation of the error-correction model in logs are reported in 
Table 3.16. These equations were estimated by using OLS on annual data for 
the 1968-95 years33 as there is no evidence of autocorrelation either from DW 
or the Lagrarian multiplier tests for sixth-order autocorrelation. The fit o f the 
equations is quite good in terms of a high R and the most simple tests 
reported. As can be seen, in all the equations the coefficient o f real money 
supply and real government spending has the expected sign and is significant 
at the 95 per cent confidence level. This means that in the short-term this 
variable exerts a positive impact on value added of these sectors, which 
suggests that expansionary fiscal and monetary policies have a positive impact 
on both tradable and non-tradable sectors of the economy in the short-run. 
The bilateral real exchange rate has the predicted sign in the case of 
construction, but not in the case of manufacturing, and it was not significant at 
the 95 percent. Similarly, for services the real exchange rate has the wrong 
sign. Hence, the hypothesis that real appreciation prompts an adjustment in 
favour of the non-tradable sectors is not confirmed in the short-run. Likewise,
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despite the devaluation of the bolivar during 1983-88, services showed the 
same rate o f growth as compared to 1973-82. It must be noted that the error- 
correction term is statistically significant in all the equations.
3.6. Final rem arks
The major finding of this chapter is that although some Dutch disease 
symptoms can be identified in the Venezuelan economy by 1972, as far as 
manufacturing is concerned these were not reinforced during 1973-77. Dutch 
disease in Venezuela is especially linked to the shrinkage of agriculture which 
was severely disrupted since the 1930s and to the non-existence of an export 
competitive manufacturing sector, which is partly explained by the structural 
overvaluation of the domestic currency common to the Venezuelan economy 
since the 1930s. Although there is evidence that Venezuelan manufacturing 
fell below the standardised norm during 1966-72, some development based on 
import-substitution industrialisation took place. As regards the 1973-77 
phase, the Dutch disease indices for manufacturing did not deteriorate 
indicating that the phenomenon was not reinforced during these years. By 
contrast, the index for agriculture did increase during these years. However, 
the trends in sectoral prices as well as the econometric evidence suggest that 
the mechanisms (or intermediate causes) embodied in the Dutch disease 
model did not take place during 1973-77. The results of the econometric work 
suggest that the predictions of the Dutch disease theory on the negative impact 
of real appreciation are rather mixed as they apply to Venezuela. The 
negative effect o f real appreciation and manufacturing and agriculture value 
added growth is verified in the long-term, but not in the short term. These 
results indicate that manufacturing was not disrupted by real appreciation 
during 1973-77.
In the cases o f  construction and services, the sample was 1960-95 due to a lack o f  earlier data for government spending.
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This discrepancy from the theoretical predictions may be explained by the 
specific features of the Venezuelan economy such as the existence of a large 
public sector, controlled prices, and interventionism in both commodity and 
factor markets, which suggest that the role o f government policies may be of 
more relevance that the price mechanism in explaining the allocation of 
resources. At the same time, there was no export-competitive Venezuelan 
manufacturing sector. Within the Dutch disease model both import- 
competing and export competing subsectors are aggregated into a tradable 
sector. However, the impact of a boom on tradables may be different if  these 
are import-competing or export-competing. Moreover, the negative impact on 
import-competing manufacturing associated with an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, may have been counterbalanced by other macroeconomic and 
sectoral policies and the positive effect of appreciation through cheaper 
imported inputs. Therefore, the negative impact o f the spending effect 
predicted by the Dutch disease model may have been mitigated or overcome.
As a result o f the previous considerations, the next step in the research is to 
examine the economic policies with special reference to manufacturing.
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4. Venezuelan Private Manufacturing and the Policy Response to the 
1970s Oil Booms 
Introduction
This chapter assesses the fiscal, financing and exchange rate policies 
adopted at the outset of the 1970s oil price shock with special reference to 
Venezuelan private manufacturing. Section 1 briefly discusses the role of 
economic policies within the Dutch disease framework. Section 2 
examines the role of fiscal policies and, especially, investment decisions 
and financing policies with reference to manufacturing. Next, exchange 
rate policy and its influence on manufacturing are considered in section 3.
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to presenting the results of 
econometric work in order to provide further insights into the impact of 
government policies during a boom. Consistent with the non-stationary 
properties o f the data, an error correction modelling approach was used to 
estimate the impact of the fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies 
launched at the outset of the 1970s oil booms on private manufacturing 
value added and investment during 1960-88. This is a relevant aspect not 
only for understanding the effects of the 1970s oil booms on manufacturing 
from a theoretical view, but also for determining the effectiveness o f the 
fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies in dealing with a resource or 
export boom (and the post-boom phase) and in attempting to reverse the 
Dutch disease process. A further contribution of this chapter relates to the 
need to evaluate the effectiveness of these macroeconomic policies at the 
sectoral level since the impacts of these policies are expected to differ 
across sectors and subsectors.1 Finally, the major findings are summarised 
in section 5.
4.1 The Role of economic policies under the Dutch disease framework
It must be noted that the econometric model attempted here also provides insights into the accuracy o f  the adjustment 
program prescribed by the Washington consensus, which was launched in Venezuela in 1989.
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From the neo-classical view point, the best policy in the face of a resource 
boom is no policy at all since, within the model, the structural adjustment 
prompted by the boom would lead to an optimal allocation of resources, 
and levels o f production and investment. In this context, appreciation and 
de-industrialisation would be necessary to improve social welfare and 
would both appear as optimal.
Nonetheless, it has been argued that if the boom is expected to be 
temporary, the structural adjustment following a sectoral boom should be 
avoided because the wrong price signal in the short-term would imply a 
movement away from the optimal allocation of resources in the long term. 
This may be the case if  the economic agents do not predict the future 
adequately or focus on short-term profitability (Corden, 1982). It has been 
argued that despite being aware of the long-term equilibrium in the short­
term, profit opportunities may induce adjustment in favour of the non­
traded sectors (Kamas, 1986). Thus, if the adjustment is expected to be 
temporary, interventionism is justified in order to avoid the loss of exports 
in the traded sector and the temporary unemployment of factors. 
Consequently, these factors make a case for interventionism at the onset of 
a boom.
One option is the setting of an “anti-cyclical” fund. Kamas (1986) 
observes that a helpful policy may be the restraint o f domestic absorption, 
which allows for a surplus of the balance of payments. The accumulation 
of foreign assets may serve the aim of future investment or like an 
equilibrating income during phases of falling resource prices.
Another option is the granting of protection to manufacturing on the basis 
that the possible losses in terms of technological leaming-by-doing in 
favour of the non-traded sector would imply losses in terms of learning and 
it may be difficult to re-establish manufacturing growth in the post-boom
143
phase (Van Winjbergen, 1982; 1984). The granting of protection to 
manufacturing is justified by arguing that technological change is more 
rapid in manufacturing than in agriculture and services.2 The existence of 
economies of scale, inter-industry links and other externalities, such as the 
training of labour in manufacturing, are also reasons for supporting 
protection for manufacturing during a sectoral boom.
By recognising the existence of positive externalities in industry, the Dutch 
disease model allows for government intervention in the presence of a 
temporary boom. However, the model remains essentially neo-classical, 
which implies a general equilibrium framework of analysis with all the 
automatic mechanisms and assumptions, such full employment, the law of 
one price, rational expectations, etc. It is worth noting that more recent 
studies ascribed to the neo-classical framework acknowledge that the 
spending effect can take place through government policies when oil 
revenues accrue to the state. In this case, real appreciation may occur 
during a boom due to both market and government failures. Nevertheless, 
the policy recommendations under this view also remain neo-classical as it 
is claimed that devaluation and more liberal policies may be effective in 
encouraging industrialisation (see Gelb and Associates, 1988, Auty, 1991).
We must stress that the considerations derived from the more orthodox 
neo-classical framework on policy issues may not be adequate for oil- 
exporting developing countries. In these cases, even if  an economy is 
expected to benefit from important extra international revenues for a long 
time, the encouragement of manufacturing is important. Concerning the 
policy recommendations of the more recent analysis of Dutch disease, we 
argue that the launching of devaluation and the use o f more liberal policies 
may not encourage industrialisation, especially in an economy such as 
Venezuela’s, which lacks an export-competitive manufacturing sector. In
2
This is arguable. According to Davis (1995) there is evidence that rapid technological change can occur in agriculture
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this case the granting of selective protection to manufacturing, within a 
coherent industrial policy which combines import-substitution and the 
development o f an export-competitive sector, is a must in the effort to 
achieve a more sustainable growth path.
4.2 The Role of fiscal policies and private manufacturing during 1973- 
77 and 1978-82
4.2.1 Domestic absorption during 1973-82
The role o f government expenditure may entail some positive and negative 
effects. Through the expansion of domestic demand, it may revive private 
investment. Likewise, investment in infrastructure can contribute to 
improving profitability by overcoming constraints, such as the low quality 
of roads.
Some evidence on the absorption of oil revenues during 1973-82 is 
presented in Fig. 4.1. These estimates assume as normal the public 
spending of 1970, because this year was characterised by stable economic 
conditions and a low level of oil revenues. Therefore, the excess o f the 
actual values relative to the normal level is considered to be the public 
spending attributed to the increase in oil revenues. In order to estimate the 
normal level of spending for the other years it was assumed that public 
spending increased with per capita GDP. Thus, the normal values of public 
spending were estimated by a lineal extrapolation or interpolation 
according to per capita GDP. Fig 4.1 shows the excess of the actual current 
spending as a share of total normal current spending; as a share of GDP; 
and, as a share of oil revenues. The same indicators for capital spending 
are also presented.
too.
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The picture that emerges from these figures is that the Venezuelan policy 
response to the 1973s oil boom favoured the domestic investment o f oil 
revenues especially during 1973-82. The differential between the actual
Fig. 4.1 Public current and capital spending, Venezuela, 1960-85
%
Excess of current spending as 
% of total current spending
% %  10 .
Excess of current spending as % of GDP Excess of current spending 
as % of oil income
%
Excess of capital spendng as 
% of normal capital spending
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Excess of capital spending as 
% of total capital spending
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Excess of capital spending 
as % of oil income
Sources: Mommer (1990), pp. 211-223, Tables 9 and 10.
and normal current spending (as a share of the normal current spending) 
increased from 3.3 per cent in 1971 to 10.9 per cent in 1975, but with the 
exception of 1981, it was negative thereafter. At the same time, the 
differential between the actual and the normal capital spending as a share of 
the normal capital spending increased from -3.9 per cent in 1971 to 319.5 
and 158.2 per cent in 1974 and 1975, respectively. Although lower, this 
variable remained positive during 1978-82, except from 1979.
Contrary to the common perception in the political and economic circles of 
Venezuelan society, it is shown that most of the oil revenues were
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beneficial for investment and tended not to be chanelled into consumption. 
This suggests that the problem in Venezuela was not the lack of 
investment, but the inefficiency of its allocation.3
4.2.2 Direct public investment
The 1973-82 years witnessed a growing direct involvement of the 
Venezuelan State in the economy and in industrialisation. Although the 
Venezuelan industrial strategy remained unchanged during 1973-77, 
interventionism was enhanced by the accrual of oil revenues to the state.4 
During the 1973 oil boom, the upsurge in public manufacturing investment 
reflected the formulation of an ambitious export-oriented resource-based 
industrialisation, as contained in the Fifth Plan of the Nation (1976-80). As 
shown by Table 4.1, 37 per cent o f the public investment projected in the
Table 4.1 Investment program by sectors of the V Development Plan (1976-80)
Sectors
Values 
millions o f  bolivares
Percentage o f  total 
%
Traded 21540 38.95
Agriculture 300 0.54
Mining 510 0.92
Manufacturing 20730 37.49
Non-traded 33758 61.05
Services 16081 29.08
Social infrastructure 5375 9.72
Infrastructure for transport 10706 19.36
Electric energy 17677 31.97
Total investment 55298 100.00
Source: Central Bank o f  Venezuela, economic reports (1976).
Fifth Plan was allocated to manufacturing. The aluminium and the iron 
industries took a full 90 per cent of public manufacturing investment. The
For an interesting and novel discussion on this topic see Baptista (1997).
4
Some Venezuelan scholars have read interventionism as a kind o f threat to the private capital. The employers 
organisation, Federacion Venezolana de Camaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Production (FEDECAMARAS), itself 
had often critiqued the strong interventionism o f  the Venezuelan state, especially when this felt threatened by some 
economic policies. Nevertheless, as Fine (1997) puts forward the interest o f  private capital can be served by an 
interventionist or privatising strategy. For a critical assessment o f interventionism in Venezuelan industrialisation see 
Rangel (1972) and Duno (1975).
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Central Bank of Venezuela estimates that real public investment grew by 
15.34 per cent during the 1973-77 period in comparison with -2.2 per cent 
during the pre-boom phase (1969-72).
Similarly, it is estimated that the percentage of funding allocated by the 
state to direct and indirect investment increased from 39.3 per cent in 1971 
to 69.4 per cent in 1977 (Table 4.2). By contrast, the private sector share of 
surplus allocated to financing capital formation declined from 60.7 per cent
Table 4.2 Public and private financing of gross fix investment
Sector 1971 % 1975 % 1977 %
(a) Public Investment 5235 39.3 22730 74.2 41958 69.4
(b) Direct investment 3152 23.7 12533 41 23662 39.1
(c) Indirect investment 2083 15.6 10197 33.2 18296 30.3
(d) Private Investment 8083 60.7 7869 25.8 18526 30.6
(e) Direct investment 10166 76.3 18065 59 36822 60.9
(f) Indirect investment 
by the public sector
2083 15.6 10197 33.2 18296 30.3
Notes: (b) This refers to government and state enterprises; (c) This refers to the credits granted by the state to the 
private sector; (e) It refers to the value o f  private investment financed by own resources; (f) Amount o f  total 
private investment financed by resources provided by the public sector. This variable was measured by excluding 
the credits granted by the state to the private sector from the investment made by the private sector. Sources: 
Infante (1981), Table 20, p. 65.
to 30 per cent on average during the same period. As a result of this, the 
dynamic performance of private manufacturing investment over 1973-75 
took place with little effort because the distribution of oil revenues served 
as a substitute for domestic saving (see chapter 5).
Concerning the quality of government investment in manufacturing, the 
choice of allocating a large share of oil income to a resource-based 
industrialisation strategy has been strongly criticised by many observers. 
As we are only concerned with private manufacturing here, it will suffice to 
say that some of these criticisms appear as valid, especially those related to 
the inefficiencies arising from lack of public administrative capacity and 
the non-consideration of international trends with regards to technological
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change.5 Nevertheless, the criticism regarding the supposed crowding-out 
effects of the large-scale projects o f resource-based industrialisation on 
private investment does not seem to be correct. In our view, there were 
enough resources to have combined even an export-oriented and owned- 
state resource sector with the promotion of other selected branches such as 
chemicals in the private sector. What was missing was a coherent 
industrial strategy. In other words, we argue that the problems with public 
investment during the 1970s were associated with the reluctance to launch a 
coherent industrial strategy which should have encouraged a deepening of 
import substitution together with the promotion of exports. By contrast, the 
industrial policy remained the same as in the 1960s and despite the 
availability o f external revenues, there was no export promotion policy 
which addressed private manufacturing. In this way, the opportunity to 
diminish dependence upon oil and set the basis for a more sustainable path 
of growth was wasted.
4.2.3 Financing policies: direct transfers to the private sector
In Venezuela, domestic investment in public and private manufacturing and 
the non-oil economy was also promoted by the policy of easy credit during 
the 1970s oil booms. One of the major instruments of the industrial 
strategy between 1960 and the mid-1980s was the granting of cheap public 
credit. In accordance with the aims of the Fifth National Plan (1973-77), 
the Venezuelan Investment Fund (F.I.V.) favoured the expansion of the 
steel and aluminium industries.6 In this plan, the encouragement of 
intermediate industries was a priority, especially the development of a 
publicly owned export-oriented sector. Public institutions, such as the 
Industrial Credit Fund (FCI), CORPOINDUSTRIA and the Venezuelan 
Industrial Bank (BIV) were created or enhanced to channel financial
5
See Auty (1991).
6
It has been estimated that more than 50 per cent o f  the total financing resources granted during the 1970s was channelled 
to the basic metal lines by the FIV. Fajardo (1984, p. 54).
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resources into manufacturing. Table 4.3 shows that there was an increase 
in credits granted to private manufacturing during 1974-78 followed by its 
decline a decline in 1979-80. The latter institutions channelled 2.061 m. 
bolivares into private manufacturing in 1975, which represented an increase 
of 152.3 per cent compared with 1974.
Table 4.3 Credits granted to private manufacturing by type of institution, Venezuela, 1970-80
1970-73 1974-78 1979 1980
Value Value Credit No Value Credit No Value Credit
No
FCI - 1444.5 155 198.1 19 192.9 19
CVF 417.0 2723.6 - 302.7 - 154.3 -
CORPOINDUSTRIA 41.3 2117.0 1601 - - - -
FIVCA - 1888.0 - - - - -
BIV - 1619.2 - - - - -
Notes: the value is in mill o f  bolivares. Sources: Fajardo (1985).
Although the policy of public credit favoured some intermediate 
manufacturing subsectors such as basic metals, metals products, non- 
metallic mineral products and chemicals, food and textiles also benefited 
(Table 4.4). Textiles received 16 per cent of the public credits granted to 
manufacturing (excluding basic metal industries) during 1974-77.7 The 
policy of easy public credit may have encouraged an increase in the number 
o f small-scale enterprises. A key point here is that some of the lines 
favoured by the government’s financing policy, such as textiles and food, 
experienced poor performance in terms of labour productivity and output 
during 1974-77 (see chapter 7). This suggests that the financing policy was 
far from adequate, with indiscriminate granting of credits leading to an 
increase in the number of small establishments with very low labour 
productivity.
The policy of easy credit to private manufacturing during 1973-82 brought 
about changes in the sources and use of funds in the sector. Regarding 
private manufacturing, between 1970 and 1977 more than half o f all
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investment relied on external sources. Thus, internal financing declined 
considerably.8 Furthermore, these so-called ‘credits’ were really grants, 
which were never re-paid.9
Table 4.4 Structure of the 
manufacturing, 1974-77 (%)
public credit to Venezuelan private
ISIC code Industries 1974 1975 1976 1977 1974-77
Labour-intensive
industries
59.1 55.2 54.4 63.8 58.1
332 Furniture 2.1 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.5
331 Wood 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.7
356-54-90 Other manufacturing 7.7 13.6 16.0 24.7 15.5
323 Leather products 1.9 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.8
322-24 Wearing apparel and 
footwear
2.6 0.8 0.7 1.3 1.4
321 Textiles 30.2 11.1 8.0 10.4 14.9
381 Metal products 9.4 13.7 10.7 7.2 10.3
355 Rubber 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.7
361-62-69 Non-metallic mineral 
products
Capital and/or human
3.9 12.2 16.4 17.2 12.4
Capital-intensive
industries
40.9 44.8 45.6 36.2 41.9
313 Beverages 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
314 Tobacco 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
341 Paper and paper 
products
0.4 1.9 4.2 0.5 1.8
384 Transport equipment 4.5 5.9 4.7 5.5 5.2
311-12 Food products 26.6 24.9 20.6 11.4 20.8
351-52 Chemical products 4.7 6.8 2.0 6.3 4.9
382-83 Mechanical and 
electrical machinery
2.4 3.1 12.7 10.3 7.1
342 Printing 1.7 2.1 1.4 1.9 1.8
300 Private manufacturing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: own estimations based on data provided by the Central Bank o f  Venezuela, 
economic reports, 1974-77.
In 1977, more than half of all private investment was financed by credits 
provided by the government.10
Concerning the possible financial crowding-out effect of public investment, 
this is unlikely because public investment in Venezuela was financed by 
external sources. The expansion of government expenditure was financed 
by the greater oil revenues and this allowed for an increase in government 
borrowing from commercial banks and in domestic credit to the private
Central Bank o f  Venezuela, economic reports, various issues.
8 Fajardo (1985, p. 17).
9
Mommer (1991).
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sector. It should be noted that during 1978-82, the existence of a financial 
crowding-out effect was also unlikely because bank credit to the private 
sector continued to grow during these years. The marked increase in 
government borrowing from commercial banks during 1978-79 reflected 
the deflationary fiscal and monetary policies pursued during these years. 
As mentioned above, the greater oil revenues derived from the second oil 
price increase were partly made available to the private sector through 
private credit. However, these revenues were saved abroad.
4.2.4 Indirect transfers to the private sector and private investment
From 1960 to the mid-1980s, private investment was encouraged by the 
availability o f loans from private banks at low interest rates. This was one 
of the indirect mechanisms of distributing part of the oil revenues to the 
private sector especially, during 1973-77. Interest rates were very low or 
negative during these years (see Fig 4.2). This would be expected to have 
encouraged private investment.11
The key role of an easy credit policy for private manufacturing during 
1960-82 can also be suggested by the fact that increasing financial costs are 
mentioned as one important contributing factor to the poor performance of 
Venezuelan private manufacturing begun in 1989. Following the sharp 
decline in oil income and the financial liberalisation from 1989, 
interventionism in the financing of private investment stopped and high and 
increasing interest rates operated as a disincentive to private investment. 
This is confirmed by the investment equation estimated below.12
10
Infante (1981, p. 65) quoted by Bitar and Troncoso (1983, p. 87).
The Venezuelan case contrasts with the case o f  other developing countries in which financial repression may have 
determined a low response o f private investment to changes in the interest rates. In this context the availability o f bank 
credit would pay a more important role (Wai and Wong, 1982). Nevertheless, Bemanke (1983) and Greene and 
Villanueva (1991) estimate that high real interest rates exert a negative impact on private investment, via increasing labour 
costs.
12
While some o f  the big-scale industries were able to stand this situation due to their links with the financial sector, the 
small-scale enterprises were severely disrupted. It has been mentioned that the inability o f  many manufacturing enterprises 
to pay the loans contributed to the severe financial crisis, which began in 1994. Valecillos (1994, p. 48).
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Fig 4.2 Real active interest rate, Venezuelan manufacturing, 1963-94
8 0
6 0
4 0
2 o
o
2 0
4 0
Notes: the active real interest rate is defined as the nominal active interest rate for the 
industrial sector deflated by the manufacturing GDP deflator. Sources: own 
estimations based on data provided by the Central Bank o f  Venezuela.
Another indirect mechanism for the distribution of oil revenues which also 
favoured private investment was the low income tax policy. This was 
possible due to the accrual of oil revenues to the state between 1936 and the 
mid-1980s. The financing of public spending did not rely entirely on tax 
payments, but it was mainly financed by oil revenues. The taxation level 
remained stable from 1946 to 1984, despite the fact that the process of 
modernisation of the economy should have entailed an increase in 
taxation.13 The contribution of private taxation to fiscal income remained 
at 10 per cent during 1960-82. This was possible due to the accrual of oil 
revenues to the state, which amounted to more than 50 per cent of public 
income between 1950 and 1970, and 60 per cent between 1970 and 1980. 
Low-income taxation remained as one of the mechanisms for the 
distribution of the mermaid oil revenues even during 1982-92. It has been 
estimated that during the latter period the amount of tax paid by non-
Mommer (1991, p. 197). The same author points out that the low taxation is not perceived as an important mechanism  
o f  distribution o f  oil income within the Venezuelan literature, which identifies the investment o f  oil income with direct 
public investment or the granting o f  public credit to the private sector. It is not understood that the distribution o f  oil 
income may have encouraged private investment through low taxation for instance. For this reason a popular idea in 
Venezuela is that oil revenues were mainly allocated into excessive current spending.
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institutions was 0.8 per cent of their income, while non-oil corporations 
paid 2.4 per cent on average.14
A negative aspect of the low income taxation policy was that this may have 
favoured a regressive income distribution leading to the worsening of the 
problem of market size already refered to. This also had a negative impact 
through the encouragement o f a diversified and fragmented market, which 
resulted in a capital intensive and inefficient pattern of production, which 
lacked long-term viability.
4.3 Manufacturing and the role of the exchange rate policies during 
1973-77
From standard Dutch disease theory, real appreciation represents the main 
mechanism of transmission of the disease. In the Venezuelan case, the 
structural overvaluation of the domestic currency under a fixed exchange 
rate regime was a striking feature of the economy from the 1940s onwards. 
According to Baptista (1997), through 1933-83 the exchange rate never 
exceeded the limit of 5 bolivares per dollar. The exceptional stability and 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate in Venezuela during 1935-1982 can 
only be explained by the accrual of considerable oil revenues to the 
Venezuelan State. Exchange rate policy was a key political matter in 
Venezuela because the real overvaluation of the bolivar resulted in the 
transfer of part of the oil revenues to the private sector through low import 
costs. This situation benefited both capital and to some extent labour.15 
Import substitution industrialisation also may have benefited from real 
overvaluation through the availability of cheap imported capital and 
intermediate goods.
14
Garcia (1994) Statistical Appendix, Table I.
The determination o f  prices in Venezuela has been also influenced by the domestic distribution o f  part o f  oil revenues 
into consumption. The access to cheap imports due to the structural overvaluation led to low inflation during 1930-1973. 
It seems that this policy contributed to control inflation pressures as a result o f  the huge spending o f  oil revenues, during
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A look at Fig 4.3 suggests the existence of a high positive correlation 
between private manufacturing value added and imports of capital and 
intermediate goods through 1960-77. From 1983, the expansion of these 
imports was lower than the expansion of manufacturing value added -this is 
confirmed in chapter 6. The fall in the importation of capital and raw 
material goods may be attributable to the modest recovery of private 
investment during 1983-88.
Fig 4.3 The structural overvaluation of the bolivar, imported capital and intermediate
goods and manufacturing growth
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Notes: Ms = volume index o f  imports o f  capital and intermediate goods; Er = $ real exchange rate;
Y = real manufacturing GDP at 1984 prices. Sources: M: BCV, Finexpo, reports (various issues);
Er: Table 2.a in chapter 2 and Yma: as Table 5.6 in chapter 5.
The passive management of the exchange rate in Venezuela before and 
during the 1970s must be understood in the light of the previous political 
economy considerations, which fall outside of the reference framework of 
the Dutch disease theory.
These results suggest that the impact of a resource boom on manufacturing 
may differ markedly depending on the export-competing and import- 
competing character of the sector and the manufacturing lines.
1973-77. (Mommer, 1991; Baptista, 1997).
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The relative price elasticity of manufacturing output, exports and imports 
may be of relevance also in explaining the final outcome o f a boom. The 
assumption embodied in neo-classical theory that manufacturing output, 
imports and exports are responsive to the movements in relative prices may 
not hold for developing countries with a high share of imported inputs. In 
this case, the short-term negative impact of real devaluation may be more 
severe. These ideas are further confirmed by the estimates of the import 
demand equations, according to which the value of imports (M) is 
explained by the level o f income (Y) and the real exchange rate (Er).16 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the results of the import demand equations for 
capital and raw material goods and total imports which were estimated by 
using the Stock and Watson dynamic OLS for the 1960-90 years. Although 
the results are far from being satisfactory in terms of the statistical 
significance of the parameters, together with the previous evidence, these 
may suggest a low price elasticity of capital and raw material imports. 
These are responsive to the income level, but not to increases in relative 
prices as measured by the bilateral real exchange rate in the long-term.17 It 
must be noted that in the short term the price elasticity of these imports is 
also positive indicating that a real devaluation does not lead to a decline in 
imports. As shown in the following chapters, this is attributable to the 
scanty progress of import-substitution in capital goods. By contrast, the 
negative price elasticities for total imports suggest that a significant volume 
of imports were not essential.
During 1973-77, the real appreciation of the bolivar was bound to have 
benefited manufacturing to some extent through the cheap importation of 
capital goods and raw materials. This, and the greater home demand, may
A1 variables in logs. Imports and income (national GDP) are expressed at constant bolivares o f 1984 and the real 
exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate adjusted by the relative prices computed as the ratio o f  the domestic 
and USA wholesale prices. Sources: For imports and income the Central Bank o f Venezuela, Finexpo, annual reports, 
various issues. All the variables were integrated o f order 1 in first difference.
17
A similar methodology was used by Reinhart (1995, p. 303) to estimate the total import and export demand equation for 
a set o f  developing countries. This scholar found that there are positive and statistically significant long-term relative price 
elasticities for imports.
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have offset the negative impact of real appreciation through higher import 
competition in the short term. Econometric estimations presented in the
Table 4.5 Stock and Watson estimates of the import demand for capital and 
intermediate goods, Venezuela, 1960-94
Dependent Variable is M 
Sample: 1963 1988 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -19.628 1.507 -13.021 0.000
Er 0.573 0.360 1.595 0.135
Y 1.252 0.088 14.265 0.000
A (&(_„) 0.701 0.353 1.988 0.068
A (Er(1)) 0.391 0.288 1.359 0.197
A (Er) 0.505 0.383 1.318 0.210
A (Y) 0.027 0.409 0.067 0.948
A (Y (.,)) -0.186 0.411 -0.452 0.659
A (Y (1)) 0.369 0.420 0.880 0.395
A (Er((.2)) 0.304 0.348 0.874 0.398
A (Et(2)) 0.020 0.308 0.066 0.948
A (Y (.2)) -0.297 0.418 -0.712 0.489
A (Y(2)) -0.054 0.463 -0.117 0.909
R-squared 0.984 Mean dependent var 4.999
Adjusted R-squared 0.969 S.D.dependentvar 0.615
S.E. o f  regression 0.109 Akaike info criterion -4.135
Sum squared resid 0.153 Schwartz criterion -3.506
Log likelihood 29.857 F-statistic 65.826
Durbin-Watson stat 1.164 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
last section of this chapter seem to validate this idea. The hypothesised 
positive effect of real appreciation through cheap imported raw materials 
and capital goods on Venezuelan manufacturing is confirmed in the short­
term. The negative impact of competition may have also been offset by the 
trade policy of lowering tariffs and quotas on capital and raw material 
goods which was implemented as an incentive to industrialisation during 
the 1960s, and maintained during 1973-77. Decree No 255 of March 1960, 
which stated that imported raw materials in general were not subjected to 
tariffs, was applied. The massive rise in the importation of capital and 
intermediate goods which occurred during this period is consistent with the 
view that higher oil revenues induced some short-term positive effect on 
Venezuelan manufacturing through cheaper imported inputs and capital 
goods.
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Table 4.6 Stock and Watson estimates o f the import demand, Venezuela 
1960-94
Dependent Variable is M 
Sample: 1963 1992
Included observations: 30 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C -8.624 2.065 -4.177 0.001
Y 0.905 0.142 6.358 0.000
Er -0.512 0.401 -1.276 0.219
A(Y) 1.038 0.639 1.626 0.122
A (Y (.,)) 1.581 0.576 2.746 0.014
A (Y(i}) 0.434 0.656 0.661 0.517
A (Er) -1.728 0.569 -3.037 0.007
A (Er(.i)) -0.491 0.539 -0.910 0.376
A (Er(i)) -2.080 0.444 -4.687 0.000
A (Y (.2)) 1.390 0.619 2.247 0.038
A (Y(2)) -0.277 0.688 -0.402 0.692
A (Er(.2)) 0.072 0.507 0.142 0.889
A (Er(2)) -0.724 0.432 -1.674 0.112
R-squared 0.921 Mean dependent var 5.023
Adjusted R-squared 0.866 S.D. dependent var 0.513
S.E. o f  regression 0.188 Akaike info criterion -3.046
Sum squared resid 0.599 Schwartz criterion -2.439
Log likelihood 16.126 F-statistic 16.627
Durbin-Watson stat 1.409 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
Thus, in an economy undergoing an export boom, devaluation is expected 
to deepen the problems by increasing domestic money and rising import 
costs. At the same time, as shown in chapters 6 and 7, the disappearance of 
the structural overvaluation and the fall in oil revenues from the mid-1980s 
has not brought about significant positive changes in the pattern of growth 
and industrial change and exports. As discussed in later chapters, the 
positive impact of devaluation on manufacturing during 1985-87, which 
took place via import-substitution and to a lesser extent via export growth, 
proved to be unsustainable. Following a severe drop during 1983-84, when 
there were negative growth rates, Venezuelan private manufacturing 
recovered during 1985-87, but declined from 1988. The negative impact of 
real devaluation on manufacturing via increased import costs may have 
been attenuated over 1983-88 because of the existence of a preferential rate
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for some imported inputs.18 Thus the full disruptive effect of real 
devaluation may have been felt only from 1989. During these years, the 
increase in the real costs of imported capital and inputs seems to have 
dampened private investment, especially in manufacturing and agriculture 
(see section 4.4).
The results presented suggest that the adoption of devaluation policies in 
Venezuela to encourage industrial exports must be made with caution and 
within a broader industrial strategy, which might include a selective 
subsidies over limited time periods.
4.4 The Impact of exchange rate and fiscal policies on Venezuelan 
industrialisation during 1973-82: some econometric evidence
Model
In this section, econometric evidence is presented in order to give further 
support to the previous idea on the impact of the 1973 oil boom, on private 
manufacturing as a whole and on some of the manufacturing lines, through 
fiscal and exchange rate policies. According to Dutch disease theory, the 
domestic spending of oil income leads to higher relative prices o f non­
tradables (spending effect) which will disrupt the non-booming traded 
sectors. The income effect takes place through public spending and/or 
monetary growth. Thus, we must establish the effects of: the real exchange 
rate and/or relative prices (Er), monetary growth (M) and/or public 
spending (G) on private manufacturing value added (Yma). A second 
equation expresses the impact of public investment (Ip), public 
consumption (Cp), real exchange rates (Er) and domestic credit to the 
private sector (DC) on private manufacturing value added (Yma). In 
notation form:
Although it was estimated that only a 5 per cent o f  total imports enjoyed a preferential exchange rate (BCV, 1989).
159
(4.1) Yma, = ao + f i lM ,  + / } 2Er , + e,
(4.2) Ymat — a 0 + f i irp ,+ fi1c p P ,D C + /3 4Er.+e,
The model presented here provides insights into the impact and 
effectiveness of the exchange rate and monetary and fiscal policies on 
Venezuelan manufacturing during 1960-88, in the short and long term. The 
fact that these policies are central to the adjustment programmes promoted 
by the Washington consensus make these model relevant in explaining not 
only the impact of higher oil prices on Venezuelan manufacturing during 
the 1973-77 oil boom, but also the effects of the neo-liberal policies 
adopted in the 1990s which call for restraint in the use of fiscal policies and 
real devaluation.
The Stock and Watson dynamic OLS methodology (1989, 1991) was 
adopted to estimate long-term and short-term elasticities. As explained in 
chapter 3, this methodology was chosen due to the non-stationary nature of 
the series involved and to the superiority of this methodology compared to 
the Engle-Granger method. The Johansen method was first applied to test 
for cointegration among the variables of the two equations. The first 
multivariate system includes private manufacturing real GDP (Yma), an 
index of the USS real exchange rate (Er), and the level of domestic 
absorption measured by real money supply or M l (M).19 A second version 
of this model includes manufacturing private value added, the level of 
public consumption (Cp), the level of public investment (Ip), the level of 
real domestic credit to the private sector (DC) and the index of the USS real 
exchange rate (Er). The dynamic Stock and Watson OLS equations are as 
follows:
This model relies on Kamas (1986), who estimated a similar model based on logarithms o f  variables to measure the 
impact o f  the 1970s coffee boom on the Colombian economy. Her results might thus be misleading.
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(4.3) Ymat -  a 0 + 0mM( + 0 ErE r t +  cfw ( I ) A M ( + dEr(L)AErt + et
(4.4) Yma = a0 + OipIpt + 6dcDC( + 0ErErt + dip(L)AIpt+cIdc(L)&DG+dEr(L)&Ert+et
4.4.1 The Unit root test for stationarity
As stated above, the research findings show that most macroeconomic 
variables have a time series structure with a unit root. Thus, the Dickey- 
Fuller (DF) and the Perron tests for stationarity were applied to the 
following variables in logs and differences: private real manufacturing 
value added (Y ^ , real money supply or M l (M), dollar real exchange rate 
(Er), real public consumption (Cp), real public investment (Ip) and real 
domestic credit to the private sector (DC). The null hypothesis is that there 
is a unit root, and failure to reject it implies that the variable is non- 
stationary. The lag length depends upon the existence of autocorrelation in 
the variables. No augmented test was performed when the disturbance 
terms in the DF regression did not appear to be autocorrelated. Table 4.7 
suggests that on the basis of the computed DF and ADF, all variables in
Table 4.7 Unit root tests for variables in logs and differences
Variables in log levels v a riab le s  in first difference
5 %  c r i t ic a l  v a lu e s
A D F O )
-3.587
Perron test 
-4 .220
DF
-3.587
Perron test 
-4 .220
V a lu e  a d d e d :
T o ta l  m a n u f a c tu r in g -1.253 -2.800 -4.673 -4.412
L a b o u r  in te n s iv e * -1.355 -1.188 -3.987 -3.477
C a p i ta l  in te n s iv e -1.340 -2.683 -5.433 -5.185
F o o d -1.793 -3.905 -6.295 -5 .952
T e x ti le s * -1.707 -1.017 -3.275 -3.625
B e v e r a g e s -1.912 -2.151 -5.459 -5 .156
C lo th in g -2.778 -3.694 -6.462 -5 .549
N o n - m e ta l l i c  m in e r a l s -2.065 -3.772 -7.621 -7.164
C h e m ic a l s -1.123 -3.344 -8.032 -8 .000
M e ta l s -1.147 -2.512 -4.851 -4 .456
M a c h in e ry * -3.541 -3.375 4.190 -4 .019
T r a n s p o r t -2.499 -3.613 -5.835 -5.553
M -1.034 -2.373 -3.655 -4.308
E r -2.253 -3.156 -6.879 -7 .027
Ip -2.908 -2.865 4.464 -4.175
C p -1.052 -1.961 -4.927 -4.925
D C -1.737 -2.789 -4.751 -5.098
N otes: No augm ented Db test was perform ed when the d isturbance term s in the DF regression did not 
seem  to be autocorrelated. *This m eans that the m odel A o f the Perron test was used, while for the 
o ther variables the m odel C was used. See Perron (1989, p. 1364 and the critical values for this test 
were taken from T ables VI.B and IV .B pags. 1376 and 1377 from the same source. The 5 % critical
v a lu e  fo r  m o d e l  A is -3 .7 2 .
log-level form are non-stationary, while variables in log first difference 
form (AX) seem to be integrated of order zero. The results of the Perron
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test with a constant and a time-trend are consistent with that derived from 
the DF and ADF tests.
Where:
Y = logarithm of private manufacturing value added at 1984 prices. Source: own estimations 
based on data provided by the Industrial Census, (for further details see methodological appendix).
M = logarithm of real money supply, that is the sum of notes, coins and checkable deposits (Ml), 
deflated by the consumer price index. Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, economic reports, 
various issues.
Er = logarithm of the bilateral real exchange rate. This is defined as the nominal exchange rate 
(Bs per US$ deflated by the ratio of the wholesale prices). Source: Statistical appendix, chapter II, 
Table 1 column 10.
Cp = logarithm of public consumption at 1984 prices. Sources: BCV, economic reports, various 
issues.
Ip = logarithm of public investment at constant 1984 prices. Sources: as Cp.
DCP = logarithm of real domestic credit to the private sector. This is defined as the ratio of 
nominal DCP to the deflator of private investment. Source: IMF and BCV.
4.4.2 Cointegration test
The Johansen maximum eigenvalue test was applied to determine the 
existence of cointegration in the multivariate system defined above. The 
results of the Johansen maximum eigenvalue (A,max) tests for the 
cointegrating vectors associated with each model are shown in Tables 4.8 
and 4.9.
Concerning the first equation (eq. 4.1), this methodology suggests the 
existence of cointegrating vectors for manufacturing and the selected lines. 
Thus there seems to be a long-term equilibrium relationship among the 
variables and the coefficients have the expected sign according to the Dutch 
disease theory.20 The bilateral real exchange rate has a positive coefficient 
indicating that manufacturing value added may have been disrupted by the 
real appreciation of the domestic currency in the long term. Likewise, the
According to the study on the impact o f real devaluation for a set o f developing countries Edwards (1986) found that a 
real devaluation has a negative effect in the short-term (1 year), but it is reversed thereafter.
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coefficient of the money supply is positive meaning that the expansionary 
monetary policies have a positive long-run effect on manufacturing value 
added. Additionally, the estimation of the long-term elasticities by 
applying the Stock and Watson (1989, 1991) dynamic OLS method gives 
further support to the previous findings (Table 4.10).
An interesting point here is that both labour-intensive and capital-intensive 
groups seem to have been similarly disrupted by real appreciation in the 
long term. A one percent increase in the index of the real exchange rate 
(devaluation) leads to an increase of 1.28 and 1.32 per cent in the value 
added of the labour-intensive and capital-intensive groups, respectively. It 
must be noted that the high positive long-term relative price elasticity for 
some of the capital-intensive branches, like machinery and transport (1.887 
and 1.922 respectively), may be ascribed to the positive demand 
substitution effect of real devaluation which may have offset the negative 
impact via higher import costs.
These results do not give support to the hypothesis that some of the more 
capital-intensive manufacturing lines may have benefited the most from the 
structural overvaluation of the domestic currency in the long term.
Table 4.9 presents the Johansen cointegration test for equation 4.2. It must 
be noted that, in general, public consumption was excluded because the 
results were not adequate. It must be noted that the results o f this equation 
do not confirm the findings on the relative price elasticity for 
manufacturing as whole given by the Johansen test in equation 4.1. In the 
second equation, the coefficient o f the real exchange rate index for 
manufacturing as a whole and for the capital-intensive group is negatively 
signed. Likewise the results of the Stock and Watson dynamic OLS
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methodology (Table 4.12) indicate that the long-term elasticity of 
manufacturing output to the real exchange rate for the entire sector and for the 
capital-intensive branches although positive, is not statistically significant. 
These results seem to contradict the previous ones.
Table 4.10 Stock and Watson dynamic OLS estimation equation 
(4.3) 1960-88___________________________________________
Sectors Constant M Er R 2
Total manufacturing -2.425 0.795 1.298 0.99
0.038 0.000 0.002
Labour-intensive group -3.164 0.753 1.384 0.99
0.001 0.000 0.000
Capital-intensive group -3.022 0.816 1.259 0.98
0.049 0.000 0.013
Food -3.865 0.597 2.007 0.98
0.007 0.000 0.000
Textiles -2.182 0.427 2.040 0.98
0.029 0.000 0.000
Beverages 0.763 0.811 0.026 0.99
0.395 0.000 0.923
Clothing -3.722 0.717 1.240 0.97
0.021 0.000 0.014
Non-metallic minerals -3.521 0.726 1.195 0.98
0.005 0.000 0.003
Chemicals -12.310 1.327 0.954 0.99
0.000 0.000 0.032
Metals -21.003 1.099 3.522 0.99
0.000 0.000 0.000
Machinery -15.132 1.245 1.674 0.88
0.010 0.000 0.277
Transport equipment -1.783 0.373 2.212 0.71
0.631 0.051 0.074
Sources: probability in bold. Except from textiles three leads and lags were used for 
all the sectors.
A look at table 4.11 indicates that there is a long term positive association 
between private manufacturing value added as a whole and public investment 
and real domestic credit to the private sector. Venezuelan manufacturing as a 
whole benefited from greater public investment and real domestic credit to the 
private sector brought about by oil revenues in the long term. It seems that 
manufacturing output in the capital-intensive group is more responsive to 
public investment in the long term than is the labour-intensive group while the
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opposite seems to hold in the case of domestic credit to the private sector. As 
expected, some manufacturing lines, such as textiles and non-metallic mineral 
products, benefited greatly from domestic credit to the private sector in the 
long-term. It must be noted that although the Stock and Watson method 
allows for estimates of the short-term elasticities these are not presented 
because they were not statistically significant at the conventional levels of 
probability. However, in some of the cases the real exchange rate was 
negatively signed. This may indicate that the impact of increasing oil prices 
and real appreciation did not have a negative impact on manufacturing during 
1973-77. The previous evidence suggests that the negative impact o f real 
appreciation on manufacturing during 1973-77 may have been partly 
counterbalanced by the greater home demand. Furthermore, real appreciation 
may have exerted some positive effect on those manufacturing branches with a 
high level of imported capital and raw materials and with an inward 
orientation in the short-term.
Table 4.11 Stock and Watson dynamic OLS estimation equation (4.4) 1960-88
Sectors Constant IP DC Er Cp R2
Total manufacturing 1.788 0.327 0.441 0.492 0.99
0.029 0.053 0.001 0.039
Labour-intensive group 0.371 0.018 0.580 1.170 0.98
0.608 0.908 0.000 0.000
Capital-intensive group 1.556 0.491 0.369 0.127 0.98
0.086 0.015 0.006 0.618
Food 1.905 0.527 0.161 0.449 0.97
0.043 0.011 0.182 0.097
Textiles -0.958 -0.538 0.703 2.659 0.93
0.425 0.046 0.001 0.000
Beverages -1.499 0.101 -0.367 -1.227 1.58 0.98
0.395 0.000 0.923 0.923
Non-metallic minerals -1.138 0.057 0.532 1.169 0.98
0.005 0.000 0.003 0.003
Metals -11.633 0.623 0.481 1.521 0.98
0.000 0.048 0.019 0.002
Transport equipment 0.087 0.604 -1.120 -1.817 1.92 0.93
0.973 0.093 0.040 0.017 0.05
Sources: probability in bold. One lead and lag were used for all the sectors.
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4.4.3 VECM Variance Decomposition and Impulse Responses
This section gives further support to the previous estimations of the impact of 
monetary and real exchange rate policies made in equation 4.1, by way of 
estimating a restricted VAR model derived from the Johansen framework. We 
focus on the analysis of the short-run and long-run dynamics among the vector 
o f variables (eq. 4.1) by using standard innovation accounting techniques: 
variance decompositions (VDCs) and impulse response functions (IRFs). It is 
well known that VDCs give the percentage of the forecast error variance of 
each variable explained by the particular shock, whereas the IRFs indicate the 
estimated response of each variable to a one standard deviation impulse in the 
fundamental shock.
The variance decomposition of private manufacturing value added growth for 
a three lags, three variables model is reported in Table 4.12. The variables 
considered are: private manufacturing value added, real money supply and the 
real exchange rate.21 The cointegrating equations derived from the Johansen 
test were used to compute the VECM model and the variance decomposition 
in this section. It seems that 10.9 per cent and 18.5 per cent of the fluctuations 
in total manufacturing value added are caused by disturbances in the real 
exchange rate and money supply respectively, at the one-year horizon. The 
variations in the real exchange rate and the real money supply account for 25.9 
and 48.8 per cent of the variations in manufacturing value added at the 10- 
period forecast horizon. These results are fairly consistent with Dutch disease 
theory in the sense that both the real exchange rate and expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies seem to have played a key role in the performance of 
manufacturing in the long term. Nevertheless, the unexplained variance of 
manufacturing is near to 70.5 per cent at one period horizon and near to 25.4
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per cent for 5- and 10-period forecasts. Thus, it seems that we need to 
consider other factors to explain the performance of Venezuelan 
manufacturing over 1974-77. As regards disaggregate manufacturing, it seems 
that in the case of the labour-intensive group, as a whole a greater percentage 
of the variation in value added is ascribed to the variation in Er and M in the 
medium to long-term (more than 70 percent between the 5- and 15-period 
forecast horizon). In contrast, the percentage of the variation in manufacturing 
output in the capital-intensive group is less than 33 per cent between the 1-and 
15-year forecasts.
Some of the lines, such as textiles, were more influenced by the exchange rate 
in the short term. For chemicals and transport, the impact o f the real exchange 
rate seems to increase in the long term.
Dynamic response to the shocks
The impact of shocks on the real exchange rate and government spending are 
measured by using IRFs, presented in Fig 4.4. This indicates the estimated 
dynamic response of manufacturing value added to a one unit increase in 
money supply and the real exchange rate (devaluation). It seems that, while 
the adverse effect of real devaluation on private manufacturing value added 
prevails in the short term (between the 2nd and the 6th period), this is reversed
tViafter the 6 period. This seems to hold for all the manufacturing lines 
considered. It must be noted, however, that some lines such as textiles and 
food seem to have a positive response to devaluation policies in the short and 
long term.
The VECM was estimated by using the econometric-view program (1994).
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Likewise, the effect of real devaluation on the capital-intensive group as a 
whole is not well-defined especially in the short-to-medium term. For 
machinery, it seems that a real devaluation has some positive effects after the 
3rd and until the 8th period, but it is not clear thereafter.
Fig. 4.4 Response o f  manufacturing value added to money and the real exchange rate index
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It should be noted that according to the IRFs, variations in the money supply 
have significant positive and long-lasting effects on manufacturing value
tFiadded in all the sectors, but this effect is reversed after the 6 period.
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4.4.4 Some econometric evidence on the impact of fiscal, exchange rate 
and credit policies on private manufacturing investment
In this section, the determinants of private manufacturing investment for 
Venezuela are estimated by using cointegration techniques and an error- 
correction model. The reason to include this section relates to various factors. 
First, the findings in chapter 3 suggest sectoral private investment has shown a 
severe reluctance to increase from the 1980s onwards, so it may be of 
relevance to disentangle the factors behind the performance of private 
manufacturing. Second, according to the resource curse thesis, there is 
supposed to be a crowding-out effect of private investment by public 
investment. In the case of an economy with unemployed resources, this effect 
may appear in the medium or long term. For this reason, the long-term 
elasticity of private manufacturing investment was estimated for Venezuelan 
manufacturing.
The equation for manufacturing investment was formulated by taking into 
account a structural feature of the Venezuelan economy, which is the high 
import content of public investment. This might lead us to expect that public 
infrastructural investment would have a greater impact on private 
manufacturing than would total public investment. The policy of easy credit 
led us to include the real interest rate as one of the independent variables. It 
must be noted that the real interest rate was chosen instead of domestic credit 
to the private sector because the first variable provided better results.
On the basis of previous considerations, the investment equation states that 
private manufacturing investment (Im) is explained by government investment 
in infrastructure (Ip), the real exchange rate index (Er), real public 
consumption (Cp) and the real interest rate (r). Since all data was integrated of
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order 1, a cointegration and error correction methodologies were applied with 
the basic equation as follows:22
Iiru = & + A Ipt + A Er, + A Cpt + A  r, + dip (L) A Ipt + diEr (E)A Er, + dCp (E)A Cpt + dr(E) A r,
where:
Imt= logarithm of private investment in the manufacturing sector at constant 1984 
prices. Sources: OCEI Industrial Survey and Central Bank of Venezuela, annual 
reports, various issues.
Ipt = logarithm of non-oil public investment in infrastructure at constant 1984 prices. 
Sources: Baptista (1991).
Ert = logarithm of the bilateral real exchange rate index. This is defined as the 
nominal exchange rate adjusted by the index of the relative prices (a fall means a real 
appreciation). Source: Statistical appendix, chapter II, Table 1 column 10.
Cp = logarithm of public consumption at constant 1984 prices. Sources: BCV, 
annual reports.
rt= real domestic interest rate at constant 1984 prices. Sources: BCV, annual reports.
The unit root test for the variables considered is presented in Table 4.13. As 
all the variables are integrated of order 1, the equation was estimated by using 
an error-correction model for the 1966-88 years.23
For the explanation on the mathematical derivation the investment function see methodological appendix.
23
The variables considered are the same included in the previous model. It was not possible to apply the Stock and Watson 
methodology due to the small sample size.
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Table 4.13 Unit root tests in logs and differences
5 % critical values
Variables in log levels Variables in first differences
DF ADF (1) 
-3.004 -3.645
Perron test 
-3.720
DF
-3.645
Perron test 
-3.72
Ima -1.709 -1.827 -4.454 -4.029
Ip -2.004 -3.424
Er -2.918 -6.62
Cp -0.942 -2.782 -4.143 -3.893
r -3.412 -4.822
Notes: non augmentes DF test was performed when the disturbance terms in the DF regression did not 
seem to be autocorrelated. The model A o f  the Perron test was used. Perron (1989, p. 1364), the critica 
values for this test were taken from Tables VI.A and IV.A, pags. 1376-1377 from the same source. In t 
case o f  public consumption the DF value is -3.003 because no trend was included.
Table 4.14 reports the results for the cointegrating equation, which suggest 
that private manufacturing investment was positively influenced by public 
consumption and investment in infrastructure and devaluation in the long 
term.24 It must be noted that the results arising from the Engle-Granger and 
the Johansen tests differ with regards to the exchange rate and the real interest 
rate. The first test suggests a disruptive impact o f real devaluation on 
manufacturing private investment, although the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. By contrast, the Johansen test suggests an important disruptive 
effect of real appreciation on private manufacturing investment in the long 
term.25
Regarding the real interest rate, the Engle-Granger test indicates that private 
manufacturing investment is highly responsive to the movement in this 
variable in the long term. Nevertheless, the Johansen test gives the opposite 
results.
Although (Ochoa, 1985) concludes that there is no evidence o f  a strong direct multiplier effect o f  fiscal policies on 
manufacturing growth, the existence o f a significant positive association between manufacturing growth and monetary 
expansion, indicates that the indirect effect o f  fiscal policies is relevant. Likewise, given that this author does not test for non- 
stationarity, his results may be mistaken.
A negative effect o f  devaluation on private investment in the short-term has been found for other developing economies. See 
Chhibber, et al, 1992)
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Concerning the short-term equation, the results presented in Table 4.15 
indicate that, except for public investment in infrastructure, all the independent 
variables are correctly signed and are statistically significant at the 
conventional levels according to our theoretical considerations. 
Manufacturing private investment seems to be disrupted by real devaluation in 
the short term, with a one per cent increase in the Er leading to a change of 
-0.73 per cent in the first variable. Likewise, manufacturing private
Table 4.14 The Engle Granger and Johansen cointegration tests, 1966-1988
Dependent Variable is A(Ima) 
Included observations: 23
Variable Coefficient Std.
Error
T-
Statistic
Prob. ADJR
2
DW
Constant -0.355 2.758 -0.129 0.899 0.933 2.218
IP 0.245 0.077 3.188 0.005
Er -0.238 0.326 -0.730 0.475
Cp 0.746 0.099 7.532 0.000
R -0.011 0.006 -2.023 0.058
Johansen maximum eigenvalue test 1966-1988
null hypothesis r = 0, alternative hypothesis r =1
No o f  lags: 1
Variables Ima Ip Er Cp r *max
Total manufacturing 
Vector
Critical values:
95 percent
-1 0.1823 34.587 14.244 0.036
43.595
33.461
investment seems to be highly responsive to public consumption, and to the 
movement in the real interest rate. An increase in one unit in the real interest 
rate causes a 0.9 per cent fall in private manufacturing investment in the short 
term. These results cast doubt on the hypothesised negative association 
between private manufacturing investment and public investment in the long 
and short term. Public investment in infrastructure seems to have a positive 
impact on non-oil private investment and private manufacturing investment.
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The availability of cheap domestic credit seems to be important for 
manufacturing in the short term. Our findings are in accordance with the 
results derived by Wai and Wong (1982) and Blejer and Khan (1984) who
Table 4.15 Error correction model for private investment in Venezuelan manufacturing
Dependent Variable is A (Ima)
Sample: 1967 1988
Included observations: 22 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob.
C 0.002 0.028 0.055 0.957
A (Ip) 0.099 0.108 0.918 0.373
A (Er) -0.726 0.226 -3.216 0.006
A (Cp) -0.009 0.004 -2.403 0.030
A (r) 1.023 0.387 2.644 0.018
A (Ima^i)) -0.243 0.104 -2.325 0.035
R2 -1.269 0.230 -5.513 0.000
R-squared 0.789 Mean dependent var 0.067
Adjusted R-squared 0.705 S.D. dependent var 0.164
S.E. o f  regression 0.089 Akaike info criterion -4.580
Sum squared resid 0.119 Schwartz criterion -4.233
Log likelihood 26.167 F-statistic 9.354
Durbin-Watson stat 1.550 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
applied traditional econometrictechniques to estimate an aggregate model of 
private investment for a set of developing countries (including Venezuela). 
Their estimates suggest the important role for public investment policy in 
directing the pattern of private capital formation in developing countries.
The real appreciation of the bolivar seems to have benefited private investment 
in manufacturing through lower costs of imported capital and inputs especially 
in the short term. This is a logical result due to the high share o f imported 
capital in total manufacturing investment in Venezuela. It must be kept in
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mind that the import coefficient in machinery, excluding electrical machinery, 
was 83 per cent in 1986.26
In linking the above evidence to the impact of the 1970s oil boom on private 
manufacturing, it seems that the expansion of government expenditure and 
some real appreciation during 1973-77 favoured private investment in 
manufacturing. However, the same factors, exerted a negative effect in the 
medium term. The negative effect may be associated with the fact that real 
appreciation encouraged a high import content in accumulation and, even 
more importantly set obstacles to the expansion of manufacturing exports.
All of these factors led to inefficiencies in the accumulation process and to 
balance of payments deficits by 1977. As shown, manufacturing investment 
stagnated from 1978 and the capital-output ratio began to increase from 
1977.27 This suggests that a more cautious and co-ordinated absorption and 
income generating policy may have been advisable. The higher installed 
capacity due to the rapid investment made during 1975-78 could not be used 
due to the declining demand over 1978-82. Through the post-boom phase 
(1985-87) some recovery in private manufacturing in terms of output and 
investment growth took place after a sharp absolute decline during 1983-84 
due to the real devaluation of the bolivar. At first glance, the Venezuelan case 
seems to give support to the conclusion that devaluation policies in the long 
term prompt a restructuring of domestic manufacturing to meet the greater 
export demand resulting in efficiency improvement and profitability (Chhibber 
and Shafik, 1992). Nonetheless, two things must be highlighted. Firstly, 
although some expansion of manufacturing exports took place following the 
devaluations of 1983-84 and 1986, the results were rather poor as discussed in
26 Brandi (1989, p. 103).
27
See chapter 6, Table 6.12.
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the previous chapter, and instead manufacturing benefited from the import- 
substitution effect. Secondly, and although the analysis of the 1989-97 phase 
is beyond the scope of this thesis, the positive impact of real devaluation on 
output and investment in Venezuelan manufacturing proved to be temporary. 
A dramatic decline in these two variables has been recorded for the whole 
1989-96 phase28
In sum, and referring to the Venezuelan case during 1973-77, the issue was not 
the lack of financial resources in the non-oil economy, but rather its 
misleading and inefficient allocation, which resulted in unsustainable growth. 
This highlights the importance of dynamics in economics compared to static 
optimum allocation for long-term growth. The Venezuelan case seems to 
corroborate the argument regarding the relevance of improvements in 
productivity which can lead to sustainable growth compared to the once-and- 
for-all gains which accrue from an improvement in the static efficiency of 
resource allocation or greater capacity utilisation.29 Finally, our findings seem 
to render mistaken the argument made by Auty (1990, p. 208) according to 
which non-resource-based private Venezuelan manufacturing was affected 
negatively by the government’s resource-based industrialisation through the 
crowding out o f investment.
The Econometric results and the role of exchange rate policies during a 
boom
In linking the previous results with the Dutch disease predictions, these appear 
to be supported by our estimates only to some extent. The theory suggests that
It is likely that import liberalisation policies have had a severe disruptive impact on manufacturing, albeit, the modest 
positive impact o f devaluation on Venezuelan manufacturing during 1985-87, may suggest that contrarily to Chhibber and 
Shafik’s (1992) conclusions on Indonesia, the impact o f  devaluation on private investment through greater costs o f  imported 
capital and inputs may prevail even in the long term and that the process o f  industrial restructuring cannot rely on a policy o f 
real devaluation as a main tool.
29 See Helleiner (1995), Rodrick (1989).
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an appreciation (fall) of the real exchange rate or an increase in the prices of 
non-tradables relative to tradables is bound to exert a negative influence on 
manufacturing value added. The Dutch disease hypothesis as a long-run 
phenomenon seems to be confirmed by our estimates. Nevertheless, this 
hypothesis is not confirmed in the short-term; real appreciation may have 
exerted some positive impact on import-competitive manufacturing in the 
short term, so the effect o f the first oil boom on Venezuelan manufacturing 
may not have taken place according to the model.
The previous evidence suggests that the overvaluation of the bolivar may have 
been functional to the industrialisation process through the availability of 
cheap capital and intermediate goods at the earlier stages. However, once the 
reduced market poses difficulties to manufacturing development, real
overvaluation is expected to have set obstacles to a sustainable pattern of 
industrial growth and structural change by disrupting exports. The stagnation 
of Venezuelan manufacturing due to the reduced market by the mid-1960s 
seems to relate to this fact (see chapters 3 and 5).
If  we choose to characterise the problems of Venezuelan industrialisation
during 1973-82 as Dutch disease, this must be qualified by various facts. First, 
over 1973-77, real appreciation was mild and its disruptive impact on 
manufacturing may have been attenuated by the import-competitive character 
of Venezuelan manufacturing and the cheapening of imported capital and 
intermediate goods in the short term. Second, the negative impact of real 
appreciation on Venezuelan manufacturing during 1973-82 must be
understood in the sense that real appreciation and the availability of oil income 
may have defferred the need to develop an export-competing manufacturing 
sector to expand the market, to avoid balance of payments problems, and to 
achieve a viable long-term pattern of growth. Likewise, the abundant oil
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revenues and the strengthening of the bolivar encouraged all kind of imports 
prompting the appearance of balance of payments problems in the short-term 
and reinforcing import dependence and the capital-intensive pattern of 
industrial growth and structural change, with the attendant problems of 
unemployment, a worsening of income distribution and the maintenance o f the 
assembly nature of the production process.
We argue that the symptoms of Dutch disease in Venezuela must be 
understood in the light of the above facts and these are not especially related to 
the 1970s oil price increase, but are concerned with the structural features of 
the economy and especially with the lack of a coherent industrial policy before 
the 1970s boom.
4.5 Concluding remarks
The consideration and econometric analysis of the policies launched during 
1973-82 with reference to Venezuelan manufacturing presented in previous 
pages further confirm that Dutch disease, especially relating to de­
industrialisation, was not the outcome of the traditional mechanisms embodied 
in the standard Dutch disease theory. Firstly, the greater public spending 
seems to have exerted some short-term positive impact on private 
manufacturing. Venezuelan manufacturing proved to be responsive to 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the short term. Secondly, over 
1973-77, the economy benefited from the launching of investment policies and 
easy credit to the private sector. Thirdly, it also benefited from cheaper 
imported capital and raw materials due to the real appreciation of the domestic 
currency. These policies may have spared manufacturing from the disruptive 
effect of the 1970s oil boom. However, the higher short-term level of private 
investment was neither able to promote long-term efficient growth, nor was it
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sustainable. The expansion of private manufacturing was rather modest over 
these years, especially if  we consider that the sector enjoyed considerable 
subsidies. In addition, this growth was inefficient as measured by the strong 
decline in value added per worker (see Chapter 5, Table 5.8).
It seems that the rapid local distribution of oil income led to a situation of 
excess demand with a huge increase in imports. The huge domestic demand 
may have been a contributing factor in explaining the drop in labour 
productivity growth at the beginning of the boom due to the scarcity of skilled 
labour and management capacities common to the Venezuelan economy. It is 
worth noting that there were serious implementation problems with the 
resource-based industrialisation and with the financing policy which favoured 
some of the most inefficient manufacturing branches, such as textiles.
Concerning exchange rate policy, the government maintained a fixed exchange 
rate regime which implied a reinforcement of the structural real overvaluation 
of the bolivar during 1973-77. In this sense, the policy of allowing for real 
appreciation during 1973-77 may have contributed to the crisis of the 
Venezuelan economy by 1978 through three channels, namely, (a) the setting 
of obstacles to the development of an export-competitive manufacturing sector 
when an important problem in the economy was the reduced home market and 
import dependence; (b) the encouragement of imports of capital goods and 
thus the over-investment of oil revenues; and, (c) the reinforcement o f a 
pattern o f industrialisation characterised by the use of imported capital and 
raw material goods, which contributed to the appearance of balance of 
payments problems by 1977.
These findings lead us to claim that the problem of Venezuelan 
industrialisation during 1960-96 is linked to the virtual lack of a coherent
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industrial policy which would consider, in an integrated way, policies focused 
on import substitution, export promotion, technology and investment.
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5. The Impact of the 1970s Oil Boom on Venezuelan Manufacturing
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the effects exerted by the 
economic policies launched during the 1970s oil booms on Venezuelan 
private manufacturing as a whole. The major issue is to what extent the 
sectoral response reflected Dutch disease symptoms or, instead, it was 
linked to structural factors and sectoral policies pursued during the 1970s 
and/or before.
The chapter begins by portraying the salient features of Venezuelan 
industrialisation through 1950-1972 (section 1). Attention is drawn to 
various aspects of growth and structural change in the non-oil economy and 
especially, the industrial sector, which seems to be essential in 
disentangling the factors behind the impact of the 1970s oil booms on the 
Venezuelan economy. Next, the principal trends in private manufacturing 
as a whole during 1974-77, 1978-82 and the post-boom phase (1983-88) 
are presented. Here we bring into the picture some explanations for the 
process followed by Venezuelan private manufacturing as a whole during 
the 1973-1982 phase, and especially during the rapid sectoral growth phase 
of 1973-77 and its stagnation thereafter. The major conclusions of the 
chapter are set out in the final section.
5.1 Venezuelan industrialisation during the pre-boom phase (1950-1972) 
An Import substitution industrialisation strategy
The adoption of an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy in 
Venezuela took place later than in other Latin American countries as a result 
of the availability of foreign currency provided by oil activities. Although
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previous studies1 claimed that the beginning of Venezuelan industrialisation 
was linked to the years of democratic rule (1945-48 and especially from 
1958), there is evidence that Venezuelan industrialisation began and was 
encouraged by the state in the 1940s, and continued during the dictatorship 
years (1948-58).2 Following the overthrow of Perez Jimenez’s dictatorship, a 
formal import substitution strategy was adopted in Venezuela from 1958 
under the new democratic government. This led to the violation of the trade 
agreement with the US. This agreement, which had prevented the rise in 
tariffs on imports by the Venezuelan government, was finally rescinded in 
1972 through an escape clause. The state planning and co-ordination board, 
CORDIPLAN, was set up in 1960 and Decree 512 was published, which 
established the commitment of the government to buying nationally produced 
goods. The industrial policy consisted mainly of uncoordinated trade policies 
under the form of protectionism, which relied basically on subsided credits, 
low tariffs and quotas on capital, and intermediate goods; the establishment of 
public enterprises and state corporations to provide financial support to the 
sector, and a decentralisation policy.3
Despite the fact that during 1950-72, industrial policies in Venezuela were 
mainly focused on the granting of protection to manufacturing, the major 
instrument for protection was not tariffs. The protectionist system adopted 
from 1959 was based on quantitative restrictions on imports, mainly quotas, 
licensing and tariff exemptions. The average tariff surcharge was only 21.6 
per cent and high tariffs were only levied on those products that represented 
less than 5 per cent of total imports during 1961-63.4 This protection 
structure obeyed the commercial agreement with the US already referred to.
1 See Silva Michelena (1971, p. 108-9).
2
In the late 1930’s, a programme to promote industrial development was launched. Nevertheless, the signing o f  the so- 
called reciprocal Trade Agreement with the United States in 1939, which prevented the increase in tariffs on imports by the 
Venezuelan government, limited the impact o f this industrial programme. As a result, instead o f tariffs, protection was 
based on quantitative restrictions. As early as in 1946 the Venezuelan Development Corporation (CVF) was established to 
grant financial resources to industrial projects. As stated above the greater government spending in education, health and 
infrastructure fostered home demand. The industrialisation continued during the Perez Jimenez dictatorship (1948-58).
3 Purroy (1982).
4
CORDIPLAN (1968, p. 166), quoted by Perez Sainz and Zarembka (1979, p. 10).
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The main instruments of protection in the 1960s were licensing and duty 
exemption on imported capital goods and raw materials. The arithmetic 
means of the incidence of custom duties, and other charges with similar 
effects on the CIF value of imports in Venezuela was 56 per cent in 1959, 
which was the third-highest level of protection in Latin America (Table 5.1). 
The existence of high protection contributed to the existence of high costs and 
prices in Venezuela compared to those in other Latin American countries. A 
comparative study undertaken by ECLAC5 for 19 Latin American countries 
estimated that Venezuela had the highest relative price index in Latin 
America in 1962. The price index for Venezuela was 101 per cent higher 
than in Ecuador.
Table 5.1 Arithmetic means of incidence of customs duties and other duties of 
equivalent effect on the CIF value of imports in selected Latin American 
countries
Country Year or 
Period
Incidence o f  
customs duties (%)
Argentina 1959 91.5
Paraguay 1957-1958 61.5
Venezuela 1959 56
Ecuador 1957-1958 54.9
Chile 1957-1958 49.2
Colombia 1956-1958 41.3
Brazil 1957-1959 40.1
Bolivia 1957-1958 30.3
Peru 1957-1958 28.3
Uruguay 1957 21.1
Mexico 1957-1958 18.1
Source: Harris (1971, p. 147, Table 39).
As noted above, tariffs were not the main instrument of protection in 
Venezuela during the 1960s. Nevertheless, we present some estimates of the 
incidence of tariffs according to the kinds of goods to make clear that the 
level of protection on consumer goods was higher than on capital goods
UN, Economic Bulletin for Latin American (1963, p. 8-10).
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(Table 5.2). Furthermore, the relative prices for five categories of goods are 
also presented. The parity exchange rates were estimated for the main 
expenditure groups. These data also indicate that the pattern of protection 
was positively correlated to the relative prices. Processed foodstuffs, tobacco, 
chemicals and pharmaceutical products showed high levels of tariff protection 
and high relative prices. By contrast, capital goods had relatively lower levels 
of tariff protection and relative prices. There is no evidence that changes in 
this situation took place throughout the 1960s.
Table 5.2 Incidence of tariffs and Venezuelan relative prices
Sectors Tariff Commodity category Relative prices
Processed foodstuffs and tobacco 287 Food and tobacco 94
Chemical and pharmaceutical 121.1 Toilet articles, drugs and medicines 103
products
Other current consumer goods 74 Clothing, footwear, textiles, household supplies 82
Durable consumer goods 14.7 Books and toys, etc., furniture, electrical appliances 54
Capital goods 10.9 Transportation equipment, producer equipment 48
Source: Harris (1971, p. 148, Table 41).
One of the main instruments of industrial protectionism in Venezuela was 
exemption from custom duties. During 1961-67, these were granted 
according to Decree N° 255, which allowed exemption from customs duties 
for imported raw materials, and machinery and equipment that covered the 
demands of industry and agriculture.6
A negative effect of this protectionist policy was the promotion of those 
industries which were more dependent on imported inputs and the placing of 
obstacles in the way of national production of some industrial inputs. The 
protectionist structure also encouraged a phenomenon of over-sized plant and 
high levels of spare capacity. It has been estimated that the average level of
6
Official Gazette No 26228, April 1960, quoted by Purroy (1982, p. 229).
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capacity utilisation in Venezuelan manufacturing was 60 per cent in 1969.
Oil income, the role of the state, and industrialisation
Expansionary fiscal policies and rural-urban migrations prompted a 
considerable stimulus to capitalist development with the creation of the home 
market and a labour force required for the beginning of industrialisation in the 
late 1940s. Oil income also contributed to the growth of the non-oil 
economy by covering the deficits in the non-oil current account of the 
balance of payments. In the terminology of structuralism, oil revenues 
covered the external gap or the foreign currency constraint to growth. In 
Venezuela, imports were financed almost totally by the foreign exchange 
income from the oil sector. The share of imports financed by oil income 
rose from 43.5 per cent in 1951 to 83 per cent in 1972. In this sense, the 
real appreciation of the bolivar became an important mechanism for the 
distribution of oil income in Venezuela, which facilitated the acquisition of 
cheap imports.
The distribution of oil income also benefited industrialisation through the 
financing of domestic investment. During 1969-71, there was an increasing 
trend in the share of external resources used in the financing of domestic 
investment (see Table 5.3). As expected, this trend was reinforced by the 
1970s oil booms, when the share of domestic savings of the non-oil sector 
declined from 71 per cent in 1971 to 43 per cent in 1977. The substitution of 
oil income for domestic savings allowed for high levels of investment without 
curbing consumption, thus favouring labour to some extent.
The evidence provided in this section seems to bear out the views o f some
o
scholars who have claimed the existence of an entirely negative impact of 
oil revenues on Venezuelan manufacturing even before the 1970s.
7
Industrial Survey (1971).
8
Examples o f  this view are Store (1980); Auty, (1987) and Gelb (1988).
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Table 5.3 Oil income and financing of capital accumulation 1968-88
Year
Gross 
Investment 
bn Bs
Percentage o f  gross investment
Gross domestic 
savings 
(a + b)
Non-oil
savings
(a)
Oil
resources
(b)
Foreign
savings
(c)
Total external 
resources 
(b+ c)
1968 11.85 117.80 72.93 44.87 22.70 67.57
1969 13.25 113.70 75.45 38.25 16.68 54.93
1970 13.35 112.40 69.27 43.13 18.20 61.33
1971 15.41 117.07 71.25 45.82 23.69 69.51
1972 18.34 108.70 65.62 43.08 11.40 54.48
1973 21.55 126.87 68.60 58.27 33.50 91.77
1974 24.29 184.04 22.51 161.53 116.34 277.88
1975 35.41 121.09 38.18 82.91 27.17 110.08
1976 49.5 102.05 43.14 58.91 2.40 61.31
1977 70 84.16 45.86 38.30 -18.30 20.00
1978 83.14 74.56 44.52 30.04 -27.95 2.09
1979 75.87 103.97 53.60 50.37 4.30 54.67
1980 74.24 126.46 53.48 72.98 27.98 100.95
1981 80.77 120.12 48.35 71.78 20.38 92.16
1982 81.21 90.54 37.37 53.17 -10.98 42.19
1983 64.06 167.96 112.92 55.04 45.30 100.34
1984 57.37 172.12 68.80 103.31 80.74 184.05
1985 70.5 155.57 81.75 73.82 62.98 136.80
1986 93.7 100.30 65.29 35.01 0.32 35.33
1987 137 103.49 54.87 48.62 4.16 52.78
1988 198.67 81.59 33.03 48.55 -26.01 22.54
Notes: The contribution o f  the oil sector to saving was assumed to be equal to oil revenues that accrue 
to government and n-on-oil saving was estimated as a residual. Foreign savings equal the current 
account o f  the balance o f  payments. Sources: World Bank Tables, 1988 and Baptista (1991).
Accelerating growth during 1950-64 and sluggish performance 
thereafter
The above policies led to rapid manufacturing growth from 1950 to the mid- 
1960s. The performance of Venezuelan industrialisation was impressive 
during 1950-65. As shown by Table 5.4, over this phase Venezuelan 
manufacturing achieved faster value added growth (9.5 per cent) than in 
seven other Latin American countries.
Table 5.4 Industrialisation and economic development in Latin America 
and Venezuela during 1960-73
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Growth rates o f Yma* Ratio o f Yma/Yt
Countries 1950-65 1965-73 1950 1973
Argentina 4.8 5.9 26 33
Brazil 7.3 12 22 30
Mexico 7.2 8.1 19 26
Chile 5.5 3.4 23 24
Colombia 6.2 7.7 13 18
Peru 7.8 6.6 16 25
Venezuela** 9.5 5 12 17
Notes: Y m a =  m anufacturing real value added in American dollars a t 1970 prices;
Y t =  total GDP; * I t refers to average annual growth rates. ** Data for Venezuela 
refer to the non-oil economy. Sources: B itar and Troncoso (1988, cuadro N o II-3, 
p. 53).
A further picture of Venezuelan manufacturing is presented in Table 5.5. The 
average annual growth rate of the sectoral value added was 12.23 per cent 
during the 1950s compared to 7.24 per cent in the non-oil economy. 
Likewise, real gross domestic investment expanded at an annual rate of 7.1 
per cent during 1950-55, and over 20 per cent during 1955-59.9 At the same 
time, manufacturing’s contribution to non-oil value added rose from 7 per 
cent in 1950 to 12 per cent in 1960 and the sector also exhibited a marked 
increase in labour productivity measured as value added per worker, although 
labour absorption was very low during the 1950s.
Interestingly, this development took place during a phase of high oil exports 
and revenues, which spanned the period from 1948 to 1957.10 This seems to 
refute the hypothesis of an intrinsic negative association between primary 
exports and industrial development.
However, the rapid manufacturing growth during the 1950s was interrupted 
by a fall in oil income during 1959-62.11 Although some recovery in the 
sector took place during 1962-65, as a whole there was a slowdown in 
manufacturing during 1960-70 and especially during 1965-69 when the 
average output growth rate per year was 6.3 per cent compared with 9.6 per
9
Data on investment at constant prices o f 1957. Sources: BCV, annual economic reports.
Oil exports increased from 691 to 2751 mill $ between 1947 and 1957.
For a study o f the performance o f Venezuelan manufacturing during 1960-70 see Merhav (1972).
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Table 5.5 Industrialisation and economic development, Venezuela, 1950-72
1950-60 1960-72’ 1960-65' 1965-69
Trend growth
Growth o f  manufacturing GDP 12.23 8.22 9.59 6.34
Growth o f  total GDP 7.24 6.92 5.05 7.47
Growth o f  manufacturing employment 3.37 6.28 7.16 5.15
Growth o f  total employment 3.27 5.54 5.16 5.21
Population growth 4.03 3.51 3.72 3.52
Growth o f  sectoral labour productivity 8.86 1.94 2.44 1.19
Growth o f  total labour productivity 3.97 1.38 -0.11 2.26
Structural change 1950 1960 1965 1972
Manufacturing share o f GDP 6.9 11.8 15 15.4
Manufacturing share o f  employment 11.7 12.5 13.1 14.7
Manufacturing employment share o f 11.0 10.9 15.3 16.1
total economically active population
Notes: GDP at 1984 prices. Growth rates are the least squares estimates o f  trend growth. * In the case o f  
employment the year 1964 was excluded due to the unreliability o f  the data for that year. Sources: own 
estimations based on data provided by PDVSA, internal files and the Central Bank o f  Venezuela, economic 
reports (various issues).
cent in 1960-65 and real investment was 0.60 per cent compared to 8.5 per 
cent during 1962-65.12 The common explanation for the lack of industrial 
dynamism has been the difficulties of embarking upon the more complex 
stages of import substitution.13 However, it is more likely that the problems 
of Venezuelan manufacturing by the mid-1960s were associated with the 
reduced market and the absence of sound and coherent industrial policy. This 
led to a pattern of growth and structural change in industrialisation which 
suffered from severe weaknesses, notably the lack of an export-competitive 
subsector, high dependence on capital and intermediate imports, low 
employment generation (which reinforced the unequal distribution of 
income), low diversification and limited intersectoral links.14 These aspects 
are discussed below.
The Lack of an export-competitive manufacturing sector, high import 
dependence and balance of payments problems
A striking feature of Venezuelan manufacturing over the period 1950-72 was
12
Data on investment refers to values at constant 1957 prices. Sources: BCV, annual reports various issues.
13
Malave (1974); Maza Zavala (1974) and Purroy (1982).
14
The idea o f  considering the demand side effect o f oil income on the economy is put forward by Karshenas (1989).
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the virtual lack of an export-competitive subsector. Indeed, oil exports 
accounted for 90 per cent of total exports during 1960-72. This problem is 
fully discussed in later chapters in relation to the impact of the 1970’s oil 
booms, so here it will suffice to introduce few ideas.
As noted, the absence of an export promotion policy implied that the 
Venezuelan industrialisation process led to the existence of chronic deficits in 
the manufacturing trade balance that were covered by oil income. As shown 
by Table 5.6, over 1969-72 the trade balance ratio defined as the share of the 
trade (export minus imports) in total trade (exports plus imports) was close to 
-1 in manufacturing as a whole and this was a sector-wide phenomenon, as 13 
out of 18 lines was very close to -1 and remained the same during these years. 
This development is explained by the scanty increase in manufacturing 
exports as well as by the high import ratios especially in the capital goods 
sectors, which have been a chronic problem of the Venezuelan industrial 
sector.
As further discussed in Chapter 6, the virtual lack of an export-competitive 
manufacturing sector in Venezuela seems to be partly related to the 
disruptive impact of the structural overvaluation of the bolivar.
Concerning trends in the import ratios, it becomes evident that although 
traditional intermediate lines such as food, textiles, non-metallic minerals and 
rubber experienced an important process of import substitution, this was not 
the case for manufacturing as a whole and especially for the capital goods 
sector. The import structure shows that the greater share of manufacturing 
imports corresponded to mechanical and electrical machinery. It is worth 
noting that according to data from ECLAC, the share of capital goods in
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manufacturing imports was the highest within a group of 7 countries.15 The 
poor performance of import substitution in the capital branches seems to have 
been a weakness of Venezuelan industrialisation, with serious implications 
for the medium and long-term feasibility of the economic model. The rapid 
growth of imports of capital and intermediate goods was the major source of 
the balance of payments problems in Venezuela in the short term and medium 
term. The share of such goods in total imports amounted to more than 50 per 
cent on average during 1950-69.16 Although data on the value of 
manufactured imports are scanty before 1968, it is estimated that in 1972 
capital and intermediate goods for manufacturing represented 66 per cent of 
total imports and that the share of capital goods for manufacturing in total 
capital imports was 77 per cent. It is reasonable to assume that these shares 
were similar or higher during the preceding years.
Table 5.6 Trade indicators for Venezuelan manufacturing, 1969-72
ISIC Manufacturing Trade balance ratio Export ratio Import ratio Share o f  exports Share o f  imports
Code Lines 1969 1972 1969 1972 1969 1972 1969 1972 1969 1972
311-12 Food -0.47 -0.29 3.7 4.9 9.7 8.5 65.2 53.3 4.9 3.7
313 Beverages - 1.00 -1.00 0.0 0.0 24.4 32.4 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.9
314 Tobacco - - - - - - - - - -
321 Textiles - 1.00 - 1.00 0.0 0.0 18.9 19.8 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.1
322-24 Clothing - 1.00 -1.00 0.0 0.0 5.5 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5
323 Leather - 1.00 - 1.00 0.0 0.0 33.6 21.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.4
331 Wood - 1.00 - 1.00 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
332 Furniture - 1.00 -1.00 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
341 Paper -0.96 -0.85 0.8 3.0 26.1 26.9 2.8 6.6 3.4 3.1
351-52 Chemicals -0.99 -0.96 0.4 1.9 49.6 50.7 1.5 5.4 9.8 10.9
355 Rubber - 1.00 -1.00 0.0 0.0 16.2 13.7 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4
361-62-
69
Non-metallic
m inerals
-0.84 -0.65 1.9 2.3 18.5 9.9 7.0 6.2 2.1 1.1
371-72 Basic metals -0.93 -0.92 1.7 1.8 32.5 30.5 12.0 8.1 9.1 7.7
381 Metal products -0.90 -0.81 3.9 5.9 43.8 37.1 9.9 11.4 5.1 4.1
382-83 Machinery -1.00 - 1.00 0.3 0.8 84.2 86.1 0.6 1.3 31.8 38.6
384 Transport equipment - 1.00 -0.96 0.1 1.9 50.2 50.2 0.8 7.4 17.4 14.6
342 Printing - 1.00 - 1.00 0.0 0.0 11.8 11.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7
354-56-
85
300
Others - 1.00 -1.00 0.0 0.2 56.4 47.6 0.0 0.4 6.8 6.9
Total -0.95 -0.93 1.4 2.2 35.0 36.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: trade balance ratio = (Xj - Mj)/ (X; + Mj); export ratio = Xj/Qi -100; import ratio = Mi/D; 100; share o f  exports = 
Xj/Xti 100; share o f  imports = Mj/Mtj 100; where X; = exports o f  sector i's products; Mj = imports o f  sector i's products; Qj 
= sector i's total domestic output; Di = Qj + Mi - Xj = domestic demand. All data at constant bolivares o f 1984. Exports 
f.o.b. and imports c.i.f. Sources: own estimation based on data provided by BCV, Finexpo, annual reports and Brandi 
(1989).
15 ECLA (1974).
16 ECLA (1963).
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In sum, we argue that the problems of Venezuelan industrialisation are partly 
linked to the lack of a coherent industrial strategy which could have 
combined import substitution with export promotion policies. This resulted 
in a pattern of growth and structural change which was prone to balance of 
payments crises. As illustrated by Fig 5.1, the Venezuelan non-oil economy 
showed a dynamic characterised by cycles of rapid growth under phases of 
increasing oil revenues, which were accompanied by rising import ratios and 
deficits in the current account and the non-oil trade balance, especially 
manufacturing. For this reason, phases of rapid growth end with balance of 
payments problems once the oil revenues can no longer finance the balance of 
payments deficits. The years 1953-59 witnessed rapid growth, which led to 
increasing deficits in the current account and the non-oil trade balance. Thus,
Fig. 5.1 Oil revenues and import dependence o f the non-oil economy
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once this expansion in income was not enough to finance such deficits, 
balance of payment problems appeared by 1960 (Fig 5.1). This forced the 
government to pursue corrective actions in the form of public spending cuts, 
import controls and devaluation.
The Low-Employment generating capacity of Venezuelan 
industrialisation
A common criticism of the Latin American and Venezuelan industrial 
process is its incapacity to generate enough employment. The major features 
of Venezuelan industrialisation during 1950-72 are summarised in Table 5.5 
above. This shows that the sectoral share in total employment was 11.7 per 
cent during 1950-60 and 12.5 per cent during 1960-72. At the same time, the 
share of manufacturing employment in the total active population remained 
static at 11 per cent through the 1950s. This share increased from 11.1 per 
cent in 1959 to 15 per cent in 1965, which is accounted for by a significant 
decline in construction and services during the recessive phase of 1959-64. 
Although there is evidence that manufacturing private investment growth fell 
during 1959-60, it recovered during 1961-63, which suggests that 
manufacturing may have benefited from the fall in imports due to real 
devaluation. It seems that Venezuelan industrialisation exhibited a very 
low labour absorption during the 1950s, but this trend was reversed during 
the late 1960s.
The incapacity of industrialisation to adequately absorb the labour force 
resulted in its absorption by the service sector, whose sectoral share in total 
employment increased from 35.11 per cent in 1950 to 42.5 per cent in 1960 
and 52 per cent in 1970. Likewise, agriculture accounted for about 36 per
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cent of total employment by 1960 and 22 per cent by 1970.17 This contrasts 
with the low agricultural share in value added, which remained at 11 per 
cent from 1950 to 1970. Consequently, the performance o f labour 
productivity in agriculture did not improve substantially.
The phenomenon of low employment absorption in Venezuelan 
manufacturing is associated with the adoption of capital-intensive techniques, 
which has been a striking feature of Venezuelan manufacturing from 1950.18 
This seems to be linked to the following factors: (a) the unequal income 
distribution which favoured the production of goods with similar 
characteristics to those produced in developed societies; (b) protectionist 
policies which favoured the importation of capital and raw materials; (c) the 
availability of oil income through real appreciation of the domestic currency, 
which led to high manufacturing wages compared with other countries at the 
prevailing exchange rate (together with the availability of international 
reserves, this encouraged the adoption of capital-intensive technologies); and, 
(d) a pattern of protection which favoured imports of capital and intermediate 
goods and may have encouraged the substitution of capital for labour to 
diminish costs.
Inefficient growth
A salient feature of Venezuelan manufacturing during the 1960s was the 
low labour productivity growth. This point is widely discussed in the next 
chapter, so here it will suffice to say that over the 1950s rapid 
manufacturing growth was accompanied by high labour productivity 
growth, which was also due to the slow expansion of employment. By 
contrast, throughout the 1960s the contrary occurred, although it is worth
BCV, annual economic reports, various issues.
18
Purroy (1982);, Baptista (1987).
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noting that during 1965-69 manufacturing output and employment 
experienced a similar declining trend (Table 5.5).
Oil income, unequal income distribution, the reduced domestic market 
and industrialisation
Although oil income had some positive effects on the non-oil economy and 
industrialisation, the accrual and particular domestic distribution of 
voluminous oil revenues in Venezuela had also undesirable implications for 
income distribution and the pattern of home demand during 1935-89.19 
Although real appreciation and public spending are bound to have favoured 
both labour and capital, the latter group seems to have benefited the most 
from government policy and the greater distribution of oil revenues in the 
urban areas led to deeper regional inequalities with regard to income. It is 
estimated that while in Latin America and other developing countries the 
richest 20 per cent of the population received 59.1 and 44.9 per cent of total 
income respectively by the late 1960s, in Venezuela this figure was 69.5 per 
cent.20 The uneven income distribution common to Venezuela has been 
highlighted as one of the reasons for the narrowness of the home market and 
the problems faced by industrialisation in the late 1960s.21
These facts brought about negative consequences for industrialisation. The 
concentrated income distribution resulted in a highly differentiated and 
changing domestic demand structure that required a differentiated and 
sophisticated supply. The marked income concentration led to a 
consumption structure oriented towards luxury consumer goods, which 
favours the adoption of capital intensive technologies since the supply is 
designed to satisfy a highly concentrated market, causing high import
Karshenas (1989) highlighted the existence o f  the negative impact o f the domestic distribution o f  oil revenues on
income distribution and the patter o f  domestic demand by reference to the Iranian case during 1950-72.
20
Baptista (1986, p. 35). This Venezuelan scholar argues that the unequal income distribution (partly favoured by the 
particular distribution o f  oil income) was one o f  the reasons for the reduced domestic market.
1 Purroy (1982) and Baptista (1986,1997).
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dependence on capital and intermediate goods, balance of payments 
problems and lack of intersectoral links.22 Likewise, the fragmented market 
sets obstacles for industrial diversification because the pattern of 
production takes the form of last-stage assemblage. This limits the 
absorption of technologies that, together with the reduced market, lead to 
efficiency problems and discourage exports. The logical result is the 
existence of chronic balance of payments problems, which reinforce the 
described process of growth leading to a worsening of the distributional 
problem due to growing unemployment.23
Lack of diversification
The unequal income distribution together with the availability of abundant 
foreign currency brought about a particular industrial structure characterised 
by the limited development of the capital goods and some intermediate 
industries (see Table 5.7). At first glance, some diversification appears to 
have taken place, with the relative share of the traditional group in 
manufacturing value added having declined from 59 per cent in 1960 to 49 
per cent in 1970. At the same time, almost all of the traditional lines grew 
more slowly than manufacturing as a whole over 1960-72. Correspondingly, 
there was an increase in the contribution of the intermediate and mechanical 
lines to industrial value added from 23 and 11 per cent in 1960, respectively, 
to 30.6 and 14 per cent respectively in 1972. However, this was not an all- 
embracing phenomenon, and the relative share of those industries producing 
capital goods was very low (4 per cent) in 1974. The high growth of these 
lines in 1960-72, which was partly due to their low level of activity in 1960, 
did not have great significance in terms of industrial diversification. 
Branches relating to the production of inputs for construction and certain
22
Purroy (1982) and Aranda (1984), Brandi (1989).
23
A  fundamental difference between the industrial process in East Asia and Latin America relates to the inclusive nature 
o f  industrialisation in the first region which produced non-durable goods for the internal market in the 1950s and for the 
external market later on due to the more even income distribution. By contrast in Latin America a capital-intensive 
industrialisation emerged as a result o f  an unequal income distribution (for a discussion o f  this idea see Anglade and Fortin
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Table 5.7 Pattern o f  Growth and Industrial Structure, Venezuela, 1950-1972
ISIC
Code
Manufacturing
lines
Growth rates of 
o f real output
Percentage breakdown
Output structure Employment structure
1950-72 60-72 1950 1955 1960 1965 1972 1961 1972
311-12 Food 11.7 17.7 15.5 18.0 20.7 18.9 18.3 17.0
313 Beverage 8.7 6.5 11.2 7.9 9.1 6.5 6.0 5.9 3.2
314 Tobacco 8.0 6.0 10.2 7.5 9.3 8.2 6.6 1.8 1.1
321 Textiles 12.9 7.6 7.7 7.6 9.0 8.9 7.9 9.4 8.8
322-24 Wearing apparel & footwear 19.6 7.6 2.8 6.1 5.5 4.6 4.6 12.6 10.3
323 Leather 14.2 0.2 1.5 1.3 2.1 1.1 0.8 1.6 0.9
331 Wood 7.2 8.1 9.1 8.5 4.1 3.2 3.2 2.1 2.7
332 Furniture 7.9 7.7 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.3 1.7 6.9 3.7
Traditional industry 10.9 7.5 64.0 57.4 59.4 55.4 49.7 58.6 47.7
341 Paper & paper products 25.2 10.6 0.8 1.9 3.3 4.2 4.1 2.7 3.0
351-52 Chemical products 14.5 10.2 5.4 6.6 6.2 6.9 7.5 4.8 7.0
355 Rubber 17.2 8.9 1.3 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.4 1.8
361-62-6 Non-metallic minerals 10.1 8.4 13.7 12.9 10.3 9.9 9.1 6.3 6.6
371-72 Basic industry 46.0 22.5 0.0 0.6 1.0 1.9 6.8 1.2 5.2
Intermediate Industry 13.5 11.2 21.1 23.8 22.7 24.7 29.4 17.3 23.6
381 Metal products 25.4 9.4 1.5 2.3 4.4 3.7 4.6 3.4 7.5
382-83 Mechanical & electrical machin 13.9 26.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.8 4.3 2.5 5.9
384 Transport equipment 9.3 7.9 7.8 9.3 6.1 8.3 4.9 8.2 5.5
Mechanical Industry 13.3 11.4 9.8 11.9 11.1 13.8 13.8 14.2 18.8
342 Printing 11.8 6.7 4.3 5.5 4.4 3.3 3.2 3.8 3.7
354-56-8 Other manufacturing 23.9 11.6 0.8 1.4 2.4 2.8 3.8 6.2 6.2
300 Total 12.0 9.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: growth rates are the least squares estimates o f trend growth (1984 prices). Sourcres: own estimations based on data provided by
PDVSA, internal files and BCV, economic reports, various issues.
5.2 Venezuelan industrialisation during 1973-8224
5.2.1 The booming phase (1973-77)
A view of the main indicators of Venezuelan private manufacturing is 
presented in Table 5.8 and Fig 5.2. These make clear that this sector 
accelerated its pace of growth during 1974-77 compared to 1968-72. The real
187), Amsden (1989).
This section is based on data provided by the industrial census (see methodological appendix to this chapter).
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annual growth rate of manufacturing value added increased from 9 per cent in 
1968-72 to 11.06 per cent in 1974-77 and a considerable expansion in 
employment and private investment also occurred.25
The expansionary fiscal, financing and investment policies of 1973-77 gave 
way to the expansion of public and private manufacturing investment. 
According to the industrial census, manufacturing private investment grew 
by 17.49 per cent per year during 1974-77; this was higher than in 1968-72 
when it grew by 12.42 per cent annually. The second estimate of private 
manufacturing investment, which refers to the non-residential assets, shows 
a more important expansion of investment. By contrast, private investment 
in manufacturing declined during 1978-82, while only a mild and unstable
97recovery took place over 1983-88. The trend in
Table 5.8 Main indicators in private manufacturing, growth rates, Venezuela, 1968-1994
Indicators 1968-72 1974-77 1978-82 1983-88 1989-1994
Value added 9.19 11.06 2.27 4.78 3.31
0.99 0.99 0.65 0.61 0.38
Gross production value 8.16 11.45 0.67 7.91 4.42
0.99 0.99 0.15 0.91 0.56
Employment 5.48 11.76 -1.49 3.21 -0.33
0.97 0.97 0.16 0.84 0.01
Value added per worker 3.71 -0.42 3.46 1.30 3.64
0.89 0.25 0.65 0.26 0.91
Gross production value per man 2.68 -0.57 1.86 3.64 4.75
0.78 0.28 0.55 0.91 0.97
Gross domestic investment* 12.42 17.49 -2.65 10.02 4.83
0.87 0.93 0.24 0.59 0.39
Gross domestic investment** 4.54 26.69 -23.99 8.17 -
0.24 0.97 0.99 0.27 -
Product wages -0.26 0.38 2.00 -7.74 -
0.049 0.28 0.45 0.93 -
Notes: growth rates are the least square estimates o f trend growth. All values at 1984 prices. "This refers to gross domestic 
investment at constant 1984 prices and based on data at current prices on investment provided by OCEI (industrial surveys) and 
the import price index for machinery and equipment. ** It refers to gross domestic investment at 1984 prices excluding 
residential investment Figures in bold are the R2. Sources: own estimations based on data provided by the industrial survey 
and the Central Bank of Venezuela, economic reports (various issues); gross domestic investment excluding residential assets is 
based on data provided by Baptista (1990).
The average annual growth rate o f private manufacturing output was 9 per cent during 1961-72.
At constant prices o f  1984.
According to the Central Bank o f  Venezuela, manufacturing investment rose during 1975-77 (see chapter 3).
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manufacturing investment, including residential assets, over 1973-74 was 
linked to the fall in construction which occurred in 1974. It seems that 
import-competitive private manufacturing benefited to some extent from the 
domestic distribution of oil revenues during 1974-77. Our findings are 
contrary to Auty’s argument (1990) according to which non-resource 
manufacturing was neglected by the government, which would have 
channelled few resources into this sector.
5.2.2 The post-1977 recession
Venezuelan manufacturing expanded during 1973-77. Nonetheless, the 
industrial process exhibited three major weaknesses which are closely 
related: (a) growth was inefficient as measured by a decline in value added 
per man and an increase in the capital/output ratio in the non-oil economy; 
(b) a coherent industrial strategy concerned with efficiency and the ability 
to exports was lacking; and (c) dependence on imported capital and 
intermediate goods was reinforced.
Concerning the first aspect, Fig 5.2 shows that a severe decline in 
manufacturing labour productivity, measured as output and value added per 
worker, occurred during 1974-77. This trend may be partially linked to the 
reluctance to launch adequate industrial policies and to the problem of the 
over-investment o f oil revenues, which exceeded the capital absorptive 
capacity o f the economy, leading to inefficiencies. This topic is assessed in 
the next chapter, so here we only point out that the huge expansion of 
domestic demand (investment and consumption) gave way to a situation 
characterised by congestion problems related to the scarcity of skilled
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labour, infrastructure services and management capacities. In this sense, 
the low capital absorptive capacity caused by these factors may have set 
obstacles to the better absorption of oil income, resulting in a huge increase 
in imports and low labour productivity growth especially in manufacturing.
It must be noted that the significant increase occurred in the wage share in 
manufacturing value added during 1973-77 is mainly explained by the 
sharp decline in labour productivity growth and to a lesser extent to the 
modest increase in product wages. Thus ‘labour hoarding’ did not explain
Fig. 5.2 Some indicators for manufacturing, Venezuela, 1968-1994
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the decline in the profit share. This seems to be in contradiction with the 
Dutch disease theory, according to which the increase in unit labour costs 
take place through rising product wages. Some subsectors experienced an 
increase in their unit labour costs over the period. Nevertheless, the reason 
was not spiralling product wages due to a drop in relative prices, but a 
substantial decline in labour productivity growth (measured as real value 
added per man). So, our findings do not seem to confirm the theoretical 
predictions of the Dutch disease model on these grounds. The profit rate 
did not fall during 1973-77 because the fall or stability in the profit share 
was compensated by the rise in the output-capital ratio during 1974-1976.28 
As regards the second and third aspects, there were no significant changes 
in the so-called industrial policy launched during the 1960s, which 
continued relying on import substitution without concern for the 
development of an export-competitive sector and the achievement of 
greater diversification and efficiency. As a result, the expansion of 
manufacturing during 1973-77 implied growing deficits in the trade 
balance (see Fig 5.3). The dependence upon imported capital and 
intermediate goods of Venezuelan manufacturing was exacerbated during 
these years. The already insignificant export ratio showed a decline from 2 
per cent in 1973 to 1 per cent in 1977, which together with the increase in 
the import ratio from 34.8 per cent in 1973 to 50.4 per cent in 1977 caused 
a worsening of the trade balance ratio (see Table 5.9). It can also be seen 
that the share of capital imports in total manufactured imports increased 
during 1973-77 and remained very high until 1988. The real appreciation 
of the bolivar during the 1973 oil boom is bound to have reinforced the
See estimations o f  manufacturing profitability in the methodological appendix to this chapter.
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importation of all kind of goods, including manufactured goods. This 
pattern of growth, together with the declining trend in oil revenues, implied 
severe foreign exchange shortages and the widening o f the current account 
deficits by 1977 (see Figure 5.3). These imbalances promoted the
Table 5.9 Trade indicators for Venezuelan manufacturing, 1973-88
i a c
Cbcfe
Nfemlacbiing
lines
Trade talarir ratio Bpcti ratio Irrpcrt ratio S w ec fcp its Sarccfinpcits
1973 1977 1982 1988 1973 1977 1982 1988 1973 1977 1982 1988 1973 1977 1962 1988 1973 1977 1982 1988
311-12 Rod ■0.5 ■0.9 0.9 0.9 Z9 1.4 1.0 1.0 8.5 18.9 163 109 33.6 225 125 66 4.3 4.6 69 7.2
313 Bnoafps -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 23.9 38.5 28.0 62 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 28 3.0 32 1.0
314 TcboxD -1.0 -1.0 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 21 4.2 0.1 0.1 03 0.3 0.0 0.0 29 25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
321 Tetiles -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 147 272 31.6 19.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 26 21 26 3.1
322-24 dotting -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.5 198 346 92 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 03 1.3 4.2 1.6
323 Leather -10 -1.0 -10 0 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 180 51.1 460 120 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 07 0.7 0.3
331 Wnd -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.7 37.8 39.3 61 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 12 02
332 Fimtue -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 0.0 00 0.0 0.4 03 0.6 0.8 01 00 0.0 00 02 0.0 00 0.0 0.0
341 ftper -0.7 -1.0 -09 OS 5.0 0.8 1.2 47 27.1 269 324 27.2 103 28 1.8 5.4 3.0 1.6 21 3.6
351-52 d e n ia ls ■0.9 ■0.9 -0.9 OS 68 4.3 4.1 7.3 49.9 47.8 39.4 40.9 19.9 284 207 23.4 11.3 7.1 9.4 17.8
355 Ritter -1.0 -10 -1.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.5 504 39.1 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.1
361-62- NjHTrtalfcrrirerals -0.7 -1.0 -1.0 0.5 1.5 12 0.8 3.8 9.2 500 29.1 11.1 3.5 4.4 1.9 5.7 1.0 4.4 29 1.6
371-72 Bascnetals -1.0 -1.0 -0.7 0 3 1.3 0.4 5.4 107 39.7 51.7 28.3 182 5.1 4.1 35.8 35.6 10.9 124 7.4 5.7
381 Nttalpudxts ■0.9 ■0.9 0.9 0.5 3.2 16 26 3.6 334 467 29.6 10.0 5.9 10.8 7.1 68 3.7 4.3 3.3 1.7
382-83 Nfedijoy -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.3 1.7 27 1.8 81.3 87.9 81.8 699 27 7.5 7.7 3.5 37.4 39.8 37.2 37.1
384 Tranent a^ipiiat -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 0 9 4.0 20 1.6 27 472 565 45.0 431 181 165 7.7 62 161 129 11.9 14.7
342 Ruing -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 13.5 144 201 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 02 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.6
354-56- ottos -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.9 0.6 OS 0.7 0.8 41.0 421 385 222 1.0 29 1.7 1.3 49 32 46 3.8
300 Rvale rranilacturing •OS -1.0 0 9 0.8 2.2 1.2 1.9 3.1 34.8 504 39.1 27.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Trade balance ratio = (X j -  M i) / (X i+  M i); export ratio = X j/Q i 100; import ratio = M j/D j -100; share o f exports = 
X j/X ti 100; share o f imports = M j/M tj • 100; where X,- = exports o f sector i's products; M j = imports o f sector i's products; 
Q i = sector i's total domestic output; D j =  Q i +  M i -  X j = domestic demand. All data at constant bolivares o f 1984. 
Exports f.o.b. and imports c.i.f. Sources: as Table 5.6.
Fig 5.3 The balance o f  payments problems and Venezuelan manufacturing
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coefficient o f  the non-oil economy and manufacturing as percent o f  home dem and are based on data in bolivares at 
consnstant 1984 prices. Sources: Central Bank o f  Venezuela, annual reports various issues and OCEI, industrial 
surveys and Brandy (1989).
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adoption of deflationary policies by 1977 and especially during 1978-80. 
Thus the expanded productive capacity, which resulted from the high 
investment o f oil income made during 1973-77, could not be matched by 
and increase in the home demand. It must be noted that the external market 
was not an alternative because the structural overvaluation of the bolivar 
limited the possibility of exporting. This suggests that foreign exchange 
constraints played a key role in explaining the crisis of Venezuelan 
manufacturing and of the whole economy from 1978.
As already noted throughout 1978-82, private investment in manufacturing 
was also disrupted by rising labour costs. In sum, we argue that the 
slowdown of manufacturing from 1978 is related to the lack of feasibility 
o f the economic strategy applied during 1950-72, which was reinforced 
during 1973-77. This implied that there was no a coherent industrial policy 
which could have led to the allocation of oil revenues into import 
substitution industrialisation and export promotion. This resulted in a high 
dependence on oil exports and the absence of a competitive manufacturing 
sector during 1950-82. This argument is found in Purroy (1982), Auty 
(1986) and Gelb (1988). However, we differ from those scholars in the 
sense that they do not seem to recognise the early contribution of oil 
revenues to industrialisation and economic growth in the previous decades. 
They also seem to blame import substitution industrialisation and 
interventionism for the failures of the Venezuelan economy and to 
associate the problems of industrialisation with the accrual of oil revenues 
when indeed there is evidence that other economies with a large primary 
export sector, such as Malaysia, which managed to adopt an export
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promotion industrial policy despite the primary booms.
Contrary to Clemente (1984), Auty (1986), Gelb and Bourguignon (1988), 
we conclude that the stagnation of Venezuelan manufacturing during 1978- 
82 did not reflect a typical Dutch disease phenomenon. How can the path 
of the non-oil economy be typified as Dutch disease if  there was no boom 
during 1978-82 owing to the adoption of deflationary policies following the 
appearance of balance of payments problems?
5.3 The Post-boom phase and manufacturing
The Venezuelan economic crisis continued during 1983-95. The path 
followed by manufacturing during 1983-88 does not fit entirely with the 
predictions o f the Dutch disease and resource curse theses. Following the 
severe decline during 1983-84, some recovery took place in manufacturing 
output, employment and private investment during 1985-88 compared to 
1978-82. This is explained by the improvement in profitability favoured by 
declining product wages, which is linked to the large devaluations o f the 
domestic currency. The latter action also encouraged an import- 
substitution effect. Nevertheless, the following aspects must be considered:
(a) the recovery of private investment was highly unstable and modest; and,
(b) from 1988 onwards the performance of private manufacturing has been 
disappointing in terms of output, employment, investment and exports (see 
Fig 5.2). Logically, the disappearance of the overvaluation of the domestic 
currency with the drop in oil revenues exerted some positive influence on 
manufacturing output and exports. The recovery during 1985-87, is 
ascribed to the import substitution effect as a result o f the real devaluation
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of the domestic currency in 1983, 1984 and 1986, and the expansion of 
public and private manufacturing exports (see chapter 6). Nevertheless, it 
was not the case that a reverse Dutch disease process took place, 
manufacturing growth has been modest and highly fluctuating, with a 
downward trend from 1986 to 1989, which points to the temporary 
dynamic effect of devaluation policies on output and exports. It must be 
noted that those lines with a high import content were negatively affected 
by real devaluation.29 Some of the industries were affected by sluggishness 
of domestic demand. Although the Venezuelan government managed to 
avoid following the prescriptions of the IMF, the policies launched in 1984- 
85 implied a reduction in government spending and major devaluations of 
the domestic currency to achieve external balance.
In sum, contrary to the predictions of the Dutch disease model and the 
‘resource curse’ thesis, agriculture and manufacturing were not the fastest- 
growing sectors during the post-boom phase and they did not record 
structural gains. Indeed, in spite of real devaluation, de-agriculturalisation 
and de-industrialisation have been the outcomes when the entire 1983-95 
period is compared to 1960-77. There was a substantial decline in 
Venezuelan private manufacturing output and investment growth from 
1989-94 and a fall in the sectoral share in total value added and 
employment. Observers of the Venezuelan economy are concerned with 
the de-investment process, which has been occurring in the manufacturing 
sector. This de-industrialisation is linked to the adoption of neo-liberal 
policies and especially trade liberalisation witch is not supported by supply- 
side policies.30
5.4 Concluding remarks
29
BCV, economic reports (1984).
30
The impact o f  the neo-liberal policies on Venezuelan manufacturing has been studied by Valecillos (1992), Maza 
Zavala and Malave Mata (1992), Lander (1996), and Pirela (1996).
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The major conclusion of this chapter is that Venezuelan private 
manufacturing did not follow a typical Dutch disease process during 1973- 
82. By contrast, our analysis suggests that the impact of oil revenues on the 
Venezuelan non-oil economy and the manufacturing sector is closely linked 
to some structural factors and the nature of the economic policies pursued 
over this period.
With the benefit o f hindsight, the picture which emerges is that oil income 
brought about some positive effects on Venezuelan industrialisation until 
the late 1960s through the creation of the home market and the positive 
impact of the structural overvaluation (due to oil revenues) though the 
cheapening of imported capital and other goods. However, the policies of 
distribution of oil income such as the real overvaluation o f the domestic 
currency together with the lack of coherent industrial policies entailed some 
negative effects such as the lack of an export-competitive manufacturing 
sector, the lack of diversification and heavy dependence on imported inputs 
and capital goods. We show that the impact of the 1970s oil booms is 
linked to the policy response in Venezuela, which reinforced the described 
weaknesses of industrialisation. The first oil boom stimulated the 
manufacturing sector, which was experiencing a slowdown from the mid- 
1960s as a result of the limited market. However, industrial growth was not 
sustainable due to inefficiencies, the lack of exports and heavy import 
dependence, with the initial rapid growth leading to severe balance of 
payments and fiscal problems once oil revenues declined. This prompted 
restraint in the use of expansive government policies by 1977. In the initial 
stages of the boom, the greater domestic demand prompted by the surge in 
government spending represented a temporary relief to the problems posed by
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the reduced market, and public investment and substantial credits also led to a 
revival of private investment. Nevertheless, given the lack of a non-oil 
export-competitive sector, once oil revenues declined, severe balance of 
payment problems appeared.
In sum, this chapter shows that Venezuelan private manufacturing was not 
affected by the lack of investment or labour in response to the squeeze of 
profitability caused by real appreciation and increasing product wages. 
Although the 1973 oil boom entailed some real appreciation, this was 
modest and substantial oil revenues were used to encourage a process of 
resource-based industrialisation. At the same time, the policy of import 
substitution industrialisation in the private sector was also reinforced. 
These policies and the expansion of the home market, help to explain why 
both private and public manufacturing grew faster during 1974-77 than in 
the late 1960s, but this growth was inefficient and unsustainable. On the 
supply side, the crisis of Venezuelan manufacturing and the whole non-oil 
economy which began in 1978 despite another increase in oil prices, points 
to the lack of a coherent industrial strategy that could have considered the 
efficiency of investment, and the encouragement o f export-competitive 
manufacturing. This led to balance of payments problems once oil income 
did not keep growing enough to match the requirements of manufacturing 
growth and prompted the launching of the stabilisation policy during 1978- 
80. On the demand side, the low capital absorptive capacity of the 
economy, caused mainly by the lack of management capacities, set 
obstacles to the absorption of oil revenues during 1973-77.
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6. The 1970s Oil Booms and the Sources of Growth of Venezuelan 
Manufacturing during 1973-82
Introduction
In this chapter, the sources of industrial growth for Venezuela during 1969-93 
are estimated. Section 1 presents the sources of growth o f manufacturing on 
the demand side. It is hypothesised that the boom may have resulted in a 
negative contribution of import substitution and exports to manufacturing 
growth, while the role of domestic demand may have been positive. Since the 
lack of an export-competitive manufacturing sector is the major symptom of 
Dutch disease in Venezuela, section 2 examines the performance of 
manufacturing exports in detail by presenting some stylised facts and 
econometric evidence on the determinants of exports. Section 3 deals with the 
supply determinants of industrial growth. This focuses on a striking feature of 
private manufacturing development during 1974-77, namely the sharp decline 
in labour productivity growth, which leads us to raise questions about the 
determinants o f productivity in an oil-based economy, and especially on the 
efficiency of the policies adopted during before 1974-77. TFPG was also 
estimated. Finally, the concluding remarks are summarised in the third section.
6.1 Demand side sources of growth of Venezuelan manufacturing during 
1973-82
Following Kavoussi (1986), a modified version of the Chenery decomposition of 
the sources of industrial growth was used to asses the impact of domestic 
demand, import-substitution, exports and shifts in the pattern of domestic 
demand on Venezuelan private manufacturing during 1969-73, 1974-77, 1978- 
82 and 1982-88.' The periodisation relates to the different economic policies 
pursued during these periods. Estimates for the 1989-93 phase are also presented
' See methodological appendix for explanation o f the methodology used.
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because the radical changes in the economic policies launched during these years 
allows for an interesting comparison with the previous years and may contribute 
to the understanding of our problem. It is hypothesised that over the pre-boom 
phase, the role of import-substitution and domestic demand in industrial growth 
should be positive, while throughout the 1974-77 phase, the impact of import- 
substitution on industrial growth is bound to be negative. The contribution of 
exports to industrial growth is expected to decline too, with domestic demand 
becoming the only driving force of growth. The immediate post boom period 
(1982-88) should be characterised by the positive role of import substitution and 
exports as a result of the disappearance of the overvaluation of the domestic 
currency.
The results for the demand side sources of growth are reported in Table 6.1. 
These indicate that despite the negative impact of the boom on the import and 
export-competitive manufacturing sub-sectors during 1974-77, the positive 
impact of the greater internal demand prevailed and private manufacturing 
accelerated its pace of growth during this phase compared to 1969-73. The 
contribution of import substitution to manufacturing growth became negative 
during 1974-77 while it had been positive during 1969-73. Throughout the 
boom years, the huge surge in imports was encouraged by the passive trade 
policy with regards to consumer goods. Imports o f consumer goods were not 
restricted in order to offset inflationary pressures arising from the huge 
internal demand. However, the expansion of domestic demand allowed for 
manufacturing growth during these years. Since the contributions o f the shift in 
the structure of domestic demand and in exports to the manufacturing growth 
were negative, sectoral growth relied entirely on expansion of home demand 
during 1974-77.
Over these years, the rise in income due to the oil boom brought about changes 
in the structure of domestic demand. As illustrated by Table 6.2, there was a
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decline in the share of the traditional sector in domestic demand, while the share 
of machinery and transport equipment, metals and chemicals increased. While 
in 1969 textiles, food and beverages accounted for 36.63 per cent o f total 
domestic demand for manufactured products, in 1977 the share o f these sectors 
had declined to 26.73 per cent. At the same time, the share of machinery and 
transport equipment and chemicals increased from 35.78 per cent in 1969 to 
47.25 per cent in 1977. The higher import coefficient for those lines compared 
to the traditional ones helps to explain the changes in the demand structure.
Table 6.1 Demand side sources o f  growth o f Venezuelan private manufacturing, 1969-93
million o f bolivares percentage o f total
1969-73 1974-77 1978-82 1982-88 1989-93 1969-73 1974-77 1978-82 1982-88 1989-93
D o m estic  dem and 3441 69647 -12337 23650 55533 90.83 213.74 -163.2 4.54 115.49
Im port substitution 20815 -22404 13712 1435 -4186 15.01 -68.76 181.41 74.83 -8.71
C hange in structure 
o f  d om estic  dem and
-2328 -13831 6241 4590 -3891 -10.16 -42.45 82.57 14.52 -8.09
Exports 988 -828 -58 1929 628 4.31 -2.54 -0.76 6.1 1.31
Total 22915 32584 7559 31605 48083 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: based on a 18-sector level o f  disaggregation. Sources: own estimations based on data at 1984 prices provided by the 
industrial survey and the Central Bank o f Venezuela. For further details see methodological appendix.
Table 6.2 Domestic demand and output structures in Venezuelan private manufacturing (%), 1969-93
SIC Code Lines Domestic demand Gross production value
1969 1974 1977 1982 1988 1993 1969 1974 1977 1982 1988 1993
311-12 Food 20.4 18.9 14 18.6 19.7 17.8 27.8 26.3 22.5 25.9 24.1 21
313 Beverages 5.3 4.9 4.5 5 4.9 6.3 6 4.8 5.4 5.9 6.3 7
314 Tobacco 2.1 2.2 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.9 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.1 2.5
322 Textiles 6.8 6.9 4.5 3.6 4.8 4.7 8.1 8.4 6.4 4 5.3 4.8
324 Clothing 4.2 4.5 3.8 5.4 5.2 5.9 5.9 5.8 6.1 5.8 6.5 6.6
323 Leather 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.7
331 Wood 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.6 2.6 2.3 2 1.3 1 0.6
332 Furniture 1.4 1.1 1 1.2 1 1.3 2.1 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.6
341 Paper 5.2 4.4 3.4 2.8 3.9 3.4 5.7 4.4 4.9 3.2 4.1 3.4
351-52 Chemicals 6.9 7.1 7.8 10.3 13 12.2 5.9 7.3 9.2 10.9 11.3 13.3
355 Rubber 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 2.2 2
361-62-69 Non-metallic minerals 4.1 3.8 5.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 5.7 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.3
381 Metal products 4.3 4 5.3 4.7 5.1 4.6 4 4.5 5.8 5.8 6.5 5.4
383-84 Machinery 15.1 16.9 26.2 20 15.9 13.7 3.5 4.9 6.3 6.1 6.6 6.7
384 Transport equipment 13.8 14.6 13.3 11.6 10.2 12.1 10.3 11.6 11.5 10.7 8.2 9.3
342 Printing 2.5 2.4 1.9 2.5 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 2.9 3.4
354-56-90 Other manufacturing 3.7 4.7 4.3 5.2 5.1 6.3 3.1 4.1 5 5.3 5.5 6.4
300 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: * This refers to the sectoral shares o f  home demand, defined as the sum o f output plus imports less exports, over total 
domestic demand for private manufacturing, **This refers to the sectoral shares o f  output in total output for private 
manufacturing. Sources: as Table 6.1.
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Interestingly, despite the lowering of tariffs in 1979, the role of import- 
substitution on manufacturing growth was positive during 1978-82, while the 
contribution of domestic demand was negative. These paradoxical results are 
explained by the decline in imports that occurred during these years due to the 
deflationary fiscal policies applied and the recession which led to a significant 
drop in imports of capital and consumer goods. The import coefficient declined 
from 49 per cent in 1978 to 41 per cent in 1982. It should be noted that a more 
detailed analysis in Chapter 7 shows that some of the manufacturing lines, 
notably, textiles, machinery and transport, recorded absolute declines in output 
growth during 1978-82.
As expected from the above discussion, import substitution had a positive role in 
manufacturing growth during the immediate post-boom phase (1982-88). At the 
same time, the expansion of domestic demand contributed only 4.6 per cent to 
manufacturing growth, while there was a positive contribution from the pattern 
of domestic demand. This development is explained by the trade and exchange 
rate policies launched during 1984-87. The three major devaluations of the 
bolivar and the restrictions on imports imposed by the government encouraged 
import-substitution of some manufacturing goods, as well as exports.2 It is worth 
noting that during 1982-88, there was an increase in the share of traditional lines 
in domestic demand, with the role of changes in demand structure being positive. 
This may be explained by the disruptive impact of the strong devaluation of the 
domestic currency on income distribution, which may have entailed a shift from 
durable goods to consumer goods. During 1989-93, there was a negative 
contribution of import substitution to industrial growth as a result of the liberal 
trade policies launched from 1989. At the same time, manufacturing growth is
2
Bruton (1989) observes that real devaluation is advantageous for import substitution because this promotes domestic saving, 
facilitates the identification o f  profitable domestic investments and promotes the accumulation o f  foreign exchange.
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largely explained by the expansion of home demand during these years, with the 
contribution of exports being positive but even lower than during 1982-88.
The major conclusion of this analysis is that Venezuelan manufacturing 
growth during 1974-77 was entirely driven by the expansion of domestic 
demand, while the contribution of import substitution was negative.
6.2 Venezuelan manufacturing exports and the 1970’s oil booms
The performance of exports for Venezuela during 1960-95 is reported in Table 
6.3. This further confirms the virtual lack of a Venezuelan export-competitive 
private manufacturing sector until 1988 and its insignificant development 
during the 1990s. As shown in the third chapter, the Dutch disease symptoms 
in Venezuela must be understood in the light of the non-existence of an 
export-competitive manufacturing sector by 1972.
Concerning the impact of the 1970’s booms on exports, there was a volume 
decline in manufacturing exports during 1973-77, followed by a recovery 
during 1978-82 and 1983-88. This suggests the existence of a Dutch disease 
process during 1973-77. As already assessed in Chapter 4, the setting of a 
fixed exchange rate regime implied some real appreciation of the bolivar 
during 1973-77. This seems to have contributed to the sharp decline in private 
manufacturing exports over this phase. Although the export incentives granted 
during 1973-773 diminished the gap between the real exchange rate for exports 
and the dollar real exchange rate for the economy during this phase compared 
to the pre-boom years, manufacturing exports declined. This outcome is
3
In the face o f  the extra oil revenues and to offset the real currency appreciation some export subsidies were granted during the 
1970s to the public and private sector. They took the form o f  fiscal incentives, subsidised credits free o f  trade risks granted by 
the Fund for export’s financing (FINEXPO), which was established by decree on 28/09/73. Preferential exchange rate was only 
implemented from 1983. The export promotion policy contained in the IV National Plan remained essentially the same during 
1976-88, with the granting o f  subsidy and financial support being the major instruments for export promotion.
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largely accounted for by the huge expansion of domestic demand (see Fig 6.1). 
Given the inward-oriented nature of the Venezuelan industrial sector, export 
growth was closely linked to the changes in domestic demand,
Table 6.3 Growth and structural change in manufacturing exports, Venezuela, 1961-95
Growth 61-72 73-77 78-82 83-88 89-95
Oil 1.60 -12.51 -6.46 1.87 7.25
0.60 0.86 0.77 0.31 0.92
Agriculture 13.29 -17.74 9.92 -15.00 16.55
0.74 0.74 0.28 0.34 0.79
Manufacturing (a) 5.64 -19.95 -0.21 14.71 17.04
0.46 0.29 0.00 0.35 0.30
Manufacturing (b ) 3.42 -16.28 -10.37 11.66 5.74
0.64 0.77 0.47 0.88 0.31
Structure
Oil 90.87 86.38 88.61 85.42 84.99
Agriculture 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.23
Manufacturing (a) 0.22 0.58 0.54 2.31 8.16
Manufacturing (b) 9.07 13.56 11.32 14.45 14.78
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: (a) It refers to private manufacturing exports; (b) It refers to total manufacturing exports 
Sources: BCV, Finexpo reports various issues.
with exports increasing when the domestic market was contracting and vice- 
versa. Manufacturing exports accelerated their pace of growth during 1978-82 
despite further real appreciation of the bolivar as a result of the strong fall in 
domestic demand owing to the deflationary monetary and fiscal policy adopted 
during 1978-80. It may be argued that tariff reductions played a role in 
reducing the anti-export bias, but it seems that the decline in domestic 
effective demand was the major factor explaining the redirection o f existing 
production from the home to the external market.
Concerning the reasons explaining the inability o f Venezuelan private 
manufacturing to export, two factors are extensively mentioned in the 
literature, namely, the structural overvaluation of the bolivar due to the accrual
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Figure 6.1 Trends in the real exchange rates and manufacturing exports
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Notes: E r (a) = index o f  the USA dollar real exchange rate. This is defined as the nominal currency exchange rate deflated by  the 
relative prices defined as the ratio o f  the home goods prices and home and im port goods prices, Erx (b) =  as Er (a) but using the nominal 
exchange rate for exports which is the nominal exchange rate including export incentives E r (b) =  As Er (a) using the relative prices 
defined as the ratio o f  domestic consum er prices to USA consumer prices index, Erx (b) = as Era (a) but using the nominal exchange rate 
for exports which is the nominal exchange rate including export incentives, Er (c) As Er (a) using the relative prices defined as the ratio 
o f  dom estic w holesale prices to USA wholesale prices index, Erx (c) = as Er (c) but using the nominal exchange rate for exports which is 
the nominal exchange rate including export incentives, Xma = private manufacturing exports index o f  volume; ulc =  unit labour costs in 
manufacturing; ic = intermediate costs in manufacturing; wr = real wages in manufacturing. Sources: for the exchange rates: IMF, 
statistic yearbook, for incentive to exports and exports, BCV, FINEXPO, various issues; for ulc, ic and w r industrial survey and BCV, 
econom ic reports (various issues).
of oil revenues (see Purroy, 1982; Gomez and Ross, 1986; Mommer, 1991; 
Baptista, 1986, 1997). The other is the ‘anti-export bias’ o f the trade regime 
and heavy subsidies which would have caused an inefficient productive 
process leading to the lack of international competitiveness (Purroy, 1982; 
Brandi, 1989). It is also observed that the virtual lack of an export strategy 
accounts for the disappointing performance of private manufacturing exports 
(Ross, 1988; Frances, 1986; Viana et al. 1996). The limited attention paid to
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the launching of a technological policy is emphasised by Avalos (1986)4, while 
Ortiz (1992) highlights the low expenditure on research and development in 
Venezuela compared with other countries such as Chile and Brazil during the 
1970s and 1980s. The scanty and inefficient infrastructure and services 
facilities is often quoted by the private sector as a serious obstacle to export 
(Purroy, 1989).
The first argument, which is also shared by orthodox theory and the ‘resource 
curse’ thesis, assigns a central role to the establishment of a competitive 
exchange rate to encourage manufacturing exports. The 1974-77 oil boom and 
the real appreciation must have further discouraged manufacturing exports, or 
more exactly, the need to develop a non-oil export-competitive sector. This 
reasoning seems to be essentially correct, although, the fall in export growth 
during these years was also related to the huge increase in domestic demand. 
We argue that the disappearance of the structural overvaluation of the 
domestic currency owing to high oil revenues was a requirement for 
promoting manufacturing exports. Nevertheless, as suggested by the modest 
export development during 1983-95, this was not the only requirement.
It should also be noted that real devaluation has led to inflation due to the 
increasing costs of imported inputs and capital goods.5 This is attributable to 
the limited degree of vertical integration common to the manufacturing lines.6 
The poor progress of import-substitution in these lines remains a feature of the 
Venezuelan manufacturing sector even today (see Chapter 7). The weak 
linkages among the manufacturing lines were partly the result o f the structural
4
For Avalos (1986) there was not technological policy in Venezuela until the late 1970s and even thereafter this can be consider 
precarious. There was the idea that the aim o f  the scientific and technological policy should be the expansion o f  the national 
scientific apparatus. This idea was based on the wrong recommendations from UNESCO, which was based on the study o f  the 
reality o f  developed economies.
5 The share o f  material inputs costs in manufacturing gross production value increased from 50.1 per cent in 1982 to 61.7 per 
cent in 1988. Sources: own estimations.
6 Canto (1987, p. 127).
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overvaluation of the domestic currency, which favoured the import of capital 
and intermediate goods. Likewise, it seems that this situation implies that a 
real devaluation leads to higher costs with little influence on exports.
The picture that emerges is that the export performance of Venezuelan private 
manufacturing is not entirely explained by the movement o f the real exchange 
rate. It appears that the real devaluation of the bolivar encouraged some 
export expansion during 1983-95 and that the export coefficient increased 
from 0.81 per cent to 2.31 per cent between 1982 and 1987. However, the 
contribution of manufacturing exports to manufacturing growth was rather low 
during 1983-88 and these exports accounted for an insignificant (12 per cent) 
share o f total exports even during 1989-95.7 Such performance is modest 
compared to the international standards (see Table 6.4).
As regards the second argument, it is likely that the excessive and 
indiscriminate protection, especially the high tariffs, which was granted to 
manufacturing discouraged the development of an export-competitive sector. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that according to recent studies (Helleiner, 1994, 
1995), the trade regime does not seem to be an important factor in explaining 
the export performance in a set of late-comer industrialising countries. In the 
case of Venezuela, the rapid and indiscriminate import liberalisation policy of 
the 1990s does not seem to have brought about an impressive expansion of 
manufacturing exports.
In our view, the disappointing performance of manufacturing exports in 
Venezuela since the 1960s is linked to the absence of an export strategy - 
which is not only related to the trade regime- within the context of a broader
7
This contrast with the export performance o f  other economies like Malaysia in which the share o f  manufacturing exports over 
gross manufacturing output increased from 23 per cent in 1983 to 45.3 per cent in 1989. Likewise, manufacturing exports as 
percentage o f  total exports increased from 12.2 per cent in 1970 to 59.2 per cent in 1990. Tech G. Lim and Kin W., Toh (1994,
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Table 6.4 International comparisons o f the export coefficient ratio
Country 1960 1982(a) 1987(b) 1988 1990
Brazil - 9.90 14.60 - -
Chile 17.50 22.80 29.10 - 36.60
Mexico 6.30 4.60 13.10 -
Peru - 10.10 8.26 - -
Tanzania - 8.10 13.80 16.60 -
Venezuela(c) 0.28 0.81 2.31 1.69 5.20
Venezuela (d) 7.27 2.52 6.56 5.87 14.04
Notes: *(a) It refers to 1980 for Mexico; (b) It refers to 1985 for Brazil and Chile;(c) It refers to 
private Venezuelan manufacturing exports; (d) It refers to total Venezuelan manufacturing 
exports. Source: For Venezuela: own estimates and for other countries: Brazil: Fritsch and Franco 
(1995) Table 3.2, p. 68; Chile: Meller (1995), Table 4.8, p. 106; Mexico: Ros (1994) Table 6.3, 
p.176; Peru: Paredes (1994), Table 7.14, p. 246; Tanzania: Ndulu and Semboja (1994), Table 16.3, 
p. 520. It must be noted that the ratio is expressed at nominal values o f the domestic currency for 
all the cases with the exception of Mexico, which is based at values o f 1980 constant prices.
coherent industrial strategy that aimed to overcome some negative structural 
features o f growth and structural change in the Venezuelan economy. As the 
experiences of other countries show, import substitution has been combined 
with export-oriented strategies, but this requires the parallel enactment of deep 
structural reforms. It is worth noting that the devaluation of the bolivar from 
1983 was not part of an export-promotion strategy. The devaluationist policy 
aimed to deal with the fiscal and balance of payment problems caused by the 
falling oil revenues.
The lack of an adequate technological policy and the disregard for 
international trends in technological processes has been pointed out by (Pirela 
et al, 1996) as a central factor in explaining the manufacturing export 
performance of Venezuela. Indeed, Avalos (1986) argues that there was no 
technology policy in Venezuela until the end of the 1970s. Even during these 
years, the so-called technology policy was rudimentary and divorced from 
scientific policy as the emphasis was put on the acquisition of technological 
packages. For this scholar, the lack o f a technology policy was partly the
p. 373).
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result of the inward-oriented character of the industrialisation process.8 The 
export promotion strategy only addressed the development of a resource-based 
sectors, while there was not a serious export-promotion policy aimed at 
developing the non-traditional manufacturing exports. Even more, the static 
vision of international trade according to which Venezuela should favour 
specialisation in raw materials or labour-intensive goods contributed to a 
disregard for technology as a key factor within the process of industrialisation.
We agree with Avalos that the specific modality assumed by the import- 
substitution strategy in Venezuela -which implied the production for a highly 
differentiated demand, high import-dependence, limited diversification, the 
lack of a parallel export strategy, and no technology- policy led to the absence 
of a non-traditional manufacturing exports sector. However, it must be 
stressed that the protecionist trade regime was not a major cause o f the non­
existence of an export-competitive manufacturing sector, as the poor 
performance of manufacturing exports under the import liberalisation policy of 
the 1990s suggests.9
The Importance of an external policy and regional integration as a tool to 
encourage manufacturing exports: the Andean Pact
In our view, all the factors mentioned above are of relevance to understand the 
virtual lack of an export-manufacturing sector in Venezuela. Nevertheless, a 
missing factor relates to the absence of an external policy aimed to take 
advantage of the regional integration and to identify some niches in which the 
economy could be able to compete. We believe that the possibility opened to 
Venezuela to expand non-oil exports requires the integration of the economy 
to the region. The few studies on manufacturing exports for the Venezuelan
g
Avalos (1986) also observes that the availability o f oil revenues, which allowed for the indiscriminate and careless acquisition 
o f  technological packages as another factor in explaining the lack o f  any technological policy in Venezuela. The modalities o f  
foreign investment and the excessive protectionism are also highlighted.
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case point to the importance of the regional markets as the sole destiny o f the 
insignificant manufacturing exports, especially Colombia.10 The integration 
attempt contributed to increase intra-regional trade. By 1965 the intra-regional 
exports accounted for 12.6 per cent o f the total exports of the countries in the 
region, and the integration coefficient increased to 17.9 per cent in 1975. It 
must be noted that the percentage of intra-regional exports corresponding to 
manufacturing increased from 26.6 per cent in 1965 to 40.8 per cent in 1970. 
Concerning Venezuela, the country only exports to the region were oil before 
1970.11 Following the setting up of the Acuerdo de Cartagena or Andean Pact 
in 1973 and the incorporation of Venezuela in 1974, most o f the Venezuelan 
non-oil manufacturing exports to the region were products of the government- 
owned primay industries (iron and aluminium). The lack of a coherent 
industrial policy towards private manufacturing implied that the participation 
of the private sector in the Andean Pact was marginal.12
Some econometric evidence on the links between export supply and the 
real exchange rate
In this section, the demand and supply export equations for Venezuelan 
manufacturing are estimated. Various specifications were attempted from the 
traditional ones to those which are eclectic. The aim was to establish which 
are the determinants o f demand and export supply for Venezuelan 
manufacturing and the effect of the 1970’s oil booms through the real 
appreciation of the domestic currency. The regressions were estimated for the 
1965-82 and 1983-95 phases in order to determine the impact on exports o f the 
1970’s oil booms and the movement from a fixed exchange rate regime during 
1965-82 to a multiple regime during 1983-88.
9 See Tables 3.6 and 6.1.
10 Ross (1988), FINEXPO, reports (1996).
11 In ter-American Development Bank (1984, p. 93).
12 Ross (1988).
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Specifications issues
The export demand and supply equations that are formulated in this section 
conform to an established tradition in the literature, according to which the 
demand for exports (xd) is explained by a foreign demand variable (Yw) and 
the real exchange rate (Er), while the supply (xs) is determined by the domestic 
prices o f exports, a domestic costs variable and a productive capacity variable. 
Likewise, in a third equation the supply export equation was estimated by 
including domestic demand as an independent variable (DD). All the variables 
are expressed in logs. According to the features o f the time series, 
cointegration and error-correction techniques were used to estimate the 
equations. Thus the static equations can be written as:
(a) xdt = a  + PXY , + P2Ert + et
(b) xst -  a  + Y?a + P2 Ert + et
(c) xst =oc + Px DDt + P2 Ert + et
The error-correction representation is as follows:
(d) Axl = a + Px(E)Ayt + P2(L)AErt + rt-1 + et
(e) A x\ — & + Pi (E) A Ymat + P2 (E) A Ert + r t - 1 + et
(f) A x] — & + P x (L)ADD + p 2 (L)A Ert + rt-\ + et
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where A denotes the first difference operator; L is the lag operator; rt.j is the 
one-period lagged value of the residual from the cointegrating regression (a-c), 
and et is the error term. Thus the variations in manufacturing export demand 
are linked to the changes in the world income (Yw) and changes in the bilateral 
real exchange rate (Ert), as well as the equilibrating error in the preceding 
period. For its part, the changes in manufacturing export supply are related to 
the variations in manufacturing GDP (AYma) and changes in the real exchange 
rate (AErt), and the error-correction term. In these equations, AYW, AErt, AYma 
and ADDt, represent the short-run disturbances in the export demand and 
export supply, respectively, and the error correction term (r^ ) captures the 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.
The Stock and Watson dynamic OLS method (1989, 1992) was also applied to 
estimate the trade elasticities. The representation reproduced below was 
applied:
x1 = ao + A  Y7 + A  Er, + E S \i A Y7 + 2 S 2: A Er, + e,
1=1 1=1
xt =ao + Px Y?a + P2 Ert + E £ 1 / A FT + Z S2i A En + et
i=i ;=i
where k means leads and lags.
Results of the econometric work
Although the demand and supply export equations were estimated, the results 
for the demand export equation are not presented because it was not possible 
to get sensible results. It must be noted that all data are integrated of order (1).
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The estimates o f the Engle-Granger and Johansen test for cointegration for the 
export supply functions are presented in Table 6.5. As a measure of relative 
price differences, estimates of the real exchange rate and the real exchange rate 
for exports were used. In equation 1, the log of the real exchange rate index 
based on home and traded goods prices was used, and in equation 2 the 
corresponding export real exchange rate was used. In equation 3 the log of the 
CPI-based real exchange rate was employed and the exchange rate for export 
was used in equation 4. The log of the real exchange rate based on wholesale 
prices and the corresponding exchange rate for exports were used in equations 
5 and 6. Finally, in equation 7 the supply export function was estimated by 
including domestic demand. Given the fact that the real capital stock is 
integrated of order two, 1(2), and there are no available data on capacity 
utilisation, an index of the real value added of manufacturing was used as a 
proxy for productive capacity. It must be noted that the dummy variable for 
the 1973-78 years was included in the cointegration regression in order to 
account for the possible impact on exports of some restrictions imposed during 
these years and the general congestion problems that arose a result o f the oil 
boom. However, in the case of the Johansen cointegration test, the dummy 
variable was not included (although cointegration is also found when the 
dummy variable is included).
The results reported in Table 6.5 suggest the existence of cointegration in all 
the vectors considered. It seems that Venezuelan manufacturing exports are 
highly responsive to the movement in the real exchange rate and the real 
exchange rate index for exports in the long term. It must be noted that the role 
o f export incentives on its own does not have the expected sign and because of 
that the variable was not included. This may indicate that exporters only asked 
for export incentives as a compensation for the disincentives arising from 
revaluation due to the administrative difficulties in obtaining these subsidies.
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On the whole, and from the Dutch disease perspective, the relevant result is 
that Venezuelan private manufacturing exports appear to be responsive to the 
real exchange rate and the real exchange rate for exports during 1973-94. 
Nevertheless the equation for the 1973-82 phase suggests that the performance 
of export supply is not adequately explained by this variable. Concerning 
manufacturing value added, this variable although not significant statistically 
is negatively signed, indicating that the performance of the export supply in 
manufacturing is linked to the trend in domestic demand in the long term. 
This is confirmed by equation 7 in which domestic demand is included.
The results for the error correction models which are presented in Table 6.6. 
The models seem to explain the performance of manufacturing exports quite 
well as measured by the fit of the regression and the simplest tests. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that the error-correction models do not pass the 
most sophisticated tests. With some caution we can say that these results 
suggest that the real exchange rate and the real exchange rate for exports are 
relevant to the performance of manufacturing exports in the short term in 3 of 
the 6 equations, and the error correction term is statistically significant 
indicating that the error correction representation is adequate to model the 
supply export equation. Although manufacturing GDP is positively signed, it 
is not statistically significant for all the cases. As regards the Stock and 
Watson methodology (Table 6.7), the results for the long-term and short-term 
export supply elasticity are basically similar, but some of the coefficients of 
the short-term elasticity with regard to manufacturing value added are negative 
and statistically insignificant. The above evidence suggests, that, as applied to 
Venezuela private manufacturing, export growth is responsive to trends in the 
real exchange rates, but it is also influenced by home demand. As with other
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late-comers, in Venezuela the expansion of manufacturing exports in the late
1980s is explained by the switching of sales from the domestic to the external
1 ^market with no increase in productive capacity. Manufacturing exports may 
have been responding to the new domestic incentives, but also to depressed 
domestic demand. This may indicate the ineffectiveness o f real devaluation as 
a policy tool on its own to encourage industrialisation and exports without 
other supply-side policies in the case of a country that is only beginning to 
apply an export-oriented industrial strategy. Manufacturing exports may 
stagnate once the potential for switching output away from the home market 
had been exhausted. Despite the positive impact of real devaluation on 
international competitiveness, this is a short-term effect since this does not 
imply an increase in productive capacity, but a switch from domestic to 
external markets (see also Fine, 1997 and Helleiner, 1995).14
The performance of Venezuelan manufacturing from 1983, once the bolivar is 
devalued, does suggest that, though important for industrialisation and export 
growth, a stable and adequate real exchange rate cannot be the only or most 
important element within an industrial strategy. If essential for the launching 
of an export-oriented strategy, the level of the real exchange rate does not 
seem to be the only factor affecting private manufacturing exports in 
Venezuela.
It may be argued that the instability of the exchange rate has been the reason 
for the ineffectiveness of real devaluation in Venezuela. There were three 
major devaluations (in 1983, 1984 and 1986), and this happened in the middle 
of great macroeconomic uncertainty. There was not coherence or continuity
13 This was the case o f  Chile, Turkey I the 1980’s, Tanzania, Mexico and Colombia (Helleiner, 1995, p. 8).
14 For Auty (1995, p. 20) the Latin American real exchange rate overvaluation not only eroded the competitiveness o f  the 
primary sector but also hampered the competitive industrial diversification. An overvalued exchange rate cheapens those 
imported inputs used by the protected sectors, which are not produced domestically. It also appears to justify extended 
protection to infant industries. Over the long-term such policies results in more erratic and slower economic growth than do
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between the exchange rate and export promotion policies. Stability in the real 
exchange rate has been pointed out as a main determinant o f output and non- 
traditional export growth (Caballero and Corbo, 1989). The stability of 
incentives, and so its credibility as a guide to investment and other behaviour, 
may be as relevant as having the statically correct ones, assuming that the 
latter are known (Rodrik, 1991). Helleiner (1994) concludes from a set o f case 
studies on industrialisation in developing countries, including Latin America, 
that what is essential for a sound industrial policy seems to be the level and 
stability o f the exchange rate as an element of an adequate macroeconomic 
environment.
6.3 Supply side factors and industrialisation
6.3.1 Total factor productivity growth15
Studies on Venezuelan manufacturing productivity are scanty and to our 
knowledge attempts to measure total factor productivity have not been made 
previously. Here we present some measures of total factor productivity in 
private manufacturing as well as some explanations for their trends.
We attempt here to provide some estimates of total factor productivity growth 
(TFPG) for Venezuelan private manufacturing by using the growth accounting 
framework.1617 TFPG was estimated for the 1968-88 years. Changes in TFP 
were obtained by applying the equations presented by Ahulawia (1991) and
more orthodox policies.
The concept o f total factor productivity is understood as a shift in the production function, which is reflecting not only 
technological change but also the improvement o f  machines, maintenance, learning by doing effects. Although this concept 
presents difficulties on the theoretical grounds (see Fine, 1994; Felipe, 1999), here it is estimated given the lack o f  an alternative 
framework.
16 See methodological appendix to this chapter.
17
The adoption o f  a growth accounting framework to estimate TFPG has been strongly criticised by Griliches and Jorgenson 
(1967), Nelson (1973) and Nelson (1981). Nevertheless, as Pack (1988) and Ahluwalia (1991) observe, the non-existence o f an 
alternative framework for assessing the links between growth and productivity justify the use o f  the concept o f  TFPG despite 
the problems arising from the methodological framework.
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Syrquin (1994) (Tables 6.8 and 6.9 respectively). Likewise, labour was 
estimated as the number of employees and real labour costs with the first 
measure giving more coherent results. The evidence presented in Table 6.8 
suggests that the contribution of TFP to manufacturing GDP growth was 21 
percent during 1968-72, but declined during 1974-76, and turned negative during 
1978-82. An improvement took place during 1985-88.
Table 6.8 Growth of output and total factor productivity in private manufacturing
1968-72 1974-76 1978-82 1985-88
Average annual growth rate o f  value added 9.17 11.94 3.71 9.27
Rate o f  growth o f  TFPG 1.94 1.21 -0.94 4.74
TFPG's contribution to output growth 21.19 10.15 -25.28 51.10
Gross domestic investment share o f  value 29.86 30.56 27.54 17.33
added
Investment growth rate 4.54 26.69 -23.99 16.04
Investment growth rate 11.41 12.54 -2.69 7.13
Notes: all data excludes the years o f  198 ini and 1983 and 1984 because there was an absolute decline in
output growth during these years. Source: own estimations, see methodological appendix to this chapter 
and text.
Table 6.9 gives another estimation of TFPG for Venezuela and other countries. 
In this case, Syrquin's equation (1994) and his assumptions were adopted to 
compute TFPG of Venezuela in order to make the variable comparable. 
According to this exercise, TFPG was lower in Venezuela than in seven other 
countries before the 1980s.
Table 6.9 Some international comparisons of estimates of TFPG
Country 1960-70 1969-72 1967-74 1974-77 1978-82 1970-82 1980-89
Mexico 3.60 - - - - 1.60 -2.80
Brazil 1.10 - - - - 2.50 -0.20
Colombia 0.90 - 1.23 - - 0.90 0.40
Peru 1.30 - - - - -0.80 -3.50
Chile 2.10 - - - - -0.90 0.20
Kenya 2.50 - - - - 2.00 -
Tanzania 2.90 - - - - 0.10 -
Venezuela - 0.13 - -0.07 0.13 - 0.61
Sources: For other countries Syrquin (1994, p. 48), Table 2.3. *In the case o f  
Venezuela, TFP was estimated by adopting the same assumptions that Syrquin 
namely, that the marginal productivity o f capital was 0.12 up to 1982 and 0.10 for 
the 1980's.
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An Explanation for the trends in TFP growth
It has been suggested that TFP growth is associated with trade openness, and 
especially with exports, through the positive impact of competition (Krueger, 
1997). Others point to the positive role of technology embodied in imported 
goods, so exports may become important as a means of financing imports 
(World Bank, 1991). Studies on the determinants of TFP in manufacturing for 
other countries suggest that the evidence on the impact o f the trade regime upon 
TFP is inconclusive and statistically uncertain (see Pack, 1988, p. 353; Rodrik, 
1992, p. 170; Helleiner, 1995, p. 30). According to the case studies compiled by 
Helleiner (1994, 1995) there is only weak empirical evidence, if  any, on the 
alleged association between export expansion or import liberalisation and 
productivity growth.18 The same study suggests that the performance of TFP 
may be linked to the stability of incentives and macroeconomic performance in 
general, such that phases of rapid GDP and investment growth are expected to be 
followed by rapid growth in productivity. The explanations for this development 
are twofold: a very well-known reason is the Verdoom (1949) effect and 
Kaldor’s idea according to which a high rate of investment is expected to 
encourage technological change through the process of learning, the embodiment 
of new technologies in machinery and the low mean age of the capital stock. 
The expansion of output may also allow for the use of potential or latent scale 
economies, positive externalities and learning experiences. The existence of 
such as association between manufacturing productivity growth and 
macroeconomic growth can be clearly identified at various points in the 1980s 
for a set of countries as different as India, Turkey, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Sri
18 In Brazil, Turkey, Korea, Thailand, Kenya and Sri Lanka an improvement in manufacturing productivity took place together 
with manufactured exports. However, this development was also associated with fast overall economic growth, which makes it 
difficult to disentangle the role o f  exports. By contrast, in India the increase in manufacturing TFP growth took place in the 
early 1980s preceding the export boom and import liberalisation policies. The improvement in manufacturing productivity 
growth in M exico in the early 1980s before import liberalisation also invalidates the alleged link between TFP and the trade 
regime. For Colombia, no link between productivity growth and changes in the trade regime during the 1970s and 1980s was 
found, and the phase o f  more rapid productivity growth in Korea was not accompanied by import liberalisation (Helleiner, 1994, 
p.29).
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Lanka, Kenya and Tanzania.19 On the other hand, the decline in manufacturing 
TFP growth in Chile the 1970s was accompanied by a deterioration of the 
macroeconomic situation.20 A second factor which explains the links between 
TFP and output growth is represented by the changes in the level of capacity 
utilisation. In general, if  demand or supply constraints increase, under-utilisation 
of the capital stock and labour leads to a decline in output and productivity.
Although an explanation of the determinants of TFP growth is a complex task, 
here we attempt to measure the impact of some variables on the productivity 
growth of Venezuelan private manufacturing during 1968-88 by adopting an 
econometric methodology and using time-series data. The exercise explores the 
effects on TFPG of economic growth, trade policies and capital intensity. It is 
worth noting that since no data on real capital stock are available for 
disaggregated manufacturing it was not possible to use pooled data to estimate 
TFPG for manufacturing.21 The equation which was estimated by using OLS 
states that TFP growth in private manufacturing is explained by the rate of 
growth of value added (Y), a measure of import substitution (MS) defined as the 
ratio of production for the domestic market as a share of apparent domestic 
demand, the capital-labour ratio (K/L), and the export coefficient (XC). A 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for 1974-77 and 0 for the other years 
was included to take into account the impact of the first oil boom. The effect of 
concentration cannot be measured due to the lack of data such as the growth in 
the number of factories or a factor scale defined as the size of capital stock per 
factory.
19 Helleiner (1994, p.29/30).
20 Idem.
21 Data on real capital stock for private manufacturing were estimated by Baptista (1991) by using the perpetual inventory 
method (see also methodological appendix to Chapter 6).
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The econometric results reported in Table 6.10 confirm the relevance of all the 
variables considered for TFPG in Venezuelan manufacturing with the exception 
of the export coefficient. As expected, the Verdoom effect is central to 
explaining the performance of TFPG in Venezuelan private manufacturing and 
value added growth had the greatest coefficient in all the equations. Import 
substitution and the capital-labour ratio have positive and statistically significant 
effects on TFP, with the role of import substitution being especially strong. In 
contrast, the export coefficient has a mixed sign and is not statistically significant 
in any case.22 This casts doubts on the argument which attributes to external 
competition a key role in productivity improvement. The negative impact o f the 
excessive and inefficient allocation of oil revenues on TFPG is caught by the 
dummy variable, which is negatively signed and statistically significant in all the 
equations.
The positive links between import substitution and TFPG can have been 
influenced by the fact that the improvement in TFP for Venezuelan private 
manufacturing during 1983-88 was accompanied by a substantial positive 
contribution of import substitution to growth which took place as a result o f the 
real devaluation of the bolivar. This development cannot be assigned to a change 
in the trade regime because this remained the same during 1983-88. There was a
Table 6.10 Determinants of TFPG in Venezuelan private manufacturing, 1968-88
Equation C GY Dum MS XC K/L R"
1 -3.172 0.850 -5.704 - - - 0.306
(-1.309) (2.811) (-2.198) - - - -
2 -30.092 0.900 -3.077 0.411 - - 0.742
(-5.356) (4.875) (-1.845) (4.966) - - -
3 -28.949 0.890 -2.612 0.419 -0.456 - 0.741
(-5.034) (4.802) (-1.503) (5.028) (-0.975) - -
4 -37.261 1.043 -2.859 0.276 0.256 0.041 0.882
(-8.208) (7.773) (-2.380) (4.015) (0.684) (3.769) -
Sources: own estimations (see text), t statistics in parenthesis.
22 Similar results were found by Ocampo (1995, p. 162).for Colombian manufacturing using pooled data
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mild lowering of tariffs during 1978-82, but this policy was abandoned from 
1983 to 1988. The picture that emerges from the econometric exercise is that the 
performance of TFPG in Venezuelan manufacturing is greatly determined by the 
Verdoom effect. This suggests that TFP is a dependent variable and that trade 
policy can only exert a positive impact on productivity if it also promotes the 
expansion of domestic production.
It must be noted that during 1973-76 TFP did not follow the well-known 
Verdoom and Kaldor proposition according to which rapid investment and 
output growth are associated with greater productivity growth. The high levels 
of oil revenues and their domestic distribution led to growth with no 
improvement in productivity. We tentatively advance the hypothesis that the 
improvement of TFP in Venezuelan private manufacturing during 1983-88 may 
be attributable to the reduced availability of oil revenues which may have 
encouraged some enterprise owners to rationalise the use of resources. It may be 
argued that real devaluation had a positive impact on manufacturing TFP from 
1983 to 1988, through the export stimulus, as the export coefficient although not 
statistically significant is positive in one of the equations. Nevertheless, if  as has 
been observed, the main impact of trade openness on TFP takes place through 
the technology embodied in imports, the Venezuelan experience is a paradox 
since the economy enjoyed a higher level of all kind of imports before the 1983- 
88 phase due to the availability of currency provided by the buoyant oil 
revenues. In contrast, the 1983-88 phase was characterised by import controls 
and devaluation with a drop in imports being the outcome.
It is worth noting that one of the few detailed studies on the Venezuelan 
industrial sector, and especially on the chemical subsector, concludes that a 
major problem of Venezuelan industrialisation was the absence of consideration 
of the important role of technological variables (Pirela et al, 1996, p. 32). This
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resulted in the lack of a technology policy as part of an industrial strategy which 
could have encouraged the promotion of technological capabilities and of 
entrepreneurship strategies. The same study suggests that in Venezuela there 
was an absolute disregard for the technological and organisational trends, or the 
links between the oil sector and some manufacturing branches. This 
development was reinforced at the outset of the 1970s oil boom, when a 
resource-based industrialisation was further promoted, with basic and 
mechanical metals being the chosen branches. This proved to be a mistake given 
the conditions in the international market, in which this subsector was in crisis 
and undergoing a process of technological redefinition. The vertical integration 
of the aluminium with the metal mechanical and the automobile industry appears 
as inappropriate given the crisis of the later branch in the 1970s (Pirela et al, p. 
33, 34). An interesting point highlighted by the same research is that the political 
and ideological thought being articulated in Venezuela previously to the 1970s, 
led to the effort to diversify out of oil-related activities. Consequently, a 
chemical industry for instance, was not promoted despite the fact that this has 
proven to be one of the few manufacturing lines with some accumulated 
technological learning experience.
6.3.2 Labour productivity23
Two indicators of manufacturing labour productivity are reported in Table 6.11, 
namely, value added per worker, and value added per unit real labour cost.24 
According to the two measures, a striking feature of Venezuelan manufacturing 
performance during 1974-77 was the substantial decline in labour productivity 
growth. Although manufacturing value added grew during 1974-77, a 
significant increase in employment during 1974-76, as compared to 1968-71,
23 The performance and determinants o f  labour productivity are better assessed by analysing disaggregate manufacturing. This
is done in chapter 7 o f  this thesis.
24 This is defined as the ratio o f  value added to the real wages divided by the number o f  persons employed.
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led to a drop in labour productivity. Venezuelan industrialisation has been 
capital-intensive, although data show that the incremental capital-intensity per 
worker ratio declined from 1972 to 1976 (see Table 6.12). One factor behind 
this was the substantial rise in employment during 1973-76. This was caused 
by the growth of some of labour-intensive and public branches during 1973- 
76, which benefitted from the greater domestic demand, cheap public credit 
and/or from public investment (e.g. wearing apparel and footwear, chemicals, 
metals and basic metals).25
The use o f value added per worker as a measure of the trends in labour 
productivity posed some problems, as the number of employees is not a good 
indicator of the effective labour time applied.26 At the same time, there was a 
mild increase in the share of labour costs in value added during 1974-77 and 
this helped to offset the marked rise in employment, while the strong increase 
in this share during 1978-82 offset the effect of the drop in employment. 
Consequently another version of labour productivity was estimated namely, 
value added per unit real labour cost. This indicator shows that labour 
productivity
Table 6.11 Growth rates of labour productivity in Venezuelan private manufacturing
1966-
71
1974-76 1978-82 1983-88
Value added per worker 2.69 0.53 2.91 0.05
Real labour cost per worker (a) 1.00 6.62 1.83 -2.86
Value added per unit real labour costs (b) 8.14 4.69 2.49 3.00
1966 1971 1974 1975 1976 1977 1979 1982
Labour cost share in value added 30.53 36.03 38.99 36.15 40.94 38.25 41.82 39.29
Labour cost share in total cost 62.58 51.44 53.82 50.75 52.16 53.17 54.57 46.03
Notes: data at constant 1984 prices. The average o f  labour productivity for 1983-88 excludes 1983. (b) This is defined as the 
ratio o f  the wages and salaries per year to the number o f  employees per year, (c) This is defined as the ratio o f  value added to 
the real wages divided by the number o f  persons employed. Sources: own estimations based on data provided by OCEI 
industrial survey, various years and the Central Bank o f  Venezuela, economic reports.
25These industries have a high relative share o f  employment in value added.
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growth almost halved during 1974-76, compared to 1969-72, but rebounded 
again during 1978-82 and 1983-88. Labour productivity seems to be led by 
output growth following the Verdoom pattern with the exception of the 1974- 
77 and 1978-82 phases.
The development of labour productivity in Venezuelan manufacturing during 
1974-77 deserves close attention. The modest growth of labour productivity 
during the latter phase compared to the increase in output, raises the issue of 
efficiency. In our view, the sharp drop in labour productivity during these 
years is explained by the following factors: (a) the lack of a coherent industrial 
policy which could have focused on efficiency and the need to promote 
exports; and, (b) the massive consumption and investment of oil revenues 
which overwhelmed the capital absorptive capacity of the economy as 
measured by the lack of managerial and skill capacities. In a study on 
productivity for manufacturing during 1971-77, Iturbe et al. (1980) observe 
that the drop in labour productivity growth (measured as value added or output 
per worker) in Venezuelan manufacturing during 1974-77 was linked to the 
high rotation of labour during these booming years, because the greater 
demand for labour between firms allowed workers more mobility from a job to 
other.
6.3.3 The Trends in the capital-output ratio
Table 6.12 presents some measures of the capital-output ratio by using capital 
stock in Venezuelan private manufacturing. Both the capital-output ratio and 
the ICOR declined during 1974-76, compared to 1968-73. Nevertheless, this 
trend was reversed from 1977 to 1982, and declined during the post-boom 
phase. The steep rise during 1978-82 is attributable to the launching of 
deflationary fiscal and monetary policies during 1978-80.
26Ndubulu and Semboja (1991, p. 523).
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In contrast, through 1983-88 the improvement in the capital-output ratio may 
have been due to the increase in capacity utilisation following the severe 
recession in 1978-82. As expected, the real devaluation prompted some 
demand substitution effects, which resulted in the expansion of some 
manufacturing branches.
Table 6.12 Trends in the capital-output ratio in private manufacturing, Venezuela, 1968-94
1968-72 1974-76 1978-82 1984-88 1989-94
Annual growth rate o f  GDI 11.4 12.54* -2.7 10.0 4.8
Annual growth rate o f  GDInr 4.5 26.7 -24.0 8.2
(a) Capital-output ratio 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.4
(b) ICOR 3.6 2.9 4.7 2.2
Notes: * It refers to 1975-77; GDI is gross domestic investment at 1984 prices including residential assess; GDInr: it 
refers to non-residential investm ent at 1984 prices; (a) It is based on data o f  capital stock at 1984 prices; (b) It is based 
on total gross domestic investm ent at 1984 prices, the 1978-82 phase excludes 1981 and the 1983-88 phase excludes the 
years o f  1983-84 because there was an absolute decline in GDP. Sources: GDI is based on data provided by the 
industrial survey; GDInr, the capital-output ratio and ICO R are based on data provided by Baptista (1990).
6.4 Concluding remarks
The estimation of the sources of industrial growth made in this chapter indicates 
that a sectoral boom may exert a negative effect on import-substitution and 
exports, while at the same time it may allow for some manufacturing growth in 
the short-term due to the greater home demand. In Venezuela, the government's 
decision to maintain a fixed nominal exchange rate implied a real appreciation, 
which caused some disruptive effects on import-substitution and exports. 
Nevertheless, the surge in government spending prompted greater domestic 
demand, which together with the protectionist policies explain manufacturing 
growth during 1974-77. On the other hand, as already noted, the specific 
policies launched during the 1973-77 phase produced negative effects on 
Venezuelan industrialisation, involving the reinforcement of the weaknesses of 
the industrial process such as the lack of exports and low labour productivity.
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As in other oil-based economies, the main lesson which can be drawn from the 
Venezuelan case and the impact of the 1970s oil boom on industrialisation is 
that the over-investment and inefficient use of the extra income entails 
negative effects. Although manufacturing achieved rapid growth based on the 
home market, this growth was inefficient without laying the foundations for a 
more independent and sustainable economic model through the adoption of a 
coherent industrial policy which may have encouraged manufacturing exports 
and diversification. As a result, growth was unsustainable in the long term due 
to the appearance of balance of payments problems which led to the launching 
of deflationary policies by 1978.
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7 Impact of the 1970’s Oil Boom on Growth and Structural Change 
within Venezuelan Manufacturing
Introduction
The present chapter examines the disaggregated performance of 
Venezuelan manufacturing by portraying the main features o f 18 
manufacturing lines within a factor intensity framework during 1973-82 
and by estimating the source of growth for some selected manufacturing 
lines. The major issues discussed are as follows: (a) the role played by 
factor intensity in explaining the differences observed across 
manufacturing; (b) The extent to which weaknesses of Venezuelan 
industrialisation during the 1960s, namely, the lack of exports, heavy 
dependence on imported capital and inputs, the lack of diversification and 
inefficient growth, were reinforced by the pattern of growth and structural 
change within Venezuelan manufacturing through 1974-82
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 1 outlines the pattern of 
growth and structural change by industries during 1968-88. Section 2 
presents the decomposition of the sources of growth into domestic demand, 
import substitution and exports for the main branches. Section 3 sets out 
the main trends and some influences at work on the growth of labour 
productivity in Venezuelan manufacturing at a detailed level of 
disaggregation. The major conclusions are summarised in the final section.
7.1 Pattern of growth within Venezuelan manufacturing during 1973- 
82 and Dutch disease
7.1.1 Pattern of growth
From the Dutch disease perspective the impact of the oil boom on the 
manufacturing branches may differ according to their factor intensities,
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with labour-intensive industries being more disrupted than capital-intensive 
ones by real appreciation and higher product wages. However, the 
econometric evidence discussed in Chapter 4 suggests that both 
manufacturing groups were equally disrupted by real appreciation in the 
long-term, while real appreciation exerted a positive influence on both 
groups in the short-term and especially in the case of the labour-intensive 
group as a whole. On the other hand, some manufacturing lines, such as 
textiles and food, seem to have been greatly affected by real appreciation in 
the short-term.
In order to get further insights on the differences observed across 
manufacturing, the path of growth revealed by manufacturing data which 
have been disaggregated according to factor-intensities is presented in 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2, as well as Figs 7.1 and 7.2. The picture that emerges 
from these data is that there were lines with very high output and 
employment growth during 1973-77 in both the labour and capital- 
intensive groups. It should also be noted that the growth of the capital- 
intensive group as a whole may appear lower due to the fact that transport 
equipment experienced a sharp decline in 1975, although this line grew at 
high rates during 1973-74 and in 1976.
Within the labour-intensive group, textiles were severely disrupted as 
shown by the strong drop in output and employment growth rates during 
1974-77 compared to the pre-boom phase. As the drop in output was more 
significant, labour productivity growth also declined. It is worth noting 
that textiles was one of the lines that benefited the most from the financing 
policy launched during 1973-79, which indicates that the sectoral problems 
were not related to the lack of resources.1
1 See chapter 4 o f  this thesis.
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Textiles continued declining during 1978-82, with a recovery taking place 
during 1983-88. It seems that the sector benefited from the demand side 
substitution effect of real devaluation through the latter phase, but 
following import liberalisation in 1989 it entered a deep crisis.
Table 7.1 Trend growth in manufacturing real value added, 1960-94
ISIC code Industries 1960-71 68-71 74-77 78-82 83-88 89-94
Labour-intensive industries 8.68 10.70 12.53 -0.16 5.13 3.64
0.99 0.96 0.99 0.00 0.84 0.38
332 Furniture -0.14 6.38 15.20 1.35 -3.21 6.52
0.00 0.66 0.87 0.01 0.29 0.41
331 Wood 7.39 15.77 2.89 -7.34 -0.25 -2.32
0.84 0.86 0.35 0.98 0.00 0.01
356-54-90 Other manufacturing 12.74 19.52 20.74 0.87 2.37 8.72
0.95 0.95 0.89 0.04 0.67 0.72
323 Leather products 6.41 9.12 9.22 -1.33 -2.80 3.90
0.73 0.62 0.81 0.07 0.25 0.08
322-24 Wearing apparel & Footwear 6.86 6.82 11.39 5.34 2.02 0.95
0.84 0.95 0.93 0.75 0.25 0.00
321 Textiles 8.96 10.02 3.59 -10.54 9.59 -2.58
0.99 0.99 0.86 0.74 0.97 0.19
381 Metal products 15.85 15.43 26.94 0.97 4.00 2.96
0.96 0.95 0.93 0.01 0.32 0.27
355 Rubber 7.89 10.48 3.54 6.87 9.71 8.57
0.95 0.99 0.27 0.95 0.70 0.70
361-62-69 Non-metallic minerals 7.67 7.55 10.40 1.91 7.94 4.36
0.93 0.61 0.83 0.16 0.91 0.58
Capita] and/or human 7.51 7.68 10.62 3.54 4.20 3.15
capital-intensive industries 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.77 0.48 0.37
313 Beverages 4.95 6.20 15.14 3.46 1.25 2.69
0.84 0.98 0.99 0.31 0.03 0.15
314 Tobacco -5.72 2.07 28.89 7.03 0.26 0.83
0.48 0.61 0.91 0.90 0.01 0.00
341 Paper and paper products 12.99 12.83 19.53 -8.73 7.92 1.53
0.99 0.86 0.99 0.70 0.69 0.15
384 Transport equipment 6.59 -1.13 7.93 7.23 6.77 30.62
0.66 0.04 0.84 0.96 0.43 0.87
311-12 Food products 8.53 7.11 1.87 2.89 1.41 1.50
0.87 0.97 0.37 0.57 0.91 0.20
371-72 Basic metal products 19.92 14.61 8.59 16.76 10.77 2.14
0.75 0.89 0.94 0.82 0.93 0.22
351-52 Chemical products 9.90 15.46 14.11 5.19 8.13 -4.61
0.97 0.93 0.90 0.20 0.85 0.32
382-83 Mechanical & electrical 10.57 19.65 17.81 2.65 7.69 2.99
machinery 0.62 0.87 0.92 0.53 0.65 0.23
342 Printing 10.42 3.93 8.51 2.77 -2.40 8.25
0.90 0.17 0.30 0.16 0.11 0.57
300 Private manufacturing 7.93 8.81 11.34 2.27 4.51 3.31
0.97 0.99 0.99 0.65 0.61 0.38
Note: growth rates are the least squares estimates o f  trend growth. Sources: OCEI, industrial survey, various issues 
and BCV, economic report, various issues, see methodological appendix.
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Among the labour-intensive group, leather, wood and rubber were also 
disrupted by the oil boom during 1974-77. By contrast, the rest of this
Table 7.2 Trend growth in manufacturing employment, 1968-94
ISIC code Industries 1968-71 74-77 78-82 83-88 89-94
Labour-intensive industries 6.53 11.87 -3.05 3.84 -0.11
0.99 0.97 0.55 0.87 0
332 Furniture 5.85 14.63 -4.18 -3.21 3.16
0.98 0.92 0.55 -0.85 0.46
331 Wood 8.88 3.83 -8.39 1.92 -2.6
0.99 0.89 0.92 0.36 0.38
356-54-90 Others 17.507 13.83 2.95 7.14 -1.72
0.91 0.93 0.63 0.99 0.025
323 Leather products 11.57 10.68 -2.09 1.87 -3.27
0.42 0.96 0.41 0.23 0.105
322-24 Wearing apparel & footwear 8.49 12.77 1.7 2.49 -8.35
0.90 0.98 0.24 0.71 0.39
321 Textiles 2.25 6.98 -12.24 6.63 -6.77
0.89 0.95 0.87 0.99 0.94
381 Metal products 6.77 13.46 -4.59 3.48 -3.35
0.97 0.87 0.40 0.41 0.39
355 Rubber 8.13 7.97 -6.92 3.65 3.51
0.96 0.95 0.83 0.6 0.31
361-62-69 Non-metallic minerals 2.46 15.76 -2.19 4.04 13.79
0.45 0.97 0.21 0.78 0.74
Capital and/or human 6.026 11.64 0.49 2.66 -0.53
capital-intensive industries 0.92 0.97 0.051 0.79 0.029
313 Beverages 2.38 12.06 2.19 -0.99 1.69
0.78 0.9 0.63 0.13 0.82
314 Tobacco 9.18 3.54 0.18 -2.85 -0.52
0.64 0.28 0.00 0.29 0.023
341 Paper and paper products 5.23 13.14 -5.78 3.63 -1.85
0.99 0.99 0.65 0.53 0.2
384 Transport equipment 11.86 13.91 -4.55 1.65 2.6
0.99 0.95 0.65 0.28 0.33
311-12 Food products 1.33 8.92 2.24 3.07 0
0.13 0.95 0.48 0.96 0
371-72 Basic metal products 6.17 18.6 0.00 3.97 -5.49
0.81 0.96 0.00 0.56 0.95
351-52 Chemical products 9.78 13.31 1.84 3.23 0.00
0.97 0.96 0.42 0.97 0
382-83 M echanical & electrical machinery 18.46 15.9 -0.04 4.58 -2.93
0.88 0.96 0.00 0.55 0.18
342 Printing 8.27 10.16 2.18 1.4 -5.13
0.99 0.94 0.28 0.26 0.41
300 Private manufacturing 6.27 11.76 -1.19 3.21 -0.33
0.98 0.97 0.19 0.84 0.009
Note: growth rates are the least squares estimates o f  trend growth. Sources: Industrial survey and UNIDO, see 
methodological appendix.
242
group benefited from the expansion of the domestic market notably, metal 
products and furniture.
As regards the capital-intensive group as a whole, it experienced lower 
growth compared to the labour-intensive group during 1974-77. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that some lines such as machinery,
Fig 7.1 Trends in value added, Venezuelan manufacturing 1960-94, (log scale)
18 5.
17.5
17. Q
155
15Q
—  Y -►-Li — Ki
15 5.
15Q
145
.150
14. Q
.145
■ ' / \ /
18.
15.
14.
13.
12.
11.
 MetdpxxLds
_ ►. Nnmdsfc rrnerafe
 Whtq —  Textiles- -  Leather products 
-►-Others
—  Chem icals--Transport equipment 
-►.Machinery —  Beverages- -  Paper -►-Food
—  Tobacco — Printing 
-►.Basic melals
Notes: Y= value added, Li = value added in the labour-intensive group and Ki = value added in the capital-intensive 
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beverages and chemicals achieved very high growth rates during this phase. 
On the other hand, food witnessed a slowdown which seems to be caused 
by import competition, the low income elasticity o f this type of good as 
well as a slowdown in agriculture output and the slowdown of agriculture.
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There were substantial differences in the performance of the lines within 
the labour-intensive and the capital-intensive groups. Concerning the 
pattern of growth during 1983-88, some branches o f the labour-intensive 
group expanded at high rates (e.g. textiles, non-metallic mineral products). 
At the same time, some of the capital-intensive branches as machinery
Fig 7.2 Trends in employment, Venezuelan manufacturing 1960-94, (log scale)
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Notes: L = manufacturing employment, Li = employment in the labour-intensive group and Ki = employment in the 
capital-intensive group. Sources: as Table 7.2.
and chemicals also achieved rapid growth during 1983-88 in terms of 
output and employment. The recovery of manufacturing during these years 
was driven by import substitution prompted by real devaluation and some 
expansion in exports as a result of relative prices incentives. Likewise, the 
recovery of some manufacturing lines during 1986 is explained by the 
positive effect of the public investment programmes on those lines linked 
to the construction sector. Nevertheless, it must be noted that over these 
years growth was unstable compared to the 1960s and the reluctance of
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private investment to expand represented a serious obstacle to long-term 
growth. Finally, following the launching of neo-liberal policies from 1989, 
manufacturing has experienced a severe fall in output, employment and 
investment growth (Figs 7.1 and 7.2).
7.2 Structural change within Venezuelan manufacturing during 1973- 
82 and Dutch disease
Structural change in Venezuelan private manufacturing during 1960-94 is 
illustrated by Table 7.3. This makes clear that manufacturing has 
maintained a similar structure over the 1960-90 period, with traditional 
industries having a major although declining share in the sector's total 
output and employment. The falling trend in the traditional sector follows 
the pattern of structural change observed in the industrial process identified 
by cross-national studies on industrialisation. Nevertheless, it must be 
stressed that the progress of the lines producing capital goods was 
disappointing during1960-90 and there were no significant changes during 
the boom phase (1974-82).
Considering the factor intensities of manufacturing lines, it seems that the 
growth of the labour-intensive group during 1974-77 led to a slight increase 
in its share of total value added and employment. However, some of the 
capital-intensive lines also increased their shares. The growth o f these 
industries was fostered by the expansion of the home demand. Table 7.3 
also indicates that the highest share of investment corresponded to non- 
metallic mineral products, metal products, food, textiles and chemicals. As 
a result, there was a favourable development of chemicals and metals, 
which increased their shares in output and employment. Nevertheless, the 
growth of these intermediate and mechanical subsectors was mainly based 
on import-substitution of a few manufacturing consumer goods and basic
2 Chenery (1960), Chenery and Taylor (1968), Chenery and Syrquin (1986).
245
-5
inputs for the construction sector. At the same time, the development of 
those industries producing capital goods was very limited, with the 
mechanical and electrical machinery branch representing only 6 per cent of 
value added in 1977 compared with 4.8 per cent in 1974. The low 
development of the capital and transport equipment subsectors over 1973- 
77 is also shown by their high import coefficients which increased from 81 
per cent in 1973 to 88 per cent in 1977 and reached more than 60 per cent 
for machinery and the whole mechanical group during this phase.4 This 
reflected the excessive dependence of the domestic productive process on 
the imports of capital goods, a feature of Venezuelan manufacturing which, 
as noted, was associated with the availability of oil revenues, unequal 
income distribution and the demand structure which encouraged a highly 
differentiated supply produced with capital-intensive techniques.5 These 
features of industrialisation were reinforced by the policies pursued during 
1973-82. As already discussed, oil income was used to finance the 
importation of capital and raw material goods. Likewise, the policy of 
lower tariffs for capital and raw material goods as an incentive for 
industrialisation seems to have been a contributing factor to the heavy 
dependence on capital imports. Thus, it seems that the policy response 
over these phases reinforced one of the major weaknesses of Venezuelan 
industrialisation namely, excessive reliance on oil income and on capital 
good imports which contributed to the appearance o f balance of payments 
problems by 1977. It must be noted that some decline in the share of 
machinery in manufacturing imports took place during 1978-82 when this 
fell from 40 per cent in 1977 to 32 per cent in 1982. This was due, 
however, to the stagnation of the economy and by 1988 this share rose to 
37 per cent due to the recovery of manufacturing during 1985-87. Over 1
3 Brandi (1989).
4 Table 5.10 in chapter 5 o f  this thesis.
5 A study o f  the mechanical industries in Venezuelan manufacturing is found Trujillo (1977, p. 62).
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7
1983-88, the lines producing machinery experienced a recovery due to the 
positive impact of real devaluation, but this effect was reversed from 
1989. Although these lines were supposed to be less disrupted by the 
import liberalisation policy, it seems that the corrosive impact of the 
policy on the other manufacturing lines, which has led to de­
accumulation, accounts for the severe decline recorded by machinery. 
These branches may have been also affected by the liberalisation of the 
financial markets.6 Concerning the performance of the labour-intensive 
industries during 1983-88, textiles, non-metallic mineral products and 
rubber benefited to some extent from the demand substitution effect of 
real devaluation of the currency during 1985-88. This positive trend was 
reversed, however, in the 1990s when import liberalisation, the greater 
financing costs and in general the lack of an adequate industrial policy
• • * 7brought about negative import substitution.
7.3 Demand side sources of growth
In this section we look at the decomposition of the sources o f growth from 
the demand side in 18 manufacturing lines. Due to the lack of data, the 
effect of the shift in domestic demand was not estimated. The results for 
manufacturing as a whole, though, do not differ basically from those 
obtained by using the previous methodology. Table 7.4 indicates that the 
contribution of domestic demand, import substitution, and exports to 
manufacturing growth differed across sectors during 1969-93.
Considering the 1974-77 phase, it seems that some industries producing 
consumer goods, like textiles and food, experienced a reversal in import
6 Valecillos (1992,1994).
7
Within manufacturing, some o f  the capital-intensive lines have been the most disrupted by the neo-liberal policies, 
notably, chemicals, electrical and non-electrical machinery, beverages and paper. Within the labour-intensive group, 
textiles and metal products has been severely hit. It must be noted that the accumulated net investment for machinery 
was negative during 1988-92. Likewise, there was a substantial drop in the used installed capacity in almost all the lines 
during these years, notably, in chemicals, machinery, textiles and metals. Between 1988 and 1992, the percentage o f  
used installed capacity declined from 78.85 per cent to 64.07 in chemicals, from 56.14 per cent to 42.58 per cent in the 
same years, and from 88.56 to 50.56 per cent in textiles. See Valecillos (1994, p. 39, Table 8).
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substitution. Within the intermediate group, non-metallic mineral 
products was severely affected also which was due to the importation of 
cement while machinery and transport equipment also recorded negative 
import substitution during this phase. The huge increase in capital goods 
imports prompted by the easy credit, real appreciation and low protection 
on capital goods seems to account for this fact. The reversal in import 
substitution during 1974-77 contrasts with the results achieved during 
1969-73 when most of the industries showed a positive contribution of 
import substitution to growth. Despite this, a significant positive 
contribution of domestic demand to growth in all the lines over 1974-77 
offset the negative impact of ISI. As expected, there was a negative 
contribution of exports to growth during 1974-77, due to the huge 
expansion of domestic demand and the real appreciation of the currency. 
This was so despite the establishment of an institution to provide easy 
credit to exporters.
Paradoxically, despite the lowering of protection, a positive contribution 
of import substitution to growth took place in some manufacturing lines 
during 1978-82, with the role of domestic demand being negative. These 
results are explained by the strong decline in imports and domestic 
demand during 1978-82 (see Table 7.4). The significant decline in the 
import coefficient of machinery and transport was the result of the fall in 
investment and this must not be understood as a structural trend in the 
import substitution of these goods. On the other hand, some highly 
protected sectors such as textiles and paper, showed negative growth rates 
during 1978-82 which suggests that they were severely affected by the 
lowering of tariffs and quotas.
When it comes to the 1982-88 phase, the real devaluation of the domestic
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currency led to a positive and important contribution of import substitution 
to manufacturing growth, notably in food, clothing, textiles, non-metallic 
minerals, metals, machinery and transport equipment. For manufacturing 
as a whole, the effect of domestic demand was lower than the effect of 
import substitution given the negative impact of real devaluation on wages 
and salaries which was reflected in a decline in the role of domestic 
demand in food and clothing. The contribution of exports to manufacturing 
growth became positive during 1982-88, but it is still insignificant (6.10 per 
cent). The higher export ratio corresponded to chemicals which despite the 
fact that this includes petrochemicals, was considered as part of the private 
sector because of an important private component in this branch.
As expected the import liberalisation policy launched in 1989 led to a 
reversal in import substitution in most of the manufacturing lines, with a 
few exceptions, such as chemicals and machinery. Contrary to the 
predictions of the advocates of free trade as a tool for encouraging exports, 
the main source of manufacturing growth during 1989-93 was domestic 
demand and not exports, whose contribution declined compared to 1982- 
88. Some of the lines in which the contribution of exports to growth was 
important were food, non-metallic minerals, textiles and tobacco.
Export performance in disaggregated manufacturing
As shown by Table 7.4, a striking feature of Venezuelan manufacturing 
was the insignificant contribution of exports to growth during 1969-73 in 
almost all the manufacturing lines considered. Chemicals, paper and 
transport equipment provided the greatest contribution of exports to 
manufacturing growth during 1969-73. Basic metals, which was 
dominated by the public sector until 1997 and was an export-oriented 
sector, showed a negative export contribution to industrial growth during
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1969-73. This is explained by the fact that resource-based industrialisation 
had begun by these years, so sectoral exports increased during 1978-82.
Figure 7.3 and Tables 7.5 and 7.6 show the negligible diversification of 
manufacturing exports from 1968 to the early 1990s. Manufacturing, 
excluding iron, accounted for only 5 per cent of total exports during 1989- 
94.
Table 1.5 Export structure as percentage of total exports, Venezuela, 1960-94
Oil Agriculture Iron Chemicals Other
Manufacturing
Total
exports
1960-72 90.9 0.1 8.9 0.0 0.2 100.0
1973-77 86.4 0.1 13.0 0.5 0.6 100.0
1978-82 88.6 0.1 10.2 0.4 0.5 100.0
1983-88 85.4 0.1 10.2 0.9 2.3 100.0
1989-94 85.0 0.2 1.0 4.8 100.0
Sources: BCV, Finexpo, reports, various issues.
Table 7.6 indicates that the most important export increase took place in 
chemicals, basic metals (which was a publicly-owned line) and food. 
These lines achieved the greatest growth rates during 1968-90, but their 
export coefficients were low and fluctuating.
The first 1970s oil boom brought about a decline in private manufacturing 
exports in almost all the lines during 1974-77 (with the exception of 1976) 
despite the granting of some export subsidies. As noted in Chapter 6, this 
was largely linked to greater domestic demand and some real appreciation. 
This defines a feature o f the performance of non-traditional exports in 
Venezuela, where national firms are only encouraged to export as a 
response to a decline in domestic demand, but there is no a real export- 
oriented sector. Concerning the immediate post-boom phase (1982-88), 
there was some expansion in private manufacturing exports as a result of 
devaluation (see Fig 7.3). However, this was not impressive. Indeed,
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during 1960-90 the contribution of manufacturing to total exports has been 
negligible with the only manufacturing exports being iron and chemicals, 
with the private sector (excluding chemicals) playing a marginal role (see 
Table 7.5). Likewise, although the export coefficient of private 
manufacturing showed an
Fig 7.3 Trends in manufacturing exports, Venezuela, 1969-91 (log scale)
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increasing trend from 1983, it was still very low and fluctuating and only 
amounted to 2.26 per cent (see Table 7.6). This was so despite the fact that 
chemicals was included in the private sector. The lines which recorded the 
greatest increases in their export coefficients were chemicals, non-metallic 
mineral products, paper, tobacco and transport equipment.
g
The decline shown by the export coefficient o f  basic metals during 1973-77 is associated with the greater domestic 
emand o f  aluminium which occurred during the booming phase.
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From 1989 onwards, the import liberalisation policy led to a reversal of 
import substitution without a substantial export effort. It must be 
highlighted that the high growth rates of manufacturing exports during
1989-93 were due to the sharp increase in 1989 but there was a decline in
1990-91, followed by a recovery during 1992-93. This poor manufacturing 
export development occurred despite the reforms launched in the exchange 
rate regime from 1983 and in the trade regime from 1989.
7.4 Supply side determinants of industrial growth
Labour productivity in Venezuelan private manufacturing during 
1973-82
In this section the development of labour productivity growth measured as 
value added per worker in Venezuelan private manufacturing is assessed. 
It was not possible to estimate TFP or the capital-output ratio due to the 
lack of reliable disaggregated data on real capital stock.9
The picture that emerges from Fig 7.4 is that during 1974-77 most o f the 
manufacturing lines were affected by a strong decline in labour 
productivity growth measured as value added per worker compared to 
1968-71. Thus, the problem of the traditionally low labour productivity in 
manufacturing worsened during 1974-77. While value added increased in 
the wake of the boom, this growth was modest compared to the rise in 
employment. Thus both the labour- and capital-intensive manufacturing 
groups were affected by falling labour productivity over this phase, but the 
decline was more severe in the labour-intensive group as a whole compared 
to 1968-71.10 In this group labour productivity growth fell from 4.17 per
9
See mehtodological appendix to Chapter 6 .
10 It must be noted that basic metals (a stated-owned industry) had the sharpest drop in labour productivity over 1974-77, 
which is explained by the huge increase in employment and the modest growth in value added over this phase.
255
cent during these years to 0.66 per cent during 1974-77; while in the case 
of the capital-intensive group as a whole the growth of this variable fell 
from 1.65 per cent per year over 1968-71 to -1.02 per cent during 1974-77. 
As noted in Chapter 6, the factors behind the falling trend observed in
Fig 7.4 Trends in value added per man, Venezuelan manufacturing, 1967-94 (log scale)
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Notes: all values at constant prices o f  1984, Y = value added per man o f  private manufacturing, Li = value added 
per man o f  labour-intensive industries, Ki = value added per man o f  capital-intensive industries. Sources: as Fig 7.1
labour productivity growth were linked to various factors: first, the inability 
to export which meant a reduced market; and second, the rapid and 
excessive spending of the extra oil income which may have led to the 
emergence of constraints on productivity growth related to supply-side 
factors, e.g. infrastructure, intermediate inputs. In this case, the shortage of 
some intermediate inputs was not the result of overall foreign exchange. 
The decline in labour productivity growth that occurred in some of the 
capital-intensive lines may be explained by their greater use o f skilled 
labour which became a scarce factor during 1974-77. Although, as noted
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earlier, there was some international migration of non-skilled labour, 
during 1973-77. Likewise, some of the labour-intensive lines, such as 
textiles and food, may have been affected by the lack of raw materials with 
low substitution elasticity.
The third factor which affected labour productivity was the disorganised 
and inefficient allocation of financial resources. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
some of the manufacturing branches which were favoured by the subsidies 
policy experienced the sharpest decline in labour productivity during 1973- 
77. This was the case for textiles and food. It may be related to the 
granting of abundant credit with no restrictions which led to the emergence 
of an excessive number of small and inefficient enterprises. This is 
confirmed by the substantial proliferation of the number of establishments 
with less than 5 workers in textiles and food during 1974-77. It must be 
noted that the growth of the number of factories has been taken by 
Ahluwalia (1994, p. 136) as a proxy for the degree of competition within an 
industry. According to this author, the higher the number o f competitors 
within an industry, the greater the forces of competition are bound to 
encourage higher productivity.11 However, the author observes that it may 
be the case that the rapid growth of factories could have been caused by a 
phenomenon of fragmentation which is derived from the existence of 
distortionary policies launched to achieve regional decentralisation and the 
granting of protection to the small-scale sector. In the Venezuelan case, 
through 1973-77 the growth in establishments during 1973-77 essentially 
reflected a phenomenon of proliferation of small-scale enterprises as a 
result of the misleading and inefficient policies launched with regards to 
manufacturing.12
Fourth, a positive association is found between the growth of labour 
productivity and the growth in value added across industries during all the
1 A hluw alia mentioned these factors as determinants o f TFPG in a study o f Indian manufacturing, but it seems that the 
same factor should affect labour productivity.
12 See Arrieta (1988).
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phases between 1968 and 1994. Despite the fact that the so-called 
Verdoom (1949) law does not seem to hold when manufacturing as a whole 
is analysed because the rapid value-added growth during 1974-77 was 
accompanied by a substantial fall in labour productivity measured as value 
added per worker, the correlation coefficient across industries was 89 per 
cent during this phase and over 70 per cent during the other phases.13
As noted in Chapter 6, the problems of inefficiency and low labour 
productivity in Venezuelan industrialisation during 1960-89 have been seen 
mainly as a consequence of the excessive protection granted to these 
sectors, especially through the closed trade regime which led to the absence 
of international competition. The reinforcement o f these policies during 
1973-82 appears as a mistake which caused a further decline in labour 
productivity. If this idea is accurate, it is expected that the productivity of 
the more protected sectors would be considerably lower than the less 
protected sectors and that the launching of an import liberalisation policy 
must have led to a considerable improvement in manufacturing labour 
productivity. The picture given by Table 7.7 and Fig 7.4 is that this was 
not the case, the more protected sectors (consumer goods lines) had higher 
labour productivity growth than the less protected ones (capital and 
intermediate lines) during 1968-72. It may be argued that this relates to the 
state-owned nature of some of the intermediate industries. Nonetheless, the 
only line dominated by the public sector was basic metals, thus this cannot 
account for these results.
It must be noted that in a study of Indian industrialisation, Ahulawia (1994) 
suggests that some protectionist policies, such as the granting of licences 
according to specified values of investments and the high rent on these 
licences, allowed for an investment capacity far in excess of what could 
have been considered as adequate in terms of efficiency. For this reason
13 Own estimations.
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some of the more protected sectors may have shown a higher capital-labour 
ratios, with this variable reflecting the effect o f protection. In the 
Venezuelan case, during the 1960s, the capital and intermediate goods 
showed higher capital-labour ratios defined as investment per worker, but 
these lines in general were less protected than the traditional group.
As assessed in Chapter 6, the low labour productivity growth of during the 
1960s may be related to the rapid expansion of the capital productive 
capacity compared to market growth. This imbalance is due to the reduced 
market size which was linked to the inability to export, the unequal income 
distribution and the nature of oil revenues. The reduced market appears as 
an obstacle to further growth and so it becomes a cause of low labour 
productivity. According to this idea, over the 1960s those industries with 
the lowest labour productivity growth may have been the same that 
required a larger market to produce efficiently, such as mechanical and 
intermediate goods. This seems to be the case o f Venezuelan 
manufacturing as shown by Table 7.7.
Concerning the trends in manufacturing labour productivity during 1983- 
88, there was no improvement in this variable compared to 1978-82. Better 
performance of labour productivity took place during 1989-94. It may be 
tempting to conclude that there is a positive association between labour 
productivity and the changes in the trade regime which involved a radical 
import liberalisation policy from 1990. Nevertheless, a qualification must 
be made: in eleven of the manufacturing lines there was no trend in labour 
productivity, showing the unstable character of the recovery in this variable 
over the later years.
Considering the case of textiles, although the sector's labour productivity 
growth was well above that of manufacturing as a whole during 1968-71, 
inter-country comparisons show that labour productivity in Venezuelan
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Table 7.7 Trend growth in manufacturing labour productivity, 1968-94
ISIC code Industries 1968-71 74-77 78-82 83-88 89-94
L ab ou r-in ten sive  ind ustries 4.17 0.66 2.89 1.29 3.75
0.98 0.38 0.03 0.65 0.79
332 Furniture 0.53 0.57 5.53 -2.36 3.36
0.02 0.01 0.48 -0.85 0.36
331 Wood 6.89 -0.94 1.05 -2.17 0.28
0.54 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.00
354-56-90 Other manufacturing 2.01 6.91 -2.08 -4.77 10.44
0.04 0.71 0.14 0.74 0.77
323 Leather products -2.45 -1.46 0.76 -4.67 7.17
0.01 0.21 0.03 0.74 0.22
322-324 Wearing apparel & footwear -1.67 -1.38 3.64 -0.47 9.30
0.30 0.13 0.28 0.09 0.79
321 Textiles 7.77 -3.39 1.70 2.96 4.19
0.94 0.82 0.15 0.67 0.56
381 Metal products 8.66 13.48 5.56 0.52 6.31
0.78 0.87 0.48 0.09 0.35
355 Rubber 2.35 -4.43 13.79 6.06 5.06
0.71 0.51 0.92 0.72 0.52
361-62-69 Non-metallic mineral products 5.09 -5.36 4.10 3.90 -9.43
0.43 0.62 0.51 0.57 0.69
C apita l an d /or hum an 1.65 - 1.02 3.05 1.54 3.68
cap ita l-in ten sive ind ustries 0.68 0.24 0.68 0.20 0.81
313 Beverages 3.82 3.08 1.27 2.24 1.00
0.94 0.43 0.09 0.16 0.03
314 Tobacco -7.11 25.35 6.85 3.11 1.35
0.42 0.77 0.54 0.15 0.06
341 Paper and paper products 7.60 6.39 -2.95 4.29 3.38
0.72 0.90 0.14 0.57 0.81
384 Transport equipment -12.99 -5.98 11.78 5.12 28.02
0.80 0.95 0.97 0.35 0.92
311-312 Food products 5.78 -7.05 0.65 - 1.66 1.43
0.81 0.76 0.11 0.09 0.25
371-372 Basic metal products 8.44 -10.01 16.76 6.80 7.63
0.82 0.85 0.90 0.56 0.80
351-352 Chemical products 5.68 0.80 3.35 4.90 -4.61
0.70 0.06 0.06 0.72 0.56
382-383 Mechanical & electrical 1.19 1.91 2.69 3.11 5.92
Machinery 0.13 0.24 0.20 0.65 0.53
342 Printing -4.34 -1.65 0.59 -3.80 13.38
0.20 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.75
300 Private manufacturing 2.54 -0.42 3.46 1.30 3.64
0.98 0.10 0.09 0.25 0.90
Notes: growth rates are the least squares estimates o f  trend growth. Sources: as Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
textiles and manufacturing as a whole was very low by 1970. Research 
conducted by UNIDO (1979), found that labour productivity in Venezuelan
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textiles grew by 4 per cent per year over the 1968-74 period compared to 
5.4 per cent in Equator, 6.4 per cent in Zambia and 13.6 per cent in South 
Korea for the same years. In accordance with the discussion on 
productivity outlined in the first chapter, the low labour productivity in 
textiles relates to the limits imposed by the small market size on the 
expansion of production and to the structural overvaluation of the domestic 
currency. This helps to explain the lack of competitiveness of Venezuelan 
manufacturing goods even before the 1970’s oil booms.
Through 1974-77, despite the slackening trend in textiles’ real value added, 
employment grew at higher rates in 1973-76 than in 1968-71, with a 
maximum of 19 per cent growth in 1974. The dynamic behaviour o f this 
variable may be linked to the fact that textiles’ real value added increased 
during 1973-75 as compared to 1968-71 and to the rising number of 
industrial establishments during 1974-76, especially in small and medium- 
scale industries, already referred to. The increase in the number o f firms 
was the result of substantial amounts of public credit granted to textiles 
during 1973-76. The number of textile enterprises with a declared capital 
of less than Bs5 m. rose from 27 in 1964-68 to 38 in 1974-79, while the 
increase in the other groups was insignificant.14 The availability of public 
credit may have allowed for the rise in the number of firms and 
employment without a corresponding expansion of real value added due to 
the inefficient allocation of resources.
It should be noted that labour productivity in this sector grew at high but 
declining rates between 1969 and 1971. During the post-boom phase 
(1983-88), despite the considerable expansion of textiles over these years, 
no substantial improvement in labour productivity took place. Figure 7.4 
shows the unstable trend in this variable during the whole of 1983-94.
14 Source: Arrieta (1981).
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7.5 Final remarks
The major conclusions drawn from this chapter are as follows:
(a) Factor-intensity does not seem to be an important factor behind the 
differences observed in the performance of the manufacturing lines during 
the 1970s. There were lines within both groups which benefitted from the 
boom in the short-term while others in both groups showed a disappointing 
performance over 1974-77.
(b) The analysis o f the sources of growth from the demand side suggests 
that the disruptive effect of real appreciation through import-competition 
was an all-embracing phenomenon during 1973-77. However, almost all o f 
the lines were able to grow out of the greater home demand. The 
exceptions were those lines, such as textiles, which were not able to stand 
external competition.
(c) The analysis of the sources of growth on the supply side suggests that a 
relevant factor in explaining the different performance across the 
manufacturing lines relates to the trends in labour productivity growth 
rather than to their factor intensities. Although a severe decline in labour 
productivity growth took place in almost all the manufacturing branches, 
those labour-intensive lines and capital-intensive lines which experienced 
the milder decline in labour productivity, performed better during 1974-77 
compared to 1968-71.
(d) The pattern of growth and structural change within the Venezuelan 
manufacturing sector during 1973-82 shows some similarities with the 
trends during 1950-72. The economic policies pursued during 1973-77 
reinforced the weaknesses exhibited by industrialisation during 1950-72. 
In particular, heavy import dependence on capital and intermediate goods 
was encouraged and despite some expansion of chemicals the progress of
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the mechanical branches and especially those branches producing capital 
goods was disappointing. This had negative consequences for industrial 
inter-linkages, efficiency, the capacity to export and external balances and 
in general for the long-term feasibility of the economic model.
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8. Conclusions
This dissertation has examined Dutch disease and its mechanisms of 
transmission in Venezuela, as well as the extent to which the problems faced 
by private manufacturing reflected the disease during the 1970s oil booms. 
An attempt was made to quantify Dutch disease and the impact of the policy 
response on industrialisation. Likewise, an exhaustive analysis o f Venezuelan 
private manufacturing, as a whole and at a dissaggregated level, was made by 
examining the sectoral process and estimating the demand and supply side 
sources o f growth during 1968-94. Attention was drawn to two features of 
Venezuelan industrialisation namely, the lack of exports and inefficiency. 
Despite our focus on the 1973-82 years, we also referred extensively to the 
pre-boom and post-boom phases in order to compare developments in the 
three phases, especially because Venezuela has been an oil exporting country 
since 1930.
In assessing the above issues we compiled, organised and processed long time 
series of important economic variables, some of which were not previously 
available. The findings o f this thesis contribute to the illumination of 
important aspects o f the Venezuelan economy and industrialisation and the 
links with the oil sector. Some insights on the policy options open to an 
economy which needs to reverse Dutch disease symptoms are derived. Thus, 
the conclusions o f this thesis are of relevance in disentangling the problems 
related to Dutch disease and industrialisation in other similar economies.
In what follows the major findings of this dissertation are summarised and the 
chapter concludes with a section on why industrial policy may have made a 
difference for the impact of the 1970s oil booms on the Venezuelan economy. 
It was shown in chapter 2 that the effects of the boom on the real exchange 
rate are quite in line with the theoretical predictions of the standard Dutch 
disease model. A real appreciation took place during 1973-77 as a result of 
the spending effect promoted by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies
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(absorption). However, real appreciation was mild during 1973-77, with a 
major fall in this variable (real appreciation) during 1978-82. This came as a 
result of price inflation which followed the price liberalisation policy applied 
within the context of the adjustment programme that began in 1978. It was 
concluded that if  the 1973s oil price increase led to a boom phase in 
Venezuela, by contrast the second oil prices increase of 1979 did not lead to a 
boom due to the launching of deflationary policies in response to the 
deterioration of internal and external macroeconomic balances, especially 
balance of payments deficits. The real appreciation of the domestic currency 
during 1978-82 was not the result of Dutch disease since domestic demand 
contracted, but it was the result of the price and trade liberalisation policy 
which implied that the prices o f non-tradables increased more than those of 
tradables. Finally, the higher real wages during 1978-82 were caused by the 
institutional settings of wages and not by greater home demand.
Chapter 3 showed that formal estimates of a Dutch disease index indicate the 
existence of severe Dutch disease symptoms in Venezuela before the 1970s 
oil booms, in the sense that the actual shares of agriculture and manufacturing 
in non-oil GDP fell under the Chenery-Syrquin (1975) norms. The inability to 
export manufacturing goods seems to be related to the Dutch disease which 
led to the structural overvaluation of the domestic currency. Nevertheless, as 
regards the 1973-82 phase, although the Dutch disease index worsened for 
agriculture, this was not the case for manufacturing. Likewise, the findings of 
this chapter suggest that the mechanisms of transmission predicted by the 
Dutch disease theory, namely, real appreciation or falling relative prices, 
increasing real wages and rising interest rates, do not seem to have been of 
relevance in explaining de-agriculturalisation or the problems of 
industrialisation in Venezuela during 1973-82. Consideration of the trends in 
the sectoral relative prices and the econometric estimates suggest that Dutch 
disease in agriculture during 1973-82 was not the result of real appreciation 
because there seems to have been a short-term positive association between
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real appreciation and output for agriculture and manufacturing. At the same 
time, agriculture showed a favourable trend in relative prices compared to 
services and manufacturing during 1973-82. An interesting point is that 
private investment in agriculture increased at higher growth rates than in 
manufacturing. Concerning the development in real and/or product wages, the 
upward trend in manufacturing was mild and the real interest rates were low 
as a part of an easy credit policy. It must be noted that the relative share of 
agriculture and manufacturing in total private investment declined during 
1973-77, but this does not seem to be explained by the movement in relative 
prices.
By contrast, Dutch disease as a long-term phenomenon seems to be confirmed 
by the econometric work, which may give support to the idea that real 
overvaluation sets obstacles to manufacturing development in the long term.
The evidence gave strong support to the hypothesis that the performance of 
the traded sector, and especially private manufacturing, in Venezuela was 
largely accounted for by the government policies during 1973-82. This was 
the topic o f the next chapter.
Chapter 4 addressed the policy response to the boom through the 
consideration and the econometric analysis o f the fiscal, financing, investment 
and exchange rate policies with special reference to dissaggregated private 
manufacturing. It was shown that these policies were far from being efficient 
in the sense that: i) the high investment in both tradables and non-tradables 
did not guarantee long-term growth; ii) some of the less productive lines 
benefited the most from credits; and, iii) the implementation of resource-based 
industrialisation was inefficient. Venezuelan manufacturing as a whole and 
all the 18 lines showed a positive response to expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies. Concerning the role of exchange rate policies, a disruptive 
impact o f real appreciation on output is confirmed in the long term for almost
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all the branches, but not in the short-term with the exceptions of textiles and 
food which proved to be very positively responsive to real devaluation. Thus, 
the problems of Venezuelan industrialisation during 1973-77 were not linked 
to real appreciation. The disruptive effect of real appreciation on Venezuelan 
industrialisation must be understood in light that this set the obstacles for the 
development of an export-competitive sector. Finally, the econometric 
estimates for the investment equation suggest that private manufacturing is 
greatly responsive to domestic demand and public infrastructure investment. 
This is o f relevance because the adjustment programmes recommend 
deflationary policies.
Chapter 5 assessed the performance of Venezuelan private manufacturing 
during 1960-94. A major conclusion of this chapter is that the manufacturing 
sector benefited from the domestic distribution of oil income during 1940-72. 
This occurred through the creation of the home market, low income taxation, 
high public investment and real overvaluation via cheap imported capital and 
intermediate goods. Nevertheless, Venezuelan manufacturing showed several 
weaknesses, notably its inefficient nature and the virtual lack of an export- 
competitive sector. These were features of Venezuelan manufacturing during 
1950-72. The evidence suggests that the structural real overvaluation of the 
domestic currency was conducive to import substitution industrialisation 
during the 1950s and the mid-1960s, but once the domestic market set limits 
to industrialisation, the real overvaluation became an obstacle to export and 
industrial development. We can associate the presence of Dutch disease in 
Venezuela with the virtual lack of an export-competitive manufacturing 
sector. In this sense, the accrual of oil revenues during 1973-77 contributed to 
defering the need to adopt a coherent industrial policy that may have 
promoted the development of an export-competitive manufacturing sector, 
thus laying the basis for a more sustainable and less vulnerable economic 
model. Thus, the weaknesses of the industrial process were reinforced during 
1973-82 due to the lack of a coherent industrial policy, with the result that the
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growth during 1973-77 implied severe external and internal balances, which 
by 1978 forced the government to launch deflationary policies, leading to 
recession in the non-oil economy. Therefore although private manufacturing 
exhibited some investment effort during 1973-77, this was not able to sustain 
output growth once oil revenues fell.
Through 1983-88 several adjustment programmes were applied including a 
major real devaluation. Nevertheless, despite the vulnerability of the 
economy to falling oil revenues no effort was made to apply a coherent 
industrial policy that could have deepened import substitution and encouraged 
exports. It must be noted that the scanty progress of manufacturing exports 
following the sharp fall in oil revenues and the disappearence o f the structural 
real overvaluation during 1983-88 and even in the early 1990s suggests that, 
concerning the lack of manufacturing exports, Dutch disease was not reversed 
in the post-boom phase despite real devaluation. This must be a warning 
against the adequacy of the adjustment programmes recommended by the 
‘Washington consensus’, which only rely on devaluation, financial 
liberalisation and labour market reforms to reverse Dutch disease, especially 
in Venezuela. Indeed some evidence suggests that the Dutch disease effect, 
understood as a fall in the relative share of agriculture and manufacturing in 
non-oil GDP, have been the outcome of the neo-liberal policies launched in 
the 1990s. This suggests that the problems of Venezuelan industrialisation 
were not exclusively linked to the accrual and domestic distribution of oil 
revenues or the real appreciation of the domestic currency as the Dutch 
disease and the resource curse thesis predict, but to the inefficient economic 
policies launched.
Chapter 6 showed that according to the estimates of the sources of 
manufacturing growth on the demand side, the contribution o f import 
substitution and exports to manufacturing growth were negative during 1973- 
77. However, the sector benefited from the greater home demand, which was
268
the only source of manufacturing growth during 1973-77. The 1973 oil boom 
seems to have disrupted manufacturing through import competition and fall in 
the already insignificant level o f exports via real appreciation and home 
demand. Manufacturing growth during 1973-77 is explained by the positive 
impact o f greater domestic demand and of the short-term effect of real 
appreciation.
The estimate of the supply side sources of growth suggests that the 1973-77 
years were characterised by a sharp decline in labour productivity and TFPG 
in Venezuela’s private manufacturing sector. It must be noted that the low 
productivity was a feature of Venezuelan industrialisation during the 1960s. 
This development seems to be associated to the lack of an external market, 
which added to the unequal income distribution and implied that sectoral 
production was inefficient because the productive capacity could not be 
expanded more due to the reduced market in spite o f the significant oil 
revenues. This led to low labour productivity growth. During 1973-77, the 
non-adoption of coherent industrial policies which could have promoted 
exports implied that this problem was reinforced. In addition, the rapid 
domestic distribution of oil revenues seems to have exceeded the capital 
absorptive capacity of the economy defined as the availability of skilled 
labour and management capacities. This may be a factor to consider when 
explaining the sharp fall which occurred in labour productivity during 1973- 
77.
Chapter 7 presented the dissaggregated performance of Venezuelan 
industrialisation during 1968-94. Attention was drawn to the factor intensities 
of the different lines. The major finding of this chapter is that an important 
factor behind the performance across manufacturing seems to have been the 
trend in labour productivity growth, while factor intensity does not seem to 
have played a key role. Those lines which performed better in terms of output 
growth were the same that experienced the less severe decline in labour
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productivity growth. The exercise for identifying the demand side sources of 
growth confirms that, apart from textiles, all the branches were able to benefit 
from the greater home demand in the short-term, but experienced a reverse in 
import-substitution and export growth. An interesting finding o f this chapter 
is that some of the lines which experienced poorer performance during 1973- 
77, such as textiles and food, were those that benefited the most from the 
credit granted by the state. This points to the efficiency in the implementation 
of policies.
Finally, the hypothesis regarding the weakness of the industrialisation process, 
such as the lack of diversification and dependence upon imported capital and 
intermediate goods were reinforced during 1973-82, was confirmed.
The Role of an industrial strategy to reverse Dutch disease in Venezuela
One of the findings of this dissertation is that the performance o f Venezuelan 
industrialisation during 1973-82 is not entirely explained by the Dutch disease 
and resource curse theses. The evidence presented in this dissertation 
suggests that the impact o f the 1970s oil booms on Venezuelan 
industrialisation was not the outcome of the automatic price adjustment 
mechanism predicted by the Dutch disease model or it was not exclusively the 
result o f the structural overvaluation of the domestic currency as suggested by 
the resource curse thesis. It must also be noted that the findings o f this 
dissertation do not give support to the argument according to which import 
liberalisation and devaluationist policies on their own can be the answer to the 
problems of industrialisation in oil-exporting countries or the cure to Dutch 
disease. By contrast, one of our main conclusions is that the impact o f the 
1970s oil booms on Venezuelan private manufacturing is largely related to the 
policy response at the macro and micro levels, and especially to the lack of an 
adequate industrial strategy. As shown in chapter 4, the structural 
overvaluation of the domestic currency in Venezuela was functional to some
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extent to manufacturing development under import substitution during 1936- 
and the middle 1960s. Nevertheless, evidence was shown that by the middle 
1960s the small size of the domestic market was setting obstacles to further 
industrial development. In this context real overvaluation exerted a negative 
impact of manufacturing by contributing to delay the adoption of export 
promotion policies and in general, of a more sound industrial strategy. In our 
view, if  there has been conditions by the late 1960s to adopt a coherent 
economy and industrial strategy, the Venezuelan economy has not gone into a 
crisis by 1978. Nevertheless, we have doubts about the feasibility o f this 
possibility given the fact that this would have required some sterilisation of 
the oil revenues and the setting of a competitive real exchange rate as one of 
the multiple factors required for the launching of a successful 
industrialisation. These measures, of course, lacked popularity because these 
would have implied that oil revenues were not transferred to the private 
sector, or to the main beneficiaries of the domestic distribution of oil revenues 
until the 1960s. As a result the oil revenues were used partly to invest in 
import substitution industries, in public-owned resource-based manufacturing, 
in consumption and no less importantly, in financing the ‘outflow of capital’ 
of the private sector during 1973-82. This, in our view, meant the 
privatisation of the oil revenues that favoured capital, which transferred these 
revenues to their external accounts.
In what follows, we want to outline some ideas on the types of economic 
policies open to developing oil-exporting countries not only during a boom, 
but during a post-boom phase and in a longer-term perspective.
The findings on the impact of oil revenues on Venezuelan industrialisation 
during the 1970s and during 1960-94 suggest that a considerable effort needs 
to be made to promote private manufacturing. The availability of substantial 
oil revenues until 1982 did not lead to a sustainable path o f growth or 
industrialisation. This, in our view, is essentially related to the lack of 
coherent industrial and macroeconomic policies, which could have set the 
basis for emergence of a non-oil export competitive manufacturing or
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agricultural sector. As shown, by 1970, unlike other Latin American 
countries, Venezuela virtually lacked an export-competitive private 
manufacturing sector and no export promotion effort which addressed the 
private sector has been launched. This, in our view, is partly linked to the 
nature of the economic model that prevailed until the early 1980s, which 
relied upon the domestic distribution of substantial oil revenues (defined as an 
income which is not the result o f the domestic productive effort). Within this 
model the structural overvaluation of the domestic currency was one of the 
main mechanisms of distribution of oil revenues. Real overvaluation was 
beneficial not only to capital but to workers through the availability of cheap 
imported consumer goods. This in our view, is an important factor in 
explaining the non-existence of manufacturing exports in Venezuela. In this 
sense the warning of the resource curse thesis on real appreciation of the 
domestic currency seems to be correct. However, we disagree with Auty on 
the central role given by the author to devaluation policies in order to promote 
exports. As it has been shown by several studies of successful cases of 
industrialisation (e.g. East Asia) exchange rate policies did not play a major 
role in increasing manufacturing exports.1 In the face of serious production 
inefficiencies resulting from the lack of appropriate industrial policies, the 
pursue of a sound exchange rate policy on its own would not be sufficient to 
promote exports
As Lall (1991, 1993) argues the causes of successful industrialisation cannot 
be associated to only one factor, but it has to do with a combination of 
multiple factors which interact with each other in several ways. To explain 
successful industrialisation in terms of one factor such as outward orientation 
or the existence of free market is a mistake which could lead to misunderstand 
the reality and drawing inadequate policies. For Lall the adoption of neo­
liberal and the strong incentives-based policies has led to the lack of attention 
to the importance of capabilities and institutional factors and to overlook the
1 Amsden ob. cit; Chang ob. cit.
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role of the state given the market failures in developing capabilities, both 
functionally and selectively.
Lall argues that an industrial strategy depends on the interplay of several 
factors, namely, incentives, capabilities and institutions, at the micro or firm 
level and at the national level.
By referring to the to the micro or firm level, Lall insists on the fact that 
efficiency at a firm level requires capabilities, that is to say, specific 
knowledge and skills to technology and organisation on the part o f the firms. 
(Lall, 1990, p. 123-124). When industries are setting up, the necessary 
capabilities do not exist within the firm. Thus if  these capabilities are not 
offered by the market they need to be generated by the firm itself, but this is 
not an easy task. The efficiency at a firm level relates to its ability 
economically mobilise external capabilities, to integrate them into its 
organisation, and to produce its own set of technological, managerial and 
other capabilities.
Capabilities can be classified as follows: entrepreneurial, managerial, and 
technological. Likewise, Lall (1987) presents a functional classification of 
technological capabilities required to setting up and operating an enterprise. 
The functions of technological capabilities relate to three general sets o f 
activities: investment, production and linkages.
Investment capabilities are defined as the skills needed to identify, prepare, 
obtain technology for design, construct equip, staff, and commission a new 
facility (or expansion) (Lall 126). Production capabilities refers to basic skills 
like quality control, operation and maintenance, adaptation, improvement or 
equipment stretching, research, design and innovation. Linkage capabilities 
are the skills required to transmit information, skills and technologies to and 
receive them from, component or raw material suppliers, sub-contrators, 
consultants, service firms, and technology institutions.
According to Lall a firm must master those technical functions that are 
essential to its efficient performance, while other capabilities can be bought
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from other agents. The author, though, warns about the fact that the excessive 
reliance upon other agents for innovations can inhibit technological progress 
The acquisition of firm level capabilities involves the interaction of diverse 
factors which are internal and external to the firm namely, incentives, 
investment and external support. Incentives for undertaking the building of 
capabilities relates to the need to compete in product markets, to adapt to local 
circumstances and meet official regulations. The most important incentives in 
the long term relate to competition and movement in the technological frontier 
(see Katz, 1987 and Lall, 1987). Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the 
argument for competition, especially in the international market, must be 
qualified in the sense that this is bound to exert some positive effects on 
learning and innovation, but it can become a negative factor when applied 
without criteria. For instance, it is argued that given the difficulties such as 
the higher cost-lower quality that are common to the process of developing 
new capabilities, a radical exposure to competition from mature firms can 
destroy a new entrant. This is a relevant aspect because in much of the theory, 
the learning period of building up capabilities is brief, costless, foreseeable 
and quite similar across different activities. This analysis has led to the policy 
prescriptions according to which the level of protection in developing 
countries should be low because the range of capabilities to be acquired is 
small, brief because the process is short and predictable and uniform across all 
industries by assumption the process of maturity is the same in all 
technologies (Lall, 1991, p. 128, 129).
The experience of many Developing countries suggests that the process of 
acquisition of capabilities is much more complex than that suggested by the 
orthodox approach. This process depends on an additional effort from the 
firm and on the interaction between and coordination with a host of other 
economic agents. It does not only relate to static efficiency (i.e., best practice 
level of operation), but it also refers to dynamic efficiency in the sense that it
2 Scholars who have assessed the topic of industrial capabilities are Lall, 1987; Pack and Wesphal,
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is a must to broaden and deepen the original capabilities. Furthermore, the 
maturing process differs according to the technology because there are 
differences in the levels and complexity involved.
Furthermore, it seems that protection must vary according to industry and 
country and even more importantly, protection is not sufficient to achieve 
maturity. It can be said that intervention is required and that protection may 
be one element o f the intervention package. This will also consider some 
competitive inducements to capability acquisition and the development of 
external support.
It is obvious that for Venezuela, which has a private manufacturing sector in 
its early stage of development, the need of a sound and coherent industrial 
policy is a must and the policies suggested by Lall must be taken into 
consideration when designing an industrial strategy. Special attention should 
be drawn to the fact that the building up of capabilities in manufacturing 
requires the creation of externalities and the providing of some degree of 
selective protection to the manufacturing enterprises. The launching of 
policies that provides protection to help firms to bear their initial costs before 
they became mature appears as a must. We want to emphasise this point 
because the pursue of liberal policies in Venezuela from 1989 which implied 
radical import liberalisation proved to be disastrous leading to de­
industrialisation.
During the 1970s oil booms, no effort was made to redirect the industrial 
strategy and thus the rapid domestic distribution of oil revenues entailed the 
old import substitution strategy and inefficiencies.
It seems that although infrastructural spending was positively related to 
private manufacturing, this is not sufficient to guarantee long-term growth. 
Likewise, although a short-term positive effect of real appreciation on private 
investment manufacturing via the low cost of imported capital is found, this
1986).
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effect is reversed in the longer term. It must be noted that the relative share of 
manufacturing in non-oil private investment fell below that of services during 
1968-77 and there is not evidence that this trend was reversed during 1988-94.
Here it is argued that the excessive and indiscriminate protection of the 
domestic industries brought about negative effects, but the alternative cannot 
be a non-interventionist free-trade policy. An adequate strategy for Venezuela 
may be to implement a new industrial strategy that fosters the acquisition of 
technical and organisational skills and combines import substitution and 
export promotion. In our view, a suitable strategy for Venezuela at present 
and within the context of falling oil revenues may be to redirect efforts to 
encourage non-oil exports within a medium and long-term perspective. In the 
meantime, oil and iron exports must provide the foreign currency necessary 
for the acquisition of imports and to deal with the severe social problems. 
Likewise, the strong dependence of Venezuelan manufacturing on imported 
capital and intermediate goods calls for the need to deepen import substitution 
industrialisation in these branches. Likewise, manufacturing lines with 
proven potential for export, such as chemicals, must be encouraged. In sum, 
an adequate industrial strategy should point to a set of industries and provide 
incentives to import and export conditional on productivity improvement. 
This strategy necessarily must be accompanied by careful technological, 
human resource and infrastructural policies. An option open to Venezuela is 
also represented by the export-promotion of some agricultural sectors.
In sum, our estimates suggest that private investment in manufacturing is 
responsive to domestic demand and infrastructural public spending in the 
short and long term. Nevertheless, despite the fact that these two factors 
exerted some positive impact on private manufacturing during 1973-77, this 
investment was not able to drive sustainable growth and by 1979 once the 
home demand and public spending declined, private manufacturing 
investment collapsed together with the non-oil economy. This seems to
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indicate that in order to revive private manufacturing in Venezuela radical 
changes in the economic and industrial strategy must be made. This is the 
immediate task in Venezuela, an economy which seems to resist making a 
shift from being a mono-export economy to a more diversified one even in the 
1990s.
We do not claim that we have provided a complete answer to the problems of 
Venezuelan private industrialisation, but in our view, some key aspects of this 
problem have been raised. Finally, it must be noted that one of the 
contributions of this dissertation is itself the highlighting of specific issues, 
which may be worth further research such as the role o f technology policies, 
the role of trade and human resource policies in the setting of an adequate 
industrial strategy for Venezuela, as well as a more detailed analysis of the 
determinants of private investment.
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Methodological Appendix
Chapter 2: Estimates of the indices of the real exchange rate1
1. The formula for the index of the real effective exchange rate for imports 
is as follows:
MW REr =  £  (REr • MWb)
l=\
where:
NErm 
REr = --------
RPIm
M  Bi
M W bi = ^  r 
2a M  Bi
j =1
NErBi = index of the exchange rate between the currency o f country B 
(under analysis) and that of country i; e.g. prices of one unit of currency i in 
terms of currency B, or number of units o f the currency of country B per 
US dollar, number of units of currency of country i in terms of liras.
RPIBi = index o f the ratio of the price index of country B to the price index 
of country i.
RErBj = index of the exchange rate between the currency of country B and 
that o f country i, divided by the index of the relative price between country 
B and i.
MBi- = imports of country B from country i.
1 This procedure was followed by ECLA (1982).
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£ m ,  = total imports of country B.
7=1
n = main trade partners for imports in country B.
m = total number o f countries from which country B imports
2. The formula for the index of effective real exchange rate for exports is as 
follows:
EWREr = t  (RErei ■ XWa)
/=1
in which
REr _ NErm 
RPlBi
X W b, = ^ -
1.x a
7=1
where: NErBi and RPIBi, correspond exactly with the definitions given in 1.
XBi = the exports of country B to country i.
m
TjX bj = total exports of country B.
7=1
n = trade partners for exports
m = total number of countries to which country B exports.
3. The formula for the trade-weighted index is as follows:
TWREr = MWREr ■ M  + ----—----
(M + X )
4. In order to obtain the series of the nominal exchange rate (NEr) the 
supplement on exchange rates of the IMF was used. In this way, it was 
possible to estimate exchange rates between the currency of the country 
under analysis and the currency of the other countries.
5. The price indices used were the consumer price index and the wholesale 
price index. In this way, different indices of the real exchange rates were 
estimated (see Table 2.a). The source of data was the IMF International 
Financial Statistics.
6. The weightings used to estimate the real effective exchange rate indices 
for exports and imports are the average share of the countries in question in 
the exports or imports o f the country under analysis (Venezuela), in every 
year (see Tables 2.e and 2.f).
7. The base year is 1980 = 100.
8. Series of the MWRER and XWRER were estimated using different 
weights, e.g. varying them every year, and with two weights, 1958 and 
1975.
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Table 2.a Measures o f the exchange rate, Venezuela, (1980 = 100)
Year (1) NEr (2) R E r (3) VM W REr (4) FM W REr (5) VXW REr (6)FXW REr (7) R Er (8)VM W REr (9)FM W REr
1968 104.83 93.90 90.78 111.74 92.31 102.23 108.21 104.62 105.47
1969 104.82 95.30 90.34 111.74 89.92 102.72 111.37 105.57 108.47
1970 104.79 96.44 91.28 111.74 96.53 104.82 114.99 108.85 113.19
1971 104.85 96.42 81.62 111.74 100.13 106.54 115.88 98.10 115.35
1972 102.50 95.75 94.99 106.83 100.85 94.07 115.09 114.18 116.33
1973 100.28 101.74 95.71 103.75 95.61 99.85 119.10 112.05 121.77
1974 99.83 111.09 108.16 113.72 112.62 109.81 120.10 116.93 123.26
1975 99.83 110.14 106.51 106.83 111.89 109.92 115.12 111.33 111.66
1976 99.94 107.31 100.09 102.52 105.51 106.66 111.74 104.21 106.75
1977 100.00 105.63 99.07 102.11 110.37 104.98 105.33 98.80 101.82
1978 100.00 106.35 115.51 106.04 106.90 106.83 105.79 114.90 105.48
1979 100.00 106.49 104.17 106.81 108.47 106.90 107.54 105.21 107.87
1980 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1981 100.00 94.02 88.80 88.61 87.64 91.94 94.79 89.53 89.34
1982 100.00 87.46 78.63 80.26 85.87 85.34 89.10 80.11 81.78
1983 100.12 83.39 74.19 75.58 79.85 80.58 83.97 74.71 76.11
1984 163.48 124.31 109.50 110.43 122.79 118.77 119.68 105.42 106.31
1985 186.78 118.74 99.98 105.38 95.48 855.19 110.42 94.70 97.99
1986 210.08 111.37 - - 64.07 - 99.19 - -
1987 233.37 205.13 - - 150.97 - 132.69 - -
1988 256.67 213.36 - - 129.62 - 114.52 - -
1989 279.97 535.41 - - 355.23 - 142.88 - -
1990 303.26 750.00 - - - - 153.70 - -
1991 326.56 909.51 - - - - 142.88 - -
N otes: A fall in each real exchange rate means an appreciation o f  the domestic currency. (1) N er =  nominal exchange rate (Bs/$);
(2) R E r = bilateral real exchange rate defined as the nominal exchange rate index divided by the relative price index = the 
V enezuelan consum er price index (CPI) divided by the U. S. wholesale price index (W PI); (3) V M W REr =  real exchange indices 
ER/dCPI/fW PI) vis a  vis the main trading partners m ultiplied by the annual imports weights; (4) FM W RE =  fixed im port-w eighted 
real exchange rate. As in 3 with 1958 and 1975 imports weights; correlation coefficient between (3) and (4) is 0.81; (5) V XW REr = 
varying export-weighted real exchange rate. As in (2) exports weights; (6) FX W REr =  export weighted real exchange rate. As in 5 
w ith 1958 and 1975 export weights, (7) REr = bilateral real exchange rate defined as the nominal exchange rate index divided by the 
relative price index w hich is defined as the domestic wholesale price index (dW PI) divided by the U.S. wholesale price index (W PI); 
(8) V M W REr =  varying im port-w eighed real exchange rate. This is defined as the real exchange indices (REr/dW PI/fW PI) vis a vis 
the main trading partners m ultiplied by the annual im port weights; (9) FM W REr = im port weighted real exchange rate. As in (7) 
with 1958 and 1975 im port weights, correlation coefficient between (8) and (9) is 0.88. Sources: International M onetary Fund, 
Supplem ents o f  Exchange Rates and Prices, (various issues). International Financial Statistics; trade and im port weights: D irection o f  
Trade, IM F (various issues)
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Table 2.b Nominal exchange rates, Venezuela
Venezuelan bolivares per:
Annual USA Canada Japan Germany Spain France Italy Unit.Kmgdom Nether. Antilles
Average dollar dollar yen mark peseta franc lira p.sterling guilder
1968 4.500 1.078 360.550 3.992 69.682 4.951 623.400 0.418 1.879
1969 4.500 1.077 358.370 3.925 69.851 5.199 627.320 0.418 1.888
1970 4.498 1.044 358.070 3.647 69.700 5.528 627.200 0.417 1.874
1971 4.501 1.010 347.860 3.482 69.230 5.512 618.400 0.409 1.800
1972 4.400 0.990 303.170 3.189 64.270 5.050 583.200 0.400 1.800
1973 4.305 1.000 271.700 2.673 58.260 4.458 583.000 0.408 1.800
1974 4.285 0.978 292.080 2.588 57.690 4.814 650.300 0.428 1.800
1975 4.285 1.017 296.790 2.460 57.410 4.286 652.800 0.452 1.800
1976 4.290 0.986 296.550 2.518 66.900 4.779 832.300 0.557 1.800
1977 4.293 1.064 268.510 2.322 75.960 4.914 882.400 0.573 1.800
1978 4.293 1.141 210.440 2.009 76.670 4.513 848.700 0.522 1.800
1979 4.293 1.171 219.140 1.833 67.130 4.254 830.900 0.472 1.800
1980 4.293 1.169 226.740 1.818 71.700 4.226 856.400 0.430 1.800
1981 4.293 1.199 220.540 2.260 92.320 5.435 1136.800 0.498 1.800
1982 4.293 1.234 249.080 2.427 109.860 6.572 1352.500 0.572 1.800
1983 4.298 1.232 237.510 2.553 143.430 7.621 1518.800 0.660 1.800
1984 7.018 1.295 237.520 2.846 160.760 8.739 1757.000 0.752 1.800
1985 7.500 1.366 238.540 2.944 170.400 8.985 1909.400 0.771 1.800
1986 8.083 1.390 168.520 2.172 140.050 6.926 1490.800 0.682 1.800
1987 14.500 1.326 144.640 1.797 123.480 6.011 1296.100 0.610 1.800
1988 14.500 1.231 128.150 1.756 116.490 5.957 1301,600 0.561 1.800
1989 34.681 1.184 137.960 1.880 118.380 6.380 1372.100 0.610 1.790
1990 46.900 1.167 144.790 1.616 101.930 5.445 1198.100 0.560 1.790
1991 56.816 1.146 134.710 1.660 103.910 5.642 1240.600 0.565 1.790
Source : IMF, supplement o f  exchange rates and prices.
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Table 2.c Nominal exchange rate indexes, Venezuela
Annual
Averages
US
dollar
Canadian
dollar
Japanese
yen
Deutch
Mark
Spanish
Peseta
French
franc
Italian
lira
Pound
sterling
Netherland
Antilles
guilder
1958 78.04 94.01 49.18 33.84 124.63 78.36 106.99 94.36 74.81
1959 78.04 95.13 49.16 33.94 111.63 67.24 107.60 94.32 74.98
1960 78.03 94.08 49.16 34.01 93.07 67.24 107.63 94.28 75.04
1961 78.04 90.06 48.99 35.30 93.13 67.23 107.60 94.10 74.85
1962 78.04 85.37 49.04 35.48 93.42 67.29 107.65 94.28 74.91
1963 78.04 84.60 48.95 35.58 93.44 67.41 107.51 94.03 74.91
1964 104.86 113.67 65.68 47.95 125.57 90.42 143.80 126.00 100.88
1965 104.83 113.70 65.75 47.71 125.49 90.38 143.66 126.13 100.31
1966 104.83 113.77 65.60 47.65 125.42 90.77 143.76 126.00 100.21
1967 104.84 113.63 65.64 47.80 123.07 90.04 143.85 123.68 100.75
1968 104.83 113.75 65.93 47.73 107.87 89.47 144.01 107.98 100.42
1969 104.82 113.82 66.32 48.54 107.60 85.20 143.10 107.82 99.94
1970 104.79 117.34 66.36 52.24 107.80 80.11 143.09 108.04 100.66
1971 104.85 121.40 68.34 54.73 108.59 80.38 145.20 110.25 104.85
1972 102.50 121.07 76.66 58.43 114.35 85.78 150.52 110.16 102.50
1973 100.28 117.24 83.69 68.20 123.41 95.06 147.31 105.72 100.28
1974 99.83 119.34 77.49 70.12 124.07 87.62 131.46 100.42 99.83
1975 99.83 114.74 76.26 73.75 124.67 98.41 130.96 95.02 99.83
1976 99.94 118.51 76.41 72.14 107.11 88.37 102.83 77.27 99.94
1977 100.00 109.94 84.44 78.27 94.39 86.00 97.05 75.06 100.00
1978 100.00 102.50 107.75 90.50 93.52 93.63 100.91 82.51 100.00
1979 100.00 99.81 103.47 99.17 106.81 99.32 103.07 91.13 100.00
1980 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1981 100.00 97.52 102.81 80.43 77.66 77.75 75.33 86.47 100.00
1982 100.00 94.77 91.03 74.91 65.26 64.30 63.32 75.17 100.00
1983 100.12 94.98 95.58 71.27 50.05 55.51 56.45 65.30 100.12
1984 163.48 147.59 156.06 104.42 72.91 79.05 79.69 93.57 163.48
1985 186.78 149.61 - 107.88 73.52 82.17 78.37 97.46 174.72
1986 210.08 158.46 - 157.63 96.41 114.89 108.18 118.87 188.31
1987 233.37 297.85 - 341.61 196.15 237.48 223.20 238.22 337.80
1988 256.67 320.92 - 349.63 207.92 239.62 222.26 258.93 337.80
1989 279.97 797.84 - 781.17 489.35 535.11 504.28 570.06 812.46
1990 303.26 1094.85 - 1229.20 768.56 847.87 780.99 839.07 1098.71
1991 326.56 1350.76 - 1449.79 913.32 991.31 913.70 1007.76 1331.01
Sources: as Table 2*.
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Table 2.d Relative prices: Venezuela CPI /main trade partners WPI (1980=100)
Year USA Canada Japan Germany Spain France Italy U.
Kingdom
Nether.
Antilles
1968 108.75 114.13 96.06 72.73 149.22 98.31 185.92 151.17 109.78
1969 107.06 112.39 97.99 72.85 143.72 96.59 183.82 147.29 108.53
1970 98.57 105.07 88.18 71.16 135.67 87.71 163.52 143.14 104.40
1971 89.86 95.65 72.55 67.94 124.34 73.54 125.80 125.51 94.80
1972 90.63 94.71 77.62 71.58 125.61 85.88 127.79 112.43 90.35
1973 93.13 96.97 79.57 74.26 119.43 86.17 111.26 104.14 92.45
1974 94.67 96.96 84.18 77.94 107.14 87.97 102.79 94.94 94.41
1975 94.02 95.12 92.60 82.58 98.58 90.31 101.59 92.60 93.54
1976 93.91 93.37 96.89 88.45 96.67 89.51 98.75 93.80 94.34
1977 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1978 106.36 105.30 114.43 107.64 100.38 104.54 99.52 105.87 103.42
1979 114.34 108.96 123.32 111.54 98.12 103.22 95.83 107.85 106.95
1980 120.06 111.91 134.10 116.84 91.30 98.83 92.86 108.77 110.54
1981 131.51 120.64 150.71 127.32 91.26 97.85 94.38 114.89 121.41
1982 147.14 130.96 169.92 138.69 94.19 104.81 97.95 121.28
1983 169.08 - - - - - - - -
1984 164.68 - - - - - - - -
1985 158.32 - - - - - - - -
1986 150.90 - - - - - - - -
1987 145.68 - - - - - - - -
1988 145.53 - - - - - - - -
1989 383.54 - - - - - - - -
1990 512.57 - - - - - - - -
1991 659.62 - - - - - - - -
Sources: IMF Supplement on Prices (various issues).
284
Table 2.e Venezuelan relative prices: domestic WPI/main trade partners WPI (1980=100)
year USA Canada Japan Germany Spain France Italy United
Kingdom
Netherlands
Antilles
1968 90.48 94.96 79.92 60.51 124.15 81.80 154.69 125.78 91.34
1969 89.06 93.49 81.52 60.61 119.56 80.36 152.92 122.53 90.29
1970 84.20 89.75 75.32 60.78 115.88 74.92 139.67 122.27 89.18
1971 83.12 88.47 67.10 62.84 115.01 68.03 116.36 116.09 87.69
1972 86.71 90.62 74.26 68.49 120.18 82.16 122.26 107.56 86.45
1973 89.44 93.13 76.42 71.32 114.71 82.76 106.86 100.01 88.79
1974 94.94 97.23 84.42 78.16 107.44 88.22 103.08 95.20 94.68
1975 94.53 95.63 93.09 83.02 99.11 90.80 102.13 93.09 94.04
1976 92.98 92.46 95.94 87.59 95.72 88.63 97.78 92.88 93.41
1977 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1978 105.49 104.44 113.50 106.76 99.56 103.69 98.71 105.01 102.58
1979 112.23 106.94 121.04 109.47 96.31 101.31 94.06 105.86 104.97
1980 119.22 111.14 133.17 116.03 90.66 98.15 92.22 108.01 109.77
1981 136.60 125.31 156.54 132.25 94.79 101.64 98.03 119.33 126.11
1982 158.24 140.84 182.73 149.15 101.29 112.72 105.34 130.43 #jDIV/0!
1983 120.11 111.96 134.16 116.89 91.34 98.88 92.91 108.81 110.59
1984 131.67 120.78 150.89 127.47 91.37 97.97 94.49 115.02 121.56
1985 147.26 131.06 170.06 138.81 94.26 104.90 98.03 121.38
Sources: IMF Supplement on Prices, (various issues).
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Table 2 .f  Import weights, Venezuela
Year
USA Canada Japan Germany Spain France Italy United
Kingdom
Netherlands
Antilles
Subtotal Others Total
68 50.4 4.6 5.7 8.6 1.3 2.8 5.2 6.5 1.0 80.8 19.2 100
69 49.3 4.5 6.0 9.4 1.3 3.2 4.6 5.4 0.6 78.5 21.5 100
70 48.5 4.2 6.9 8.9 1.6 3.0 4.9 5.1 0.3 77.0 23.0 100
71 38.3 5.9 7.9 8.5 1.9 3.9 4.7 4.3 0.1 68.2 31.8 100
72 42.9 6.9 7.5 10.3 2.2 3.9 5.8 4.9 0.0 77.8 22.2 100
73 42.0 2.9 8.6 13.1 1.7 3.3 4.0 3.6 0.1 73.8 26.2 100
74 47.6 2.3 8.3 8.9 2.0 3.0 4.2 3.2 0.3 73.4 26.6 100
75 47.7 2.8 9.5 8.1 2.3 3.0 5.7 3.5 - 75.2 24.8 100
76 44.8 2.8 8.0 9.7 2.3 2.4 5.6 3.2 - 73.1 26.9 100
77 39.7 2.9 8.7 12.0 2.7 2.1 6.0 2.8 - 70.9 29.1 100
78 50.8 3.9 11.0 11.2 3.8 4.3 6.2 4.5 - 86.8 13.2 100
79 46.1 4.2 11.7 7.0 3.5 2.6 4.1 2.9 0.7 73.2 26.8 100
80 47.8 4.8 8.2 6.8 3.0 3.0 4.2 2.9 0.8 75.0 25.0 100
81 48.3 4.7 8.0 6.3 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.8 0.7 74.9 25.1 100
82 43.6 4.6 8.0 4.7 2.9 3.8 7.2 2.2 0.8 73.8 26.2 100
83 47.9 4.2 9.8 4.3 2.8 4.3 5.6 2.2 1.5 83.3 16.7 100
84 50.1 3.2 6.0 4.6 2.5 4.3 6.0 2.0 1.1 84.5 15.5 100
85 47.5 3.8 5.2 5.7 2.5 3.5 4.3 3.0 0.8 81.1 18.9 100
86 45.9 2.5 5.7 7.4 2.5 4.3 4.7 4.1 - 82.8 17.2 100
87 44.6 2.7 6.9 8.6 2.6 3.5 5.0 3.4 - 80.8 19.2 100
88 42.6 3.2 6.1 9.1 2.6 3.3 6.1 2.8 - 79.9 20.1 100
89 44.6 2.2 5.4 7.9 2.2 2.9 7.0 2.9 - 78.0 22.0 100
90 46.7 2.9 4.1 9.9 2.2 3.5 4.8 3.0 - 80.7 19.3 100
91 49.4 3.8 3.9 6.4 2.7 2.8 5.5 3.1 - 82.1 17.9 100
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction o f  Trade, various issues.
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Table 2.g Export weights, Venezuela
Year USA Canada Japan Germany Spain France Italy United
Kingdom
Netherlands
Antilles
Subtotal Others Total
1968 32.69 12.07 1.42 1.84 2.25 1.36 1.59 7.09 19.58 82.44 17.56 100
1969 33.53 11.78 1.98 1.63 1.54 1.27 1.65 5.12 19.53 78.56 21.44 100
1970 37.94 11.22 0.74 1.76 1.23 1.55 1.33 4.81 20.05 82.5 17.5 100
1971 36.91 11.65 0.76 2.69 0.77 1.38 1.59 5.17 21.83 84.5 15.5 100
1972 34.87 12.54 0.46 1.25 0.83 1.57 1.25 3.97 25.46 83.56 16.44 100
1973 38.09 11.82 0.58 0.98 0.76 1.19 0.96 2.68 16.93 75.2 24.8 100
1974 38.43 12.24 0.43 1.13 1.11 1.01 0.95 2.79 21.39 80.89 19.11 100
1975 33.86 12.43 0.4 1.39 1.15 0.8 1.43 3.84 23.69 79.98 20.02 100
1976 32.28 13.25 0.31 1.31 0.91 0.8 2.09 2.06 22.67 76.85 23.15 100
1977 42.89 12.38 0.37 0.79 0.98 0.83 1.71 1.27 19.79 82.55 17.45 100
1978 38.36 10.76 0.46 0.66 1.81 0.87 2.24 1.27 22.08 81.03 18.97 100
1979 37.3 10.1 0.38 0.93 2.35 1.07 2.45 2.45 21.71 80.96 19.04 100
1980 27.75 9.2 1.01 1.05 3.63 1.78 5.83 1.17 23.83 81.3 18.7 100
1981 25.57 9.55 3.54 0.95 3.16 2.3 7 0.95 21.54 79.59 20.41 100
1982 26.93 8.79 3.9 2.67 2.01 1.83 5.18 1.33 25.75 84.11 15.89 100
1983 31.41 5.49 3.91 7.45 1.26 1.66 4.63 1.69 20.76 82.16 17.84 100
1984 39.96 6.06 3.45 5.68 0.99 1.13 4.11 1.89 17.99 83.98 16.02 100
1985 45.99 5.05 2.73 4.27 1.58 1.17 5.23 1.71 17.7 87.76 12.24 100
1986 44.75 3.23 2.92 5.79 0.49 1.59 1.75 2.41 0 64.15 35.85 100
1987 57.24 3.09 3.32 5.48 0.33 1.02 1.8 1.43 11.55 83.85 16.15 100
1988 47.25 2.83 0.53 4.37 0.42 0.71 0.95 1.08 0 63.47 36.53 100
1989 51.6 3.12 4.4 4.38 1.08 0.68 0.57 1.11 7.79 76.35 23.65 100
1990 51.54 2.64 4 3.67 0.8 0.92 1.06 0.94 0 66.3 33.7 100
1991 50.73 2.31 2.8 4.27 1.08 1.34 0.81 1.03 2.72 67.68 32.32 100
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction o f Trade, various issues.
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Chapter 3
Table 3 a Dutch disease index, Chenery-Syrquin (1975) norm
Dutch disease index Incremental Dutch disease index
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Traded Agriculture Manufacturing Traded
1966 00 00 15.8 24.6
0000 15.8 24.6
1967
0000 14.5 23.2 -0.1 -1.3 -1.4
1968 8.5 15.1 23.6 -0.3 0.6 0.4
1969 6.7 15.8 22.5 -1.8 0.7 -1.1
1970 6.0 15.1 21.0 -0.8 -0.7 -1.5
1971 5.9 14.3 20.3 0.0 -0.7 -0.8
1972 6.1 12.7 18.8 0.2 -1.7 -1.4
1973 4.9 11.8 16.8 - 1.2 -0.9 -2.1
1974 3.1 12.8 15.9 - 1.8 0.9 -0.9
1975 5.4 12.8 18.2 2.3 0.0 2.3
1976 8.2 11.8 20.0 2.8 - 1.0 1.8
1977 11.2 10.5 21.7 3.0 -1.3 1.7
1978 10.9 8.9 19.9 -0.3 - 1.6 - 1.8
1979 5.8 00 oo 14.6 -5.1 -0.1 -5.3
1980 3.9 9.4 13.2 -1.9 0.6 -1.4
1981 3.6 9.2 12.7 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5
1982 4.7 9.6 14.3 1.2 0.4 1.6
1983 -2.9 8.1 5.2 -7.6 -1.5 -9.1
1984 -0.5 11.1 10.6 2.4 3.0 5.4
1985 -1.5 11.0 9.4 - 1.0 -0.1 - 1.2
1986 -1.4 11.2 9.8 0.2 0.2 0.4
1987 0.7 11.6 12.3 2.1 0.4 2.5
1988 2.2 12.2 14.4 1.5 0.6 2.1
1989 -3.2 12.6 9.5 -5.4 0.4 -5.0
1990 -4.7 13.1 8.4 -1.5 0.4 - 1.1
Notes: The traded index is the sum o f  the manufacturing and agriculture indices; the incremental indices are estimated 
as the change in the value o f  each index from the previous year. A negative number means an ‘improvement’ and a 
positive number a ‘deterioration’ in each index or reinforcement o f  Dutch disease. Source: own estimations (see text).
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T a b l e  3 b D u t c h  d i s e a s e  i n d e x ,  S y r q u i n  n o r m  ( 1 9 8 9 )  f o r  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
Y e a r  I n d e x  i n c r e m e n t a l  i n d e x
19  6 7 - 2 . 3 - 2 . 3
1 9 6 8 1. 3 3 . 6
1 9 6 9 1 .6 0 . 3
1 9 7 0 -1 .9 - 3  .5
1 9 7  1 -1 . 7 0 . 2
1 9 7 2 - 2 . 1 - 0 . 5
1 9 7 3 - 0 . 2 1 . 9
1 9 7 4 - 0 . 4 - 0 . 2
1 9 7 5 - 0 . 3 0 . 1
1 9 7 6 - 2 . 4 - 2 . 0
1 9 7 7 2 . 8 5 . 1
1 9 7 8 -3 . 7 - 6 . 5
1 9 7 9 - 3 . 8 - 0 . 1
1 9 8 0 - 6 . 1 - 2 . 3
1 9 8  1 1 .1 7 . 2
1 9 8 2 - 3 . 9 - 5 . 0
1 9 8 3 - 5 . 5 -1 . 6
1 9 8 4 - 7 . 5 -1 .9
1 9 8 5 - 2 . 7 4 . 8
1 9 8 6 -1 .0 1 . 7
1 9 8 7 - 2 . 0 -1 . 0
1 9 8 8 1 .9 3 .9
1 9 8 9
OOm 1 .9
1 9 9 0 3 .9 0 . 1
1 9 9  1 - 6 . 5 -1 0 . 4
1 9 9 2 2 . 3 8 . 8
1 9 9 3 0 . 0 - 2 . 3
1 9 9 4 - 2 . 7 - 2 . 6
Sources: own estimations (see text) based on Sakr (1997).
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Chapter 4
Derivation of the Investment Equation
The specification of the investment function adopted here considers both 
macro and microeconomic aspects. Following Shafik (1992) the 
investment function was derived from a conventional neo-classical model 
with profit-maximising firm subjects to constant returns to scale and 
constant elasticity of substitution production function. Thus the optimal 
capital stock is derived from the marginal productivity conditions:
(1) K ’ = AY'Q + l l e f ! ( ?  
where
K = desired capital stock,
Yc = expected output,
s = elasticity o f demand in the product market (which is assumed to be 
constant),
C = cost of capital 
a  = elasticity of substitution
The relationship between investment and the capital stock is given by the 
following equation:
(2) I , — 8  Kt-\ + a(L)A fc' 
where
It = investment 
K= capital stock
290
8 = depreciation rate
a(L) =function of the lagged operator
Given the problems posed by the fact that the capital stock is a variable 
integrated of order 2, Bean's (1981) approach which allows for direct 
analysis of investment flows was adopted. Under the assumption that 
output grows at some constant rate which is small relative to the rate of 
depreciation, 5,
(3) \n[K,lY]=\n[i,l(8 + g)Y] 
and
(4) \tl[k ,Iy ]  * H.I,Iy \ ~  In 8 -  g  / S
Substituting (4) into (1), the following long-run equilibrium relationship is 
obtained:
(5) (ii - y Y  = a-crC g/S
In accordance with the non-stationary character of most o f the series 
considered, cointegration and error-correction techniques were applied to 
estimate short- and long-run dynamics of private investment in Venezuelan 
manufacturing. As already mentioned, since the capital stock proved to be 
integrated of order two we adopted a specification which allowed us to 
remove the capital stock variable.
A modality of the reduced form specification derived from a model which 
takes into account the firms' behaviour and macroeconomic variables was
291
applied by Shafik (1992) for the Egyptian case and was adopted. The 
variables considered as a proxy for costs of capital in the Venezuelan case 
were the real exchange rate and the domestic real interest rate. Real 
domestic credit to the private sector (nominal domestic credit to the private 
sector deflated by the private investment deflator) was firstly included as a 
proxy for the cost of capital but the results were not good enough.
Chapter 5
The basic source for detailed time series data on gross production value, 
value added, employment, investment, number of establishments, wages, 
imports and exports for private manufacturing is the annual industrial 
survey carried out by the Central Statistic Office of Venezuela (OCEI). It 
must be noted that we used the industrial survey because the BCV does not 
publish detailed data on manufacturing. As data from the industrial survey 
is at current prices, suitable deflators were obtained from the Central Bank 
of. Venezuela in order to estimate the variables at constant prices of 1984. 
The procedure used to estimate each variable in detail is explained below
1. The Industrial survey
As noted, the main source for detailed time series data on industrial 
indicators within a consistent framework is the industrial census, which is 
conducted by the Central Statistical Office (OCEI). This survey, which 
covers establishments with more than 5 workers, has been conducted for 
the following years: 1961, 1966, 1971 and 1974-94, except for 1980. Data 
for the missing years were interpolated by using the real growth rates 
provided by the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV).
Real manufacturing gross production or output and real value added:
value added and output at constant 1984 prices for total manufacturing
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were estimated by first deflating the sectoral values and then these were 
aggregated. These variables for a number of industries at the three-digit 
level of disaggregation were estimated as follows: the current values of 
gross production and value added provided by the industrial census were 
deflated by the producer price index and the GDP deflator given by the 
Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). The real growth rates provided by the 
BCV were used to complete the whole 1961-94 series data.
Employment: This is defined as the total number o f employees who had a 
paid or unpaid job in the establishment when the census took place. The 
categories covered are as follows: owners, family and non-remunerated 
workers, managers, employees and workers. The growth rates o f 
manufacturing employment provided by UNIDO were used to complete the 
1966-88 series.
Nominal wages and salaries per worker: Total annual nominal wages 
and salaries, and employment are provided by the industrial census, so 
wages per worker were estimated. As in the case of employment, when the 
census was not available the growth rates from UNIDO were used to 
complete the 1967-88 series. It must be noted that there were some 
problems with the results for the years of 1972 and 1981. Because o f that, 
the trends for the 1973-82 period were estimated excluding 1981.
Product wages and salaries: This was estimated as the ratio o f nominal 
wages and salaries per worker to manufacturing output prices. There were 
some problems with the results for the year 1972 and 1981. Thus, the 
trends for the 1973-82 period were estimated excluding 1981.
Intermediate consumption: This was estimated by subtracting the value 
added from output.
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Exports and imports: Sectoral exports were provided by the Central Bank 
of Venezuela, Finexpo; and the source for disaggregated manufacturing 
exports and imports at 1984 prices is own estimations based on data 
provided by Brandi (1989) from 1968 to 1983 data provided by the Central 
Bank o f from 1983 to 1993. It must be noted that the basic source for this 
data is the international trade bulletin from OCEI, which guarantees its 
compatibility with data on value added and output that is provided by the 
same source (OCEI).
2. Estimates of profitability in Venezuelan private manufacturing 
sector
Decomposition of the profit rate
To decompose the changes in profit rate considers the following mark-up 
rule pricing equation:2
(2.1) 0 = P °-o  = \W + M  + N t \ \  1 + r]
Dividing 2.1 by P0-o we have the following identity:
(2 .1) ’ 1 =
W M  Nt +  +
Po' O Po'O Po'O
[ l  +  T] =
1 =
W M  Nt +  +
P o O  P o O  Po'O
+
W M  Nt +  +
Po'O Po'O P o O
, _  W nW'L pw
(2 .2)  =  =  —
Po' O Po' O Ip
2
Formulations o f  mark-up price models are found in Sylos-Labini (1957, 1984), Kalecki (1971), Taylor (1991).
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Similarly, the wage share in value added can be written as:
W _ W Pv-L Po_ 
Va~ P o -L  Va Pv
1 Po
Pw ' ' *77“
where P0 = price index of output, Pv = price index for value added, Ip ’ = 
labour productivity or real value added per man.
Likewise, product wages can be decomposed into real consumption wages 
(nw/Pc) and relative prices of consumer to manufacturing goods. That is to 
say:
nw Pc
( 2 ' 4 )  pw=T<’To
These formulas can be written in approximate proportionate rate-of-change 
form. Dots are used to indicate proportionate rate-of-change variables:
According to (2.3)’, the variations o f the wage share in value added 
depends on the excess o f product wages over the rate o f growth of real 
factor incomes. This is the growth rate of labour productivity (value added 
per man) adjusted for the impact of the variations in the relative prices of 
inputs (including depreciation) and gross value added. Thus, if the average 
product wages increase at a rate equal to productivity, the unit labour cost 
and profits remain unchanged. A rise in the wages share in value added 
may be caused by an increase in the product wages or a decline in real 
factor incomes due to a slowdown in labour productivity or increasing 
relative prices o f intermediate materials.
It must be noted that according to the standard Dutch Disease model the 
disruptive impact o f a resource boom on manufacturing is linked to a 
decline in the price of tradeables relative to that of non-tradeables. Under a 
fixed exchange regime, the adjustment in an economy following a sectoral 
boom should take via increasing prices. Since the inflation rate will be 
accelerated, it is expected that a fall in the relative prices of manufacturing 
to consumer goods will take place P JP C (identity 2.4’), which in term, leads 
to a rise in product wages (pw) and a profit squeeze in manufacturing. So, 
it follows that those industries with a higher labour intensity will be more 
disrupted by the resource boom. The reason is that this model relies on the 
neo-classical cost function or so-called factor price frontier. Although 
within the Dutch disease framework labour productivity can change due to 
factor substitution, the impact of technological change on labour 
productivity is not taken into account. Therefore, the assumptions of 
constant returns to scale and full employment lead to a strict inverse trade- 
off between real wages and profit rate. It should be also noted that the 
assumption of the marginal productivity conditions in the Dutch Disease 
model involves that if  real wages increase, the labour/output ratio declines. 
So, for a given output, a drop in employment is necessarily related to higher
3 It should be noted that the trade-off between the real wage and the profit rate is also implicit to Marxist formulations in 
which the rise in wages due to the drop in the reserve army leads to lower profits and a slowdown o f  accumulation.
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real wages. A lower employment in the traded sector is entailed by a rise in 
product wages. In this way, some resources are directed towards the non­
traded sectors in which lower product wages allow for greater employment. 
According to the identities presented here, a rise in product wages may 
occur together with higher employment.
The profit share is defined as the ratio of operating surplus (.Prof) to output 
or value added:
5 P ro f _ t - ( W + M  + Nt) _ W M Nt
o  o  o  o  o
5  Pr of  _ t - (W + M  + Nt) _ W M Nt
Va Va Va Va Va
W M  Ntwhere — ,— ,—  are the share of wages, intermediate materials and non- 
O O O
traded services in output respectively. Equation (2.5)’ restates (2.5) in 
terms of value added.
The profit rate (r) is defined as the ratio of gross operating surplus 
(Prof=0-W-Nt) to capital stock at current prices (.K). The profit rate can be 
expressed as the product of the profit share and the output- capital ratio 
(u=0/K)
(2 .6) r = Pr of 
K
^Pr o f
O
Writing this expression in proportionate rate-of-change form:
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(2 .6 )’ r  = Pr of 
K
(  ■ A ( . \ ( ■ \
Pr of + 0 _ Pr o f
0 K 0
+ u
The output/capital ratio (u) is defined as the product of the real 
output/capital ratio (o/k) and the relative price of output and capital goods 
(Po/Pk):
(2.7) u = O • Po 
k'Pk
P.?  
PkJ
Trends in the profit share and its components for Venezuelan 
manufacturing during 1968-88
Variations in the Profit Share and Unit Labour Costs
A look at Table 5.a indicates that while there was an downward trend in the 
relative share of labour costs in value added4 which led to high profit shares 
between 1966 and 1971 a reverse in this trend occurred during 1974-1976. 
Although it must be noted that the profit share increased slightly during 
1975-76. Unit labour costs rose between 1977 and 1979 while it declined 
between 1979 and 1982 prompting a recovery of the profit share in 1982. 
The drop in the labour share of value added during 1983-88 implied a 
stable upward trend in the profit share.
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Table 5.a Cost structure of non-oil Venezuelan manufacturing (as a share of gross value 
added)________________________________________________________________________
1966 1971 1974 1975 1976 1977 1979 1981 1982 1985 1986 1988
Labour input 37.72 33.74 33.94 36.15 37.71 38.25 41.82 42.24 39.73 37.09 36.18 32.94
Other inputs 22.55 25.08 21.73 27.40 26.43 33.69 34.82 41.56 40.21 42.09 42.87 41.58
Rents 2.08 1.49 1.79 2.22 2.42 2.58 2.99 2.81 2.39 2.74 2.79 2.40
Interests & insurance 3.75 4.09 5.44 6.54 5.78 5.94 8.50 13.40 12.21 14.95 11.65 11.20
Royalties 1.04 1.36 0.96 0.69 2.50 0.57 0.74 0.39 0.38 0.51 0.37 0.55
Publicity 3.40 3.51 2.32 2.46 1.21 2.36 2.57 3.02 2.92 4.02 3.52
Professional services 0.82 0.78 1.03 1.19 0.69 1.21 1.52 1.86 2.22 2.54 2.89 2.66
Indirect tax 2.34 2.43 1.19 4.54 4.32 4.34 4.76 7.22 5.69 6.37 6.03 5.25
Various 9.11 11.42 8.99 9.77 9.52 9.86 13.73 12.86 14.39 14.99 15.13 16.00
Depreciation 8.33 7.20 6.65 7.67 7.68 6.83 8.25 8.27 8.36 7.22 7.05 6.22
Profit share 39.73 33.98 44.32 28.55 35.86 28.06 34.68 15.98 20.06 20.83 20.95 25.48
Total 39.73 33.98 44.32 28.55 35.86 28.06 34.68 15.98 20.06 20.83 20.95 25.48
Sources: OCEI, industrial survey, and various issues.
Variations in labour costs and in labour productivity
A look at Table 5.b indicates that there was a marked labour productivity 
slowdown measured as manufacturing output and value added per man 
during 1974-76 compared to 1969-71.5 Despite the faster growth of output 
and value added during 1974-76 compared with 1968-71 the substantial 
rise in employment prompted a decline in labour productivity. An 
important recovery of labour productivity occurred during the recessive 
phase (1978-82) because of the substantial fall in employment.6
The disappointing performance of labour productivity may have reflected 
problems o f inefficient management of oil revenues during the boom phase 
and to the adoption of sectoral policies that imply inefficient allocation of 
resources and the reinforcement of the weakness of industrialisation such as 
low productivity and high import dependence.
Labour productivity growth measured as value added per man slowed down 
during 1983-88 while it remained stable as measured by output per man. 
Manufacturing value added growth declined strongly over 1983-84, and
4
This is defined as the sum o f  wages and salaries, social benefits and other payments as percentage o f  value added.
5 It was not possible to estimate hourly labour productivity due to the lack o f  data.
6 Iturbe’s (1980) and Ecobar (1982) pointed out that a fall in labour productivity occurred in Venezuelan manufacturing 
during 1974-1976 compared with 1961-71.
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following a recovery during 1985-87, stagnated during 1988-89. This 
result may be explained by the negative impact of devaluation through 
increasing intermediate and capital costs. There was a substantial decline 
in the relative price of output or value added to capital through 1983-88 
(see Table 5.b).
Table 5.b Average annual variations in manufacturing profitability, Venezuela, 1969-88
1969-71 1974-76 1978-82* 1983-88*
(a) Labour productivity = (d) - (e) 2.36 -1.49 4.60 0.93
(b) Labour productivity = (c) - (e) 1.40 -0.04 2.43 1.84
(c) Real output 8.43 13.39 1.23 5.29
(d) Real value added 9.39 11.94 3.40 4.38
(e) Employment 7.03 13.43 -1.20 3.45
(f) Effect o f  input costs 0.10 1.19 0.50 2.76
(g) Real factor incomes = (a)-(f) 2.26 -2.68 4.10 -1.83
(h) Product wages -2.72 0.74 2.55 -8.40
(i) Nominal wages and salaries per man -0.36 10.42 21.12 12.35
(j) Wages share o f  value added = (h) - (g) -4.98 3.42 -1.55 -6.57
(k) Wages share o f  output = (h) - (b) -4.12 0.78 0.12 -10.24
(1) Real intermediate material/gross real
output ratio -0.89 1.19 -1.92 0.74
(m) Relative prices o f  intermediate
Materials and gross output 0.10 0.81 0.61 1.83
(n) Prices o f  intermediate materials 2.46 10.49 19.18 22.59
(o) Intermediate materials
share o f  output = (m) +  (n) -0.79 2.00 -1.31 2.57
(p) Profit share o f  output 2.72 -3.78 2.28 1.79
(q) Profit share o f  value added 1.86 -1.14 0.56 1.88
Notes: * excluding 1980 and 1987, (see methodological appendix). Source: own estimations based on 
data provided by OCEI, industrial survey, various issues, BCV, economic report.
The intersectoral performance of unit labour costs and its components is 
presented in Table 5.c. As the 1974-77 phase is considered, a rise in the 
changes in the wage share in value added in 12 out o f 17 sub-sectors 
compared to 1968-71 took place. The highest increases took place in, in 
order: rubber (11.65 per cent), leather (9.47 per cent), food (6.69), transport 
equipment (5.85) textiles (4.2 per cent), mechanical and electrical 
machinery (2.79 per cent) and wearing apparel, food (2.16 per cent). The 
lines which performed better in terms of the unit labour costs were: tobacco 
(-14.29 per cent), wood (-6.34 per cent), non-metallic mineral products (- 
2.73 per cent), others (-2.09), paper (-1.89), furniture (-1.42), metal 
products (0.14) and chemical products (0.33).
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According to the Dutch disease theory, those labour-intensive industries are 
expected to be more disrupted by supply factors than the capital-intensive 
ones; namely, increasing product wages due to the real exchange rate 
appreciation of the domestic currency. Nevertheless, it seems that both, 
labour and capital-intensive industries suffered from increasing unit labour 
costs during 1974-77.
At the same time the previous results show that the significant increase in 
unit labour costs occurred in Venezuelan private manufacturing during 
1974-77 reflected a significant decline in labour productivity growth, with 
the role played by the changes in product wages being insignificant. The 
average annual growth rate of value added per man in private 
manufacturing fell from 2.54 per cent in 1968-71 to -0.43 per cent during
1973-82, with a maximum of 25 per cent per year for tobacco and with a 
minimum of -7.05 for food over the latest phase. The disappointing 
performance of labour productivity growth was a whole-embraced 
phenomenon in private manufacturing, with a substantial decline in this 
variable having taking place in 8 of the 17 manufacturing branches 
considered regardless of factor intensities during 1973-7 compared to 1968- 
71. It must be noted that four of the remaining lines, recorded negative 
growth rates o f labour productivity despite the fact that this meant an 
improvement compared to the pre-boom phase. The decline in labour 
productivity growth occurred over 1974-77 was due to the substantial rise 
in employment in both labour-intensive and capital-intensive industries and 
to the problems linked to the low capital absorptive capacity of the 
economy to absorb the extra oil revenues. The lack o f management 
capacities and skilled labour led to inefficient growth. This is consistent 
with one of the main argument of this thesis that the over spending of the 
oil revenues is expected to have prompted a fall in labour productivity 
during the first years of the boom. By contrast an improvement in labour
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productivity occurred during the recessive phase (1978-82) due to the 
substantial drop in employment.
Although product wages declined in some industries or increased at a 
moderate pace over 1974-77 compared to 1968-71, this variable increased 
faster than the real factor income (wages plus profit), which is permitted by 
the increase in labour productivity adjusted by the changes in the real costs 
o f intermediate inputs. It must be noted that through 1974-77 there was 
similar growth of product wages in capital and labour intensive groups as a 
whole. Some labour-intensive industries such as furniture, wood, non- 
metallic minerals wearing apparel and textiles showed the lowest growth 
rates of product wages over 1974-77. This result seems to be explained by 
the improvement in the relative prices and the modest increase in nominal 
and real wages of the latest group. Salaries grew faster than wages, so 
labour-intensive industries, which has a low skill ratio were less affected 
than capital industries, in which salaries are an important component of 
labour costs. Additionally, the above development was partly due to the 
modest increase in employment occurred in this group (11.84 per cent p.a.) 
compared to the capital-intensive industries (11.15 per cent p.a.) during 
1974-77. The expansion of employment in the capital-intensive industries 
was related to their more dynamic performance during 1974-77. As 
regards the performance of relative prices, the output response does not 
seem to be explained by the relative prices changes.
The modest increase in the cost of non-labour inputs contributed to 
ameliorate the effects on the wage share of the faster wages growth over 
productivity growth. However, the significant fall in labour productivity 
prompted a rise in unit labour costs. It seems that the differences in the 
sectoral changes in this variable are largely explained by the intersectoral 
variations in labour productivity. The intersectoral development o f product 
wages and intermediate costs growth being less important.
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Table 5.d shows the correlation coefficients between the intersectoral 
changes in the wage share in value added and its components, namely 
product wages, value added per man and intermediates costs according to 
formula (2.3). It is evident that there was a very low correlation coefficient 
(0.06) between the intersectoral variations in product wages and the wage 
share in value added over 1974-77 compared to 0.45 in 1968-71. The 
correlation between this variable and the variations in input costs was also 
insignificant trough 1974-77.
The picture that emerges from the previous findings is that some of the 
sectors where labour productivity increased or declined less showed a 
decline or a milder increase in the wages share in value added despite 
higher product wages over 1974-77. A look at Tables 2.3 indicates this 
was the case of tobacco, metals, paper, beverages, others chemicals, and 
machinery over 1973. The increase in product wages growth was 
compensated by higher labour productivity growth.
Table 5.d Correlation coefficients between intersectoral changes
in the wage share o f  value added and its components
Y/L Pw Po/Py
1968-71 -0.69 0.45 -0.04
1974-77 -0.71 0.06 0.01
1978-82 -0.72 0.74 0.00
1983-88 -0.39 0.62 -0.41
Source: own estimations.
By contrast, despite a decline in product wages growth the sharper fall in 
labour productivity growth prompted a rise in labour costs in textiles, 
transport, food and printing during 1974-77. In the case of transport, a 
substantial slowdown in value added per man implied a significant rise in 
the unit labour costs despite declining intermediate input costs (Table 5.c).
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Non-metallic minerals and paper showed relative low unit labour costs 
growth during 1974-77. However, the decline in this variable was milder 
than in 1968-71 due to the deterioration in labour productivity growth 
during 1974-77. This development occurred despite the substantial drop in 
the growth of product wages and input costs over 1973-82 compared to
1968-71.
As regards the 1978-82 phase it seems that the increase in product wages 
growth played a key role in explaining the trends in the wages share in 
value added across the manufacturing lines. This is due to the declined in 
manufacturing relative prices, which was prompted by the import and price 
liberalisation policy. As noted above this was not Dutch disease because 
there was a stagnant domestic demand during 1978-82. It must be noted 
that the rise in labour productivity growth during this recessive phase was 
mainly due to the sharp fall in employment which decline more than value 
added.
Considering the 1983-88 phase, it seems that there was a negative 
correlation between value added per man and unit labour costs (-0.49), but 
it was lower than in 1974-77 (-0.73). The correlation coefficient between 
unit labour costs and product wages (0.73) increased considerably 
compared to 1974-77. It has already been noted that there was a substantial 
decrease in product wages over 1983-88, which was linked to the 
considerable improvement in manufacturing relative prices after the strong 
devaluation of the domestic currency implemented in 1983, 1984 and 1986.
It is worth noting that the correlation coefficient between the wage share in 
value added and intermediate costs had the wrong sign during 1983-88. 
This may suggest that the increase in the price of imported intermediate 
goods did not exert a strong disruptive effect on manufacturing. Although 
intermediate inputs costs measured as the ratio of output to value added
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prices showed an important increase during 1983-88 compared to 1974-77, 
the increase was rather mild until 1986. This is partly explained by the 
exchange rate system adopted, which established an official exchange rate 
for imports of $7.50 in 1983 as compared to $4.30 in the preceding years, 
while the rest o f the transactions should take place in a free market. 
Likewise, the increase in the exchange rate for imports took place 
gradually. It has been estimated that the accumulated devaluation of the 
controlled exchange rate was only 74 per cent between 1983 and October 
1986, while the accumulated devaluation of the free exchange was 500 per 
cent for the same years.1 Consequently, it seems that Venezuelan 
manufacturing benefited from the real devaluation of the domestic currency 
over these years through import-substitution. However, no all the 
industries were spared from the negative impact o f devaluation. The 
expansion of manufacturing was driven by intermediate and mechanical 
industries, which were able to expand due to the import substitution effect 
following the devaluation of the domestic currency. By contrast, apart 
from textiles, most of the traditional industries declined as a result of the 
substantial drop in real wages, which implied a severe decrease in their 
domestic demand.
An interesting point is that most of the capital-intensive industries 
continued expanding at high rates during the post-boom phase. This is in 
contradiction with the Dutch disease theory, which predicts a better 
performance of labour-intensive industries after the devaluation of the real 
exchange rate and the fall in product wages, which are supposed to occur 
over the post-boom phase. The reason is that this theory does not take into 
account the demand-side factors. In the Venezuelan case, the negative 
effect o f real devaluation on the domestic demand implied that despite 
lower product wages, many labour-intensive industries stagnated or did not 
experience a substantial expansion during the post-boom phase.
1 BCV, economic surveys various issues.
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Variations in Unit Labour Cost and in Product Wages
As illustrated by Table 5.e, the increase in product wages during 1974-76 is 
mostly explained by the considerable growth of nominal wages
Table 5.e Trends in product wages and its components, Venezuelan private 
manufacturing, 1969-88_____________________________________________
Phases Nominal
Wages
Real
consumption
wages
Relative
prices
Product
wages
1969-71 -0.4 -3.21 -0.49 -2.72
1974-76 10.4 1.88 1.14 0.74
1978-82 21.1 1.107 -1.4 2.55
1983-88 12.4 -6.59 1.82 -8.4
Notes: trends are the least squares estimates o f  the variables 
Source: own estimations.
and to a lesser extent, to real consumption wages variations. This is 
explained by the favourable movement occurred in manufacturing relative 
output prices during these years compared to the pre-boom phase, which 
contributed to counterbalance the effect o f rising nominal on product wages 
changes. Despite the existence of price controls for some products, 
manufacturing prices went up considerably during 1974-76 compared to 
1969-71. This path was linked to the substantial rise in nominal wages 
and in the price of intermediate materials occurred over these years. The 
trend in the latter prices was mainly due to the higher variations in the 
prices of imported intermediate goods. According to the Central Bank of 
Venezuela the imported component of these prices grew faster than the 
national component during 1973-76. The faster growth of manufacturing 
prices though led to a modest rise in input costs and in product wages 
during this phase.
2
On August 1974 the prices o f  some items which had been subjected to controls, among other, agricultural goods, and 
some processed food. It seems that the food branch was the most affected by price controls over 1974-76. Likewise, the 
price o f  some itertis like processed food remained controlled after 1979. Central Bank o f  Venezuela, economic reports, 
(1979, p. 158).
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This development is neither in accordance with the Dutch disease model, 
nor with the experience of other economies that have gone through an 
export boom. The theory predicts an increase in product wages during a 
boom due to the fall in the relative price o f manufacturing goods to 
consumer goods. The estimations show that the variations in the relative 
prices o f manufacturing goods contributed to lowering product wages 
growth over 1974-76. Likewise, the Iranian, Nigerian and Zambian 
economies, for instance, experienced a substantial increase in product 
wages during the 1970’s export booms. Government policy seems to 
explain the outcome in Venezuela. In this economy the more modest rate 
o f domestic inflation during 1974-76 due to the control prices policy may 
have contributed to avoid a fall in the relative prices of manufacturing to 
consumer goods during 1974-77. The main increase in manufacturing 
product wages occurred during 1977-82 despite recession because of the 
higher inflation rate and the role of trade unions together with the decline in 
the relative price of manufacturing.4 These exerted pressures on the 
government owing to the accelerating inflation following prices 
deregulation. In fact, a law calling for a 30 per cent increase in wages was 
approved in December 1979. This together with an improvement in labour 
productivity during 1978-82, prompted a mild fall in unit labour costs 
during this phase.
It must be noted that the mild upward trend in the relative prices of 
intermediate materials to value added contributed to counterbalance the 
effect on the wage share of the excess of product wages growth over 
productivity growth during 1973-77. The relative price of intermediate 
materials and value added grew at a modest rate in 1973-82 as compared to
1969-71. Although the prices of intermediate materials went up
3 See Jazayery (1988) and Norberg and Blomstrom (1993).
4
The Venezuelan manufacturing sector was affected by a large number o f  strikes during 1973-82. A strike in textiles 
lasted for 6 months.
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substantially during 1974-76 and 1973-82 compared to 1969-71, value 
added prices also increased.
Trends in the profit rate in Venezuelan private manufacturing over
1974-76 and 1978-82
Table 5.f illustrates the trends in the profit rate for Venezuelan private 
manufacturing during 1969-88. This data makes clear that despite a decline 
in the manufacturing profit share occurred through 1974-76 compared to 
1968-71, the increase in the output-capital ratio determined a rise in the 
profit rate growth. By contrast the fall in the output-capital ratio from 1977 
to 1982 led to a decline in the profit rate during 1978-82.
It must be noted that the declining profit share did not allow for a greater 
improvement in the profit rate which may account for the modest 
performance of the sectoral private investment compared to the rest o f  the 
non-oil economy.
Table 5.f Variations in manufacturing profitability, Venezuela, 1969-88
(a) Profit share o f output
(b) Profit share o f  value added
(c) Real output-capital ratio
(d) Relative prices o f  output to capital
(e) Real value added-capital ratio
(f) Relative prices o f  value added to capital
(g) Nominal output/capital ratio = (c) + (d)
(h) Nominal value added/capital ratio = (e) + (f)
(i) Profit rate =(a)+(g)
(j) Profit rate = (b) + (h)
1969-71 1974-76 1978-82* 1983-88'
2.72 -3.78 2.28 1.79
1.86 -1.14 0.56 1.88
-1.00 4.90 -2.25 3.99
-1.43 1.30 1.86 -3.85
0.07 3.37 -1.87 3.73
- 1.88 -1.78 0.94 -2.70
-2.43 6.21 -0.39 0.14
-1.81 1.59 -0.93 1.03
0.29 2.43 1.89 1.93
0.05 0.45 -0.37 2.91
Notes: *exc1uding 1980 and 1987, (see methodological appendix).
Source: own estimations based on data provided by OCEI, industrial survey, BCV and Baptista (1991).
As shown before, the considerable expansion of the effective demand 
during 1974-1976 led to the recovery of the sector, which was suffering 
from lack of market for the investment before the 1973. Thus the capital- 
output ratio fell over these years, but the low capital absorptive capacity of
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the economy caused by the lack of management capacities and other input 
bottlenecks implied a fall in labour productivity together with the lack of a 
coherent industrial policy which could have aimed to develop an export- 
competitive sector. Furthermore, once the over-investment of the oil 
revenues prompted a huge expansion of the productive capacity, the lack of 
market due to the deflationary policies set obstacles leading to an increase 
in the capital-output ratio and the decline in the profit rate from 1977.
Chapter 6
As in the case of chapter 5, this chapter is based on data provided by the 
annual industrial survey carried out by the Central Statistic Office of 
Venezuela (OCEI).
1. Derivation of the sources of demand side growth
The sources of industrial growth can be expressed as follows:
(1.1) x j - x } = ( l -  m))(Dl ~ D)) + (m! -  ml) D l  + (E l  ~ E !)
According to this expression the increase in manufacturing output is due to 
three different effects namely:
Contribution of the increase in domestic demand: (1 -m]){Dl -  D\) 
Contribution of import substitution: (m] -  ml) D]
Contribution of export growth: (e ! -  E))
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The decomposition of the sources of growth in the manufacturing sector can 
be assessed under two different approaches. The first ones sums the 
components for each subsector as follows:
(1 -2) (jc/ -  Jt!) = E (xf~ xj) = E(1 -  m])(Dj ~ £>]) + Z(mj -  mj)Dj  + HiEj ~ E))
‘ '' i '■
where x is global total manufacturing production.
In the second methodology, domestic production, imports and exports are 
aggregated across branches and then these results are used to compute the 
source of growth. In notation:
(1 -3) x 2 -  x' = 0 -  m'XD2 -D') + (m '-m 2)D2 + (E2-  E1) 
where
t  S ' t  
x  -  2-, x i 
i 1
d ‘ = T.d ‘
i
t  V- t
M  = Z  M i  
i
Ef = ZEf  
i
t M1
m
There has been an extensive discussion on these two methods due to the 
different results for the effect of import substitution provided by each 
equations. A significant contribution to the aggregation problem has been 
made by Guillaumont (1979). This scholar states that the global import 
coefficient (m = M/D) is affected by import substitution at the sectoral level,
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but variations in this ratio can also be due to changes in the structure of 
demand or substitution between demand with different import contents. A 
demand shift towards imported products may imply an increase in the import 
coefficient for manufacturing as a whole, even if it remains the same for each 
subsector. The change in the global import coefficient can be expressed as 
follows:
(1.4) m l - m 2 = 'Laiim) ~ ml) ~ -  ad
where a; = Di/D or the share of sector i in total domestic demand for industrial 
products. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (1.4) accounts 
for the impact of the shift in the structure of demand, and the first term 
represents the impact of import substitution at the sectoral level. Import 
substitution at the global level is defined by Guillaumont as 'the difference 
between the value of the global average import coefficient which would have 
prevailed if  the import coefficient by product had been unchanged and the 
actual value of the import coefficient'. It follows that the first term on the 
right-hand side of equation (1.4) measures import substitution at the global 
level. Kavoussi argues that Guillaumont’s definition of import substitution is 
also compatible with that implicit in equation (1.2) so the estimate o f the 
sources of growth of manufacturing provided by the equation is also biased. 
While the effect of import substitution is correctly estimated by (1.4), the role 
of final demand is not adequately assessed. The reason is that the effect of 
variations in the demand structure is amalgamated with that of the demand 
expansion.
Kauvossi wrote equation (2.4) as follows:
(1.5) £ (1  -  mli)(D2 -  D\) -  (1 -  m’KZ)2 -  Z)1) -  D 2Tjm)(a2 ~ af)
i  i
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and shows that even when there is no change in domestic demand, if  there is a 
shift in user’s purchases from sectors with high import coefficients to those 
with low ones, equation (1.4) will erroneously indicate an increase in total 
manufacturing output as a result of demand expansion.
In this light, it seems that the contradictory results given by equations (1.2) 
and (1.3) are related to the fact that neither formula explicitly considers the 
effects o f changes in the demand structure. In the first equation this effect is 
combined with that of demand growth, and in the second formula, it is 
combined with the effect of import substitution.
In order to overcome this problem, here the definition of global import 
substitution proposed by Gillaumont and Kavoussi is used. Specifically, the 
equations provided by the latter author, which explicitly account for the effect 
of the change in the pattern of domestic demand, is used. These equations 
expressed in Laspeyre and Paasche formulas are as follows:
The Laspeyre form is as follows:
(1.6) x ~ x = (! -  m)(D2 ~ Dl) + D2 S  a2 (m) -  mf) ~ D2 S  m] (a2 ~ a]) + Z( E2 ~ E))
i  i
The Paasche form is as follows:
(1.7) x ~ x -  (1 -  m)(D2 ~ Dl) + Dx Y,a) (m1 ~ m ) ~ D1'Em2(a2 ~ a)) + {E2 -  E l)
/ i
The two equations were estimated for the manufacturing sector as a whole 
and as the results were very similar we worked with the Laspeyres form.. 
This analysis was based on a 18-sector desegregation for 1968-73, 1974-82, 
1983-88 and 1989-93. The high aggregation may have led to overestimation 
the extent of import expansion during 1973-77 and 1978-82 because it is
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likely that a higher income would prompt demand shifts from products with 
low import coefficients to those with high import coefficients. This error may 
be very serious if the products included in particular subsectors were 
characterised by major differences in import coefficients and income 
elasticity of demand. The lack of data made it impossible to estimate the 
sources of industrial growth based on a greater disaggregation.
2. Derivation of the sources of supply side growth
Total Factor productivity growth: data and procedure for estimation
The estimates of total factor productivity growth for Venezuelan 
manufacturing used in this research were obtained by using the growth 
accounting method. Two estimates were made. Firstly, following Syrquin 
(1994), TFPG was estimated using this simple growth accounting equation:
(2.1) gy = M P K - j  + E Lg L + y  
where
gy = growth rate of real value added;
MPK = marginal product of capital;
I/Y = net domestic investment as a share of GDP;
El = elasticity of output with respect to labour; 
gi = growth rate of employment; and 
Y = residual or TFPG.
A second estimate of TFPG was attempted. A translog index of TFP was 
derived by using the growth accounting framework. The translog 
production function presented by Ahluwalia (1991) is as follows:
(2.2) AlogTFPt = AYt- [(SLt + SU-d/ 2]AlogZ,-[(1 - SLt) + (1 ■-SLt-i)/ 2]AlogKt
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where
Y, L, K and TFP and SL represent real value added, labour, capital, total 
factor productivity and the share of labour income in value added, 
respectively.
It must be noted that we estimated TFPG by using the number of 
employees and the real unit labour cost as a proxy for the labour factor. As 
the first estimates appear to be more coherent, we only present these 
results.
As is well known, the estimate of TFPG by using a growth accounting 
framework represents the composite effect of all factors, other than the 
increases in labour and capital, on the variations in value added. The error 
on estimates of any variable is included too. According to Ahluwalia 
(1991) the error term is likely to be high.
There are several criticism of the concept of TFP, of the growth accounting 
methodology and of the problems embodied in the estimation of real capital 
stock. Nevertheless, given the lack of any alternative methodology we 
adopted this framework. We estimated TFPG according to these two above 
equations. In the case of the one presented by Syrquin, we applied the 
assumptions made by the scholar according to which the marginal product 
o f capital was assumed to be 0.12 up to 1982 and 0.10 for the 1980s. This 
procedure was followed in order to make the results for Venezuela 
comparable with the results provided by Syrquin.
In the case o f the second estimation of TFPG in order to avoid the problems 
caused by the volatility of the variable, which is partly related to the oil 
boom, trend values o f GDP and inputs as computed by regressions of the 
variables on time together with average factor shares were used to compute 
TFPG. It is worth noting that to our knowledge, there has been no other 
attempt to measure TFPG for Venezuelan private manufacturing.
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No correction was possible for under-utilisation of capital stock and there 
was no data on man-hours, for instance. It must be noted that the problem 
of the high under-utilisation of capital in Venezuela is mainly due to the 
lack of demand, which is a structural factor, which must be considered as 
one of the causes of low TFPG. In other words, in the Venezuelan case the 
problem of low use of the installed capacity is related to the oil-based 
nature of the economy in which the excessive investment of oil revenues is 
used to prompt the more rapid growth of the productive capacity relative to 
market growth. In this sense, more than a correction for under-utilisation 
of capital, it is likely that we must include this variable as one of the 
determinants of TFPG in Venezuela.
Concerning the sources of data, this covered the period from 1968 to 1988 
and the basic source was the yearly survey of manufacturing carried out by 
the Central Statistic Office of Venezuela. Data on wages and salaries, the 
number of workers, and value added was basically provided by the OCEI 
and nominal values were deflated by the prices given by the Central Bank 
of Venezuela (see section 1 of this appendix above). The major problem 
was to find data on capital stock because the manufacturing survey does not 
provide data on this variable.
Real capital stock
The theoretical and practical difficulties related to measuring capital stock 
are well known. In the case o f developing countries, the lack o f the 
necessary data to estimate this variable is especially notorious. In the case 
of Venezuela, there is scanty data on real capital stock from 1968 onwards. 
The Central Bank of Venezuela did estimate this variable for the different 
economic subsectors and manufacturing branches until 1968. The 
industrial census does not provide data on capital stock. For this reason we
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took the estimations of real capital stock at 1984 prices provided by 
Baptista (1991). This scholar used the perpetual inventory method to build 
up these series and this is, to our knowledge, the most serious attempt to 
estimate this variable in Venezuela. The other attempt to estimate capital 
stock for Venezuelan manufacturing is provided by CORDIPLAN in a 
paper made by the employment division. Although both series give a 
similar picture, we opted for using the data provided by Baptista because 
data from CORDIPLAN relied on a benchmark capital-output ratio for the 
initial year and it is valued at 1968 prices.
Chapter 7
See appendix to chapters 5 and 6.
Classification of manufacturing industries by factor intensity
Various methods have been developed to measure factor intensity. The so- 
called 'industry method' commonly uses two indices to estimate capital 
intensities namely, fixed capital per worker and a skill ratio. These indices 
were estimated by Hufbauer (1970) and Hirsch (1974). The higher the 
fixed capital per worker, the more capital-intensive an industry. This 
estimation deals with capital stock instead of capital flow, so it allows for 
comparing both the consumed and the capital stock required in the 
production. The skill ratio can be measured by the share o f professional, 
technical and scientific personnel in the labour force. A high ratio indicates 
a human capital-intensive industry. This index tries to give some picture o f 
the innovative content of the manufactured goods.5 Both indices are the 
result o f long-term investment in an industry. For this reason the 
classification based on these indices is called the industry method. The 
commodity method classifies commodity groups by factor intensity. The 
indices used in this method are the value added per worker and the labour
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costs share in value added. These indices were used by Lary (1968), 
Krause (1982), Anderson (1980) and Findlay and Li (1992). Krause (1982) 
presents a classification in which goods are divided into natural-resource 
intensive goods, unskilled labour-intensive goods which rely on per capita 
value added in the USA, and technology-intensive goods using USA data 
on research and development expenditure as an indicator. Tyers and 
Phillips () and Ariff and Hill (1986) adopted a similar classification, but 
they divide resource intensive goods into agriculture and mineral-resource 
intensive products.
The wage share in value added is commonly used as an indicator o f the 
labour requirement. Nevertheless, a high wage bill/value added ratio may 
be the result o f a large number of low-wage unskilled workers or few well- 
paid skilled workers. In the first case the industry is labour-intensive while 
in the second case is human capital-intensive. Zhang (1994) stresses the 
need to use the value added per worker together with the wage share in 
value added to overcome this problem. In our view, another possibility is to 
diseggregate the wage share in value added into the share corresponding to 
skilled personnel (salaries) and the share corresponding to unskilled 
personnel (wages).
Venezuela’s 1971 industrial census provides data to measure factor 
intensity by using the skill ratio, the value added per worker, and the share 
of wages in value added. It was not possible to estimate the fixed capital 
per worker index due to the lack of reliable data on capital stock. Indeed, 
earlier attempts to classify Venezuelan manufacturing branches using the 
fixed capital per worker led to mistaken results. A classification using this 
index for Venezuelan manufacturing in 1966 was made by Tomas (1975). 
According to this classification, many establishments in textiles were
5 Lary (1968).
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ranked as capital-intensive, while heavy industries like electrical and 
mechanical machinery and transport had many establishments which 
appeared to be labour-intensive. This casts doubt on the reliability of these 
results. In fact, the institution responsible for the industrial census carried 
out in 1961 and 1966 warned about the unreliability of data on capital stock 
for these years.6
The classification for 18 manufacturing subsectors according to the 
commodity method in 1971 is reported in Table 7.a. The skill ratio was 
also used. Industries were classified into labour-intensive, capital-intensive 
and human capital-intensive. Those branches ranked in places 1-9 by using 
the wage share in value added were classified as labour-intensive. Non- 
metallic mineral products were classified as labour-intensive because the
Table 7.a Classification o f  industries by factor intensities, 1971 ranking
ISIC
Code
Labour
productivit
y
Y/L
Skill ratio 
Salaries/Y
Wages share in 
value added
wages/Y ratio
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Labour-intensive industries 
Furniture 18 16 1
331 Wood 12 17 3
356-54-90 Other industries 11 11 4
323 Leather 9 15 5
322-24 Wearing apparel & footwear 17 18 6
321 Textiles 10 14 7
381 Metal products 16 12 8
355 Rubber 15 10 9
361-62-69 Non-metallic mineral 13 13 10
313
products
Capital and/or human 
capital intensive industries
Beverage 1 3 18
314 Tobacco 3 2 17
341 Paper 4 6 16
384 Transport equipment 5 8 15
311-12 Food 8 7 14
371-72 Basic metals 2 5 13
351-52 Chemicals 7 1 12
382-83 Mechanical & electrical 14 9 11
342
machinery
Printing 6 4 2
Sources: own estimations based on data provided by the 1971 industrial survey
6 See Iturbe (1980).
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wage/value added ratio is above the average and because its low skill ratio. 
Printing was included in the capital-intensive group due to its high skill 
ratio. Labour-intensive industries had the lower rank of value added per 
worker. Indeed, a negative correlation coefficient of -0.70 was found 
between these two indices. This group was also characterised by a low skill 
ratio. The more labour-intensive and less human capital-intensive were 
furniture, wood, leather, wearing apparel, textiles and metal products.
Those industries ranked between 9 and 18 according to the wage bill/value 
added were classified as physical capital-intensive. Among the most 
capital-intensive branches were beverages, tobacco, basic metals and 
chemicals. It should be noted that these industries are also human capital- 
intensive. According to the skill ratio index, all o f them are ranked in 
places 1-9. Apart from machinery, when the value added per worker index 
is considered, this group had the highest ranks.
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Exports and im ports: Sectoral exports were provided by the Central Bank 
of Venezuela, Finexpo, (various issues) and the source for desegregate 
manufacturing exports and imports at 1984 prices is own estimations based 
on data provided by Brandi (1989) from 1968 to 1983 and on data provided 
by the Central Bank of from 1983 to 1993. The real growth rates provided 
by Brandi were used to complete the whole series before 1983. It must be 
noted that the basic source for this data is the international trade bulletin 
from OCEI, which guarantee its compatibility with data on value added and 
output that is provided by the same source (OCEI). Likewise, it is worth 
noting that the paper by Brandi is a research made for the Central Bank of 
Venezuela while she was a researcher for that institution.
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